

# THE STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE

*(Mi'yar al-'Ilm)*



Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali



THE ROYAL ISLAMIC STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTRE

ENGLISH ISLAM SERIES • BOOK NUMBER 37



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ





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*(Mi'yar al-'Ilm)*



ABU HAMID MUHAMMAD IBN  
MUHAMMAD IBN MUHAMMAD  
AL-GHAZALI

*Translated by*  
JOSEF MERI



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ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali

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## TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali (d. 505 H./1111 CE), who is known as Algazel in the medieval West, is one of the most important Muslim theologians and philosophers many of whose works have already been translated into the English language.<sup>1</sup> This is the first complete translation ever produced in any western language of *Mi'yar al-'Ilm*.

The present translation relies upon the 2013 Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah edition of Ahmad Shamseddin with occasional corrections to the Arabic which are noted in the footnotes. For easy reference the pagination of the Arabic text is indicated in bold square brackets. On occasion earlier editions have been employed where this edition is deemed to be faulty. Echoing the view of a number of scholars, a new authoritative edition based on all known manuscripts of Al-Ghazali's *Mi'yar* is needed.

Herein we will briefly explore a number of salient features of this work and its relationship to other works. The *Mi'yar* is one of a number of works Ghazali produced which address aspects of Aristotelean logic, the other two being: *Aims of the Philosophers (Maqasid al-Falasifa)*,<sup>2</sup> which he produced in 1094 and more comprehensive than the latter, *The Touchstone of Reasoning in Logic (Mihakk*

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<sup>1</sup> For a biography of Ghazali, see Eric Ormsby, *Ghazali*. Oxford: One World, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Concerning the dating of this work, see Maurice Bouyges, *Essai de chronologie des œuvres de al-Ghazali (Algazel)*. ed. Michel Allard. Beirut: L'Institut de Lettres Orientales de Beyrouth, 1959, pp.23–24.

*al-Nazar fi Fann al-Mantiq*), which he produced in 1095 prior to the *Mi'yar*.<sup>3</sup> However, the most detailed exposition of Aristotelian logic in Ghazali's works may be found in the *Standard of Knowledge*.

### Dating and purpose

Ghazali wrote *The Standard of Knowledge* in 1095 as a logical introduction to his *Tahafut al-Falasifa* (*Precipitance of the Philosophers*), the latter which he finished writing in January 1095.<sup>4</sup> It is a 'supplement' (*madmum*) to the *Precipitance of the Philosophers*, under the provisional titles *Standard of Reason* (*Mi'yar al-'Aql*) and *Documentary Sources of the Intellects* (*Madarik al-'Uql*).<sup>5</sup> This is the same year in which he experienced a spiritual crisis, resigned his teaching post at the Nizamiyya Teaching College in Baghdad and left for Bilad al-Sham, or Historic Syria, and the Hijaz where he spent two years. Griffel dates the production of the *Tahafut* to January/Muharram 1095.<sup>6</sup> Ghazali most likely produced the *Standard of Knowledge* at this point, and his other major work on logic *Touchstone of Reason* (*Mihakk al-Nazar*) as well as a number of other works.

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<sup>3</sup> Bouyges, *Essai de chronologie*, p.27.

<sup>4</sup> See Frank Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 36. The title is commonly translated as *Incoherence of the Philosophers*. The preferred translation of the title is *Precipitance of the Philosophers*, see Kenneth Garden, *The First Islamic Reviver: Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and His Revival of the Religious Sciences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p.6 and n.31.

<sup>5</sup> Michael Marmura, trans. *Incoherence of the Philosophers*. Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2000, pp. xvi-xvii. These titles are mentioned in Bouyges, *Essai de chronologie*, pp.25-26.

<sup>6</sup> Concerning the dating of this work, see Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*, p.xii and concerning his sojourn in Bilad al-Sham and the Hijaz, pp.40-49.

The purpose of the *Standard* is to teach the syllogistic method and acquaint readers with the language of the philosophers.<sup>7</sup> As Ghazali says:

The motivation for composing this book titled *Standard of Knowledge* is two-fold: First, to explain the methods of systematic thinking and reasoning (*al-fikr wa-al-nazar*), and to shed light on the ways of analogy (*aqyisa*) and reflection (*i'tibar*).

Ghazali also elaborates on his purpose in the conclusion:

... to show the way to knowledge of the realities of things, introducing the law of proper reflection, and cultivating the standard of knowledge (*tathqif mi'yar al-'ilm*) in order to distinguish between [knowledge] and fancy (*khayal*) and supposition (*zann*) which are near to it.<sup>8</sup>

Logic was a controversial tool in the hands of the philosophers (*falasifa*) and the scholastic theologians (*mutakalimun*). However, Ghazali regarded logic as a neutral tool that when used properly could be employed in the service of the religious sciences and defence of the faith.<sup>9</sup>

Ghazali wrote this work for jurists and theologians who would not necessarily be familiar with the use of logic in jurisprudence. Throughout he refers to the *mujtahid* or the jurist who is guided by God in his judgements.

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<sup>7</sup> See below, p.1.

<sup>8</sup> See below, p.278.

<sup>9</sup> See Michael Marmura, 'Ghazali's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic,' in *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science*, ed. George F. Hourani. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1957, p.101.

## Structure and primary themes

*The Standard of Knowledge* is divided into four primary sections: 1) Book of Syllogistic Premises, 2) Book of the Syllogism, 3) Book of Definition,<sup>10</sup> and 4) Book of the Divisions and Principles of Existence.

Likewise in *The Touchstone of Reasoning in Logic* (*Mihakk al-Nazar fi Fann al-Mantiq*) a similar order of the discussion of the syllogism followed by the definition is followed. The types of syllogism may be classified as: categorical, apodictic, dialectical and sophist.

## Influences

Ghazali's work shows extensive reliance on al-Farabi and Ibn Sina which Jules Janssen has established in a detailed study of the *Mi'yar's* influences.<sup>11</sup> However, Ghazali occasionally modifies the aforementioned authors' presentations of certain themes. In one instance he refers directly to Ibn Sina's *Treatise on the Soul* (*Kitab al-Nafs*), but does not mention the author by name.<sup>12</sup>

Janssens clearly demonstrates Ghazali's reliance on the works of Ibn Sina such as the *Book of Deliverance* (*Al-Najat*), *Remarks and Admonitions* (*Al-Isharat wa-al-Tanbihat*), *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Knowledge* (*Danesh-Nameh*) and *The Book of Definitions* (*Kitab al-Hudud*) as well as Al-Farabi's *Prior Analytics* (*al-Qiyas al-Saghir*) and *Paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle* (*al-Maqulat*). Despite this reliance on the works of others, the *Mi'yar* was

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<sup>10</sup> Also syllogistic terms.

<sup>11</sup> See Jules Janssens, «Al-Ghazzali's mi'yar al-'ilm fi fann al-mantiq sources avicenniennes et farabiennes», *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 69:1 (2002), pp.39–66. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-archives-d-histoire-doctrinale-et-litteraire-du-moyen-age-2002-1-p-39.htm>

<sup>12</sup> See below, p.224.



in a sense unique in upholding the permissibility of utilising Aristotelian logic in the service of faith and the works of other philosophers and thinkers provided Ghazali with the tools to make his case.

The work is largely considered to be authored by Ghazali, though scholars like Frank Griffel have demonstrated that certain passages pertaining to the philosophers' (*falasifa*) teachings while though similar to another of Ghazali's works: *The Aims of the Philosophers* (*Maqasid al-Falasifa*), suggest that these passages may not have been written by Ghazali.<sup>13</sup>

### **Approach to the translation**

We have attempted to make this translation as close as possible to the original text while making it accessible to non-specialists in so far as the subject matter permits. Therefore, we have not burdened the reader with excessive and exhaustive notes. Where possible we have referred to relevant studies as well as primary sources in English translation such as Ghazali's other works and the works of Ibn Sina and al-Farabi. Where no accessible or reliable English translations of a given work exists, the Arabic is cited.

YOUSEF MERI

Amman, 1 August 2018

19 Dhu'l-Qa'ada 1439

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<sup>13</sup> Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*, pp.271–72.



## TRANSLATION NOTE

In translating this work as other works in this volume, we have sought to produce a more literal translation that is accurate. Moreover, for philosophical concepts we have generally referred to Lammer and Kretz's *On-line Dictionary of Philosophical Terms*:

<http://www.arabic-philosophy.com/dict/>

In certain places more than one translation of a word is employed to clarify the meaning of a sentence. For instance, *burhan* is translated as 'apodictic proof' and also as 'demonstration.' It may also be translated as 'demonstrative proof.' Likewise, '*ahkam*' is often translated as 'judgements,' particularly in legal contexts or as 'principles' or 'modalities' depending upon the context. The word *fann* which can denote a 'section' has been translated as 'aspect.' The word '*nazar*' is translated as 'proper reflection,' 'theoretical inquiry,' and 'rational inquiry.' This translation attempts to capture these nuances.

In order to further simplify matters, no transliteration of Arabic and Persian words has been employed as with the other works in this volume.



# THE STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE

*(Mi'yar al-'Ilm)*







*In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful  
May God bless Muhammad and his Family*

‘O God, show us the truth as truth and grant us success in following it. Show us falsehood as falsehood and aid us in avoiding it.’<sup>14</sup> Amen.

Know and verify (*tahaqqaq*), O you whose vigilance and will are exclusively directed at attaining the different kinds of knowledge whose endeavour (*himma*) extends toward the secrets of the intellectual truths (*haqa’iq ‘aqliyya*), and whose effort and toil are removed from [it] the ornaments of the worldly life and its base pleasures, and whose exertion and endeavour in knowledge and worship [of God] are dedicated to attaining happiness, [all] after the praise of God, whose praise precedes every matter possessing importance (*dhu bal*) and May God’s blessings be upon the Prophet Muhammad, His Messenger and servant.

The motivation for composing this book titled ‘Standard of Knowledge’ is for two important reasons: [p.26] First, to explain the methods of systematic thinking and reasoning (*al-fikr wa-al-nazar*), and to shed light on the ways of analogy (*aqyisa*) and reflection (*i’tibar*). The theoretical sciences (*‘ulum al-nazar*) are not innately and instinctively given. [But rather] they are undoubtedly acquired and sought. Not every seeker excels at seeking the object sought or is guided to the path of the sought. Likewise, not

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<sup>14</sup> This *hadith* is not found in any of the *Sunan*. See for example Al-‘Iraqi, *Al-Mughni ‘an haml al-asfar*. Riyadh: Maktabat Dar Tabariyya, 1995, #2406; See also Ibn Kathir, *Tafsir of Qur’an 2:213*:

[https://www.greattafsirs.com/Tafsir\\_Library.aspx?SoraNo=2&AyahNo=213&MadhabNo=1&TafsirNo=7](https://www.greattafsirs.com/Tafsir_Library.aspx?SoraNo=2&AyahNo=213&MadhabNo=1&TafsirNo=7).

every wayfarer is guided to perfection nor protected from self-deception by stopping short of reaching the peak of perfection. Nor is everyone who thinks he has attained the resemblance of correctness (*shakilat al-sawab*) safe from succumbing to the mirage's brilliance.

When lapses and the inherent qualities of man which stimulate error (*matharat al-dalal*) increased in the intelligibles and the mirror of the intellect (*mir'at al-'aql*) did not detach from the mixtures of illusions (*takhlitat al-awham*), and the deceptions of the imagination (*talbisat al-khayal*) which pollute it, we ordered this book to be a standard of theoretical inquiry (*nazar*) and reflection (*i'tibar*) and a balance of research and cogitation (*iftikar*), a hone (*sayqal*) for the mind (*dhihn*), a whetstone (*mishhadh*) for the faculty of thought and reason so it will be to the rational proofs (*adillat al-'uqul*) as metre is to poetry and grammar (*nahw*) is to parsing (*i'rab*), and the unrythmic change of poetry from one foot to another (*munzahaf al-shi'r*) is not known from its metre (*mawzun*) except with the balance of prosody (*'urud*) and there cannot be a distinction between sound and unsound parsing except with the touchstone (*mi-hakk*) of grammar.

Likewise, it is not possible to distinguish between defective (*fasid*) and correct (*qawim*) proofs or sound (*sahih*) and weak (*saqim*) ones except with this book.

[p.27] Every act of theoretical inquiry (*nazar*) that is not balanced with this balance or gauged with this standard, then know that it is badly measured and its conclusions (*ghawa'il*) and bases (*aghwar*) are not trustworthy (*ghayr ma'mun*).

The second motivation [for writing this book] is to explain what we wrote in the book *Precipitance of the*

*Philosophers (Tahafut al-Falasifa)* for we debated them using their language and addressed them on the basis of their terminology (*istilahat*) in logic that they have [coined] and approved [among themselves]. In this book the terminology will be revealed. This is the more specific of the two motives, while the first is more general and more important. As for the reason why it is more important; surely this is already patently familiar to you.

As for the reason for it being more general, it is because its benefit encompasses all the theoretical sciences (*al-‘ulum al-nazariyya*): the intellectual (*‘aqliyya*) and legal (*fiqhiyya*). We shall demonstrate that theoretical inquiry (*nazar*) in the legal sciences is not different from in the intellectual sciences (*‘aqliyyat*) in its organisation, conditions, and measures; but they only [differ] as to the sources of their premises (*ma’akidh al-muqaddimat*).

In our age when the intentions (*himam*) were more disposed to jurisprudence than the intellectual sciences, but rather were restricted to it, until that urged us to author the following on the ways of disputation concerning it in the following order:

*The Source of Disagreement (Ma’khadh al-Khilaf)*  
*The Pith of Proper Reflection (Lubab al-Nazar)*  
*Fortifying the Premises (Tahsin al-Ma’akhidh)*  
*The Book of Principles and Goals (Al-Mabadi’  
wal-Ghayat)*

[p.28] [This book] is the ultimate goal in the present investigation into the methodology of rational inquiry (*min-haj al-nazar al-‘aqli*) in its organisation and conditions even if it should differ in its premises (*muqaddimat*).

That prompted us to desire to display concerning the methodology of theoretical inquiry (*nazar*) in this book, legal examples, so that its benefits, usefulness, and gain will encompass all other kinds [of knowledge].

Perhaps whoever sees with the defect eye with vilification (*ta'n*) and disdain and denies our deviating from established customs concerning instructing definitive (*qat'i*) rational proofs (*'aqliyyat*) with probable legal examples (*amthila fiqhiyya zanniyya*), let him desist from his excess in his vilification and disdain and let him bear witness over himself that he is ignorant about the production of simile and its benefit. [These examples] are not produced except to provide understanding of a hidden matter with what is familiar to the addressee who is seeking guidance so that he makes an analogy of that which is hidden to that which is known by him and the hidden matter resides in his self.

If the addressee was a carpenter, he does not know except for carpentry and to use his tools. Then it is necessary for his guide not to give him examples except from carpentry so that is an antecedent to his understanding (*asbaq ila fahmihi*) and more compatible with his mind.

Likewise, it is not suitable to guide a learned human being except with his own language or communicating intelligibles to his understanding except by examples that are established in his knowledge (*ma'rifa*).

Thus, we have made you to understand the object and goal of this book by giving you an overview. Let there be a commentary and elucidation (*idah*) to this work because of the crucial need of the speculative theologians (*nuzzar*)<sup>15</sup> for this book.

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<sup>15</sup> Alternatively translated as 'theoreticians.'

Perhaps you will say, o you who is deceived by the mental forms of knowledge (*'ulum dhibniyya*) you possess and who is heedless of that toward which the rational proofs (*barahin 'aqliyya*) drive him. What is this pomposity and aggrandizement? Why does the rational person need the standard balance, the intellect being the correct balance and the upright (*qawim*) standard and so the rational person after the perfection of his mind does not need direction (*tasdid*) or correction (*taqwim*). Then proceed deliberately and carefully and verify the mishaps of the rational ways and verify before everything that within you are the following:

[p.29] Sensorial judgement (*hakim hissi*)

Imaginative judgement (*hakim wahmi*)

Intellectual judgement (*hakim 'aqli*)

The correct one of those judgements is the intellectual judgement.

The soul at the start of the original disposition (*fitra*) is more yielding and submissive to accepting the sensorial and imaginative judgements since they were both antecedent in the soul at its early formation (*awwal al-fitra*) and they both approached it by ruling over it and their rule became familiar and the soul was on intimate terms with them both before the intellectual judgement attained it. The weaning from its familiar and approaching as if it were a stranger to the time of its creation became more intense.

Yet the soul continues to oppose (*tukhalif*) and deny (*tukadhdhib*) the intellect and agree with the judgement of the senses and imagination and believe them until such time that it detects the ruse (*hila*) which we will later explain in [this] book.

Should you wish to know the veracity of what we say concerning the slander (*takharrus*) and faltiness (*ikhhtilal*) by both judgements (i.e. the imaginative and sensorial), behold the judgement of the senses, how it rules; if you should look at the sun, it appears the width of a lintel [above a door] (*'ard majarr*) [p.30] and at the stars as if they are scattered [golden] dinars on a blue carpet and in the shadow of upright individuals overcast on the land that it is still, indeed, judging the form of a youth at the start of growing up that he remains as he is (i.e. does not grow).

How does the intellect know with apodictic proofs (*barahin*)<sup>16</sup> that the senses are unable to contend with that the disc of the sun is many times larger than the earth, likewise the planets?

How did the senses guide us to [the conclusion] that the shadow which we see as stationery is actually perpetually in motion and that it does not grow weak? And that the youth's height at the time of growth is continuous, but rather he is perpetually and continuously in a state of growth and progressing to greater growth in subtle degrees, which the senses are too dull to perceive, but the intellect witnesses it.

The errors of the senses of this sort are many, so do not think you can them and be satisfied with this simple synopsis of its happenings with which you can review its deceit (*ighwa*).

As for the imaginative judgement (*al-hakim al-wahmi*), do not ignore its lying about an existence (*takdhibihi bi-*

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<sup>16</sup> Concerning the demonstrative proof (*burhan*), see for instance Ibn Sina, *Avicenna's Deliverance: Logic*, trans. Asad Q. Ahmed. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011; Al-Farabi, *Al-Farabi's Philosophical Lexicon*, trans. I. Alon, vol. 2. Warminster: The E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2002, p.692.



*mawjud*)—there is no indication of its direction—and its denial or something that is not suited to the bodies of this world by using the descriptions of division (*infisal*) and continuity (*ittisal*).<sup>17</sup> Nor is it described as within this world nor apart from it.

If it were not for the intellect's stopping the evil of the imagination in its misguidance (*tadlil*), evil beliefs would have taken root in the souls of scholars, concerning the Creator of the Earth and Heaven as has taken root in the hearts of the common people and stupid people.

We do not need this distancing in representing its misguidance and fabrication (*takhyil*); it lies in a manner close to the sensibilia (*mahsusat*) as we mentioned, for the reason that if you showed it a single body which contains movement, taste, colour, smell and suggested to it that it believe that all that comes together in a single locus, it would cowardly reject it and would imagine that part of that is annexed to part and next to it and estimate each one adhering to each other in the likeness of a thin curtain enclosing another curtain and was not part of its constitution (*jibilla*) for it to understand [p.31] its multiplicity (*ta'addud*) except by estimating the multiplicity of the place.

The imagination takes from the senses and at the end of the matter the senses perceive multiplicity (*ta'addud*) and exclusivity (*tabayun*) in place or time.

If both should be suspended, it would be difficult for it to believe its veracity with changing numbers in attribute and reality [when] it is in a single space.

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<sup>17</sup> Concerning division and continuity, see for instance Andreas Lammer, *The Elements of Avicenna's Physics: Greek Sources and Arabic Innovations* (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2018), esp. pp. 149–152.

This and other fallacies of the imagination are innumerable. God the Exalted is to be thanked for the intellect that is guided from error (*dalala*); [He is] the deliverer from the darkness of ignorance who is the saviour with the light of the proof (*burhan*) from the darkness of Satan's whisperings.

Should you wish to further demonstrate the disloyalty of both these judgements (i.e. the sensorial and imaginative), then it is within your reach to take the study of what appears in the divine law concerning the attributes of these sophisms (*tamwihat*) to Satan, calling them whisperings (*wasawis*), assigning them to him (i.e. Satan), and calling the light of the intellect (*diya' al-'aql*) 'guidance and light' and attributing it to God the Exalted and His angels, as He [the Exalted] says:

*God is the Light of the heavens and the earth*  
(Qur'an 24:35)

[p.32] When the place of delusion (*wahm*) and the imagination (*khayal*) is believed to be in the brain—both are sources [manipulated by the] Whisperer (i.e. Satan), Abu Bakr, May God have mercy upon him, said to the person applying the *hadd* punishment<sup>18</sup> to one of the criminals: 'Strike the head; for Satan[']s influence] is in the head.'<sup>19</sup>

When the imagining and delusional whisperings adhered to the intellective faculty (*al-quwwa al-mufakkira*), an adherence that makes it rare for someone to be independent in getting rid of [the whisperings] to the extent that is like

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<sup>18</sup> Lit. prohibition. Punishment proscribed by the Qur'an and Hadith.

<sup>19</sup> This tradition is weak and has discontinuity in the chain of narrators. See for instance Ahmad ibn 'Ali Muhammad al-Kinani al-'Asqalani, *al-Talbis al-Habir fi Takbrij Ahadith Al-Rafi'i al-Kabir*, *Kitab Hadd Sharib al-Khamr*, no.2127:

[http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=11&ID=1506](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=11&ID=1506),

blood mixing with our flesh and organs. The Prophet, May peace be upon him, said: ‘Verily, Satans flows through the human being like blood.’<sup>20</sup>

If you should take notice with the eye of the intellect (*‘ayn al-‘aql*) of these secrets to which I alerted you, your intense need to devise a stratagem to get rid of the error (*dalal*) of the two judges will be awakened.

Should you inquire: What is the stratagem as a precaution along with what you described of the intense attachment to these pitfalls?

Then ponder the subtlety of the stratagems of the intellect concerning it (i.e. error). The intellect gradually leads the senses (*hiss*) and the imagination (*wahm*) to matters which assist it in perceiving observed phenomena (*mushahadat*) that are in agreement with what is imagined (*mawhum*) and rationalised (*ma‘qul*).

Then it apprehends from these observed phenomena premises (*muqaddimat*) in which the imagination assists it and orders [the premises] in an undisputable order. Then it necessarily deduces from the premises a conclusion which it is not possible for the imagination to deny, since [the premises] are apprehended from the matters which the imagination and the intellect did not fail to decide upon, namely the necessary (*daruriyyat*) and sensorial (*hissiyat*) sciences about which people did not disagree and received them from the senses and imagination and apprehended

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<sup>20</sup> This *hadith* can be found for instance in Bukhari, *Sahih, Kitab al-I’tikaf*, Bab hal yadra’u al-mu’takifu ‘an nafsihi, no 1908:

[http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display\\_hbook.php?bk\\_no=146&chid=1908&pid=1050231](http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=146&chid=1908&pid=1050231)

and with slight variation in Muslim, *Sahih, Kitab al-Salam*, Bab bayan annahu yustahabbu li-man ru’iya khaliyan, no. 4047:

[http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display\\_hbook.php?bk\\_no=158&chid=4047&pid=107879](http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=158&chid=4047&pid=107879).

from them [these sciences] as a security. [Therefore,] the imagination and intellect believed that the necessary conclusion from [the premises] is true and real.

[p.33] Then the intellect transmitted [the premises] essentially in order to that which the imagination disputes and produced from it results. When the imagination denied [the premises] and refused to accept them, it was easy for the intellect to receive its provision. For the premises which the intellect produced, the imagination believed them according to the order which it ordered to produce the result. [Therefore,] the imagination received the necessary consequence of the result from [the premises]. Then the theoretician (*nazir*) reaches the conclusion that the imagination's refusal to accept the conclusion after believing the premises and the soundness of the organisation of that which is produced, is truly a deficiency (*qusur*) in the nature of the imagination and its natural disposition (*jibilliyya*) in perceiving the conclusion, not because the conclusion is false, but rather because the order of the premises is transmitted from a place which the imagination assisted in believing it.

Therefore, our goal in this book is to take the sensibilia (*mahsusat*) and the innate necessary propositions (*al-daru-riyyat al-jibilliyya*) as a standard for inquiry; even if we transmitted it (i.e. the standard) to the enigmas (*ghawamid*), we did not doubt the veracity of the necessary sensibilia and innate propositions.

Perhaps you now say, if what you mentioned [occurred] with the inquirers, why then did they differ with respect to the intelligibles (*ma'qulat*)? And why don't they agree about [the intelligibles] [the same way] as they did about their geometrical and arithmetical theories with which the imagination assists the intellect?

Your answer has two aspects:

First, that which we mentioned is one of the inducers of error (*matharat al-dalal*), not all of them. Behind that in inspecting the rational propositions (*'aqliyyat*) are dangerous obstacles. It is very rare among intelligent persons who avoid them is given power and therefore is saved from them.

Upon comprehending the totality of the conditions of the demonstration (*burhan*), which produces certitude (*yaqin*), you will not find remote that the faculty of most of humankind will fall short in perceiving the latent realities of the intelligibles (*haqa'iq al-ma'qulat*).

Second: The estimative propositions (*qadaya wahmiyya*) are divided into two types: That which is true and that which is false with the latter exceedingly resembling the former.

[p.34] I display concerning [the estimative propositions] (*qadaya wahmiyya*) issues for which it is difficult for the soul to distinguish from the fabricated and is unable to overcome them except whoever God grants success and honours with following the Path of Truth (*minhaj al-haqq*) with His way.

The rational propositions may be divided into [the following]:

That for which it is easy for the majority to perceive.

That which defies (*ista'sa*) the minds of the masses (*jamahir*) except for the rare Friends of God the Exalted who are supported by the Light of the Truth (*al-mu'ayyadin binur al-haqq*) except which the long ages do not permit except for a few individuals from them to exist not to speak of the huge number of [people].

Perhaps you now consider yourself from among the

crowd and recite over yourself the Chapter of Despair<sup>21</sup> and allege: ‘When will I be one of the age (*wahid al-dahr*), unique in this era (*farid al-‘asr*), supported by the Light of the Truth, freed from Satan’s strifes, in command of the conditions of the apodictic proof? Being idle is more suited to me, and being convinced of the belief inherited from the ancestors is safer for me than riding on the back of danger; I am not confident that I will attain the distant goal (*qasiyat al-watar*).’

It is said about the likes of you that if this occurred to you, then you are nothing more than a person who realises the rank of ruler of the age (*sultan al-zaman*) whose power-base (*shawka*), equipment (*‘udda*), [military] strength (*najda*), fortune (*tharwa*), partisans and that helped him. I think it unlikely that he will attain his rank or come near to his degree. However, I believe that he will attain the rank of wazir or leader (*rutbat al-riyasa*) or a lower rank. He said: ‘I [now] know what is sound after being incapacitated from the ultimate purpose (*ghaya al-quswa*) and the highest peak which is the degree of the ruler of this world (*sultan al-dunya*), namely that I am convinced of brooms which is my ancestors’ craft.’

The broom maker is not incapable of attaining bread to eat and clothes to wear, according to the poet:

*Leave noble traits; do not set out to attain them.  
Stay; for you have been fed and clothed.*

[p.35] Should this short-sighted contemptible person focus their thoughts more closely, contemplate and consider, they will come to realise that between the degree of the

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<sup>21</sup> By employing the fictitious name of ‘Sura al-Ya’s Ghazali is being critical.

broom maker and the sultan are stations. Not everybody who is incapable of [reaching] the highest degrees (*darajat*) ought to be convinced by the lowest levels of descending (*darakat*).<sup>22</sup>

Rather should he alight, ascending from the rank of vileness, that which he is elevated to, compared to that which he is elevated from, is presidential.

It is thus you ought to regard the degrees of happiness among the *ulema*. Everyone among us has a known station which he does not exceed and a stage which he does not transgress. Rather he ought to look forward to the highest step and to bring forth from potentiality to actuality that for which his faculties have the capacity.

Should you say: 'I have now understood the intense need for this book with respect to what you have clarified from verification. I had an intense desire for what you cited out of yearning, and [the book's] objective and benefit became clear. Then its contents became clear to me,' know that its contents [relate to] teaching how to move from the images occurring in your mind to matters unseen by you. This [process of] moving has a form and order which if you have taken into consideration, then you will have reached the goal.

[However,] if they were neglected, then you will fall short of the goal. That which is sound [in] its form and order strongly resembles that which is unsound.

The contents (*madmun*) of this knowledge is thus summarized succinctly or in detail: The goal is knowledge which is divided into the following:

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<sup>22</sup> *Darajat* (upward stairs) lead to paradise while *darakat* (downward stairs) lead to hell. Qur'an 15:44; See also C. Lange, *Locating Hell in Islamic Tradition*. Leiden: Brill, 2015, p.13.

1) Knowledge of the essences of things (*dhawat al-ash-ya'*) like your knowledge of the person, the tree, the s, etc. This kind of knowledge is called: conception (*tasawwur*).<sup>23</sup>

2) Knowledge of the relationship of conceived essences (*al-dhawat al-mutasawwira*) to each other either by means of negation (*salb*) or belief (*iman*), as it is said:

[p.36] Man is an animal.

Man is not a stone.

Therefore, you understand 'man' and 'stone' through a conceptualised understanding (*fahm tasawwuri*) of their essences. Then you judge that one of them is negated by the other (*maslub*) or fixed by it (*thabit*). This [process] is called confirmation since it takes up assent (*tasdiq*) and denial (*takdhib*).

The seeker's reflective research (*bath nazari*) either heads in the direction of full knowledge of something's reality (*tasawwur*) or to assent (*tasdiq*). That which connects to assent (*tasdiq*) is called an explanatory statement (*qawl sharih*) and is of two types: definition (*hadd*) and description (*rasm*). That which leads to full knowledge of something's reality is called proof (*hujja*) including analogical reasoning (*qiyas*) and induction (*istiqra'*) etc.

The content of this book is as follows:

1) The principles of 'the explanatory statement' (*al-qawl al-sharih*) for that which needs conceptualisation, whether definition or description.

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<sup>23</sup> Concerning *tasawwur* and *tasdiq*, see Janssens, p.55 and n.49; M. Maroth, 'Tasawwur and tasdiq', ed. S. Knuuttila, R. Tyorinoja, and S. Ebbesen, *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy*, Helsinki, 1990, 2:265–274; Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp.77–78; Ibn Sina, *Avicenna's Treatise on Logic Danesh-Name Alai*, trans. Farhang Zabeeh. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, p.13.



2) Defining the principles of the proof (*hujja*) which leads to assent, whether through analogical reasoning or else with the forewarning concerning the condition of their soundness and the impetus (*mathar*) for the error in them both.

Should you say: How is a person ignorant of conceptual knowledge (*'ilm tasawwuri*) such that he needs a definition?

We say: Should a person hear a word (lit. noun) whose meaning he does not understand, he is like whoever says: What is 'al-khala' (void)? What is 'al-mala' (filling)? What is an angel (*malak*)? What is Satan? What is wine (*'uqar*)? 'Uqar' is wine (*khamr*). If he does not understand it by its commonly known name, let him understand it by its definition (*hadd*), saying: 'Wine (*khamr*) is a drink made of pressed grapes, an intoxicant.' [At that moment] he receives conceptual knowledge (*'ilm tasawwuri*) of the wine's essence (*dhat*).

As for assensual knowledge (*'ilm tasdiqi*): The person is ignorant, for instance, [of the fact] the world has a creator and asks: 'Does the world have a creator?' and you reply to him: 'Yes, the world has a Creator' and you inform him of the truth of that through proof (*hujja*) and demonstration (*burhan*) as we shall elucidate.

Then this is the content of the book:

[p.37] Should you wish to know the list of chapters [content of this work], know that we have divided the saying about logic (*madarik al-'ulum*) into four:

- 1) Book of Syllogistic Premises
- 2) Book of the Syllogism
- 3) Book of Definition
- 4) Book of the Divisions and Principles of Existence

# [p.41]<sup>24</sup> [BOOK ONE] SYLLOGISTIC PREMISES

Let us then mention the aspect of a premise through which reflection in analogical reasoning (*qiyas*) is divided into: near and far.

We say that the farthest requirement in this section is the apodictic proof (*burhan*) that yields indubitable knowledge (*'ilm yaqini*). The apodictic proof (*burhan*) is a kind of analogical reasoning with 'qiyas' being the general name and 'burhan' the name for a specific kind of it. 'Qiyas' is not ordered except with two premises which are also ordered by: predicand (*mukhbar 'anhu*) which is called 'mawdu' (i.e. subject) and a *khabar* (predicate) which is called 'mahmul.'<sup>25</sup>

Every subject or predicate is mentioned in a proposition and is an expression which inevitably indicates a meaning (*ma'na*). *Qiyas* (analogical reasoning) is compound (*murakkab*) and everyone who reflects on something (*nazir*) compound, his path is to analyse the compound to its components, beginning with reflecting on the singular, then the compound.

It necessarily follows that in reflecting on *qiyas* (analogical reasoning) to reflect on that which *qiyas* is broken down to, namely the premises (*muqaddimat*).

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<sup>24</sup> Pages 38–40 of the Arabic edition do not contain text.

<sup>25</sup> Greek: kategoroumenon.

And reflection (*nazar*) on the premises (*muqaddimat*) is followed by reflection on predicate and subject from which the premises are composed.

[p.42] And reflecting on predicate and subject is followed by reflecting on the utterances (also words) and the individual connotational attributes (*ma'ani*) with which the predicate and subject are formed.

[Another essential aspect] of reflecting on the premises (*muqaddimat*) is reflecting on their conditions (*shurut*). It is necessary to reflect for each compound of substance (*madda*) and form (*sura*) on their substance and form.

This is like whoever wants to build a house. He has a right to concern himself with selecting the materials from which it will be built, like fired brick, clay, and wood. Then he occupies himself with the conceptualisation (*taswir*) and the means of arrangement and assembly. Thus, is the case with reflection in analogical reasoning. This is a demonstration of the need for these divisions. Let us take after it what is intended.

## [CHAPTER ONE]

### Concerning the Premises of Analogical Reasoning (*qiyas*)

#### On words' signification, elucidating the aspects of their signification (*dalala*) and their relationship to connotational attributes (*ma'ani*)

Its exposition is in seven sections:

**Section 1:** We say that the expressions signify the connotational attributes in three different (*mutabayin*) ways:

The first is the signification of congruence (*mutabaqa*)

like in a name posited for an object, such as the signification of the word 'wall (*ha'it*)' for the [actual] wall.<sup>26</sup>

The second is through inclusion (*al-tadammun*) such as the signification of the word 'house (*bayt*)' for its walls or the word 'human (*insan*)' for the 'animal (*hayawan*).' Likewise every particular description signifying the more general substantive description (*al-wasf al-a'amm al-jawhari*).

The third is signification by way of concomitance (*iltizam*) or succession (*ittiba'*) such as the signification of the word 'ceiling' for the 'wall.' The two concur with one acting as an accompanying concomitant that is external to the other (*al-rafiq al-lazim al-kharij 'an dhatihi*) and the signification of the word 'human (*insan*)' for the potential for the tailoring craft and learning it.

[p.44] Definitions established by personal reflection (*al-mu'tabar fi'l-ta'rifat*) are the signification (*dalala*) of congruence (*mutabaqa*) and inclusion (*tadammun*).<sup>27</sup> As for the signification of 'concomitance (*iltizam*),' it is not, for the reason whoever posits a language did not posit it, unlike congruence and inclusion; since that which is signified (*madlul*) in it is not defined nor contained and the necessary concomitants of things (*lawazim al-ashya'*) and the necessary concomitants of its necessary concomitants (of congruence and inclusion) (*lawazim lawazimiha*) are not determined (*la tandabit*) nor are they finite (*la tanhasir*). This would lead to the word being a signification of connotational attributes (*ma'ani*) that are endless which is impossible.

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<sup>26</sup> Jurjani, *Kitab al-Ta'rifat* (Beirut, 1985), p.233.

<sup>27</sup> A useful chart which summarises the subdivisions of the significations is provided by Ahmad Shams al-Din, the editor of the Arabic edition, p.44.

**Section 2: Concerning the word ‘expression (*lafz*)’<sup>28</sup> both the general and specific meaning (*ma‘na*). The word ‘expression (*lafz*)’ is divided into the following:**

1) Particular: That whose conceptualisation in itself prevents other things from falling under its concept, such as: ‘Zayd,’ ‘this tree,’ and ‘this horse.’

2) [p.45] That whose conceptualisation in itself does not prevent other things from falling under its concept, such as: ‘man,’ ‘horse,’ and ‘tree.’

If prevention should occur, it would be due to an external [factor] apart from its understanding and entailed by its expression.

They are the names of genera and species and the general universal meanings (*al-ma‘ani al-kulliyya al-‘amma*).

[The universal] exists in the Arabic language in every name to which *alif* and *lam* (i.e the definite article) is added, not in exhibiting a transference to prior specific understanding like ‘the man (*al-rajul*)’ which is the genus. Perhaps you would apply it and want a specific man whom the addressee knows from before, so you say: The man (*al-rajul*) came. The definite article (for specifying); that is the man who came to me before. If there is not the like of this context, the noun *al-rajul* (man) is a universal name under which all other male persons are subsumed.

[Should we say]: The spherical form (*al-shakl al-kurawi*) which surrounds the twelve constellations is a celestial sphere and there is no other form (*shakl*) like it in existence but one, then how is it that the noun is universal and the

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<sup>28</sup> *Lafz* may also be translated as ‘utterance.’

designation is ‘one’?<sup>29</sup> The necessary definite article was added to attach a universal sense to it.

[p.46] It is said to you that this (i.e. the definite article) is universal since we do not make conditional for that under which it is subsumed for it to be present *in actu*. Rather, it is permissible for it to be present *in potentia* and in possible existent [state] (*bi'l-imkan*).

If its state was possible (*qadara*), it would undoubtedly be subsumed under it, since in pre-existence it is in *potentia*. Not like the singular noun ‘Zayd’ the occurrence of association in *actu* and in *potentia* together is forbidden from occurring.

Should you and we say: God the Truth is [One], how is it that this is a universal and the occurrence of association with Him is forbidden in *actu* and in *potentia* (together)? And [the same question applies] to our expression ‘The Sun’, according to the position of those who don’t permit the existence of another sun. Just as the person of Zayd is considered, it is included in the formation of the conception (*tasawwur*) of the expression ‘Zayd.’ It is said to you—the expression is universal and impossible for associationism to occur in it, not because of the same manner of understanding the expression and its subject (*mawdu'*), but rather because of an external meaning, namely the impossibility of the existence of another God for the world. We did not make entirely conditional the expression, except the same understanding of the expression and its subject does not prevent the occurrence of associationism in it.

You then had two questions [posed] to you and their answer is that the ‘universal’ can be divided into three parts.

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<sup>29</sup> The *alif-lam* (definite article) in Arabic grammar is known as ‘the universal’ because it includes all members of the genus to which it is attached.

## Part One

Associationism in *actu* as we said: ‘the person’ is a person if other persons come into existence from him.

## Part Two

Associationism exists in *potentia*, as we said: ‘the person.’ If it so happens that only one person remains and likewise with the planet which is surrounded by twelve constellations.

## Part Three

There is no associationism neither in *actu* nor in *potentia* as [in the case of] ‘the God’ since with that He is Universal because the impossibility is not the subject of the expression and [its understanding] opposite the expression ‘Zayd.’

## Legal benefit

Scholars of the foundations of jurisprudence differed with respect to the simple expression (*ism mufrad*) to which the definite article is connected, [if] immersion (*istighraq*) is necessitated. Does it constitute a generalisation, as it is said: ‘The dinar is better than the dirham,’ (i.e. gold is better than silver) and ‘The man is better than the woman’?

[p.47] The doubters doubted: In so far as it exists the simple expression (*ism mufrad*) does not necessitate exhaustiveness (*istighraq*) per se (*li-mujarradihi*). However, the understanding of the general (*fahm al-‘umum*) is with the indicator of pricing (*qarinat al-tas‘ir*)<sup>30</sup> and the indicator of

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<sup>30</sup> *Qarina*: The connection between the two parts of a syllogism through which one infers knowledge. See for instance Wael Hallaq, ‘Notes on the term qarina in Islamic Legal discourse,’ *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 108:3 (1988), pp.475–480.

preference (*qarīnat al-tafdīl*) for the male over the female;<sup>31</sup> rather we know that it is due to the deficiency of the state of the dirham [relative] to the state of the dinar and the deficiency of femaleness to maleness.

Should you ponder what we mentioned concerning verifying the meaning of the universal (*ma'na al-kullī*), you will have understood the lapses (*zalal*) of those people's of the universal expression (*lafz kullī*) necessitating exhaustiveness (*istighraq*) per se (*bi-mujarradihi*) and not requiring a further indicator (*qarīna*). Should you say: 'From where did this error of theirs come about?' you will know this in section three.

**Section 3: Elucidating the levels of the expressions (*alfaz*) from the stations of existence (*maratīb al-wujūd*).**<sup>32</sup> Know that the levels concerning what we intend are four with expression (*lafz*) being at the third level. A thing has an existence:

[First], existence in the outer world (*wujūd fi'l-a'yan*). Then in the inner-mental realities (*adhhan*). Then in the expressions (*alfaz*). Then in writing (*kitāba*).<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> See Qur'an 4:34: 'Men are in charge of women because of that with which God has preferred the one over the other, and because of what they expend of their property....' Traditionally, though not exclusively, men have been the expositors and transmitters of religious knowledge.

<sup>32</sup> This system of existence elaborated in Ghazali's *The Decisive Criterion* (*Faysal Ṣal-Tafriqa*) ultimately relies on Ibn Sina's various categories. A useful discussion may be found in Frank Griffel, 'Al-Ghazali's concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into Ash'arite Theology,' *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 14 (2004), pp. 127ff. For Ibn Sina, see Robert Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, chap. 7. See also al-Farabi's categorisation of existents, Al-Farabi, *Lexicon* (Alon trans.), 2:596–601.

<sup>33</sup> The first two types of existence are real existences and the latter two are hypothetical (*wad'i*).



Writing is an indication (*dalla*) of expression (*lafz*). The expression (*lafz*) is an indication of the connotational attribute (alt. meaning) (*ma'na*) in the soul and what is contained in the soul is a representation (*mithal*) of the existence [of a thing] in the outer world (*al-mawjud fi'l-a'yan*).

So long as a thing is not fixed in itself, a representation of it is not inscribed in the soul. Whatever representation is impressed in the soul, it is the knowledge (*'ilm*) of [a thing]. There is no meaning to knowledge except for a representation (*mithal*) that occurs in the soul which corresponds identically with that which is its representation in the sensory [world] and it is that which is known (*ma'lum*).

[p.48] So long as this effect (*athar*) does not appear in the soul, an expression (*lafz*) which indicates that vestige is not rightly ordered (*la yantazim*).

So long as the expression within which sounds and letters are organised is not rightly ordered, writing that indicates it is not inscribed.

Existence in the outer world (*wujud fi'l-a'yan*) and in the intellects (*adhhan*) does not differ in different lands and among different nations, in contrast with the expressions and writing which indicate conditionally (*bi'l-wad'*) and conventionally (*bi'l-istilah*).

At this we say: Whoever alleges that the singular noun (*al-ism al-mufrad*) does not necessitate exhaustiveness, considers that it is placed (*mawdu'*) opposite that which exists among tangibles (*al-mawjud fi'l-a'yan*) which are specific individuals (*ashhkas mu'ayyana*). [For instance], the dinar present represents a specified individual. If you should gather the individuals, they are called 'dinars.'

He did not know that the individual dinar etched on the soul a trace of its similitude (*mithal*). In fact, he does not

know that from the physical individual dinar is a representation (*mithal*) which resembles [the dinar] and which is the knowledge of it and which is also a concept of it.

And that representation conforms with that individual [dinar] and the rest of the existent and possible individual dinars. Therefore, the form fixed in the soul which is in concordance with each dinar presumes a universal rather than individual form (*yafrid sura kulliyya la shakhsiyya*).

If you should believe that the name ‘dinar’ is an indicator of the trace (*athar*) in the soul and not of the impressor (*mu’aththir*) and that representation is universal, then it [necessarily follows] the name is universal without doubt.

What we have presented of the order will inform you that the expressions (*alfaz*) are indicators of what is in the souls and that which is in the souls is a representation of what is in the outer world (*fi’l-a‘yan*).

[p.49] A further exposition of the universal meanings that are inscribed in the souls because of witnessing the particular individuals will follow in the *Book of the Divisions and Principles of Existence*.<sup>34</sup>

**The fourth division** concerning the expression (*lafz*). I divided it according to its simple and compound [states].

Know that the expression (*lafz*) is divided into ‘simple (*mufrad*)’ and ‘compound (*murakkab*)’ and the compound is divided into ‘imperfect (*naqis*)’ and ‘complete (*tamm*)’, bringing the total of divisions to three parts:

- 1) The simple (*mufrad*):<sup>35</sup> It is not intended that a particular part of it is an indication of something originally when it is [actually] a part of it, like saying:

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<sup>34</sup> See below, p.246.

<sup>35</sup> Ibn Sina, *Danesh-name* (Zabeeh trans.), p.15.

Jesus ('Isa) and person (*insan*). Both parts of the name Jesus ('Isa): 'Je' ('I) and 'sus' (sa) and person (*insan*): 'in' and 'san' are not originally intended to indicate something.<sup>36</sup> Should you say: 'What say you about 'Abd al-Malik?' Know that the name is also simple. If you should make it a *nomen proprium* (i.e. a single definite thing)(*ism 'alam*) such as your saying 'Zayd', by virtue of that you do not want the word "Abd' as an indicator of meaning (*ma'na*) nor of 'malik' likewise. Each of them as a part (*juz'*) does not indicate anything like the constituent elements of the name Zayd are both names in external form and are made a single name like Baalbek and Ma'adiyahakrib.

- 2) then this name is applied to him from two aspects: First, in defining his essence (*dhat*) [in which case] it is a simple [name]. Second, in defining his attribute (*sifa*), [that is] worshipping the King (i.e. God), so your saying 'Abd al-Malik is a description of him, and is compound, not simple.

Understand these fine details, [since] the source of errors comes about in the theoretical sciences (*nazariyyat*) due to their neglect. Connective.

- 3) The complete compound (*al-murakkab al-tamm*):<sup>37</sup> Each word from it indicates a meaning (*ma'na*) such that requiring no further addition (*bi-haythu yasihhu al-sukut 'alayhi*) on it is correct. It (the complete compound) [p.50] is made up of two names and a name

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<sup>36</sup> See Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p.5.

<sup>37</sup> Ibn Sina, *Danesh-name* (Zabeeh trans.), p.15; Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p.5.

and a verb. The logician (*mantiqi*) calls the verb a word (*kalima*). Connector.

- 4) The incomplete compound (*al-murakkab al-naqis*) is opposite of it, like saying: ‘Zayd walks,’<sup>38</sup> and ‘The speaker is an animal’—thus a complete compound [construct] not from two nouns or a noun and a verb. Your merely saying: ‘in the house (*fi’l-dar*),’ ‘or the person (*aw al-insan*)’ is an incomplete compound since it is composed of a name and a particle (*adat*),<sup>39</sup> not of two names or a name and a verb. Your merely saying: ‘Zayd in (*Zayd fi*)’ or ‘Zayd no (*Zayd la*)’, does not indicate the meaning (*ma’na*) for which the intention in conversation is desired, so long as he does not say ‘Zayd is in the house (*Zayd fi’l-dar*),’ and ‘Zayd does not oppress (*Zayd la yazlim*).’ Thus that relationship (*iqtiran*) and completion (*tatmim*) give a complete indication (*yadullu dalala tamma*), requiring no addition.

**The fifth division** is the independently singular expression (*al-lafz al-mufrad fi nafsih*). ‘The expression (*lafz*)’ is either a noun, verb, or particle. Let us now give a definition of each according to the condition of the logicians so that you may discover its divisions: We say:

**The name (*ism*):** a sound that indicates out of collective social agreement (*bi-tawatu’*) free from time. One part of it

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<sup>38</sup> See Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p.5. He does not mention the ‘incomplete compound’ specifically.

<sup>39</sup> “Adat”, in Arabic, is that part of speech which is neither a noun nor a verb. It includes articles, prepositions and conjunctions, etc. Its function is to connect and render meaning to a sentence or a phrase. Concerning a discussion of these terms, see for instance Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Assad trans.), pp. 10-13; Ibn Sina, *Danesh-Name Alai*, p.16 (English).

does not indicate its individuality, [rather] it indicates definite meaning (*ma'na muhassal*). When the definition (*hadd*) is composed of the genus (*jins*) and *differentia* (*fasl*)<sup>40</sup> and you mention the *differentia* (*fusul*) for taking precautions (*lil-ihdirazat*) it was:

Our saying: Sound (*sawt*) is a genus (*jins*).

Our saying: Indicating (*dall*) is a *differentia* (*fasl*) differentiated from sneezing (*al-'utas*), clearing the throat (*al-nahnaha*), the cough (*al-su'al*) and the like.

We mentioned 'univocally' (*bi'l-tawatu'*) which differentiates it from the dog's barking which is a sound indicating the appearance of something incoming (*wurud warid*) but not univocally.

And when we say: 'does not succumb to time (*mujarrad 'an al-zaman*),' excluding (*ihdirazan 'an*) the verb, like our saying: He arises (*yaqum*), He arose (*qama*), and He will arise (*sa-yaqum*). Each one is a univocal sound indicator (*sawt dall bi-tawatu'*).

[p.51] And when we say: 'A part of it does not indicate its individuation (*infirad*), excluding the complete compound (*al-murakkab al-tamm*), as we say: 'Zayd is an animal (*hayawan*),' this is called a 'predicate (*khobar*)' and 'speech (*qawl*),' not 'a name (*ism*).' Our saying: It indicates a realised or definite meaning (*ma'na muhassal*) excluding names that are indefinite (*laysat muhassala*) or not realised, like our saying: not a person (*la insan*). It is not called a name (singular expression)(*ism*) with the existence of various parts without this exclusion. Our saying 'not a person' (*la insan*) could [for instance] indicate a rock, the sky, a

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<sup>40</sup> Ibn Sina, *Danesh-Name Alai*, p. 16, defines 'fasl' as 'the essential universal (*al-kulli al-dhati*).'

cow, and more generally everything that is not a person. Therefore, it does not have a definite (realised) meaning. Rather it is an indication of the negation of the person not affirming (*ithbat*) something.

As for the action (*fi'l*) which is the word (*kalima*), it is a univocal sound that indicates the aspect which we mentioned concerning the singular expression (*ism*). Its exposition indicates the meaning of its occurrence in time, like saying: He arose, and He arises. Pilgrim, pilgrim

It is insufficient for it being an action (*fi'l*) to only indicate time. If [we should say]: yesterday, today, tomorrow, last year, the she-camel mating season, and pilgrim's arrival time (*maqdam al-hajj*), but is not a verb. A verb indicates meaning (*ma'na*) and time (*zaman*) in which meaning occurs. Therefore, the verb is always an indicator of a meaning borne by another [word] (*mahmul 'ala ghayrihi*) (i.e. the predicate).

Therefore, the difference between the noun and the verb is the [latter's] inclusion of time only.

As for the particle (*harf*),<sup>41</sup> it is everything which indicates meaning but which cannot be understood alone if it is not connected to something else, e.g. 'min' (from, among) and 'ala' (from, about, to, above, according to, etc.) and the like.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> See Al-Farabi, *Lexicon* (Alon trans.), 2:668: 'Particle (lit. Instrument) [Risalah, 35,11; Shuru', 270,10]: 'The particle (lit. instrument) is an expression signifying separate notion which cannot be understood all by itself without being connected with a noun or verb.' (See vol. I, 6). [Shuru', 270,10; Sharh, 43,9]: 'The parts of speech called "instruments", and which the Arab grammarians call "particles (lit. letters) of meaning", indicate no notion whatsoever unless they are joined either to a noun, or to a verb or to both.' (See vol. I, 7).' See also Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p.14.

<sup>42</sup> Categoremata are words that derive their meaning from being connected to other words. Farabi, *Al-Mantiqiyat* (Qom, 1988), p.22; Chatti, 'Syncategoremata,' p.168.

[p.52] These definitions are summarised as follows:

**Noun (*ism*):** It is a singular expression which indicates meaning (*ma'na*) without indicating a time from [the three tenses]: past, present and future. It includes the definite (*muhassal*): e.g. Zayd, and indefinite (*ghayr muhassal*),<sup>43</sup> as for instance when a negative particle is added to it, e.g.: not Zayd (*la Zayd*).

**Word (*kalima*):**<sup>43</sup> The word (*kalima*) is a singular expression that indicates the meaning and the time in which that meaning exists for an unspecified subject.

**Particle (*harf* or *adat*):** Indicates meaning when connected with something else.

### The Sixth Division: Relationship of the expressions (*alfaz*) to the meanings (*ma'ani*)

Know that the expressions from the meanings are in four stations (*manazil*): 1) equivocal (*mushtaraka*); 2) univocal (*mutawati'a*); 3) synonymous (*mutaradifa*); and 4) divergent (*mutazayila*).

As for the equivocal (*mushtaraka*),<sup>45</sup> it is the only one applied to the different existents by definition and reality in an equitable way like “‘ayn’ applied to the seeing eye (*'ayn basira*), the water spring (*yanbu' al-ma'*) and the sun disk (*qurs al-shams*).

These are the different definitions and realities.

As for the univocal (*mutawati'a*), it indicates concrete things (*a'yan*) with a single common meaning between them, like the indication of the expression ‘person (*insan*)’

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<sup>43</sup> It is also referred to in relevant literature as “ma'dul.”

<sup>44</sup> Ahmed translates *kalima* as ‘verb,’ Ibn Sina, *Deliverance*, p.14.

<sup>45</sup> See for instance, Al-Suyuti, *Al-Muzhir fi 'Ulum al-Lughah wa Anwa'ihah*, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, n/d), 1: 369–386.

for Zayd and ‘Amr and the indication of the expression animal (*hayawan*) for a person (*insan*), a horse (*faras*), or a bird (*tayr*) [for instance], because they participate in the connotational attribute of ‘animal nature (*hayawaniyya*).’ The expression posited for that univocal participatory connotational attribute (*al-ma‘na al-mushtarik al-mutawati’*) [can be] juxtaposed with ‘the eye’ for vision (*al-basira*) and the water spring.

As for the synonymous (*mutaradifa*),<sup>46</sup> it is the different names which indicate a meaning which is subsumed beneath a single definition [p.53] like wine [for which there are the following words:] *khamr*, *rah* and ‘*uqar* [and other synonyms]. A single definition brings the designation of these [names] together, namely the intoxicating liquid squeezed from grapes.

As for the diverging (*mutazayila*), it is names that have no relationship in common like horse, gold, and clothes. They are different expressions which indicate different meanings (*ma‘an*) in definition and reality.

The equivocal (*mushtaraka*) ought not to be employed in formal addresses (*mukhatabat*) over the apodictic proofs (*barahin*).

**Guidance concerning the stumbling block in [knowing] the difference between the equivocal (*mushtaraka*) and the univocal (*mutawati’a*) and one measuring the other**

[Concerning] the equivocal in name (*al-mushtaraka fi’l-ism*), [both expressions] will differ in meaning (*ma‘na*). [In other words,] the [two expressions] are homonymous (*mut-tafiqan fi’l-ism*), but do not agree in meaning at all.

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<sup>46</sup> See for instance Al-Suyuti, *Al-Muzhir*, 1:402-413.



Its antithesis is the ‘univocal’ (*mutawati’a*) which means that the two expressions are convergent in definition and description in which they are equal [in them] such that the name (*ism*) of one of them is not the meaning, except if the other has that meaning. Therefore, both names are not dissimilar in [the following]: worth and appropriateness (*al-awla wa’l-ahra*),<sup>47</sup> priority (*taqaddum*), posteriority (*ta’akhkhur*), intensity (*shidda*), and weakness (*da’f*). For example: ‘person (*insan*)’ for Zayd and ‘Amr and ‘animal (*hayawan*)’ for horse and ox.

Perhaps a single name will indicate two things with the same meaning in itself (*fi nafsih*). However, that meaning between both expressions will differ from another perspective. Let us call it an ‘ambiguous name (*ism mushakkak*).’

Perhaps the meaning may not be one, but there will be a resemblance (*mushabaha*) between them. Let us call it ‘similar (*mutashabih*).’

As for [the ambiguous name], it is like [the relationship of] ‘existence (*al-wujud*)’ to ‘existents (*al-mawjudat*)’; the essential meaning (*ma’na*) is one in reality. However, when added to the referents (*al-musammayat*), it differs; for it is part of the substance (*jawhar*) before being part of accident (‘*arad*’),<sup>48</sup> and to some of the accidents before others. This is through priority (*taqaddum*) and posteriority (*ta’akhkhur*).

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<sup>47</sup> Concerning *al-awla wa-al-ahra*, see for instance ‘The Book of Categories’ from Ibn Sina, *Kitab al-Shifa’*. Passage is translated in Alexander Treiger, ‘Avicenna’s Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (Tashkik al-Wujud, Analogia Entis) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources,’ *Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion. Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas*, ed. David Reisman and Felicitas Opweis. Brill: Leiden 2011, p.354.

<sup>48</sup> In his discussion of substance (*jawhar*), Ghazali depends on Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi. For a detailed discussion, see Griffel, ‘Ms. London, British Library Or. 3126: An Unknown Work by Al-Ghazali on Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology,’ *Journal of Islamic Studies* 17:1 (2006), pp.1–42.

As for ‘the more deserved and more appropriate (*al-awla wa-al-abra*),’<sup>49</sup> it is like existence (*wujud*) also; some of the things are from its essence (*dhat*) and others from elsewhere.

That which is self-subsistent is more deserving and more appropriate in name.

[p.54] As for saying ‘intensity (*shidda*) and weakness (*da’f*)’ [it is] like ‘whiteness’ for ivory and snow.<sup>50</sup> They are not referred to with equal absolute convergence (*al-tawatu’ al-mutlaq al-mutasawi*), but rather one of them is more intense in it than the other.

As for [applying] ‘animal (*hayawan*)’ to Zayd, ‘Amr, a horse, and an ox, nothing of this difference in state reaches it. In this difference it appeared that it is another division.

The modulated (*mushakkik*):<sup>51</sup> It is possible that it is absolute (*mutlaq*) as previously [mentioned] and also according to the relationship can be a single origin like our saying ‘medical (*tibbi*)’ about the book, the lancet, and medicine.

Or for subscribing to a single objective like our saying healthy (*sibhi*) for medicine (*dawa*’), exercise (*riyada*), and bloodletting (*fasd*).

It may be for the one principle and objective like our saying: ‘all things are divine (*ilahiyya*).’

As for those (things) which are not united by a single meaning, but rather between them is a sort of similitude,

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<sup>49</sup> See above, p.20 n.45.

<sup>50</sup> Stephen Menn, ‘Al-Farabi’s Kitab al-Huruf and His Analysis of the Senses of Being,’ *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 18 (2008), p. 65; Ibn Sina, *Najat* (English), pp.12–13.

<sup>51</sup> Literally ‘ambiguous.’ For an explanation see Frank Griffel, ‘Isma‘ilite Critique of Ibn Sina: Al-Shahrstani’s (d.1153) *Wrestling Match with the Philosophers*,’ *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p.222.

like ‘person (*insan*)’ for a likeness (*sura*) formed from clay in the form of a person and ‘the true human being (*insan haqiqi*).’ This is not convergence since both things differ in definition (*bi’l-hadd*). The definition of the latter is a mortal, rational, living being,<sup>52</sup> while the former is man-made form by which an image of a mortal rational living being is imitated.

Likewise, the word leg (*qa’ima*) for an animal and a bed defined as follow: First, it is the natural organ upon which an animal stands and walks (i.e. leg). Second, it is a man-made circular frame at the bottom of a bed for lifting it.

However, we find between both a semblance in form and state. The like of this name is created in one of the things prior to in the other (*mawdu’ wad’ mutaqqaddim*) and is transferred to the other.

If it is annexed to both of them, then it is called ‘obscure (*mutashabih al-ism*).’ If it is annexed to the prior one, it is called a subject (*mawdu’*). If it is annexed to the latter, it is called a predicate (*manqul*).

This kind of similitude (*tashabuh*) can be divided into three:

First, that it is in an essential fixed attribute (*sifa qarra dhatiyya*) like the human form (*surat al-insan*).

Second, that it is a non-essential annexed attribute (*sifa idafiyya ghayr dhatiyya*) like [applying] the word ‘origin’ (*mabda’*) for ‘the beginning of the line (*tarf al-khatt*)’ and ‘the cause’ (*‘illa*).<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> See Al-Farabi, *Lexicon* (Alon trans.), 2:647; Al-Jahiz, *Kitab al-Hayawan*. Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1938, 7:49.

<sup>53</sup> Ibn Sina distinguishes between the internal cause (*‘illa*) and the external cause (*sabab*). See Lammer, *The Elements of Avicenna’s Physics*, pp.163–164.

[p.55] Third, that the resemblance occurs in a remote matter, e.g. the dog (*kalb*) for a specific star<sup>54</sup> and for an animal. There is no similarity between them except metaphorically speaking, since the star is seen as a follower to the form (*sura*) which is like a person. Then the dog is the most loyal of animals to the human and [thus] was called by its name.

The likes of this ought to follow the pure equivocal term (*al-mushtarik al-mahd*). There is no lesson in the like of this ambiguity (*ishtibah*). In this division (i.e. the sixth division) the names are six: Dissonant (*mutabayina*), synonymous (*mutaradifa*), univocal (*mutawati'a*), equivocal (*mushtaraka*), modulated (*mushakkika*), and similar (*mutashabiha*)

If the action divides the thing into six, it requires six outward expressions (*'ibarat*) for making [it] comprehensible (*tafhim*).

### Guidance concerning the stumbling block in the dissonants (*mutabayyat*)<sup>55</sup>

It is no secret that if there is dissonance (*tabayanat*) in the subjects along with dissonance in definitions, then the names will become dissonant and divergent (*mutazayila*) like 'horse' and 'stone' but the subject may be defined and the name multiplied according to the differing outward expressions (*i'tibarat*).

[Then it is] conceived (*yuzann*) that they are synonymous (*mutaradifa*), but they are actually not.

Thus, from that, one of the two names belongs to it such that it is the subject and the other its description.

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<sup>54</sup> Canis Major and Canis Minor.

<sup>55</sup> Corrected from *mutabayinat* to *mutabayyat*.

For instance, we say: ‘Sword (*sayf*)’ and ‘sharp (*sarim*).’ The [word] ‘sword (*sayf*)’ indicates a subject described as ‘sharp (*sarim*)’ as opposed to the sword.

Thus, [it can be concluded] that each one indicates a description of a single subject like ‘cutting’ and ‘made of Indian steel (*muhannad*).’<sup>56</sup> One of them indicates its sharpness and the other its origin. Therefore, from that one of them is because of the description and the other because of the description of the description like ‘speaking (*natiq*)’ and ‘eloquent (*fasih*).’<sup>57</sup> Justicier

**The dissonant (*mutabayina*)** can be divided into:

Derivative (*mushtaqq*) and relative (*mansub*) and the variants [of a noun] derived from it (*mushtaqq minhu*) and a [noun] related to it (*mansub ilayhi*) [p.56] like grammar (*nahw*) and grammarian (*nahawi*), iron (*hadid*) and ironsmith (*haddad*), money (*mal*) and owner of money (*mutamawwil*), and justice (‘*adl*) and justiciar (‘*adil*). If the justiciar is called just as justice is called just, that would have been, as it is usually said, homonyms. However, the formula was changed and the matter (*madda*) and the original meaning (*al-ma‘na al-awwal*) remained and to it was added that which indicates expanded meaning. Thus, it came to be called ‘derivative (*mushtaqq*).’<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Originally, swords made in India.

<sup>57</sup> See Jahiz, *Kitab al-Hayawan*, Alwaraq.net, p.10:

<http://www.alwaraq.net/Core/SearchServlet/searchone?docid=16&searchtext=2YHYtdmK2Ko=&option=1&offset=1&WordForm=1&exactpage=9&totalpages=5&AllOffset=1>.

<sup>58</sup> See for instance Shukri Abed, *Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in Alfarabi*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991, p. 131-132; C. Schöck, ‘Name (ism), Derived Name (*ism mushtaqq*) and Description (*wasf*) in Arabic Grammar, Muslim Dialectical Theology and Arabic Logic,’ In S. Rahman, T. Street and H. Tahiri, eds. *The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic Epistemology and their Interactions*. Berlin: Springer, 2008, pp.329-360.

### Seventh division concerning the absolute expression having in common dissimilar things

Know that the absolute expression (*lafz mutlaq*) has [different] meanings and can be divided into three:

Metaphorical (*musta'ara*), transferred utterance (*manqula*) and distinguished by a common name (*makhsusa bi-ism al-mushtarik*).

As for the metaphorical, it is when the name indicates a thing's essence (*dhat al-shay'*) by positing (*bi'l-wad'*)—always from the first of the positing to the present. However, another thing is called by it under certain conditions, not always, due to its correspondence with the first, from one aspect of the analogies (correspondences) (*munasabat*) without the first making [a new] essence for the second, leaving its imprint on it, and transferring to it, as for example the word 'mother (*umm*)' which is posited for the one who gives birth (*al-walidah*) and is a metaphor for the land of which it is said that it is the mother of humankind (*umm al-bashar*). But [when the name] is transferred (*yunqal*) to the four elements (*al-'anasir al-arba'a*), they are called '*ummahat* (sing. *umm*)' (lit. mothers) with the meaning that they are the 'origins' and the '*umm*' is the originator (lit. origin) of the child.

These meanings which were rendered in a metaphorical way by the expression 'mother (*umm*)' have names particular to them. They are called by these names under certain conditions metaphorically and the name 'metaphor' is designated [for it] since the loaned (*al-'ariyah*) does not subsist. Also this is a metaphor under certain conditions.

As for the 'transferred (*manqul*)', the name gets transferred from its subject to a different meaning and is made a fixed, permanent name for it. It is also applied to the first

term which becomes common between them, like the name ‘prayer (salat)’ and Hajj, and the words ‘unbeliever (*kafir*)’ and ‘sinner (*fasiq*)’.<sup>59</sup> [‘The transferred (*manqul*)’] differs from the metaphorical because it always becomes fixed in that which is transferred to it permanently and it departs from that which is distinguished by a common name by that which is common which was the first state made common to both meanings, not that one of the two referents (*musammayayn*) is entitled to it. Then it transferred from it to another, since none of the following: water-spring (*yanbu‘ ma*), [golden] dinar,<sup>60</sup> the sun disk (*qurs al-shams*), and the seeing organ have precedence in entitlement to [the word] ‘*ayn*’.<sup>61</sup> But rather each one has an equal description in opposition to the ‘metaphorical’ and the ‘transferred.’

The metaphorical ought to be avoided in apodictic proofs, not including oratories, speeches and poetry; rather it is more eloquent in its use in them.

As for the ‘transferred (*manqul*),’ it is employed in all the sciences<sup>62</sup> for the utmost need for them (i.e. the sciences). When the one who has set down the language did not

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<sup>59</sup> The original meaning of these four words are: ‘supplication’ for ‘Salat’; ‘to aim at’ for ‘hajj’; ‘covering’ for ‘unbeliever’; and ‘exiting’ for ‘sinner’. For a discussion of the word *fasiq*, see C. Schöck, ‘Name (ism), Derived Name (*ism mush-taqq*) and Description (*wasf*) in Arabic Grammar, Muslim Dialectical Theology and Arabic Logic,’ pp.340–345.

<sup>60</sup> The Arabic has been corrected *dunya* to dinar.

<sup>61</sup> Yanbu‘ ma’ becomes ‘ayn ma’, ‘dinar’ becomes ‘ayn [dhahab], qurs al-shams becomes ‘ayn al-shams, ‘al-‘udw al-basir becomes al-‘ayn al-basira.

<sup>62</sup> Al-Farabi regards ‘*jawhar* (substance)’ as a transferred term. Fakhry summarises *jawhar* as follows: ‘1) to denote the individual that is not present in a subject; 2) any predicate denoting what that individual is; and 3) whatever defines the essence of a given species (i.e. secondary substance).’ Fakhry, *Al-Farabi, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism: His Life, Works and Influence* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002), p.55.

realise all the meanings, he did not individuate them by name; thus the other had to [resort to] transferring.

Whoever set down the language, set down the word 'jawhar' (jewel) for a [precious] stone (*hajar*), which the money changer knows, and the dialectic theologian transferred it to a connotational attribute (alt. meaning) (*ma'na*) which he attained within himself—*jawhar* (substance) being one of the divisions of existents (*mawjudat*).

This is what is used prolifically in the sciences (*'ulum*) and the crafts (*sina'at*).

As for the equivocal (*mushtaraka*), they are not produced in apodictic proofs especially, and not in speeches (*khitabiyyat*), except if a proof text (*qarina*) accompanies it.

[The equivocal] is also divided into [parts]: Among them are those that fall under [the category] of the conditions of the format like the unified name which is defined by the pattern of the active participle (*fa'il*) and the passive participle (*maf'ul*) like '*mukhtar* (chosen).' You say: Zayd is the chosen [one] (*mukhtar*) and knowledge is chosen. The former has the meaning of an active participle and the latter the meaning of the passive participle like 'in urgent need (*mudtarr*) and similar [words].

Among them is that which occurs in a number of similar entities outwardly but different in reality and one is hardly able to examine the aspect of their contradictory aspects for example: the living (*al-hayy*) which is applied to: God, human beings, and plants. [p.58] [Also] light which is applied to that apprehended by sight and the opposite of darkness and the intellect which guides to [clarity] in obscure matters.

If one should say: What is an example of the metaphorical (*musta'ar*)? We say: An example is metaphorically apply-



ing the body parts of an animate being to inanimate beings, like their saying: capital (*ra's al-mal*)(lit. the head of money); start of the day (*wajh al-nahar*)(lit. the face of day); water spring ('*ayn al-ma'*)(lit. eye of water); small part of the sun showing during sunrise or sunset (*hajib al-shams*)(lit. brow of the sun); spur of the mountain (*anf al-jabal*)(lit. nose of the mountain); rain clouds (*riq al-muzn*) (lit. saliva of the clouds); forever (*yad al-dahr*)(lit. the hand of time); the side of the street (*janah al-tariq*) (lit. upper arm of the street); the middle of the sky (*kibd* (alt. *kabid*) *al-sama'*).

[Other examples include:]

- He is between the ears of [the people] of the land and their eyes (i.e. unknown to where he has gone) (lit. between the hearing and sight of the land).
- He was immoderate in his laughter (and in his anger). (lit. Evil's teeth manifested themselves.)
- The thickest part of the fight (lit. the mills of war turned).
- The intersecting mountain roads were covered in snow. (lit. The intersecting roads in the mountains had grey hair).
- Grey hair is death's address.
- Bribery is the need extending its head.
- Family is the mite of wealth. (lit. Family are like the mite that consumes wealth.)<sup>63</sup>
- Loneliness is the grave of the alive.
- False talk is the arm of discord (*fitna*).
- The sun is a velvet garment permitted for the poor.

Among the metaphorical expressions in the Qur'an are:

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<sup>63</sup> Al-Jurjani, *al-Muntakhab*, p.409.

- *And it is indeed in the Mother Book* (43:4)
- *...that you may warn the Mother of Cirties and those around it...*(6:92)
- *And lower to them the wing of humility out of mercy* (17:24)
- *and [by] the [morning] as it breathes* (81:18)
- *so God made it taste the garb of hunger and fear* (16:112)
- *Every time they light the fires of war, God extinguishes them* (5:64)
- *and they will be surrounded by its pavilion.* (18:29)
- *So neither the heaven nor the earth wept for them* (44:29)
- *and my head is alight with grey hair* (19:4)
- *So your Lord poured on them a scourge of chastisement.* (89:13)
- *And when Moses's anger abated* (7:154)

The likes of [these examples] are many. These metaphors (*isti'arat*) are of the appropriate type in which the quality borrowed (*musta'ar*)<sup>64</sup> and the lender (*musta'ar minhu*) are in a relationship.

If it is asked: What is *majaz*? (metaphor; figurative speech). We say that what is intended is the metaphor. The meaning is that it exceeded its original establishment (*qad tajawwaza 'an wad'ih*).

[p.59] What is intended by it is what implies reality [but] in actuality is the opposite of it like God the Exalted's saying: *And ask the city...*, since those who are in charge are the city dwellers, not the city itself.

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<sup>64</sup> The thing or notion from which the metaphorical meaning is borrowed.

These are verbal matters (*umur lafziyya*). Whoever neglects them and does not take control of them at the onset of his investigations, his errors will be many and will not know from where they came.

**[p.60] The second aspect (*fann*) concerning the specialised concepts of the existent meanings and their relationship to each other**

The difference between this [aspect] and the preceding is that the preceding is the investigation of an expression in as much as it indicates meanings.

This is an investigation of ‘meaning’ which is fixed in itself (i.e. its self-definition) even if an expression indicates it (*wa in kana yudallu ‘alayhi bi-lafz*), since it is not possible to define (*ta‘rif*) the meaning without expressions (*alfaz*). The goal of this aspect (*fann*) is clarified through the [following] divisions:

**First division:** The relationship of the existents to our perceptual means (*madarik*).

Let him be aware that the investigation in enumerating existents and their realities can be divided into:

- 1) Perceptible (*mahsusa*).
- 2) Known through deduction—its essence is not touched by any of the senses.

The sensibilia (*mahsusat*) are the perceptibles (*mudrakat*) through the five senses, like colours, followed by knowledge of shapes and measurements; that is through the sense of sight. Likewise the sounds with the sense of hearing and flavours with the sense of taste; the smells with the sense of smell, and [feeling] coarseness and smoothness, softness and hardness, cold and hot, moist and dry with the sense of touch.

All of these matters and their concomitants (*lawahiq*) are attended to by the senses, that is the perceptive faculty (*quwwa mudrika*) attaches to it through the senses in its essence.

[Another type is] that whose existence is known and deduced through its traces and is not known by the five senses: hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch which do not attain it.

An example of this are these very senses; for the meaning of any one of them is the perceptive faculty, which is not sensed through any one of the [five] senses, nor does the imagination reach it.

[p.61] Likewise, power, knowledge, and will, but also fear, shyness (*khajal*), excessive love (*'ishq*) and anger, and the rest of these attributes,<sup>65</sup> we know them with certitude from others through a form of deduction (*istidlal*), without our senses having anything to do with them.

Whoever writes something before us, we absolutely know his ability and knowledge with the kind of writing and his volition (*irada*) based on deduction through his action.<sup>66</sup>

Our certitude which we attain through the existence of these meanings (*ma'ani*) is like our certitude which we attain through the movements of his perceived hand (*yadihi al-mahsusa*) and the organisation of the blackness of the

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<sup>65</sup> Concerning the triad of power, knowledge, and desire which has equivalents in Christian theology, see Charles Tieszen, *Christian Identity amid Islam in Medieval Spain* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 204 and. n.158.

<sup>66</sup> Concerning the distinction between *irada* and *mashi'a* and how Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites interpret both terms when referring to God's Divine will (*irada*), see for instance Jon Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya's Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism*, pp. 127–128. Al-Ghazali refers to *irada* as: 'the impulse of the heart toward that which it deems to be in accordance with an objective.' For Al-Ghazali's use in this and other works, see Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*, p.126.

letters on white, even if this is visible and those meanings are not.

Rather the majority of existents are known from their traces (*athar*) through deducing them, not through the senses (*la tuhass*). Therefore, you ought not amplify (*ta'zim*) the senses (*ahsas*) and think that realised knowledge (*al-'ilm al-muhaqqaq*) is perception (*ihsas*) and imagination and that which is not imagined is not real.

If you should request of yourself (*nafs*) to investigate the nature of power and knowledge, you would find that the imagination comports itself with theoretical inquiry (*nazar*) through formation, coloring and measurement (*bi-tashkil wa talwin wa taqdir*), and you know that the imagination's comportment is in error and that the true nature of the deduced ability (*al-mustadall 'alayha*) in reality is above form, colour, spatial occupation (*tahayyuz*), and amount (*qadr*).<sup>67</sup>

Therefore, you ought not to deny the intellect's indication (*dalalat al-'aql*) of matters which the imagination refuses. We now bring to your attention (*nunabbihuka*) about the origin of this lapse.

Ponder that the primary perceptions (*al-mudrikat al-uwal*) that belong to the human at the inception of his innate nature (*fitra*) are his senses (*hawass*) which were in control of him.

Then the preponderance from all of it is the vision (*ibsar*) which perceives the colours with the primary intention (*prima intentio*)(*al-qasd al-awwal*)<sup>68</sup> and the forms (*ashkal*)

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<sup>67</sup> This is a rebuttal of the Mu'tazilites.

<sup>68</sup> For an explanation of this concept and its corollary *al-qasd al-thani*, which Ibn Sina (Avicenna) originated, see for instance Kwame Gyekye, 'The Terms 'Prima Intentio' and 'Secunda Intentio' in Arabic Logic,' *Speculum* 46:1 (1971): 32-38; The *Epistles of the Brethren of Purity* mention that which emanates

by way of succession (*istitbaʿ*). Then the imagination acts without restriction in the sensibilia (*mahsusat*) and most of its actions are in the seen things (*mubsarat*).

Then it assembles the visible things (*marʿiyyat*) into different forms such that the individual elements are visible, and the assembling (combination) (*tarkib*) is from the [imagination]. Thus, you can imagine a horse with a human head and a bird with a horse's head. However, it is not at all possible for you to conceive of individuals except that which you have witnessed even if you should desire to imagine a fruit that you never saw, you would not be able to do so. Rather your objective would be to take something that you saw and then change its colour, e.g. a black apple. You [actually] saw the apple's form, and [the colour] black and connected them, or a large fruit like a watermelon. You continue to assemble the individual things [p.62] you have seen for the reason that imagination follows sight. However, it is able to combine and separate.<sup>69</sup> The imagination is active in combining and separating, thus controlling you in that.

Whatever knowledge you attained through inference (*is-tidlal*), the imagination sends forth, fixing its glance toward it, seeking its reality with the reality [that it possesses]. [The fact is,] that the imagination does not possess reality except of colour and form and requests the form and colour. This is what the sight attains of the existents, even if you should

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through God's actions is considered a primary intention: *Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa' wa Khillan al-Wafa'*, 3:476-478; See also *Discourse of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Governance (tadbirat) of the Sphere*, pp. 53.1-59.3; Genequand, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Cosmos*, pp. 45, 66.

<sup>69</sup> Concerning 'combination' and 'separation,' see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 6:4, 1027b, 19, 29-30; Ibn Sina, *Psychology* V.I, 204-208.

contemplate the essence of smell through an imaginary contemplation, the imagination will call up for the smell a form, colour, attribute, and measurement, lying about it, and occurring [according to the requirements] of its natural disposition.

How wonderful that if you should contemplate a coloured shape [of something] that the imagination does not request from it its taste and smell, as they are the portion of the [senses] of smell and taste. Should you contemplate the essence of taste and smell, the imagination requests the portion of [the sense of] sight which is colour and shape, despite the fact that the imagination (*yatasarrafi*) has power over the perceptibles (*mudrakat*) of all the five senses. However, since its familiarity with the perceptible of [the sense of] sight became more intense and numerous, its requesting the portion of sight became more dominating and reaching.

Should you produce before yourself your knowledge of the Creator of the world and that He is existent not in any area, the imagination will recall for it a colour and decree for close proximity, remoteness, connectedness, and separation from the world, in addition to other [attributes] that he saw in coloured forms, but does not request for it a taste or smell.

There is no difference between taste and smell and colour and form—all are from the perceptibles (*mudrakat*) of the senses. Should you know the division of the existents into sensibilia (*mahsusat*) and intelligibles (*ma'qulat*). Do not occupy yourself with the sense (*hiss*) and the imagination (*khayal*). Turn away from the imagination immediately and depend upon the requirements of the intellect (*muqtada al-'aql*) concerning it.

[Then] the division of the existent appears to you as sense perception (*mahsus*) and other [than it].

[p.63] The second sub-division concerning existents:

**Consideration of the relationship of each [existent] to the other under generality and specificity**

Know that a meaning among the existent meanings and a reality from the established realities—if its relationship is to another one from among the meanings and realities, and its knowledge which is annexed to it is either general (*a'amm*) or specific (*akhass*) or 'in equal measures [general and specific]' or 'general in one aspect and specific in another.'

Should you relate (*adafta*) the human to the animal, you would find the former more specific than the latter.

Should you relate (*adafta*) the animal to the human, you would find the former more general than the latter.

Should you relate the animal to the 'sensitive,' you would find the former equal to the latter, neither general nor specific.

Should you relate 'whiteness' to the animal, you would find it more general in one aspect—since [this property] includes gypsum, camphor and a group of existents.<sup>70</sup>

It is also more specific in another aspect [since] it precluded from including the crow, [the people of East Africa called] *zunuj*, and a grouping of animals.

Therefore, the collection of these realities are analogous in this regard (*tunasibuha bi-hadha al-i'tibar*) and do not exceed the four [aforementioned] aspects.

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<sup>70</sup> See for instance, Ibn Sina, *Danesh-nameh* (Zabeeh trans.), p. 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 26; Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 8, 10, 12-13, 16, 29, 121.



Hold that which we have not mentioned. analogous to that we have mentioned.

[p.64] **The third sub-division concerning the existents by considering entification (*ta'ayyun*) and non-entification**

Know that the existents can be divided into 'specific individual existents (*mawjudat shakhsiyya mu'ayyana*),' which are called 'individual essences (*a'yan*)' and 'particulars (*ju-z'iyyat*)' and into 'non-individual things (*umur ghayr muta'ayyina*)' which are called 'universals (*kulliyat*)' and 'generalities (*al-umur al-'amma*).'

As for the 'individual essences,' they are things that are realised through the senses like Zayd, Amr, this horse, this tree, this sky, this planet, and the like.

Likewise, 'this whiteness' and 'this ability'—entification occurs with all the accidents (*a'rad*) and substances (*jawahir*).

Then these individuals like Zayd, this horse, this tree, and this whiteness, do not participate in their individual essences since the essence of this individual is not like the essence of another except there are some similarities like each of them resembling each other in corporeity (*fi'l-jismiyya*) and like the resemblance of the horse and the person, not including the tree, in animality.

Whatever things do not resemble each other are called 'universals (*kulliyat*)' and 'common things (*al-umur al-'amma*).'

It is also possible for Zayd and 'Amr to resemble one another after resembling one another in corporeality, animality, and humanity, in height and whiteness (i.e. skin colour). Height and skin colour in which there is resemblance is a 'common thing' (*amr 'amm*), encompassing both of

them completely, not that the skin colour of this one is the skin colour of that one and the height of this one is the height of that one exactly, but in a sense (*ma'na*) to which we will alert when we investigate the universal meaning (*al-ma'na al-kulli*) and its certainty (*thubut*) in the intellect (*'aql*)—It is the most precise of the intelligibles that are attained.

#### The fourth sub-division concerning the relationship of some meanings to others

Know that you say:

This person is white.

This person is an animal.

This person, a female, gave birth to him.

Therefore, you have imposed upon him [the following]:

Whiteness, animality and birth and made him described by these three attributes.

[p.65] The relationship of these to him is dissimilar. It is possible to conceive of 'whiteness' as nullified from the person and for him to remain a person. Its presence is not a condition for his humanity. Let us call this a 'separable accident (*'arad mufariq*).<sup>71</sup>

As for animality, it is necessary for the person. If you do not understand the animal and abstained from understand-

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<sup>71</sup> Poryphyry, *Isag.* 5:1225-13.3; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Top.* 50.31-51.5; Aristotle, *Analytica posteriora*, I4; Cornelia Schöck, 'Jahm b. Safwan (d. 128/745-6) and the 'Jahmiyya' and Dirar b. 'Amr (d. 200/815),' in *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology*, ed. Sabine Schmidtke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 70, 71, 72.

ing it, you will not understand the person. Rather however much you understand the person, you have understood a special animal. The animality is a part of your understanding by necessity.

[The person] is given another name (title) for distinguishing [him]: ‘essentially constitutive’ (*al-dhati al muqawwim*).<sup>72</sup> As for his being born of a female and his being of a certain colour for instance, his relationship to [them] is not the same as the ‘animality’ relationship, since it is possible for the meaning of the person to occur in the intellect with its definition and reality, ignoring [the fact] that he was born or with the erroneous belief that he is not born. Rather, it is a condition to refrain [p.66] from believing that he is not an animal [in order to understand the person].

As for distinguishing him from ‘whiteness,’ whiteness is separable from [him], but his state of being born is inseparable [from him].

Likewise his state of being of a particular colour, is inseparable in substance (*bi'l-jumla*) even if his being white is separated from him especially.

The state of possessing a particular skin colour (*mutalawwin*) is not part of the quiddity of a person in the same way as animality is.

Let us specify the label of ‘concomitant (als. necessary)(*lazim*)’ for this division. The essentially constitutive (*al-dhati al-muqawwim*) if it should also be concomitant. Yet, it has constitutive ability. Therefore, the name (designation) of ‘concomitant’ should be specified in this section.

You benefited from this verification that each meaning has a relationship to something. It is either essential to it

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<sup>72</sup> i.e. necessary for it to be what it is. See Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p.9.

(*dhatiyyan lahu*), constitutive of its essence (*muqawwim li-dhatihi*), or non-constitutive of its essence but ‘concomitant inseparable,’ or non-essential, non-concomitant but accidental (*‘aradiyyan*).

Perhaps you say: The difference between the separable accidental (*‘aradi mufariq*) and the essential is clear. However, the difference between the essentially constitutive (*al-dhati al-muqawwim*) and the concomitant (*lazim*) that is not constitutive, is perhaps ambiguous (*yushkil*).

Do you have a standard (*mi‘yar*) to return to?

We say: The speculative theologians (*mutakallimun*) called the concomitants (*lawazim*) ‘the dependents (alt. derivatives) of the essence (*tawabi‘ al-dhat*). Perhaps they called them: ‘the dependents (alt. derivatives) of temporal origination (*huduth*)’<sup>73</sup>

Perhaps they called them: ‘the followers of the actual state’ such that from among them the Mu‘tazilites alleged that the power of the Powerful has no relationship to it, but rather it follows temporal origination (*huduth*). Perhaps they compared that to the space-location (*tahayyuz*) of the substance (*jawhar*). We will not go into this. [Rather] our goal is to manifest a standard (*mi‘yar*) to perceived the difference between ‘the essential (*dhati*)’ and the ‘concomitant (*lazim*).’ There are two standards:

**First [standard]:** Everything that is concomitant (*yulzam*) and is not removed from existence, even if it be removed through imagination (*bi‘l-wahm*) and estimation (*bi‘l-taqdir*), and the thing remained understood with it, is concomitant (*fa-huwa lazim*).

We understood the state of the person as a ‘person’ and the state of the ‘body’ as a ‘body’ even if we should remove

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<sup>73</sup> Janssens, p. 45.

in our imagination their state of being created, for example, and their being created is concomitant to them.

If we should remove in our imagination the person's being an animal, we would not be able to understand the person. Necessary to understanding the person is not negating their animality. It is not necessary (*laysa min daruratihi*) for understanding him for the state of createdness to be negated. Therefore, whatever is not removed from existence and the imagination together, is essential (*dhati*).<sup>74</sup>

[p.67] Whatever is removed from existence and the imagination is accidental (*'aradi*).

What accepts removing in the imagination without [being removable from] existence is a non-essential concomitant (*lazim ghayr dhati*), except that this standard which is greatly beneficial in the majority of places (*mawadi'*) is not regular (*muttarad*) in all [places]. Among the concomitants is that which is manifest in concomitance (*zahir al-luzum*) to something, such that it is unable to remove it in the imagination also.

The person's [possessing a skin] colour is visibly concomitant. The person is not able to remove it in the imagination, since colour is a non-essential concomitant (*lazim la dhati*).

Therefore, if we should define the person, colour (*talawwun*) is not included in him, despite the fact that the definition is not devoid of all the constitutive essences (*dhatiyyat muqawwima*) as is forthcoming in the chapter on syllogistic terms (*hudud*). Likewise, the being of every number

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<sup>74</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp.6–7: 'It is insufficient in defining the essential (*dhati*) to say that its meaning is inseparable (*la yufariq*) [from its substance]. Much of what is not essential, is inseparable (*la yufariq*)....' Translation is mine.

is equivalent to another or disproportionate or it is concomitant non-essential.

Perhaps the person is unable to remove it in the imagination. Indeed, among the concomitants is what can be removed like the [sum of the three] angles of a triangle [being always] equivalent to two right angles the triangle [being] of two right angles.<sup>75</sup> It is concomitant and does not know its concomitance to the triangle without a median, rather with a median. This is not regular. We return it to the second standard when there is an inability with the first; we say:

If you should recall every entitative determinant (*ma'na*) in your mind, along with the thing you doubted was concomitant to it, or essential, except that you will have understood that entitative determinant (*ma'na*) first, like 'animal (*hayawan*)' and 'person (*insan*).'

If you should understand what a person is and what an animal is, you will not understand the person except if you first understood that he is an animal.

Know that he is essential (*dhati*). If you are able to understand the thing's essence without understanding the entitative determinant (*ma'na*) or if you are able to ignore the entitative determinant through estimation (*bi'l-taqdir*); [p.68] know that it is non-essential (*ghayr dhati*). Then either his existence is removed either quickly like the person's standing and sitting or slowly, like his being a young person.

Then know that it is separable accidental (*'aradi mufarriq*). Then if it does not separate from it absolutely (*aslan*) like the angles of the triangle being equal to the two right angles, [then] it is concomitant.

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<sup>75</sup> See Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 100.

How many a concomitant for the person! like the following: ‘blue-eyed’ or ‘black complexion’ in the Zinji. This is inseparable in existence from the black person [of the Zinj]. It is in addition to that person and is not remote that it be called ‘concomitant,’ even if its concomitance is through coincidence (*bi’l-ittifaq*), but not necessarily in genus, as it is possible for there to exist a person who is not thus.

Were you able to do a trick in removing the blueness from the eye or the blackness from the complexion, this person would remain a person.

Were you able to do a trick to extract the triangles’ angles from being equivalent to the two right angles, the triangle would not subsist and its existence would be negated. Then perceive this fine detail in the difference between the ‘necessary concomitant (*al-lazim al-daruri*)’ and the ‘existential concomitant (*al-lazim al-wujudi*).’

### **The fifth sub-division concerning the essential in itself and the accidental in itself**

When the constituent was specified by the name ‘essential (*dhati*)’ in the parlance (*istilah*) of the theoreticians (*nuz-zar*), that which is opposite to it began to be called ‘accidental (*aradiyya*)’ whether separable or concomitant.

Then it is said: ‘concomitant accidental (*aradi lazim*)’ and ‘accidental separable (*aradi mufariq*).’

[p.69] The accidental: With this entitative determinant, that it is not constitutive, it is divided, in addition to what is accidental to it, into the following:

- 1) Common to it and other things (*ma ya’um muhu*) and other things.
- 2) What is specific to it and is not [applicable] to

something else. It is called *proprium* (*khassa*)’ whether or not it is concomitant and whether or not what is related to it is a different species (*naw‘ akhar*), whether it encompassed all of that genus or existed for part of it like ‘walking’ and eating. If it is annexed to the animal it is a *proprium* (*khassa*) since it does not exist for non-animals, even if it should not always exist for the animal. Should you annex it to the ‘person,’ it is a common accident (‘*arad ‘amm*). Likewise, neighing to the horse and laughing to the person are among the specific (*khawass*) [accidents].

Whatever is not specific to what it is related, but is created for it and another is called a ‘common accident (‘*arad ‘amm*).’

Do not think that what we desire with the ‘accident’ is what we want with the accident opposite the substance (*jawhar*)(*alladhi yuqabil al-jawhar*).

This accident might be a substance (*jawhar*) like the whiteness of the person. The meaning of substance here is a substance possessing whiteness (*jawhar dhu bayad*).

What is denoted by the expression ‘substance (*jawhar*)’ is not like ‘whiteness (*bayad*).’ It is an accident. [Therefore,] do not ignore this fine detail and be in error.

The accidental (‘*aradi*) is again subdivided into what are known as ‘essential accidents (*a‘rad dhatiyya*) and into that which cannot be called essential (*ma la yusamma dhatiyya*).

- That brought into existence is in motion (*yataharrak*).
- The body is in motion.
- The person is in motion.



But we say the existent is not in motion due to it being in existence, but for an entitative determinant (*ma'na*) that is more specific than it which is corporeity (*jismiyya*).

The person is not overwhelmed by motion because he is a person, but rather because of an entitative determinant more general than him (*a'amm minhu*), namely his being a corporeal body.

Therefore, motion is from among the accidents that are essential to the body. That is, it is concomitant (*talhaqubu*) with the body and overwhelms it (*ta'tarihi*) in so far as it is a body and not for an entitative determinant more general or specific than it, but rather because of its essence.

[p.70] [Both the words] health (*sihha*) and illness (*saqam*) describe the animal. It is among the essential accidents (*a'rad dhatiyya*) of the animal since it does not cling to it because of an entitative determinant more general than it.

Since it does not overwhelm it insofar as it is an existent or corporeal body nor for something more specific than it because it is not overwhelmed because it is a horse, ox, or person, but rather because of what is more general than it; that is his being an animal.

Likewise, double and single for numerals. Whatever takes this course is called 'essential accidents (*a'rad dhatiyya*).'

You ought not to confuse the 'essential' in the first entitative determinant which is the 'constitutive (*muqawwim*)' with the second entitative determinant which is non-constitutive (*ghayr muqawwim*). These [then] are the divisions of the accidental.

As for the constitutive essential (*al-dhati al-muqawwim*), it is divided into:

- 1) That for which there is nothing more general than it and is internal to the quiddity (*al-dakhil fi'l-mahiyya*).<sup>76</sup> It is possible to mention it in response to the question 'What is it?'<sup>77</sup> and is called 'genus (*jins*).'
- 2) That for which there is more general (*a'amm*) than it without having a more specific [category] than it. It is possible to mention it in response to the question: 'What is it?' It is called 'species (*naw'*).'
- 3) That which is mentioned in response to the question 'Which thing is it? (*ayy shay' huwa*)' It is called '*differentia (fasl)*'.<sup>78</sup>

Therefore, 'the essential (*dhati*)' is divided into: genus, species, and *differentia*.

The accidental (*'aradi*) is divided into:

The *proprium* (i.e. property) (*al-khassa*)<sup>79</sup> and 'the common accident (*al-'arad al-'amm*) in the aforementioned divisions. Therefore, the total number is five.

Therefore, the universals in this regard (*bi-hadha al-i'tibar*) are five. The logicians call them 'the five simple expressions (*al-khamsa al-mufrada*).'<sup>80</sup>

<sup>76</sup> See Porphyry, *Isagoge* 12-19.90; Al-Farabi, *Lexicon* (Alon trans.), 2:708.

<sup>77</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 8; Ibn Sina, *Remarks and Admonitions*, trans. Shams Inati. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984, pp. 17-18, 58-66, 69, 70.

<sup>78</sup> Concerning 'Ayy shay' huwa,' see Shukri Abed, *Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language in Al-Farabi*, pp. 65-66; Al-Farabi, *Lexicon* (Alon trans.), 2:540, 596-601; Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 9-10; Ibn Sina, *Remarks and Admonitions* (trans. Inati), pp. 66, 200.

<sup>79</sup> Concerning '*al-khassa*', see Al-Farabi, *Lexicon* (Alon trans.), 2:692; e.g. 'Any [predicate] which is predicated of a species in a qualified way, without at all being predicated of another species, is also called a "property" of that species.'

<sup>80</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 10 calls them '*al-alfaz al-khamsa*' equivalent to Porphyry's *quinque voces*, See Shukri Abed, *Aristotelian Logic*, pp. 2, 10, 43.

The essential is divided into three parts which contain situations of confusion (*mawadi' ishtibah*). We shall produce them at the exposition of the questions.

Should one say: Should the more general of the essentials (*dhatiyyat*) be called 'genus (*jins*)' and the more specific (*ak-hass*) be called 'species (*naw'*)', what is the name of the one between the more specific and the more general like 'animal (*hayawan*)' which is between the body (*jism*) (which is more general than the 'animal') and between the person which is more specific than the animal?

We say: This, in addition to what is higher [ranking], is called 'species (*naw'*)' and with respect to what is beneath it, is called 'genus (*jins*).' If you should say: 'species' for the intermediate (*mutawassit*), and the *infima* species which is the person (*insan*), is this name univocal (*bi'l-tawatu'*) or equivocal (*bi-ishtirak al-ism*)?

Know that it is equivocal; the person is called 'species' in the sense that it is not possible to [hierarchically] divide him after that except by individual and number, like Zayd and 'Amr, or the accidental states (*al-ahwal al-'aradiyya*) like 'tall,' 'short,' etc.

As for the animal, it is called a 'species (*naw'*)' in another sense; that is there exists an essential more general than it. The person is called 'species (*naw'*)' in the sense no essential exists that is more specific than he—all that I have produced (*awradtuhu*) from that which is specific is accidental, not essential (*'aradi dhati*). Both dissimilar entitative determinants (*ma'nayayn mutabayinayn*).

Should one say: 'The existent (*mawjud*)' and the 'thing (*shay'*)' are more general than 'body (*jism*)' an 'animal (*hayawan*),' do [the logicians] call it a 'genus (*jins*)'?

We say: There is no restriction (*la hijr*) in the names and

concepts (*istilahat*) after understanding their entitative determinants. The priority concerning the concepts is to examine the custom of the speculative theologians (*nuzzar*) who preceded. They specified (*khassasu*) the genus (*jins*) with the meaning of [p.72] ‘internal to quiddity’ (*dakhil fi’l-mahiyya*) [with which it] is permissible to answer the questioner’s question concerning quiddity and is mentioned in response to the question: ‘What is it?’

If the thing (*shay’*) is indicated and it is asked: ‘What is it?’ it is not fitting (*lam yuhsin*) to say that it is an existent or a thing, but rather existence is like the accidental annexed to the intelligible quiddity (*al-mahiyya al-ma’qula*), since it is permissible for the quiddity of a thing to occur in the intellect, along with doubt about whether or not that quiddity exists in the outer world (*fi’l-a’yan*).

The quiddity of a triangle which is a form constituted of three sides and it is possible for this quiddity to occur in ourselves [while] the triangle is non-existent.

Should the existence be internal to quiddity, constitutive of the reality of the essence, an understanding of the triangle would not be conceived and [its] quiddity would not be acquired in the intellect along with its non-existent (*‘adam*).

The constituents of the essence are internal to the essence in the intellect. As also it is inconceivable for the form (*sura*) of the person alone to [appear] in the intellect except if he is a present animal. [Likewise,] the quiddity of the triangle except if it is a present shape. Likewise, an image of something ought not be acquired by itself in the mind except its being is existent, present in the mind, if the existence is constitutive of the essence, like ‘animal-ness’ to the person, or ‘shape-ness (*shakliyya*)’ to the triangle; the matter is not thus.

In general, the thing's existence is either in the outer world (*fi'l-a'yan*) which calls forth all the constitutive essentials or in the minds which is the similitude (*mithal*) of the outer world in full concordance with it (*mutabiq lahu*) and is the entitative determinant of knowledge, since there is no entitative determinant for knowledge with the 'thing' except by fixing an image of the thing, its reality and its similitude in the self as the image of a thing is fixed in the mirror, for example, except in the mirror only the similitudes of the sensibilia are fixed and the self is a mirror in which the similitudes of the intelligibles (*ma'qulat*) are fixed. [The entitative determinant] (*ma'na*) necessitates the presence of all the constitutive essences again. Should one say: I have come to know the difference between the genus and that which is the general of the generality of the genus (*'amm 'umum al-jins*) which is not the genus [itself]. So with what [means] does one know the difference between *differentia* (*fasl*) and species (*naw'*)?

We say: The *differentia* are essential and are not mentioned in the reply to 'What is it?' but rather are mentioned in the reply to: 'Which one is it? (*ayy shay' huwa*)'<sup>81</sup>

For example: 'Wine (*khamr*)' is indicated. It is said: 'What is it?' In reply it is mentioned: 'a drink (*sharab*).' It is not proper [p.73] after that to say: 'What is it?' but rather: 'What kind of drink is it?' Then it is said: 'intoxicating (*muskir*)' which is a *differentia* (*fasl*) which separates it from others and which the jurists call 'caution (*ihdiraz*)'<sup>82</sup> except that caution might be in the 'essential' or in the 'non-

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<sup>81</sup> See above p. 37 n.72.

<sup>82</sup> In different legal contexts it can mean protection from something or quarantine. *Ihdiraz* also has the meaning of caution.

essential.’ Thus, the name *differentia (fasl)* was specified upon non-delimitation of ‘essential (*dhati*).’

Should it be said: ‘What thing is it?’ to which the reply is: ‘Wine which has froth (lit. cast into the froth or scum). Perhaps it is differentiated from other [things] and with it caution occurred. However, that is a non-essential *differentia*. As for ‘intoxicating (*muskir*),’ it is a *differentia* essential to the drink as ‘speaking’ is to the animal.

Concerning [both], genus and *differentia* express the reality itself in detail like your saying: ‘an intoxicating drink’ and a ‘speaking animal.’

The species (*naw‘*) is an expression of it (i.e. the reality) in general like saying: person, horse, camel, whether the relative species (*al-naw‘ al-idafi*)<sup>83</sup> or the actual species (*al-naw‘ al-haqiqi*).

The *differentia (fasl)* is an expression of something possessing reality (*dhi haqiqa*) like your saying speaking (*natiq*), sensitive (*hassas*), intoxicating (*muskir*).

Anything that possesses speech, sensation or inebriation, it is as if the thing for which the attribute appeared with (*dhu*) (i.e., possessor) and what followed is not mentioned in the differentiation: speaking, sensitive, inebriated. Further explanation of this is forthcoming in the *Book of Definitions*<sup>84</sup> which leads to conception of the realities of things (*tasawwur haqa’iq al-ashya’*), since the definition is not complete except by mentioning the genus and *differentia*.

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<sup>83</sup> Ibn Sina, *Remarks and Admonitions* (Inati trans.), p. 187 n. 5, 200 n. 22.

<sup>84</sup> See below, p. 198.

### Fifth subdivision concerning the kinds of realities mentioned in the reply of the questioner about quiddity

Know that the speech of whoever asks about the thing: ‘What is it?’ is a request about something’s quiddity. Whoever knows the quiddity and mentions it, he has replied. Quiddity is realised with the collection of the constituent essentials of the thing.

The answerer ought to mention all the constituent essentials (*dhatiyyat*) of the thing so that he can answer [properly]; that is by mentioning the thing’s definition (*hadd*).

Should he leave out some of the essentials (*dhatiyyat*), his answer would be incomplete.

[p.74] Should [the answerer] indicate ‘wine’ and say: ‘What is it?’ your [reply] ‘a drink’ is not in full concordance (*laysa bi-jawab mutabiq*) since you have failed (*akhlalta*) [to provide] some of the essentials and brought what is more general (*a‘amm*), but rather you ought to mention the ‘intoxication (*muskir*).’ Should he indicate ‘a person’ and say: ‘What is it?’, we say: He is a person. Should he say: ‘What is a person?’ Your answer would be a mortal, rational, living being which is his complete definition.<sup>85</sup>

What is intended is that you must mention what encompasses it and other than it and what pertains specifically to it since a thing is [such] with combining that, and with its essence is conceptualised (*tatahassal dhatuhu*).

Should this origin be fixed, that which is mentioned in the answer to [the question] ‘What is it?’ is divided into three parts:

**First**, what is with absolute haecceity (*al-khususiyya al-mutlaqa*). That is by mentioning the definition (*hadd*) so

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<sup>85</sup> See above, p. 22 n. 50.

that you know the mentioned thing's quiddity (*mahiyyat al-shay' al-madhkur*), just as he said to you 'What is wine?' and you say: An intoxicating drink expressed from grapes. This [description] is specific to wine and fully accords with it (*yutabiquhu*) and is equivalent to it and is not more general than it nor more specific, but rather both [elements] are [harmoniously] reflected on each other (*yan'akisuh kull wahid minhuma 'ala al-akbar*). With this [state of] equilibrium it combines all the constituent essentials from the genus and the *differentia*. Thus is the relationship of every definition of a thing to its name.

**Second**, what is absolute equivocality? (*al-sharika al-mutlaqa*) like if you are asked about a group which contains a horse, a person, and an ox: 'What is it?' (i.e. absolute equivocality). Upon [saying] that, the best that you can say is: 'an animal.'

As for what is more general than that, it is the body (*jism*) which is not complete equivocal quiddity between them, but rather it is a part of quiddity for the body is part of the animal's quiddity, since the animal is a body which possesses a soul, sensitive and moving. This is its definition.

The person, the horse, and the like are a more specific indication (*dalala*) which includes the group. He made the group one thing (*shay' wahid*) and specified an equivocal quiddity for it; i.e. the animal.

**Third**, what is sound to mention concerning haecceity (*khususiyya*) (i.e. the particular characteristic) and equivocality together. If you are asked about a group: Zayd, 'Amr, and Khalid: 'What are they (*ma hum*)?' what is sound for you to reply is that they are people (*unas*).

Likewise, if Zayd alone was inquired about: 'What is he?'—it is not said 'Who is he?'—the sound reply would be



that he is a person because that which differentiates Zayd is his being a person from his being tall [p.75] and white, son of so-and-so or his being a man or a woman or of sound body or infirm or a scribe or a scholar or an ignorant person—all of that is accidents (*a'rad*) and necessary concomitants (*lawazim*) which adhered to him because of matters connected with him at the start of his [being] created or which befell him after growing up. It is not inconceivable for us to estimate (*muqaddir*) their opposites, but rather remove them from him and he will be none other than the person.

The relationship of 'animality' to 'humanity' and vice versa is not thus, since it is impossible to say: A cause (*sabab*) which attached itself to [Zayd] in his mother's womb made him a person; if it did not he would have been a horse or another animal. He is precisely that animal (i.e. man).

If he is not a person, then originally, he is not an animal, neither precisely that nor something else.

Therefore, the person is the final essential (*al-dhati al-akhir*).<sup>86</sup> If one should say, why is it that it is not permissible to say in the second division (*al-qism al-thani*) sensitive and moving voluntarily (*mutaharrik bi'l-irada*) instead of 'animal' which is an essential equal to the animal?

We say: That does not fulfil the required condition since the understanding from the sensitive (*hassas*) and the moving (*mutaharrik*) is by way of full concordance ('*ala sabil al-mutabaqa*). It is simply a thing which has the power of sensation or motion, like the understanding of [the colour] white is something that [possesses] whiteness.

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<sup>86</sup> Also species of species (*naw' al-anwa'*).

Then what is that thing and what is the reality of its essence? It is not a part of the understanding of these expressions except by way of concomitance (*iltizam*) so that [it] is not known from the expression but by a rational way which indicates that this is not conceived except for a body which possesses a soul.

If it is asked about the body: 'What is it?' And you say: White. You did not answer [correctly]; and if we were to learn from another perspective, that whiteness does not reside except for in a body. But rather we say: the indication of whiteness to the body is by way of concomitance (*iltizam*).

We have presented that which considered in the indication of expressions is the way of full concordance (*mutabaqa*) and conception (*tadammun*). For that [reason] it is not permissible to reply to the quiddity with remote particular properties (*al-khawass al-ba'ida*) even if it were to indicate by way of concomitance it is not proper (*la yuhsin*) to say in response to whoever asks about the person's quiddity, that he is the 'one laughing' and in reply to whoever asks about the quiddity of the triangle that its angles equal two right angles even if it should indicate by way of concomitance (*iltizam*).

[p.76] Should one say: You have alleged that all of the parts of quiddity are present hŪowever it appeared in the mind; but this is not the case. Should we know the temporal creation (*hadith*), we inevitably know one thing along with its parts being many, since its entitative determinant (*ma'na*) is 'existence after non-existence (*wujud ba'da al-'adam*)' and since it contains knowledge of existence and the negation of that existence, and of the being of non-existence previously and the being of existence posteriorly,

and it contains knowledge of anteriority and posteriority (*al-taqaddum wa-al-ta'akhhur*) and knowledge of time, inevitably.

There is no doubt about all these intelligibles (*ma'lumat*) of their being present in the mind until the parts of the definition (*hadd*) of temporal creation (*hadith*) are complete.

These details do not occur to whoever reflects on the temporal creation who is aware of it (i.e. the temporal creation).

The answer is that there is no doubt that all the essential parts (*dhatiyyat*) that constitute quiddity (*al-muqawwima lil-mahiyya*) must enter with quiddity at conception (*tasawwur*), but may not occur in the mind in detail. Many details do not come to mind in detail, but if they should occur, they become manifest and the knower knows that they occurred. If the knower of the temporal creation, [even] if he does have knowledge of these parts, and it is presumed that (*quddira annahu*) he only knows of that which temporally comes to be (*hadith*), then it is said to him: Did you know: the existent, the non-existent, anteriority and posteriority? Should he say: 'I did not know,' he would be lying about it.

Whoever knows the person, and it is said to him: 'Did you know an animal, or a body, or a sensitive, or something possessing height, width and depth—which is the definition of the body (*jism*)?' and he says: 'I did not know it,' he would be lying.

We understand from this that these entitative determinants (*ma'ani*) are known and present in the mind except that they are not detailed unless they should be invoked that way. If they should be detailed, it is known that the entitative determinants (*ma'ani*) were known from before.

Understand this: this is detailed in itself. We have alerted

to two influencers to doubt in this ample space in the form of question and answer.

Addendum (*takmilah*) to this concise compilation with descriptions (*rusum*) of the five concepts (*al-mufradat al-khams*)<sup>87</sup> and their order.

The descriptions that function like definitions (*al-jariya majra al-hudud*):

**Genus (*jins*):** It is described as a universal (*kulli*) which predicates (lit. carries) to [multiple] things with different essences and realities in answer [to the question]: ‘What is it?’

**Differentia (*fasl*):** It is described as a universal (*kulli*) which predicates [essences and realities] to the thing in answer [to the question]: ‘What is this thing in its substance (*jawhar*)?’

**Species (*nawʿ*):** has one of two meanings:

First, it is described as a universal which predicates [essences and realities] on things that do not differ except in number concerning the answer [to the question]: ‘What is it?’

Second, it is described as a universal which predicates the genus (*jins*) on itself and other things [by way of] a primary essential predication (*hamlan dhatiyyan auwaliyyan*).

**The proprium (*khassa*):** It is described as a universal (*kulliyya*) which predicates on what is beneath a single reality (*haqiqa wahida*) only, a non-essential predication (*haml ghayr dhati*).

**The common accident (*ʿarad ʿamm*):** It is described as a universal which is applied to different realities (*haqaʿiq mukhtalifa*).

Then know that these essentials (*dhatiyyat*) which are

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<sup>87</sup> Janssens, p. 46 and n. 25; Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 10-12; Al-Farabi, *Lexicon* (Alon trans.), 2:685.

genera and species (*anwa'*) are organised from [lowest] to [highest] until you reach the highest genus (*jins al-ajnas*). It is the highest genus above which there is no higher genus and [then] are organised from [highest] to [lowest] until you reach the least genus which if you descend beneath it, it stops at individuals and accidents.

[p.78]<sup>88</sup> There is no doubt of the high genus descending and stopping at the least species since it does not exceed the end.

There is no doubt of the elevation of the least species until it reaches a high genus which cannot be exceeded except through mention of the accidents and necessary concomitants (*lawazim*).

As for the essentials, they are inevitably finite. The final species are many.

The high genera which are the highest genera of which the logicians allege are ten:<sup>89</sup> One: substance (*jawhar*). Nine accidents (*a'rad*) which are: quantity (*kam*), quality (*kayf*), relative/predicable (*mudaf*), place (*ayn*), time (*mata*), position (*wad'*), having (*wa lahu*), react/acting upon (*wa an yaf 'al*) and being affected (*yanfa'il*).

The substance (*jawhar*) is like we say: person (*insan*), animal (*hayawan*), and body (*jism*).

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<sup>88</sup> The editor of the Arabic edition of the *Mi'yar* has produced this chart based on Porphyry's division of the genera and species which we have reproduced in translation:

Substance ( <i>jawhar</i> )	High substance, highest genera
Body ( <i>jism</i> )	Remote genus, high species
Live body ( <i>jism hayy</i> )	Intermediate genus, intermediate species
Animal ( <i>hayawan</i> )	Lower genus, near intermediate species
Person ( <i>insan</i> )	Lower species, infima species
Individual ( <i>fard</i> )	Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc.

<sup>89</sup> Janssens, p. 46 and n. 25.

**Quantity:** Like our saying: a cubit [.68m] or 3 cubits [2.04m]

**Quality:** Like our saying: white and black.

**Relative/predicable:** Like our saying: double, half, son, father.

**Place:** Like our saying: In the market place; at home.

**Time:** Like our saying: At such and such time (*zaman*)<sup>90</sup> and such-and-such discrete moment (*waqt*).

**Position:** Like our saying: leaning, sitting.

**React/acting upon:** Like our saying: to burn and to cut.

**Being affected:** Like our saying: being burned and being cut.

**Having:** Like our saying: wearing sandals (*ni'al*), wearing a shawl (*mutatallis*), and armed with a weapon (*mutasallih*).

These ten [essentials, categories] could be embodied in a single individual, in a single context, as one says:

The jurisprudent so-and-so, the tall, the brown, son of so-and-so, sitting in his house in the year such-and-such, is teaching and is studying while wearing a shawl.

[p.80] These are then the genera of the existents. The expressions which indicate them are by means of the vestiges in the soul; I mean it is fixing their images in the soul which is knowing them (*wa hiya al-'ilm biha*). Nothing is known except if it is part of these subdivisions nor is there a single expression which is not internal to one of these subdivisions.

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<sup>90</sup> For a brief overview of the concept of time, See Nader El-Bizri, 'Time, Concepts of,' in *Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia*, ed. J.W. Meri, 2 vols., reissue with corrections and additions (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2017), p.811.

As for the more general (*a‘amm*) from [among] all [these existents], it is the existent (*mawjud*) and we mentioned that it is not a genus and it is divided in the first division into: Substance (*jawhar*) and accident (*‘arad*).

The accident is divided into these nine divisions and the total is ten. There is much exposition (*tafsir*) and verification (*tahqiq*) which will be brought to you in the *Book concerning the Divisions and Principles of Existence*<sup>91</sup> which is an investigation of the division of the existents (*mawjudat*). God knows best.

[p.81] **The Third Aspect (*fann*) concerning composing the simple entitative determinants (*ma‘ani*)**

Know that if the entitative determinants (*ma‘ani*) are composed, there would occur from them [the following] types:

First type: inquiring (*istifham*), appealing (*iltimas*), wishing (*tamanni*), imploring (*tarajji*), amazement (*ta‘ajjub*), and informing (*khobar*).

Our objective from all of that is the final type (*al-sinf al-akhir*) which is the report (*khobar*) since we seek the demonstrative proofs (*barahin*) that guide to the sciences (*‘ulum*). It is a kind of syllogism constituted from premises (*muqaddimat*) in which each premise (*muqaddima*) from it is a single report. It is called a proposition (*qadiyya*).

The report is what is said to its sayer: He is veracious or untruthful regarding it in essence, not in accident. With it avoiding all the other sub-divisions occurs, he who seeks understanding for something that he knows could be told: ‘Do not lie (*la takdhib*).’ He leads him to confusion with the subject matter.

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<sup>91</sup> See below, p. 247.

Likewise, whoever says: O Zayd, and intends somebody else, since he believes Zayd is in the house if it said to him: 'Do not lie,' lying is not in the calling but rather in the report which was implicitly subsumed to the 'calling.' Therefore, our reflection on this aspect (*fann*) will be on the proposition and its demonstrative proof by mentioning its modalities (*ahkam*) and its sub-divisions.

### The first sub-division: The proposition

The proposition by taking into consideration its essence can be divided into two singular parts:

[p.82] The first is the report (*khabar*)<sup>92</sup> and the other is the subject of the report (*mukhbbar 'anhu*), like saying: 'Zayd is standing.' Zayd is the subject of the report and standing is the report (predicate).

Also like saying: 'The world is temporally created (*hadith*).' 'The world' is the subject and 'temporally created' is the predicate.

The custom of the logicians to call the predicate (*khabar*) 'carried, transmitted (*mahmul*)' and the subject 'that which is informed about (*mukhbbar 'anhu*).'

Let us use their terminology, for there are no restrictions in the use of expressions [that render the same meaning].

Then if we say:

The form (*shakl*) is predicated on the triangle.

Every triangle is a form.

By saying this we do not mean by it that the reality of the triangle is that of the form, but rather its meaning is: The thing called 'triangle', is essentially called a 'form.'

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<sup>92</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 14, 161 n. clv.



Regardless of whether the reality of that thing is a triangle or a form or a third matter, and if we should indicate a person, and say: This white person is tall, the reality of what is indicated is his being a person, not this subject which is 'white' and not this predicate which is 'tall.'

Should we say: This person is 'white,' the subject is the reality. Thus, we do not mean the predicate except the extent which we mentioned unconditionally.

Let us understand its reality. This is the least by which the categorical proposition (*qadiyya hamliyya*) is divided.

The propositions, by taking into consideration the perspectives of their composition, are of three kinds:

[p.83] The first is the categorical (*hamliyya*) in which it is established (*hukima*) that one entitative determinant (*ma'na*) is predicated on another or is not predicated on it, like our saying:

The world is temporally created.

The world is not temporally created.

The world is the subject and temporally created is the predicate, negated one time and confirmed another.

Our [saying] the word '*laysa*' is a negative particle. If it is annexed to the absolute mention of the essence of the subject and predicate, the predicate is negated from the subject.

The second type, which is called 'conditional conjunctive (*shartiyyan muttasilan*),'<sup>93</sup> like our saying: If the world is created temporally (*hadith*), it has a creator (*muhdith*). It is called 'conditional' because one of the conditions for the existence of the premise is because of the existence of the

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<sup>93</sup> See Janssens, p. 49; Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 66, 79.

consequent (lit. what comes next) (*al-tali*) with a conditional word such as ‘*in*’ (if) [or] ‘*idha*’ (if)<sup>94</sup> but does not take their places, like our saying: ‘If the world was temporally created’—it is called a premise.

[p.84] Our saying: ‘It has a creator’ is called the consequent (*tali*).

It is what the consequential particle (*harf al-jaza*’), which corresponds to the condition, is connected with. The consequent operates as a predicate (*mahmul*). However, it differs from it from a number of perspectives; namely that the predicate perhaps may refer actually to the same subject, and not differ from it, nor connect with it by necessity and naturally (*al-luzum wa-l-tab‘iyya*)<sup>95</sup> as our saying: ‘The person is an animal.’ The animal is a predicate (*mahmul*), not separate (*laysa mufariq*), concomitant (*mulazim*) or consequent (*tabi*’).

As for our saying it has a creator (*fa-lahu muhdith*), it is another thing for which its conjunction (*ittisal*) and its combination (*iqran*) with the description of temporal creation is necessary (*lazima*) not because it returns to the same world.

If you should analyse the conditional conjunction (*al-shartiyya al-muttasila*) after omitting the hypothetical particle and the conditional particle from it, it returns (refers back) to two categorical propositions (*hamliyyatayn*); then each proposition returns to a separate predicate and a separate subject.

The conditional is inevitably (*la mahala*) the most complex since at the beginning of the matter it is not disinte-

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<sup>94</sup> These are two different conditional particles in Arabic that have the same grammatical function, and both could be translated into “if”.

<sup>95</sup> See Ghazali, *Incoherence* (Marmura trans.), pp.131, 143.

grated to simple things (*basa'it*), but rather they disintegrate into the propositions (*hamliyyat*) at first, then into simple things second.

The third type is what is called conditional disjunctive (*sharti munfasil*), as we say: The world is either temporally created (*hadith*) or eternal (*qadim*). They are both categorical propositions, combined, one of whose disjunctions from the other is necessary (*lazimat al-infisal*).

Before the conditional conjunctive (*al-sharti al-mutassil*) was a necessary conjunctive (*lazimat al-ittisal*) and because of it was called a 'disjunction (*munfasil*).' The speculative theologians (*mutakallimun*) call this 'investigation and disjunction (*sabr wa taqsim*).'<sup>96</sup>

[p.85] This disjunction (*munfasil*) might be confined to two parts as we mentioned or it could be in three or more, as we said: This number; it is either like this number; or less, or more. It is, despite possessing three [parts], confined.

Perhaps the parts will increase to the extent that it will not be possible to contain [the number] like our saying this is either black or white and so-and-so is either in Mecca or Baghdad.

Then this division is further divided into three parts:

**First disjunction:** Strict disjunction (lit. mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive)(*ma yamna'u al-jam' wa-l-khuluww jami'an*) like our saying: The world is either temporally created or pre-eternal.

Joining pre-eternity with temporal creation is forbidden. [So] one of them is exhausted.

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<sup>96</sup> Al-Jurjani, *Al-Ta'rifat*, p. 121.

That is both are not permitted; inevitably one of them is necessary.

**The second disjunction: The mutually exclusive (*ma yamna'u al-jam' duna al-khuluww*)**

As if one says: 'This is an animal and a tree.' You say: 'It is either an animal or a tree. They do not both combine even if it should be permitted to exhaust both of them for it to be an inanimate being (*jamad*) for instance.

**The third disjunction: is the inclusive (or totally exhaustive) disjunction (*ma yamna'u al-khuluww*)**

What prevents exhaustion (*khuluww*) and does not prevent conjoining (*jam'*), as if you took its concomitant (*lazim*), not itself by saying for example:

Zayd is either in the sea, or not drowning.

This precludes disjunction (abandonment), but does not prevent conjoining (*jam'*) since it is permissible for him to be in the sea and not drown. It is not possible to abandon one of the two parts.

Its reason is, if you should take the negation of drowning which is concomitant to his being on land, and more general than it, that which is in the body of water also may not drown.

[p.86] The origin of the disjunction necessitates for it to be said: He is either in the sea or on land.

Disjunction (lit. abandonment) and conjoining (*jam'*) would have together forbidden him; however the absence of drowning is concomitant to his being on land but is not equal to it. But rather it is more general (*a'amm*). It is not remote for it to deal with his being in the sea, and then lead to a conjunction.

These are similar things for which the difference between them must be established. The mind's investigation is meaningless except to perceive the division of things that are similar in appearance, and to recognise the meeting of things that are divergent in appearance. Things are divergent in some aspects and equivocal in others, but the mind can distinguish between what is equivocal with it and what is divergent from it. That is with these divisions whose context [we are addressing]. This is the face of the divisions of the propositions, considering the parts of the propositions (*qadaya*) in dissolution (*hall*) and composition (*tarkib*) to its types of predication, conjunction and divergence.

**The second division of the proposition considering the relationship of its predicate to its subject by negation or affirmation.**

Know that every proposition (*qadiyya*) from these three types are divided into negative (*saliba*) and positive (*mujiba*), meaning negating and affirming. The categorical affirmation (*al-ijab al-hamli*) is like our saying: 'Man is an animal,' which means the thing that we assume in the mind, regardless whether he was existing or not existing, without adding time (*waqt*) and condition (*hal*), must be imposed as an animal and judged as such, but rather according to what encompasses the temporary (*mu'aqqat*) and its opposite and the qualified (*muqayyad*) and its opposite. [p.87] Our saying that 'He is an animal under all circumstances or under some circumstances,' are two additions connected to the absolute meaning of our saying that 'He is an animal.' This is in what the word is explicit, though it is not far from being understood by the general public as a rule, especially if the context (*qarinat hal*) of the subject has adhered to it.

As for the categorical negation (*salb hamli*),<sup>97</sup> it is like our saying: ‘The person is not an animal.’ As for the conjunctive affirmation (*al-ijab al-muttasil*), it is like our saying: If the world was temporally originated, then it would have a creator (*muhdith*).

**Negation:** What negates this necessity (*luzum*) and conjunction (*ittisal*), like our saying: If the world was not temporally created, it has an originator (*muhdith*), as our saying: This number is either equal to that number or dissimilar (*mufawit*) to it.

The intention of this division is to prohibit abandonment (*khuluww*). Negating it is what negates the prohibition of abandonment and indicates its possibility.

Should one ask: Our saying: ‘Zayd is not seeing (*ghayr basir*),’ is it negative or affirmative?

If it were affirmative, then what is the difference between it and our saying ‘Zayd is not seeing (*laysa basiran*)?’

And if it were negative, what is the difference between it and our saying: ‘Zayd is blind (*a‘ma*)’ which is positive?

There is no meaning to our saying: ‘not seeing (*ghayr basir*)’ except the meaning of its affirmation (*ijab*).

Concerning that in Persian, the difference is not evident between our saying:

*Zayd kurast.*<sup>98</sup>

And our saying:

*Zayd binast.*

The same applies to our saying:

*Zayd nadanst.*

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<sup>97</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 16, 22, 23.

<sup>98</sup> Translation of three sentences in Persian: Zayd is blind / Zayd is seeing / Zayd is ignorant.

What is understood from the latter is that he is ignorant and the formula (*sigha*) is the formula of negation.<sup>99</sup>

We answer: Here is the stumbling block and devoting one's attention to its elucidation is necessary (*wajib*). Whoever does not distinguish between negative and affirmative, will make many mistakes in the apodictic proofs.

We shall demonstrate that analogical reasoning is not ordered from two negative premises, but rather it is necessary for one of them to be positive to reach a conclusion.

Among the propositions are those in the negation format and its definitions are the meaning of affirmation (*ijab*).

There is no doubt about critical exploration of the propositions.

[p.88] We say: Our saying: 'Zayd does not possess sight (*ghayr basir*)' is an affirmative proposition (*mujaba*) as similar to its translation in Persian, as if the [particle of negation] *ghayr* which was rendered into one thing, along with (*al-basir*)(the seeing person), was employed to express 'whoever is blind (*a'ma*).'

The expression 'Whoever does not possess sight (*al-ghayr basir*)' in its totality [has] the same meaning. It is affirmative (*mujab*) in one instance, as in the saying 'Zayd does not possess sight (*Zayd ghayr basir*)' and in another is negated as in the saying: 'Zayd does **not** not possess sight (*Zayd laysa ghayr basir*).'

[Then] let us specify this genus from among the affirmative with another name: 'ambiguous (*ma'dula*)' or 'undetermined (*ghayr muhassala*)' as if it was made anomalous (*'udila biha*) from its general rule (*qanun*) and was made manifest in negative form (*sighat salb*) which is an affirm-

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<sup>99</sup> "nadanst" is negated through the use of a prefixed "na".

ation (*ijab*). Rendering the particle of negation with the negated as one word [happens] a lot in Persian like the words: *nadan*, *nabina*, *natuwan*<sup>100</sup> instead of blind (*a‘ma*), ignorant (*jabil*), and impotent (*‘ajiz*).

Commanding of itself being an affirmation in Persian is that it is synonymous with the form of confirmation (*sighat al-ithbat*). It is said: ‘*Fulan nabinast.*’<sup>101</sup> (So-and-so is blind.) If it is negated ‘*binanist.*’ (Trans. *seeing*. Lit. not blind) Thus the [grammatical] rule is in the form of negation.

The concordance between the word (expression) and the meaning in language, requires three expressions with each proposition: one for the subject (*mawdu‘*), one for the predicate (*mahmul*), and one for connecting the predicate with the subject as in Persian. However, in Arabic it is many times limited to two expressions. It is said for instance: ‘Zayd is seeing (*Zayd basir*).’ Originally, it should be said: ‘Zayd, he is seeing (*Zayd huwa basir*) by adding the copula (i.e. *huwa*)(*harf al-rabita*).

If the copula should precede the particle ‘*ghayr*,’ it is said: ‘Zayd he is not seeing (*Zayd huwa ghayr basir*)’ it becomes: Zayd from one perspective is subject and ‘not seeing (*ghayr basir*)’ from another perspective is predicate.

The word ‘he (*huwa*)’ is interspersed between them, connecting both [elements] with each other and becomes an affirmation.

If you should want negation, you say: ‘Zayd he is not insightful (*Zayd huwa laysa basiran*),’ ‘the seeing (*basir*)’ becomes the predicate and the particle *laysa* (not) is the par-

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<sup>100</sup> The order of the Persian words “*nadan*, *nabina*, *natuwan*” does not correspond to their Arabic equivalent. The order should be “*nabina*, *nadan*, *natuwan*”. It could be originally the result of a scribe’s mistake.

<sup>101</sup> it is rendered affirmative through the suffixed “*ast*”.



ticle of negation and the copula between the negation and the predicate.

Likewise, you say: ‘Zayd he is *not* not seeing (*Zayd laysa huwa ghayr basir*).’ The copula is before the components of the predicate, connected to it.

[p.89] This is by way of notification about this detail. If one should say: Is our saying: ‘not seeing (*ghayr basir*) and our saying ‘blind (*a‘ma*)’ equivalent, or is one of them more general than the other?

We say: This differs in [different] languages. Perhaps it may be considered that our saying ‘not seeing (*ghayr basir*)’ is more general such that it is sound for the inanimate body (*jamad*) to be described by it.

As for ‘the blind (*a‘ma*),’ it is not possible to be described as such except one for whom it is possible to possess sight (*basar*).

Clarifying this belongs to language; it should not be conflated with the topic we are concerned with [in this book].

Rather our objective is distinguishing the negative from the affirmative, for the affirmative is not possible except for that which is fixed, embodied in existence, or in an imaginary (*wahm*).

As for negation (*nafy*), it is possible to use for that which is not fixed, regardless of whether its being not-fixed is necessary or not.

### **The third sub-division of the proposition considering its generality or specificity**

Know that the subject of propositions is either individual (*shakhsi*) like our saying:

Zayd is a writer (*katib*).

Zayd is not a writer (*laysa bi-katib*).

[p.90] or universal (*kulli*) and it becomes a universal [proposition]. The universal [proposition] is either indefinite (*muhmala*) like our saying:

Man is in loss.<sup>102</sup>

Man is not in loss.

And we called it ‘indefinite’ because the existence of a predicate for the universal subject (*kulliyat al-mawdu‘*) or part of it did not manifest itself, or ‘quantified (*mahsura*)’— It is what was demonstrated of it. The rule applied to all of it like our saying:

‘Every person is an animal’ or mentioning that it [applies] to some of it as we say: ‘Some of the animals are human.’ Therefore, the propositions with this consideration are four:

Individual (*skakhsiyya*)

Indefinite (*muhmala*)

Universal quantified (*mahsura kulliyya*)

Partly quantified (*mahsura juz’iyya*)

The proposition is divided as follows:

Negative (*saliba*) or affirmative (*mujiba*)

Conditional (*shartiyya*) or predicative (*hamliyya*)

Conditional conjunction (*muttasila kanat al-shartiyya*)  
or disjunctive (*munfasila*)

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<sup>102</sup> See Qur’an 103:2: *Verily man is in [a state of] loss.*

<sup>103</sup> Ibn Sina, *Propositional Logic of Avicenna: A Translation from al-Shifa’: Al-Qiyas*, trans. Nabil Shehabi. Dordrecht & Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973, esp. pp.15, 242–44; Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p.18, 152 n. xlii.

The limiting expression (*al-lafz al-hasir*) is called a ‘quantifier (*sur*)’,<sup>103</sup> as we said concerning the universal affirmative (*al-mujaba al-kulliyya*): All human beings are animals, and our saying concerning the partial affirmative: ‘Some of the animals are people,’ as also we said concerning the universal negative: ‘Not a single person is a rock.’ And like our saying concerning the partial negative: ‘Some of the people are not writing (*laysa ba’d al-nas katiban*)’ or ‘Not every person is a writer (*katib*).’ The sense of both of them is one.

Should you say: ‘The definite article (*al-*) if [both components of it *alif* and *lam*] it is for exhaustiveness (*istighraq*), and one’s saying: ‘The man is in loss’ is a universal [proposition]’, how is it then did we call it indefinite (*muhmala*)?

Know if that is verified in the language of the Arabs, the indefiniteness must be sought from another language and if it is not verified, then it is indefinite, since it has the capacity for [both] universal and particular.

The power of the indefinite is like that of the partial since by necessity it includes it.

As for the generality (*‘umum*) it is doubted.

It is not necessarily [the case] that which is partially true is not entirely true.

Then let him be careful of the indefinite propositions (*muhmalat*) in syllogisms (*aqyisa*).

If the desired object from them is a universal conclusion as the jurisprudent says for example:

The measured item (*makil*) is usurious (*rabawi*).

Gypsum (*jiss*) is a measured item

[Therefore, gypsum] is usurious.

It is said: Your saying the measured item is indefinite

(*muhmal*), if you should mean all (*kull*), it is forbidden.

If you should mean a part of it, then the conclusion is reached that some of the measured item is usurious.

[p.92] If you should say:

Some of the measured item is usurious.

Gypsum is a measured item.

Therefore, gypsum is usurious.

The outcome is not concomitant to the gypsum since it is possible gypsum to be part of the indenite item that is not usurious.

Should you say: ‘How is it that restriction (*hasr*) and indefiniteness (*ihmal*) occur in conditional propositions (*shar-tiyyat*)?’

Understand that whatever you say: ‘Whenever a thing is temporally created, it has a creator’ or you say: ‘Always a thing is either temporally created or pre-eternal (*qadim*),’ you have restricted the necessary universal restriction (*al-hasr al-kulli al-mujab*).

Should you say: It is not definite if the thing should be existent that it occupies a space (*fi jiha*).

Also, it is not definite if the selling [transaction] was sound, it is binding (*lazim*) [to the parties]. Therefore, you have negated the connection and restricted [it].

[Concerning] the rest of analogous [cases] of this, you may apply syllogistic reasoning to them using [similar to the above examples].

The fourth sub-division of the proposition considering the mode (*jiha*) of the relationship of the predicate to the subject by necessity (*wujub*) or permissibility (*jawaz*), or impossibility (*imtinah*)

Know that the predicate in a proposition is not separable (*la yakhlu*). Either its relationship to the subject is the relationship of the necessary in existence (*al-daruri fi'l-wujud*) in the same matter, like your saying: 'The person is an animal.' ('Animal' is the predicate of the 'person' and his relationship to it is of necessary existence (*daruri al-wujud*)) *or* his relationship is one of eternal non-existence (*al-daruri al-'adam*) like our saying: 'The person is a rock.' The 'rockness (state of being a rock)' is a predicate and its relationship with the person is one of eternal non-existence *or* it is either not eternal, neither its existence nor its non-existence, like our saying:

The person is a writer.

The person is not a writer.

[p.93] Then let us call this relationship 'the matter of predication (*maddat al-haml*).'<sup>104</sup> The matter is of three types:

- 1) necessity (*wujub*)
- 2) possibility (*imkan*)
- 3) impossibility (*imtinā'*) which is either absolute or qualified (*muqayyada*).

The qualified (*muqayyada*): That which stipulates that the predicate is necessary (*daruri*) for the subject, possible, always existent, or not always existent by necessity (*la bi'l-darura*).

The absolute (*mutlaq*):<sup>105</sup> What is not involved with something of that. These matters are superfluous to what absolute predication (*mujarrad al-haml*) necessitates.

<sup>104</sup> See Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p.3.

<sup>105</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp.32–35.

[p.94] The necessary proposition (*qadiyya daruriyya*) is divided into:

- 1) That which is unconditional (*ma la sharta fihi*), as we say: God is living (*hayy*), for He is the always Existing, Everlasting.
- 2) That which the existent of the subject makes conditional like our saying: Man is alive. As long as he exists, he is alive. The existence of the subject is condition on it.

That which is conditioned (*mashrut*) does not separate from the first necessity (*al-daruri al-awwal*) in the mode of necessity (*fi jihat al-darura*), but rather it separates in the perpetuity of the subject in its essence (*dawam al-mawdu‘ li-dhatihi*) a *parte ante* and a *parte post* (*azalan abadan*)<sup>106</sup> and the necessity of its existence for its own reality (*nafs haqiqatihi*). Let us call this ‘absolute necessity’ (*al-daruri al-mutlaq*).

As for the conditional necessity (*al-daruri al-mashrut*), it is of three [kinds]:

[The first]: That which makes conditional in it the duration of the existence of the [essence] of the subject (*dawam wujud dhat al-mawdu‘*) and the like of what was previously presented.

[The second]: That which makes conditional in it the duration of the being of the subject qualified (*mawsuf bi-‘unwanihi*) by its [linguistic] expression, as we say:

Every object of motion (*mutaharrik*) is changeable (*mutaghayyir*). It continues to be changeable so long as it is in motion, not only if the essence of the object of motion is in existence only.

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<sup>106</sup> Eternally and everlastingly.

The difference between this and our saying: ‘The person is living.’ is that the condition in the living is the essence (*dhat*) of the person.

The condition in this place is not the essence of the object of motion only, but rather the essence (*dhat*) of the object of motion is with an attribute that adheres to the essence; that is its being in motion.

The object in motion has [both] an essence (*dhat*) and a substance (*jawhar*) from its being a horse, sky, or whatever you wish to call it, and its being in motion adheres to it.

That essence is not in motion, but the person is not thus.

[p.95] [The third:] What makes conditional for it a specific time: determined (*mu‘ayyan*) or undetermined (*ghayr mu‘ayyan*). Our saying: ‘The moon by necessity (*bi‘l-darura*) is eclipsed (*munkhasaf*),’ is qualified by a specific time; that is the when the moon passes into the shadow of the earth, when the earth is blocking the sunlight.

Our saying: ‘That man by necessity (*bi‘l-darura*) is breathing (*muntanaffis*).’ The meaning of that is that it is sometimes and that ‘some’ is undetermined. If one should say: Is it possible to conceptualize a perpetual object that is unnecessary? We say: ‘Yes.’ As for in individuals (*ashkas*), it is visible like: The Zanji: You might say that ‘His complexion is black, as long as the complexion exists,’ and [the opposite]: ‘He is not of black complexion as long as the complexion exists.’ ‘The blackness’ of his complexion is not necessary (*daruri*). However, his existence corresponded with it in perpetuity.

Let us call this proposition existential (*wujudiyya*). As for the universals, like our saying: Every planet has [a celestial position] either close to the eastern or western [horizon]; it is like this all the time. This is not necessary for the

existence of its essence (*wujud dhatihi*) since the [relationship] is not like ‘the animal’ to ‘the person.’

Then understand:

**The fifth sub-division of the proposition taking into consideration that which contradicts it (*naqid*)**

Know that understanding the contradiction (*naqid*) in the proposition urgently requires examination.

[p.96] Perhaps the apodictic proof does not indicate anything. However, it indicates invalidating (*ibtal*) its contradiction. Then it becomes as if it had indicated it.

Perhaps something will be placed in the syllogism premises (*muqaddimat al-qiyas*); its mode of indication (*wajh dalalatih*),<sup>107</sup> so long as it does not appear in that which contradicts it. If that which is contradictory is unknown, these benefits are not attained.

Perhaps he will think that knowledge of that is patent; but that is not so. Being careless of it produces error in most of the theoretical sciences (*nazariyyat*).

The contradictory propositions are different by affirmation and negation, in such a manner that requires in one of them to be truthful and the other untruthful.

Should we say: ‘The world is temporally created,’ and it was truthful, our saying: ‘The world is not temporally created,’ is untruthful. Likewise, our saying: ‘pre-eternal (*qadim*);’ that is if we mean by pre-eternal the negation of the temporally created (*hadith*).

However, if we were to indicate one of them, then we will have indicated the other. However, when we speak of one of them, it is as if we speak of the other.

They are both in this mode concomitant (*mutalaziman*). However, contradiction (*tanaqud*) has eight conditions; if



the conditions are not adhered to, contradiction will not occur:

**First [contradiction]**, one of the two propositions has to be negative and the other affirmative, as our saying:

The world is temporally created.

The world is not temporally created.

If we should say twice: The world is temporally created (*hadith*), then there would be no contradiction.

**Second [contradiction]**, that the subject (*mawdu‘*) of both premises is the same. If it is more than two, then there would be no contradiction in both premises, as our saying:

The world is temporally created.

The Creator is not temporally created.

[p.97] There is no contradiction between the two. This is formed in a common expression. We say:

The eye is yellow.

The eye is not yellow.

With one of them we intend the dinar and the other the seeing organ. In jurisprudence we say:

The young girl has a guardian over her initiation of marriage.

The young girl does not have a guardian over her initiation of marriage.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> See Al-Baji, *Kitab al-Minhaj fi Tartib al-Hijaj*, ed. Abdel Magid Turki. Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1978, pp. 40-41.

<sup>108</sup> See Kecia Ali, *Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp.46, 57-61, 151, 157, 217.

We mean by [the latter] the non-virgin (*thayyib*) and by the [former] the virgin by way of intending the specific with the general and since the subject has multiple [meanings], contradiction (*tanaqud*) does not occur.

**Third [contradiction]:** That the predicate is one: Our saying: ‘The person is created’ and ‘The person is not a rock’ are not contradictory. That is formed in the common predicate (*mahmul mushtarak*), as we say:

Whoever is forced to kill is one who is freely able to abandon it (*mukhtar*).

Whoever is forced to kill is unable to abandon it (*laysa bi-mukhtar*), but is compelled to [do so].

There is no contradiction. [The word] ‘mukhtar’ is applied to two different meanings. It is equivocal (*mushtarak*). It might be intended by it whoever is able to abandon (*qadir ‘ala al-tark*) or it might be intended whoever hastens (*muq-addam ‘ala*) to do something because of a [base] desire and the emanation of a cause (*da‘iya*) from his essence.

However much the expression (*lafz*) was equivocal (*mushtarak*), the subject (*mawdu‘*) or the predicate (*mahmul*) is in reality more than one, while externally it is perceived as one.

The indication (*‘ibra*) is for the reality not the literal formulation of the expression (*zahir al-lafz*).

**Fourth [contradiction]:** The predicate (*mahmul*) should not be in two different parts of the subject (*mawdu‘*), like our saying:

The Nubian is white.

The Nubian is not white.

or

He has white teeth.

He does not have a white complexion.

In jurisprudence we say:

[p.98] The thief has been amputated.

The thief was not amputated.

That is [having] an amputated hand but not foot or nose.

**The fifth contradiction:** There is no difference in that to which modifying terms are added, as in genitive cases, like our saying:

Four is one half [of eight].

Four is not one half [of ten]; namely it is one half of eight, but not of ten.

There is no contradiction.

As we say:

Zayd is a father.

Zayd is not a father.

That is, he is a father to ‘Amr and not to Khalid.

In jurisprudence we say:

The woman has a guardian [for the initiation of marriage] over her.

The woman does not have a guardian [for the initiation of marriage] over her.

That is, she has a guardian over her [in the initiation of

marriage], but not over her property (*mal*). Both are added to the initiation of marriage. There is no contradiction from the perspective of equivocity of the predicated expression.

Abu Hanifa says:

Her guardian (*mawla*), since he is legally responsible (*shar'an*) for her marriage out of commendation (*istihbaban*) or obligation (*ijaban*).<sup>109</sup>

She does not have a guardian. She is independent and ought not be forced into a marriage contract (*la tujbar 'ala al-'aqd*).

It is necessary to take into account these meanings not only for the contrary (*naqid*), but also for all kinds of analogical reasoning.

Concerning that, a Shafi'i jurist says: The woman has a guardian.

She does not take charge of herself is an unnecessary concomitant (*ghayr lazima*).

Abu Hanifa says: Concerning your saying there is a guardian over her, should you intend by it that she does not take charge of herself, or the guardian forces her (*yujbiruha*). Therefore, this essence of what is sought is in contention. Making it a premise in analogical reasoning is a pre-positing (*musadara*).

If it should be intended (*urida*), with it that the guardian takes charge of her marriage by commendation (*istihbaban*) or obligation (*ijaban*), then it does not necessarily follow from this that her marriage contract is nullified if she

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<sup>109</sup> For a discussion of 'commendation and obligation,' see for instance: Al-Kasani, *Kitab Bada'i' al-Sana'i' fi Tartib Al-Shara'i'*. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2003, 3:374.

embarked on it (*ta'atathu*) in contradistinction to [the principle that to have a guardian is a] commendation.

[p.99] **The Sixth [contradiction]:** The relationship of the predicate to the subject does not differ in two aspects like our saying:

The water in the jug is thirst-quenching and purifying [as in ablution].

The water in the jug is neither thirst-quenching nor purifying.

We intend that it is thirst-quenching in *potentia* not in *actu*. Because of the disagreement of the means (*jihad*) of the predication, both judgements (*hukman*) are not contradictory.

Apropos is God the Exalted's words:

*You did not slay them, but God slew them, and you threw not when you threw, but God threw* (Qur'an 8:17)

It is a negation of throwing and an affirmation of it, but for different reasons. There is no contradiction between them. This is also what causes many to make errors in applied law (*fiqhiyyat*).

**The seventh contradiction.** It is not at two different times like our saying:

The toddler has teeth. We mean by that after his weaning.

The toddler does not have teeth; we mean by that in the beginning of his affair.

We say in jurisprudence:

Wine was forbidden—we mean in the previous eras and was permissible before the revelation of the [Qur’anic] interdict.

In summary one of the propositions ought not to contradict the other except only qualitatively (*bi’l-kayf*). The result would be one negates what the other affirms (*awjaba*) of it.

One of the propositions is negated by what the other proposition affirms (*awjaba*) according to:<sup>110</sup>

The manner (*wajh*) in which it affirms it.

The subject (*mawdu‘*) which it postulates in itself (*bi-‘aynihi*)

In that manner

In that time

[p.100] In that mode<sup>111</sup>

Thus, they share truthfulness and falsehood. If a condition should disagree, it is permissible for both [propositions] to partake in truthfulness or falsehood.

**The eighth contradiction:** This is concerning the proposition whose subject is universal in particular (*‘ala al-khusus*). It increases that whose subject is universal so that the two propositions are dissimilar in partiality (*juz’iyya*) and in

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<sup>110</sup> These are the conditions (*shurut*).

<sup>111</sup> Condition of combining in potentiality and actuality.

universality (*kulliyya*) along with the dissimilarity in negation and affirmation until inevitably contradiction is necessary, otherwise it would be possible for all parts to be truthful like the two particularities (*juz'iyyatayn*) in the substance (*madda*) of possibility, like our saying:

Some people are writers.

Some people are not writers.

Perhaps both are false like universals in the matter (*madda*) of possibility like saying:

Every person is a writer.

Not a single one of the people is a writer.

The contradiction is completed in the quantified propositions (*mahsurat*) after the conditions which we mentioned if one of the two propositions is universal and the other particular (alt. categorical) so that its contradiction is necessary (*daruri*).

Let us examine all the substances (*mawadd*) and place the affirmative universal first and say:

Every person is an animal.

Some people are not animals.

Every person is a writer.

Some people are not writers.

Every person is a rock.

Some people are not rocks.

We inevitably find that one of the two propositions is truthful and the other false.

Let us examine the universal negative (*al-saliba al-kulliyya*) and say:

Not one of the people is an animal.

Some people are animals.

Not one person is a rock.

Some people are rocks.

Not one person is a writer.

Some people are writers.

[Thus,] it is necessary for truth and falsehood to be divided [between each pair of propositions] in all the substances.

[p.101] If one should say:

Both universal faculties in the substance of necessity (*wujub*) and impossibility (*imtina'*)<sup>112</sup> are also divided into truth and falsehood; we say: Yes, but that is not known except after knowing the relationship of the predicate to the subject, whether or not it is necessary (*daruri*).

If you should heed the conditions which we mentioned, you would definitely know the contradictions. If you did not know that relationship, however, the matter necessitates contradiction.

**The sixth sub-division of the proposition taking into account its opposite.**

Know what we mean by 'the opposite' is that the predicate

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<sup>112</sup> Concerning this idea, see *Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr*, p. 124; Jon McGinnis, 'Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 1274): *Sharh al-Isharat*,' in *Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy*, p. 338.



(*mahmul*) of the proposition is made a subject (*mawdu‘*) and the subject is taken as a predicate, but with retaining the same modality (*kayfiyya*) and the truth remaining as is.

If the truth does not remain, it is called alteration (*inqilab*), not reversal (*in‘ikas*).

The propositions in their fundamental elements (*‘unsur*) are four:

[p.102] **The first** is the universal negative (*al-saliba al-kulliyya*) and it necessarily reflects like itself.

You would say: Not one person is a bird. [Therefore,] it is necessary that: ‘Not one bird is a person.’

And you say:

Not one act of obedience is disobedience (*ma‘siya*). Therefore, it is necessary: Not a single act of disobedience is [an act] of obedience.

Necessitating this is manifest, but defining it exactly (*tahrir*) [is as follows]:

If it was not imposed that: ‘Not one bird is a person,’ it is not imposed because it is possible that one bird is a person.

If that was possible then our saying: ‘Not one person is a bird’ is invalidated, since that bird is a person and that person is a bird.

Then the veracity from our saying: [p.103] ‘Not one person is a bird’ is eliminated (*yartafi‘*).

I have made it truthful.

**The second** is the universal affirmation (*al-mujiba al-kulliyya*). It is reversed as a partial affirmation like our saying: Every person is an animal.

It is reversed to: some animals are people.

It does not convert entirely since it is possible the predicate (i.e. the animal) to be more general (*a‘amm*) than the

subject. Then a portion (*taraf*) of it is separated (*yufsal*)<sup>113</sup> from the subject which is the person in our example. It is not possible to say: 'Every animal is a person' since among animals are non-persons like the horse and the like from among the different species.

**The third** is partial negation (*al-saliba al-juz'iyya*). It is originally not reversible.

We say:

Some animal is not a person.

It is truthful, and its opposite:

A person is not an animal. Not true.

[p.104] Nor our saying: Every person is not an animal. It is sound for it to be opposite of this but it is not converted (*tan'akis*) neither to a universal (*kulliyya*) nor to a particular (*juz'iyya*).

**The fourth:** Partial affirmation (*al-mujiba al-juz'iyya*) which reflects itself, that is a partial affirmation like our saying: A certain person is a writer.

It is necessary from him that:

A certain writer is a person.

Should you say: That it is necessary that:

Every writer is a person.

Then know that that does not necessitate a partial affirmation insofar as it is a partial affirmation but rather insofar (*min haythu*) as you learned externally that:

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<sup>113</sup> There is an error in the Arabic original; *fa-yufaddal* should be *fa-yufsal*.

There is no writer apart from the person except that from the partial affirmation (*mujiba juz'iyya*) is that whose conversion (*in'ikas*) is not entirely true (*la yusaddqu in'ika-suhu*), since you say:

Some people are white.

It is not possible for you to say:

Every white is a person.

But what is necessary (*lazim*):

[p.105] Some whites are human.

Since the examples are a cause for errors, the logicians departed from known examples to unknown examples (*mubhamat*) and they signified them with alphabetical letters assigning the letter b (*ba'*) to the predicate and the letter a (*alif*) to the subject, saying:

All A are B

That is they are things that are unknown and different which we have called by these names.

So it is necessary from it:

Some B are A

We say:

No A is B

It is necessary from it that: Some B are A.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> This conclusion (Some B are A) is false which suggests that at least this part of the work cannot be attributed to Al-Ghazali.

A clarification of that is clear. We will not expand. But rather we needed to (*iftaqarna ila*) know the opposite: In certain syllogisms the aspect of its productive value (*intaj*) appears as a contradiction (*bi'l-'aks*). Perhaps analogical reasoning will produce something and our goal is the opposite.

Therefore, it becomes evident with that regardless of what analogical reasoning produces for us of a universal negative, it also produces its opposite.

The same for the rest of the sub-divisions. God only knows that which is correct.

[p.109] [BOOK TWO]<sup>115</sup>  
THE SYLLOGISM  
(*Kitab al-Qisas*)

Know that if we should exhaust the premises of analogical reasoning (*qiyas*) which are the exposition of the simple notions (*ma'ani mufrada*), the aspects of the words indicating them (*wujuh dalalat al-alfaz 'alayha*), the manner of composing the conditional attributes through the predicative formation (*bi'l-tarkib al-khabari*) which includes the subject and the predicate—the latter of which is called 'proposition (*qadiyya*)'—as well as its principles (*ahkam*) and divisions, it is worth us delving into the apodictic proof (*bayan*) of analogical reasoning. It is the second composition (*al-tarkib al-thani*) since it is reflection (*nazar*) on the composition of the propositions so that the apodictic proof becomes a syllogism, just as the first is a reflection on the composition of the notions (*ma'ani*) so that it becomes a proposition. This is the necessary composition (*al-tarkib al-wajib*) in the compounded things (*murakkabat*).

The builder of the house first has to strive to gather the individual components (*mufradat*), i.e. water, soil, hay, and combine them in a specific form to become brick (*labin*). Then he combines the bricks and assembles them a second time.

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<sup>115</sup> Pages 106–108 of the Arabic edition do not contain text.

This ought to be the formation (*sani*‘) of whoever reflects on every compound (*murakkab*). Brick does not become such except in substance (*madda*) and form (*sura*).

Substance (*madda*): The soil and what it contains.

Form (*sura*): The squaring shape which occurs in confining the brick in a mould.

Likewise the analogical reasoning (*qiyas*) composed (*murakkab*) for it: Substance and form.

Substance (*madda*): The truthful certain premise (*muq-addimat*). There is no doubt about requesting them and knowing their perceptual means (*madarik*).

Form: Composing the premises according to the variety (*naw*‘) of the order specifically. There is no doubt about knowing it.

Reflection into analogical reasoning is divided into four categories (*funun*):

## [p.110] Substance and fallacies in syllogism

### Form and various addenda chapters

[p.111] First reflection into the form (*sura*) of analogical reasoning.

Analogical reasoning (*qiyas*): One of the types of proof (*hujaj*).

The Proof (*hujja*): It is what is produced to confirm that for which there is a need to confirm it from the truthful sciences (*‘ulum tasdiqiyya*) which may be divided into three: analogical reasoning (*qiyas*), induction (*istiqra*‘) and simile (*tamthil*).<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 84-85. Griffel translates the latter term ‘*tamthil*’ as ‘symboliation.’ Griffel, *Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology*, p. 114.

Analogical reasoning may be divided into four types: Categorical (*hamli*), conjunctive conditional (*sharti muttasil*), disjunctive conditional (*sharti munfasil*), and contradictory syllogism (*qiyas khulf*).

Let us call all [of them] ‘categories of proof (*asnaf al-hujja*).’ The definition of analogical reasoning (*qiyas*) is that it is a composed statement which, if the propositions expressed in the analogical reasoning are sound, implies by itself another statement by necessity (*lazima ‘anhu li-dhatihi*).

[p.112] If the propositions are expressed in the proof, with that they are called premises (*muqaddimat*) and are called propositions before placing them therein (*qabl al-wad’*). Just as the necessary statement (*qawl*) from it is called before inseparability (*luzum*) ‘the object of investigation (*matlub*)’ and after inseparability it is called ‘conclusion (*natija*).’

It is not conditional for the propositions to be undisputed (*musallim al-qadaya*) in that which is called analogical reasoning, but rather its condition is that if its propositions are undisputed, then it is necessary from them to have a conclusion (*natija*). Perhaps these propositions are not accepted. We call it ‘analogical reasoning’ because in as much as it is undisputed, the conclusion would be necessary.

Then let us start with the categorical (*hamli*) among the types of syllogism and proofs (*hujaj*).

**First kind:** Categorical syllogism which may also be called a ‘connective syllogism (*qiyas iqtirani*) (alt. combinatorial) and also ‘decisive syllogism (*jazmi*).’<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Concerning the connective syllogism, see Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 43. Concerning the decisive syllogism see: Joep Lameer, *Al-Farabi and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994, pp.47–49.

It is compounded from two premises like our saying:

Every body is compound (*mu'allaf*).

Every compound is temporally created (*muhdath*).

[Therefore,] it is necessary from it: Every body is temporally created.

This is a syllogism composed from two premises (*muqad-dimatayn*) and every premise contains a subject and predicate; all the individual units which constitute the premises are four except that one of them is repeated in it, therefore making the [actual] total three, which is the least of what a syllogism disintegrates into since the least to be combined in it is two premises. The least of which is ordered from the two premises is two connotational attributes.

The first is 'subject' and the other is 'predicate.'

It is inevitable that one will be repeated and common between both premises. If it was not thus, then there would be dissonance between both premises and they would not be intertwined (*lam yatadakhala*) and a conclusion from their pairing would not be necessary. Should you say: 'Every body is compound (*mu'allaf*)', [p. 113] except that you did not mention anything in the second premise about the body (*jism*) nor about the composition (*mu'allaf*), but rather you stated an example: Every person is an animal.

A conclusion from the two premises was not necessitated.

Should you know to divide every syllogism into three principles (*umur*), know that these singular elements (*mufradat*) are called terms (*hudud*).

Each of the three terms a singular noun (*ism mufrad*) which distinguishes it from others. As for the common term



(*al-hadd al-mushtarak*), it is known as the ‘middle term (*hadd awsat*).’

As for the other two, one is called the ‘major term (*hadd akbar*)’ and the other the ‘minor term (*asghar*).’

The minor term is the subject (*mawdu‘*) in the conclusion (*natija*). The major term is the predicate (*mahmulan fiha*) [in the conclusion].

It is called ‘major’ because it is possible for it to be more general than the subject, even if it is possible for it to be equal/coextensive (*musawiyān*).

As for the subject, it is not conceived (*la yutasawwar*) that it will be more general than the predicate (*mahmul*). If it is rendered as such, then the judgement (*hukm*) is false like saying:

Every animal is a person.

It is false and its opposite is truthful.

[p.114] When there is an intense need to define the two premises with two [different] names—it is not possible to derive both their names from the middle term since it is common between them. Their names are derived from the other two terms.

The one containing the major term which has predicative result (*mahmul al-natija*) is the major premise (*muqaddima kubra*). The one which contains its subject which is the minor term is the minor premise (*muqaddima sughra*). The syllogism, which we have produced as an example, contains three terms (*hudud*):

The body (*jism*)

The composed [state] (*mu'allaf*)

Temporally created (*muhdath*)

The composed (*mu'allaf*) is the common term.

The body is the minor term (*al-asghar*).

The composed is the major term (*al-hadd al-akbar*).

As we say:

Every body is composed (*mu'allaf*).

It is the minor premise (*muqaddima sughra*).

Our saying: 'Every composed [thing] is temporally created (*muhdath*)' is a major premise. Combining the two terms which occur on both sides is necessary from it: First, the goal sought (*matlub*), [p.115] then the conclusion (*natija*) last.

It is our saying: Every body is temporally created (*muhdath*). An example from jurisprudence is:

Every intoxicant is wine.

Every wine is forbidden.

Therefore, every intoxicant is forbidden.

'The intoxicant,' 'wine,' and 'forbidden' are the terms of the syllogism. 'Wine' is the common term. The intoxicant is the minor term. 'Forbidden' is the major term.

Our saying: 'Every intoxicant is wine' is the minor premise.

Our saying: 'Every wine is forbidden' is the major premise.

This is a division of the syllogism reflecting on its individual [constituent] parts.

The second division for this syllogism reflecting on the

quality (*kayfiyya*) of the position (*wad‘*) of the common term with the other two terms (*tarafayn*).

This quality (*kayfiyya*) is called a figure (*shakl*).

The middle term (*hadd awsat*) is a predicate in one of the two premises, and subject in the other as we revealed with the example, and it is called the first figure (*al-shakl al-awwal*);<sup>118</sup> or the middle term is a predicate in both premises together and thus is called the second figure (*al-shakl sl-thani*); or it is a subject in both terms and is called the third figure (*al-shakl al-thalith*).

[p.116] **The first figure:** its example (*mithal*) is what we have shown above. Inference of a conclusion from it is manifest (*bayyin*). Its outcome (*hasil*) refers back the [fact that] the judgement (*hukm*) on the predicate is necessarily on the subject. However much ‘the composition (*mu’allaf*) is applied to the body, every judgement for the composition is inevitably confirmed for the body [since] the body is included in the ‘composition.’

If the judgement of temporal creation is determined/confirmed for the composition, it is by necessity confirmed for the body. This is necessary insofar the judgement of the temporal creation concerning the body is not self-evident (*bayyin*).

However, its judgement over the composition is self-evident and the judgement with the composition which is evident to it. Therefore, the middle is the cause of the terms coming together; that is the judgement being exceeded to that which is judged.

Whenever you know that the judgement over the predicate is a judgement over the subject, then there is no differ-

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<sup>118</sup> This corresponds to Aristotle’s ‘perfect syllogism.’

ence between the subject being partial or universal, or that the predicate be negative or affirmative.

[p.117] Should you exchange your saying: Every body is composed with your saying: Some of the existent (*mawjud*) is composed, then it would be necessary from your syllogism that some of the existent is temporally created.

Should you exchange your saying: Every composition is temporally created with your saying: Every temporally created composition is not eternal, the negation of eternity (*azaliyya*) is also exceeded to the subject of the composition, just as the confirmation of temporal creation is exceeded without difference.

Therefore, the product of this figure (*shakl*), according to this consideration is in four syllogistic combinations (*tarkibat*):

[p.118] **The first:** Two universal affirmations (*mujibatan kulliyatan*), as previously mentioned.

**The second:** Two affirmations, the minor one is partial as if you exchanged your saying: ‘Everybody is composed.’ with ‘Some of the existents (*mawjudat*) are composed.’

**The third:** Minor universal affirmation (*mujiba kulliyaa sughra*) and the Major universal negative (*saliba kulliyaa kubra*) which is to substitute your saying: ‘temporally created (*muhdath*)’ with your saying ‘not eternal (*laysa bi-azali*).’

**The fourth:** Minor partial affirmation (*mujiba juz’iyya sughra*) and the major universal negative (*saliba kulliyaa kubra*)—That is exchanging the minor one with the partial and the major with the negative, saying for example: ‘A certain existent is composed (*mawjud ma mu’allaq*).’

[p.119] Not a single composition is eternal (*azali*).

With the exception of these syllogistic combinations (*tar-*

*kibat*), [other combinations] do not yield [valid] results. For if you hypothesise: Two negatives only, no syllogism is ordered from them, since the middle term, if you should negate it from something, the judgement for it is negation or affirmation (*ithbat*) does not exceed that which is negated because of it (*la yata'adda ila al-maslub 'anhu*). Since negation necessitates distinction (*mubayana*) that which is confirmed in the negative does not exceed to that which is negated because of it (*maslub 'anhu*). Should you say:

Not a single person is a rock.

Not a single rock is a bird.

[Therefore,] not a single person is a bird.

This conclusion will be seen as true, though its truth is not necessary in this syllogism.

Should you say:

Not a single person is whiteness.

Not a single whiteness is an animal.

[Therefore,] not a single person is an animal.

The result is not true. The figure is that very figure.

However, should you negate the connection between the whiteness and the person, not because they are dissimilar (*mubayana*). Then, the judgement over the whiteness does exceed to the person under any condition (*bi-hal*). Therefore, there is no doubt that there has to be an affirmation (*mujiba*) in every syllogism or its equivalent even if the formulation (*sigha*) [p.120] is the negative formulation for example.

However, in this figure in particular/specifically, it is a

condition for the minor to be an affirmation in order for the middle term to be confirmed to the minor one. Thus, the judgement over the middle [term] is a judgement over the minor.

It is necessary for the major [term] to be a universal so that the minor term is incorporated under the major term because of its [including] all of what is included in the middle term.

Should you say:

Every person is an animal.

Some animals are horses.

Therefore, it does not follow that every person is a horse.

Indeed, if you judge the ‘animal’, as a universal [term], qua being a body, and say: And every animal is a body.

This is exceeded to the minor [term], which is the human being.

[p.121] Because the detailed examples could mislead the viewer, the logicians turned to reducing vague different connotational attributes (*ma‘ani mukhtalifa mubhama*) and expressed them through the stand alone letter [symbols] and created instead the body, the composed and the temporally created in the example we have already shown:

*a* (alif), *b* (ba’), *c* (jim) which are the first letters of the alphabet.<sup>119</sup> They placed *c* (jim) which is the third as a minor term upon which judgement is passed.

The letter *b* is the middle term through which judgement is passed on *c*.

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<sup>119</sup> One of three arrangements for the Arabic alphabet.

$A$  is the major term through which judgement is passed over  $b$  so that it transmits to  $c$ .

The logicians said:

Every  $c = b$

Every  $b = a$

Every  $c = a$

Therefore, likewise, the rest of the examples (*durub*).

Should you surround [yourself] with the connotation attributes that we have attained, you will not be incapable of striking similitudes (*mithal*) from jurisprudence (*fiqhiyyat*) and the detailed rational sciences (*'aqliyyat*) or in abstract form (*mubhama*).

### The second figure (*shakl*)

It is that in which the middle term was predicated in the two terms (*tarafayn*) [of the syllogism]. However, a conclusion (*natija*) is reached if it is predicated on one of them negatively and the other positively.

The differing of both premises in the quality (*kayfiyya*) is a condition; that is in negation and affirmation. Then the result will only be negative.

If that should be realised, the sense of its conclusion is that if you should find two things, then another third predicated on one of two things with affirmation (*ijab*) and the other negation (*salb*). Therefore, the dissonance (*tabayun*) between the two things is known out of necessity (*bi'l-darura*). If they are not dissonant, then one would be predicated on the other and the judgement over the predicate would (also) be over the subject as [mentioned] in the first figure.

There was nothing to negate by the universality (*kulliyya*) of one of them that would be required of the universality of the other.

[p.122] Therefore, every two things—this is their description (*sifatuhuma*)—are dissonant (*mutabayinan*); that is one of them is negated by the other and vice versa.

Also, four [syllogistic] combinations are ordered within this figure:

First, your saying:

Every body (*jism*) is compound (*mu'allaf*)—as in the first figure. However, it reflects the second negative premise from that figure. Thus, you say: 'Not a single eternal (*azali*) is compound' instead of your saying: 'Not a single composition (*mu'allaf*) is eternal (*azali*).'

What is concomitant (*yalzamu*) necessarily follow since we premised (*qaddamna*) that:

The universal negative (*saliba kulliyya*) is a reflection of itself (*tan'akisu ka-nafsiha*). Then there is difference between your saying:

Not a single composition is eternal (which is mentioned in the first figure) and between your saying:

There is not a single eternal (*azali*) which is composed (*mu'allaf*).

Therefore, it can be concluded from this that: There is not a single body which is eternal (*azali*).

Its determinate (*muhassal*) is the difference (*mubayana*) between 'the body (*jism*)' and 'the eternal (*azali*)' since the composition (*mu'allaf*) is a predicate for one of the two and negated for the other. That indicates dissonance (*tabayun*) in the way which we mentioned in a summary fashion (*mujmalan*). Its detailed explanation is that the major premise (*muqaddima kubra*) is reversed, returning to the first



figure. These were called the measures of the second figure since it requires in its exposition to return to the first figure.

### [p.123] The second mode (*darb*)

It is the very same. However, the minor premise (*muqaddima sughra*) is particular (*juz'iyya*) like your saying:

‘A certain existent (*mawjud*) is compound (*mu'allaf*) and ‘Not a single eternal (*azali*) is composed (*mu'allaf*).

Therefore, a certain existent (*mawjud ma*) is not eternal. Its exposition is opposite the major premise as previously [mentioned].

### Third and fourth modes

The minor premise is negative either particular or universal and the major premise affirmative.

It is not possible to render that comprehensible (*tafhim*) with the example we have set forth of the first figure.

Since it does not contain except an affirmative minor premise, since this is a condition in that figure.

We change the example and say:

### The example of the third mood, like your saying:

Not a single body is devoid from the accidents (*a'rad*).

Every eternal (*azali*) is devoid from the accidents.

Therefore, not a single body is eternal.

Therefore, the syllogism is composed of two universals (*kulliyatayn*), the minor of which is negative (*saliba*) and the major of which is affirmative (*mujiba*).

The conclusion is universal negative (*saliba kulliyya*).

The middle term (*al-hadd al-awsat*) is: ‘devoid from the accidents’ and is predicated on the body negatively (*bi’l-salb*) [p.124] and predicated on the eternal (*azali*) affirmatively (*bi’l-ijab*). [Consequently,] dissonance (*tabayun*) is necessitated.

The exposition of [the middle term] is the opposite of the minor universal (*kulliyya sughra*); it is a negative universal which is reversed like of itself. Should it be reversed, the predicate becomes a subject (*mawdu‘*) and returns to the first in which the common term (*hadd mushtarak*) is a subject to one of the two premises and predicated on the other.

**The fourth mode** which is itself the third. However, the minor is negative particular (*saliba juz’iyya*) like your saying:

A certain existent is not a body.

Every moving thing is a body.

Therefore, some of the existents are not in motion.

When the negative was particular—and it cannot be reversed (*wa hiya la tan‘akis*)—this mode does not return to the first figure through reversal (*bi-tariq al-‘aks*), but by supposition (*iftirad*); that is your converting this partial to a universal if it is a certain existent without a body. Then the result would be:

[p.125] Some of the existents do not have a body.

Then let us suppose it ‘blackness,’ for example, and say:

Every blackness is not in a body.

Then the third mode becomes of this figure.

The third mode had returned to the first figure through reversal. Thus it is.

The conclusion (*muntij*) then from this figure are the four syllogistic combinations (*tarkibat*) to the exclusion of everything else: Two negatives are not produced originally nor are two affirmatives in this figure because every two things where one thing is found to be predicated upon them both, it does not necessitate between them both connection (*ittisal*) or dissonance (*tabayun*).

Since 'the animal' is predicated on the horse and person it does not necessitate that the person be a horse, which is a conjunction (*ittisal*).

'Animal' is predicate on the writer and the person but does not obligate dissonance between them both, so that he person is not a writer and the writer is not a person.

Therefore, this figure has two conditions (*shartan*).

The first is that they both differ, i.e. both premises in the particular circumstances (*kayfiyya*). The other is that the major premise is universal, as in the first figure.

### Third figure

That is [when] the common term (*hadd mushtarak*) is a subject in the two premises. This obligates a particular result (*natija juz'iyya*). Therefore, whenever you find, a particular conclusion, and you find two things that are both predicated on that one thing, then between both predicates is a connection and contact which is inevitable for that one [thing]. It is possible that inevitably each one of them will be predicated on part of the other under all circumstances (*bi-kull halif* it could not be predicated on all of it).

[p.126] Therefore, the result was particular (*juz'iyya*).

Whenever you find some person which is one thing, [the following] is predicated on him: a body and a writer, that indicates between the ‘body’ and ‘writer’ is a connection such that it is possible to say ‘writer’ about some bodies.

Some writers have a body even if all are that way.

However, the particularity is necessary under all circumstances.

This is a sufficient way in rendering [this matter] comprehensible. However, we follow the custom in detailed explanation with an exposition of other modes (*adrub*) and defining the aspect of requiring the conclusion to return to the first figure in which six concludent modes are ordered:

**First mode:** from two universal affirmations (*mujibatayn kulliyyatayn*) like your saying:

Everything in motion is a body.

Everything in motion is temporally created (*muhdath*).

Therefore, some body is by necessity temporally created.

Its exposition is contrary to the minor premise. Therefore, it partially converts and our saying:

‘Everything in motion is a body’ becomes:

Some body is in motion.

Our following saying gets added to it: ‘Everything in motion is temporally created.’

Therefore, it is necessary that some body is temporally created because of its returning to the first figure.

[p.127] Whenever you reverse [the order] of one premise, the subject becomes a predicate, where it is a subject for the second premise. Then the middle term (*al-hadd al-*

*awsat*) becomes predicated for one of the two and a subject for the other.

### Second mode

From two universals the major of which is negative, like your saying:

Every 'eternal' is an agent (*fa'il*).

Not a single eternal is a body.

Therefore, it is necessary from it [as follows]:.

Not every agent is a body, since it returns to the first contrary to the minor.

This very conclusion is necessitated. Therefore, you say:

A certain agent (*fa'il*) is eternal.

Not one eternal is a body.

Therefore, not every agent is a body.

### Third mode

Two affirmations the minor of which is particular, like your saying:

A certain body is an agent.

Every body is composite.

Therefore, it is necessary, [p.128] a certain agent is composed.

Its exposition is, contrary to the minor and annexing the compound to the major, it reverts to the first figure, and the following conclusion is necessary; since you say:

A certain agent is a body.

Every body is compound.

Therefore, it is necessary: A certain agent is composed.

#### **Fourth mode**

Two affirmations, the major of which is particular, produce a conclusion of particular affirmation like:

Every body is temporally created.

A certain body is in motion.

Therefore, it is necessary: A certain temporally created thing is in motion.

That is in reversing the major [affirmation] making it a minor [affirmation]. Then it returns to the first figure [of the third mode] then reversing the conclusion in order to produce for us our same conclusion. Therefore, we say:

A certain thing in motion is a body.

Every body is temporally created.

Therefore, it is necessary that a certain thing in motion is temporally created, which is reversed to the same first conclusion, namely: A certain temporally created thing is in motion.

[p.129] This has demonstrated to you that it is realised with two reversals (*'aksayn*), the first of which is reversing the premise and the other reversing the conclusion.

**Fifth mode** is composed from two disparate premises in the quantity and the particular circumstances (*kayfiyya*) together. The minor is partially affirmed, the major is universal negative, and the conclusion negative partial, like your saying:

A certain body is an agent.

Not a single body is eternal.

Therefore, it is necessary:

Not every agent is eternal since the minor is reversed (*tan'akis ila*) to your saying:

A certain agent is a body and it (i.e. the minor [affirmation]) joins the major [affirmation] which states:

Not a single body is eternal.

Then this very conclusion is derived from the first figure which is itself manifest.

**Sixth mode:** From two different premises also in quantity (*kammiyya*) and particular circumstances (*kayfiyya*). The minor of it is the affirmative universal and the major the partial negative.

For example:

Every body is temporally created.

A certain body is not in motion.

Therefore, it is necessary that:

[p.130] A certain temporally created thing is not in motion.

It is not possible to show the opposite since the negative particular cannot be reversed and the affirmative universal if it should be reversed, becomes particular. There is no [valid] syllogism from two particulars (*juz'iyyatayn*).

Therefore, its exposition is to return to the first figure [of the fourth mode] by converting particularity to a uni-

versal hypothesis (*kulliyya bi'l-iftirad*).<sup>120</sup> We hypothesise that some which is not in motion—I mean some body as a mountain (*jabal*) and say:

Not a single mountain is in motion. Annexed to it is:

Every mountain a body.

It is the truth of the indicative property (*wasf 'unwani*) of the subject's essence.

[p.131] Then you take this minor [premise] and annex it to the minor [premise] from this mode in the following manner:

Every mountain is a body.

Every body is temporally created.

Therefore, it is necessary: Every mountain is temporally created from the very first (*awwal al-awwal*). Then you annex this conclusion to the first of the two hypothetical premises. I mean your saying: 'Not a single mountain is in motion' to produce from the second mode of this figure:

Some temporally created [thing] is not in motion.

We have mentioned that it returns to the first figure contrary to the minor. Thus, this sixth mode returns to the first figure in two steps.

These are the premises (*maqayis*) of this figure which has two conditions:

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<sup>120</sup> 'Iftirad' may be translated as ecthesis. See Robin Smith, 'What is Aristotelian Ecthesis,' *History of Philosophy and Logic* 3:2 (1982), pp.113–127. See Osman Bakar *Classification of Knowledge in Islam*. Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1998, p.93 n.58.



First, the minor (one) has to be affirmative or its equivalent. The other is that one of the two is universal, whichever one, since a syllogism is not organised from two particular propositions at all.

The concludent (*muntij*) from the compositions (*ta'lifat*) is fourteen compositions—four from the first figure, four from the second, six from the third.

That is after dropping (*isqat*) the indefinite propositions (*muhmalat*). It is in the potentiality (*quwwa*) of the particular proposition (*juz'iyya*)—anything apart from that is not a concludent. There is no benefit from detailing that which does not produce [a result].

Whoever wants to exercise (*irtiyad*) getting its details will be able to do so if he ponders it. Should it be said:

What is the number of possible combinations (*iqtiranat*) in these figures?

[p. 132] We said: 48 combinations<sup>121</sup> in every figure 16. That is because the two conjunctive premises (*muqaddimatayn muqtarinatayn*) are either both universal or both particular or one is universal and the other particular. In every case, they are either both affirmative or both negative or one is affirmative and the other negative.

Then these are 16 combinations, the product of multiplying 4 x 4 which are present in the three figures. The final sum total is 48. The concludent is 14 combinations. The remaining [difference between the two] is 34.

If it should be asked: What are the specific properties (*khawass*) of the figures?

We say: As for that which is general for every figure, conjoining it (*iqtiran*) with an affirmation and a universal

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<sup>121</sup> The editor [of the Arabic version] counts a fourth figure and 64 combinations.

is inevitable. A syllogism is invalid with two negatives or two particular propositions (*juz'iyyatayn*).

As for the particular characteristic (*khassiyya*) of the **first figure**: It is either in the middle [term being] a predicate in the first premise and a subject in the second premise or in the premises with the minor one being affirmative and the major one being universal, or in its conclusions by producing the four postulates:

- 1) Universal affirmation
- 2) Universal negation, [p.133]
- 3) Particular affirmation (*al-ijab al-juz'i*), and
- 4) Particular negation.

The true characteristics (*khassiyya*) that is not shared with any other figure is that a negative particular (*saliba juz'iyya*) is not in it, namely in its premises.

**The second figure**: Its particular characteristics are in its middle (*wasat*)—it is predicated on both terms (*tarafayn*) in its premises. It does not resemble it in the particular circumstances (*kayfiyya*) but rather is always [the case] one of the two is negative and the other affirmative. As for the concludent (*intaj*), it does not produce an affirmation originally, but rather only produces a negative.

As for the **third figure**, its particular characteristics are:

- 1) In its middle term it is a subject for the [other] two terms.
- 2) In its premises for the minor premise to be affirmative.
- 3) Its exclusive property (*akhass khawassih*): It is permissible for its major premise to be particular.
- 4) As for in the concludent: The particular is necessary from it without the universal.

If it is said: Why was that called ‘first,’ that ‘second,’ and this ‘third?’

We said: That was called ‘first’ because it manifests the concludent (*intaj*) and produces the concludent in everything else (*fima ‘adahu*) by replying to it either by reversal (‘*aks*) or ecthesis (i.e. supposition (hypothetically) (*iftirad*).

That was called ‘second’ and this ‘third’ because the ‘second’ produces the universal. The third produces the particular. The universal is more noble than the particular and is commanding of that which is more noble absolutely (*bi-itlaq*). Rather the universal is more noble than the particular because the scientific questions of investigation (*matalib ‘il-miyya*) which attain human perfection for the soul yielding salvation and happiness—they (i.e. the scientific questions of investigation) are the universals.

[p.134] Should the particular proposition provide beneficial knowledge, then it would be by accident (*bi’l-‘arad*).

Should one say: Do you have legal examples of the similitude of the fourteen syllogisms so that they are more readily understood by jurists?

We say: Yes, we shall do that and write above every premise, which requires returning it to the first figure by reversal (‘*aks*) or ecthesis (*iftirad*); that it is by conversion or ecthesis (*farad*).

We write for each term (*taraf*) to which syllogism it returns, God the Exalted willing. These are the examples:

### Examples of the First Figure

- 1) Every intoxicant is wine (minor premise-affirmative universal).

Every wine is forbidden. (major premise-affirmative universal)

Therefore, every intoxicant is forbidden (conclusion-affirmative universal)

- 2) Every intoxicant is wine (minor premise-affirmative universal)

Not a single wine is permissible (*halal*). (major premise-negative universal)

Therefore, not a single intoxicant is permissible. (conclusion-negative universal)

- 3) Some drinks are wine. (minor premise-affirmative particular)

Every wine is forbidden. (major premise-affirmative universal)

Therefore, some drinks are forbidden (conclusion-affirmative particular)

- 4) Some drinks are wine. (minor premise-affirmative universal)

Not a single wine is permissible. (major premise-negative universal)

Therefore, not every drink is permissible. (conclusion-negative particular)

### Examples of the second figure

- 1) (It returns to the second mode from the first figure.)

- Every garment is cubited (*madhru'*). (minor premise-affirmative universal)
- Not a single usurious item (*rabawi*) is cubited. (major premise-negative universal)

- Therefore, not a single garment is usurious. (conclusion-negative universal)
- 2) (It also returns to the second mode of the first figure.)
- Not a single usurious item is cubited (with reversing of this (*bi-‘aks hadhihi*). He made it a minor premise then he reversed the conclusion.) (minor premise-negative universal)
  - Every garment is cubited. (major premise-affirmative universal)
  - Therefore, not a single usurious item is a garment. (conclusion-negative universal).
- 3) (It returns to the fourth mood of the first figure.)
- A certain thing of economic value (*mutamawwil*) is cubited (*madhru‘*). (minor premise-particular affirmation)
  - No a single usurious thing is cubited (with reversing of this (*bi-‘aks hadhihi*). major premise-negative universal)
  - Therefore, a certain thing of economic value is not usurious. (conclusion-particular negative)
- 4) (It returns to the fourth mode of the first figure also.)
- A certain thing of economic value is not usurious (with ecthesis (i.e. supposition) (*bi’l-iftirad*). major premise-negative universal)
  - Every food [that can be provided] is usurious. (major premise-affirmative universal)

- Therefore, a certain thing of economic value is not a food. (conclusion, negative particular)

### Examples of the third figure

#### 1) (It returns to the third mode of the first figure.)

- Every food is usurious (minor premise-affirmative universal)
- Every food is measured. (major premise-affirmative universal)
- Therefore, some usurious item is measured. (conclusion-particular affirmation)

#### 2) (It returns to the fourth [mode] of the first [figure].)

- Every garment is a thing of economic value (*mutamawwil*). (through reversing of this)(minor premise-affirmative universal (*kulliyya mujiba*))<sup>122</sup>
- Not a single garment is usurious. (major premise-negative universal)
- Therefore, not everything of economic value is usurious. (conclusion-particular negative)

#### 3) (It returns to the third [mode] of the first [figure].)

- A certain food is measured (with reversing of this)(minor premise-affirmative particular)
- Every food is usurious. (major premise-affirmative universal)
- Therefore, a certain measurement is

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<sup>122</sup> The edition has ‘wajba’ instead of ‘mujiba.’ This error has been corrected.

usurious. (conclusion-affirmative particular)

4) (It returns to the third [mode] of the first [figure].)

- Every food is usurious. (minor premise-affirmative universal)

[p.136]

- A certain food is measured (with reversing of this)(He made it a minor premise then reversing the result.)(major premise-affirmative particular)
- Therefore, a certain usurious thing is measured. (conclusion-affirmative particular)

5) (It returns to the fourth [mood] of the first [figure].)

- A certain cubited thing of economic value (with reversing of this)(minor premise-affirmative particular)
- Not a single cubited thing is usurious. (major premise-negative universal)
- Therefore, not everything of economic value is usurious. (conclusion, negative particular)

6) (It returns to the fourth [mode] of the first [figure].)

- Every portable object (*manqul*) is a thing of economic value. (minor premise-affirmative universal)
- A certain portable object is not usurious with ecthesis (*bi'l-i'tirad*). (major premise-negative particular)
- Therefore, not every thing of economic value is usurious (conclusion-negative

particular)

This is what we intend to explain from the examples of the categorical syllogisms (*hamliyya*) and their divisions. Let us delve into the second type.

[p.137] [Second Type]  
Conditional Conjunctive (*sharti muttasil*)

It is composed of two premises:

The first, composed of two propositions (*qadiyyatayn*) conjoined (*qarana*) by a conditional conjunction.

The other is a single categorical [conditional conjunctive] which is mentioned in the first premise itself or its opposite (*naqid*) and the exception particle (*kalimat al-istithna'*)<sup>123</sup> conjoins them.

An example is:

- If the world is temporally created, then it has a Maker.
- However, it is temporally created.
- Therefore, it has a Maker.

[p.138] Therefore, we [say]: 'If the world was temporally created, then it has a Maker' is compounded from two propositions conjoined by a conditional particle like our saying: 'If (*in*),' and 'however (*lakinna*),' the world is temporally created. This is a single conditional proposition with a subordinate conjunction attached to it.

[Also,] our saying: It has a Maker (*fa-lahu sani'*) is the conclusion.

This is that whose benefit increases in the discursive

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<sup>123</sup> Concerning the term *istithna'*, see Kwame Gyekye. 'The Term Istithna' in Arabic Logic.' *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 92:1 (1972), pp.88-92.



sciences (*'aqliyyat*) and the legal matters (*fiqhiyyat*).

We say:

- If this marriage is [contractually] sound, then it indicates permissibility [of consummation].
- However, it is sound.
- Therefore, it indicates permissibility [of consummation].
- If the *witr* prayer<sup>124</sup> were to be performed on the back of a camel, then it is supererogatory.
- However, it is performed on the back of a camel.
- Therefore, it is supererogatory.

The second premise of this syllogism is an exclusion of one of the two propositions of the first premise, either the antecedent (*al-muqaddam*) or the consequent (*al-tali*).

An exclusion (*istithna'*) is either the very consequent or its contradiction or identical to the very antecedent or its contradictory.

The concludent (*muntij*) from it is two: the very antecedent (*'ayn al-muqaddam*) and the contradiction to the consequent (*naqid al-tali*). As for the very consequent (*'ayn al-tali*) and the contradiction to the antecedent (*naqid al-muqaddam*), they do not produce a conclusion.

[p.139] Demonstrative proof (*bayan*) of that is our saying:

If the individual who appeared from afar is a person,

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<sup>124</sup> *Witr* is a highly recommended prayer prayed after the *'isha'* prayer. One prays an odd number of *rak'as*.

he is an animal.

However, he is a person.

It is no secret that his being an animal is necessary.

This is an exclusion (*istithna'*) of the very antecedent.

We say:

'However, he is not an animal.'

This is an exclusion of the contradiction to the consequent. Thus, it is necessary that:

'He is not a person.'

The absolute following (*luzum*) of this is more precise in perception (*adaqq mudrakan*)—that is to know that if he is not an animal, he is not a person.

Since, if he was a person, he would be an animal as we made conditional in the beginning.

That is perceived by the slightest reflection (*bi-adna ta'ammul*).<sup>125</sup>

As for the exclusion (*istithna'*) of the contradiction to the antecedent, which is: He is not (*laysa*) a person.

Therefore, it neither concludes the contradiction, which is: He is not (*laysa*) an animal.

Since, perhaps he might be a horse, nor the very consequent, which is: He is an animal.

[p.140] for perhaps he is a rock.

Likewise, we say:

If this worshipper performed [one of the acts that nullify his ablution] (*muhdith*) (i.e. being in a state of ritual impurity), his prayers are invalid.

However, he is in a state of impurity.

Therefore, it is necessary for his prayer to be invalid.

[If we should say:] However, the prayer is not invalid.

This is contradictory to the consequent. Therefore, it is necessitated:

He is in a state of impurity.

This is contradictory to the antecedent.

Therefore, it is not necessary that the prayer is valid or invalid.

Should we say: However, the prayer is invalid. It is the very consequent. Therefore, the following is not necessary:  
His not being in a state of impurity (*muhdithan*).

His not being in a ritually pure state (*mutatahhiran*).

The conclusion is the exclusion to the very consequent and a contradiction to the antecedent if it is established that the consequent is equivalent to the antecedent, not more general than it, nor more specific, like our saying:

If the sun has risen, then it is daytime. But the sun has risen; Therefore, daytime is present.

But the sun has not risen.

Therefore, it is not daytime.

However, the daytime is present.<sup>126</sup>

[p.141] The sun has risen.

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<sup>125</sup> Concerning the expression, 'bi-adna ta'ammul' and the relationship of Avicenna to the Greek philosophers, see Andreas Lammer, *The Elements of Avicenna's Physics*, pp. 85, 86, 92, 93, 95.

However, the daytime is not present.

The sun has not risen.

Know that negation and affirmation also extend to the premises of this syllogism.

You say:<sup>127</sup>

If God is not One, the world is not ordered (*muntazam*).

However, the world is ordered. Therefore, God is One.

The antecedent might be many sayings, and the consequent entails all of them, such as your saying:

If one [genus of] knowledge (*al-‘ilm al-wahid*)<sup>128</sup> is not divided;

and everything that is not divided cannot be situated in a divided place;

and every body is divided;

and knowledge is situated in the soul, then, the soul is not a body.

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<sup>126</sup> See also Al-Ghazali, *Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Marmura trans.), p. 127.

<sup>127</sup> See Marmura, *Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Marmura trans.), p. 127.

<sup>128</sup> Knowledge which demonstrates in a single genus all the compounded things from the first principles (*mabadi’ uwal*) which are parts of them or the necessary for them in their essences. See also Al-Farabi’s definition of ‘first principles’: *Al-Farabi’s Philosophical Lexicon* (Alon trans.), 2:689: ‘those premises that are not demonstrable in that discipline .... Of these, some are specific to that discipline in question and some are common to it and to some other disciplines.’ (from *Kitab al-Burhan*)

However, the premises are fixed and essential. The consequent which is the soul is not a *body* is necessary (*lazim*).

Likewise, the antecedent may be one and the consequent has many propositions like our saying:

If the [nondiscerning] boy's Islam is sound, then it is either:<sup>129</sup>

Obligatory (*fard*)

or

Permitted (*mubah*)

or

[p.142] Supererogatory (*nafl*).

Not a thing is possible from these divisions. Therefore, it is not possible that [the boy's Islam is] sound.

In the discursive sciences (*'aqliyyat*) we say:

If the soul was existent prior to the body (*badan*), it (the soul) is either:

Many (*kathira*)

or

One (*wahida*)

Neither this nor that is possible.

It is not possible for the soul to be present before the body.

These are the modes of the conditional conjunctives.

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<sup>129</sup> These terms are applied in Islamic law to the range of human actions.

God knows best.

### The Third Type The Conditional Disjunctive

This is what the jurists and the speculative theologians call ‘investigation and disjunction’ (*al-sabr wa-al-taqsim*) for example our saying:

The world is either pre-eternal or temporally created.

However, it is temporally created.

Therefore, it is not pre-eternal.

[p.143] Our saying either ‘pre-eternal’ or ‘temporally created’ is one premise.

Our saying: ‘However, it is temporally created’ is another premise. It is the exception (*istithna*)<sup>130</sup> of one of the two propositions (*qadiyyatay*) of the first premise in itself. Thus, the contradiction of the other [proposition] is concluded. In it four exclusions are produced.

[For instance], you say:

However, the world is temporally created.

Therefore, the following is necessary from it:

[The world] is not pre-eternal.

Or you say:

However, it is pre-eternal.

Therefore, it is necessary that it is not temporally created

Or you say:

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<sup>130</sup> Ghazali, *Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Marmura trans.), p.237 n.5.

However, it is not pre-eternal.

[p.144] Therefore, it is necessary that it is temporally created.

It is an exclusion of the contrary (*istithna' al-naqid*). Or you say:

However, it is not temporally created.

Therefore, [the following] is necessary from it:

It is pre-eternal.

The exclusion of exactly of the two, produces a contradiction of the other. The exclusion of the contradiction of one of the two, produces the very other.

This is if the parts of incompatibility were restricted to two. If they are three or more, but are completely incompatible (*tammāt al-‘inad*), then excluding one individual produces a contradiction of the other two, like your saying:

- This number is either equal to that number, less, or more.
- However, it is equal.

Therefore, it is necessary that it is neither less nor more. Excluding one of the contradictions [of the propositions] only results in restricting the truth to the other two parts, like your saying: However, it is not equal.

[p.145] Therefore, it is necessary for it to be lesser or greater.

Should you exclude the contradiction of the two elements, the third becomes assigned (*ta‘ayyan*).

However, if the parts are not completely incompatible (*tammāt al-‘inad*), like your saying:

- This is either white or black.
- or
- Zayd is either in the Hijaz or in Iraq.

Excluding a single element (*'ayn al-wahid*) results in contradicting the other, like your saying:

- However, he is in the Hijaz.
- or
- However, he is black.

Thus, it results in the contradiction of all other divisions.

As for excluding the contradiction of one, it neither produces the very other, nor its negation. There is no restriction in the divisions like your saying: He is not in the Hijaz (*laysa bi'l-Hijaz*).

This does not require his being or not being in Iraq except if the invalidity of the rest of the divisions is proven with another proof (*dalil*). Upon that the rest will become manifestly restricted (*hasr*) and completely incompatible. This will not require an example from jurisprudence, for most of the jurists' reflection deals with investigation and division [i.e., the examples from jurisprudence are widely spread].

However, in the norms of the applied law, an absolute restriction (*hasr qat'i*) is not imposed. But rather hypothetical in it is like the absolute in another.

### [p.146] The Fourth Type Concerning the Impossible Syllogism



(*qiyas al-khalf*)(alt. *al-khulf*)

Its form is similar to the categorical syllogism.

If both premises are true, then it is called an ‘ostensive syllogism (*qiyas mustaqim*).’

If one of the premises should apparently be true, and the other false or disputed, and a patently false conclusion is produced to deduce from it [the fact] that the premise is false, it is called an impossible syllogism.<sup>131</sup>

An example of this is our saying in jurisprudence:

Every [formal prayer] that is obligatory (*fard*) is not performed [while riding] a mount.

*Witr* prayer is obligatory (*fard*).

Therefore, it cannot be performed [while on a] mount.

This conclusion is false and does not appear except from a syllogism that has, among its premises, a false one.

However, our saying: Every obligation is not performed on a mount.

This is a patently true premise. The falseness remained in our saying: *Witr* prayer is obligatory (*fard*).

[p.147] Its contradiction that ‘It is not an obligation’ is truthful. This is what is required from this question.

Its counterpart in the discursive sciences is our saying:

Everything that is eternal (*azali*) is not compound (*mu'allaf*).

The world is pre-eternal.

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<sup>131</sup> Concerning true syllogisms from false premises, see Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp.76–77.

Therefore, it is not compound.

However, the conclusion is patently false, for in its premises one is false.

Our saying:

The eternal is not compound.

It is apparently truthful.

Falseness is restricted to our saying:

The world is pre-eternal.

Its contradiction is:

‘The world is not pre-eternal’ is truthful. This is what is sought.

The method of this syllogism is for you to take the adversarial position as a premise then annex another patently true premise. The result of the syllogism will be patently false. This became manifest due to the presence of one false premise among them.

[p.148] It is permitted to call this the impossible syllogism (*apogogic* syllogism)<sup>132</sup> (*qiyas al-khalf*) since you turn back from the conclusion. Then you take what you seek from the premise that you left behind as if it is sound.

It is also permitted to call this the false syllogism (*qiyas al-khulf*) since *khulf* means ‘falsehood’ which is contrary to the truth A false [premise] is subsumed among the premises as if true.

Naming of it is incontestable after understanding the meaning.

## The Fifth Type Induction

Induction is to examine many particulars (*juz'iyat*) which are subsumed under a universal sense (*ma'na kulli*) until you find a judgement concerning those particulars with which judgement is applied to that universal (*hukima 'ala dhalika al-kulli bihi*).

An example of this in the discursive sciences (*'aqliyyat*) is for one to say:

An agent in the world is a body.

It is said to him: Why?

He says: Because every agent is a body.

It is said to him: Why?

He says: I have examined types of agents, including: tailor, builder, shoemaker, carpenter, weaver, etc. and found that each is a body (*jism*). Therefore, I learned that corporeity (*jismiyya*) is a necessary judgement (*hukm lazim*) for the state of agency (*fa'il-iyya*) with which I passed judgement over each agent.

This kind of inference (*istidlal*) is not beneficial in what is sought. Therefore, we inquire:

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<sup>132</sup> Concerning this syllogism, see for instance Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p.79, *khalf/khulf* is translated as 'absurd.'

Did you examine in all of that (*fi jumlat dhalika*) the agent of the world (*fa'il al-'alam*)? If you examined it, and you found it to be a body (*jisman*), then you get to know what is sought before you examine the shoemaker, the builder, and the like. Therefore, your being pre-occupied with what is sought is being preoccupied with what does not concern you.

If you did not examine the agent of the world, and did not know its state, then why did you judge each agent to be a body? You have examined some of the agents. Therefore, it is not necessary from it (*la yalzam minhu*) except that some of the agents are a body. But rather what is necessary is [p.149] that every agent is a body, [only] if you should carefully examine all [particulars] and none of them is anomalous. Upon that what is sought will be one of the parts of that which is examined (*mutasaffah*). Therefore, it is not known with a premise built upon examination.<sup>133</sup>

Should one say: I did not examine all of them, but the majority.

We say: Why then is it not possible for all to be a body except for one? If that is possible, no certitude occurs with it? However, probability (*zann*) occurs. Therefore, it is sufficient in the applied law (*fiqhiyyat*) at first examination.

But rather analogy (*tamthil*) is sufficient as will [be discussed] later. It is the judgement of one particular over another. The transmitted judgement is three:

- 1) Judgement [transmitted] from the general to the particular. It is sound and necessary. It is the

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<sup>133</sup> Al-Farabi, *Lexicon* (Alon trans.), 2:623–624; Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 83–84.

sound syllogism which we presented.

[p.150]

- 2) Judgement from one particular (*juz'i wahid*) to another like considering the absent by the present. This is analogy as will be [mentioned] later.
- 3) Judgement [transmitted] from many particulars to a single particular. This is induction (*istiqrā'*) which is stronger than analogy.

An example of induction in jurisprudence is our saying: If *witr* prayer should be an obligation (*fard*), then it would not be performed on a mount.

It may be deduced from it as in the false analogy (*qiyas al-khulf*). It is said: With what did you know that the obligatory prayer (*fard*) is not performed on a mount?

We say: With the induction of the particulars of the obligatory prayer from supererogatory prayers (*rawatib*) and apart from it like the funeral prayer, votive prayers (lit. that which is vowed) and making-up missed prayers, etc.

The Hanafi says:

The charitable endowment in perpetuity is valid [while the endower] is alive. If it were necessary, it would not follow the stipulations of the endower [because he is not the owner anymore].

Then it is said to [the Hanafi]: Why did you say that of every necessary thing that it does not follow the condition of the contracting party?

Then he says: I have induced (*istaqraytu*) the particulars of the [resulting] necessary actions from selling, marriage, manumitting a slave, and contractual di-

voiced settlement [initiated by the wife] (*khul'*)...etc.

Whoever permits clinging to an absolute analogy (*bi'l-tamthil al-mujarrad*) for which there is no analogy, it becomes required for him. If the principles (*usul*) should multiply, then the probability would increase.

However much the manifest principles, that is the particulars (*juz'iyyat*), increased in difference, the probability in them would be greater such that if we say:

Wiping the head [in ablution] is fundamentally an obligatory practice (*wazifa asliyya*) in ritual ablutions. Repeating this action is recommended (*yustahabb*).

It is said: Why?

We said: [p.151] We inducted (*istaqrayna*) that from [the repeated] washing the face, hands, and feet. We did not have save for this induction (*istiqra'*).

The Hanafi says: Wiping that is not repeated. It is said: Why? He said: I induced [non-repetition from the singularity of] wiping in dry ablution (*mash al-tayammum*) and the wiping of footwear (*mash al-khuff*).

His presumption (*zann*) is stronger due to proof (*dalala*) of two different parts for it.

As for three [bodily] organs in ablution, they form a single testimony due to their homogeneity: It is like the [single] testimony of the face, the right hand and the left in dry ablution.

Then why is it not said to the jurist: Your induction (*istiqra'*) is incomplete. Why have you not examined the location of the disagreement?

Answer: Verily, induction falling short of reaching perfection necessitates inability of the conviction (*i'tiqad*) to attain certitude (*yaqin*). It did not necessitate the possibility of remaining [equally] balanced as it was previously. But

rather it determined selectively on the basis of probability (*bi'l-zann*) of one of two possibilities. In jurisprudence probability is sufficient. Confirming one according to many particular propositions is more probable (*aghlab*) than it being exceptionally [acknowledged] based on rarity. (*mustathna 'ala al-nudur*).

If we do not have evidence (*dalil*) that the *witr* prayer is obligatory [*wajib*], and that endowment [while still alive] is necessary, and saw the permissibility of performing it (i.e., *witr*) on a mount—there is no knowledge of it being an obligation (*fard*), and the obligation to fulfil the condition of the endower nor is there knowledge of it being a necessary act (*tasarruf lazim*), then excluding the obligatory [status of *witr*] and the necessity [of fulfilling the endower's conditions], have become more probable (*aghlab 'ala al-zann*) and more likely (*arjah*) than its contrary (*naqid*).

The possibility of disagreement does not conjecture, nor is there a way to deny the possibility so long as the induction is incomplete.

It is insufficient for the completion of induction to examine (*tatasaffah*) what you found attesting to the judgement (*shahidan 'ala al-hukm*) if it is possible for onething could be removed (i.e., does not fit into the induced generalization) (*yunqal*) from it.

Just as if a person passes judgement that every animal moves its lower jaw upon chewing since he induced the many types of animals. However, he did not see all the types of animals. He cannot ruleout that at sea there is an animal, a crocodile, moves its upper jaw, according to what is said.

Should he judge that any other animal except man, has dorsoventral copulation with the female of the species with-

out [meeting] face to face, he cannot rule out that the mounting of the hedgehog to be face to face. However, he did not witness it.

[p.152] Therefore, the result of this is that complete induction yields certitude and the incomplete (*naqis*) yields probability (*zann*).

Therefore, induction is not beneficial if there are differences regarding any particulars, for the induction does not yield universal knowledge by the fixing of the judgement to the meaning which brings the particulars together until it becomes a premise in another syllogism, not in fixing the judgement for one of the particulars (*juz'iyyat*). As we say:

- Every movement takes place in time (*fi zaman*).
- Everything in time is temporally created.
- Therefore, movement is temporally created.

We have proven our saying: “Every movement takes place in time” by surveying the types of movement, including swimming, flying, walking, etc.

If we wish to prove that swimming occurs temporally with this induction, it will not be complete.

Exactitude (*dabt*): The proposition (*qadiyya*) that is known through induction.

If a judgement is determined to its predicate which exceeds (*yata'adda*) to its subject, then there is no problem (*la ba's*). Should its predicate be conveyed to one of the particulars of the subject, then this would not be possible since the outcome is part of the same induction. Therefore, the syllogism is no longer beneficial (*fa-tasqut fa'idat al-qiyas*).

Should our goal be for instance to demonstrate whether or not the power of the intellect discerning of intelligibles (*al-quwwa al-'aqliyya al-mudrika lil-ma'qulat*) is impressed



(*muntaba'a*) in the body, we say that it is not impressed in the body since it realises itself (*tudrik nafsaha*) while the faculties impressed in the body do not perceive themselves.

Then it is said: Why did you say that the faculties impressed in the bodies do not perceive themselves?

[p.153] We say: We have examined the human perceptive faculties like sight, sound, smell, taste, touch, imagination, and estimation (*wahm*) and found that they do not perceive themselves.

Then it is said: Have you examined, along with these, the faculty of intellect?

If you examined it, you will know it before this proof (*dalil*) which you do not need, even if you did not know it. This is what is sought. Rather you did not examine everything, but some [of the evidence]. Then why have you applied this judgement to everything? How is it that is unlikely for all the impressed faculties to not know themselves except in one instance? Therefore, there is one judgement in contradiction to the universal judgement (*bi-khilaf hukm al-jumla*). This is possible as we mentioned in the example of the crocodile and the hedgehog and in the example of whoever alleges that the Creator of the world is a body (*jism*).

Whoever possesses neither hearing nor sight will perhaps pass judgement that the sense does not realise something except by connecting with it with evidence (*dalil*) of taste, touch, and smell. Were that made to [connect with] sound and sight, it will be an error.

It is said: Why is it impossible for the senses to be divided into that which needs connection with the perceived (*mahsus*) and that which does not need?

If division is permitted, it is permitted for the two parts

to be in a state of equilibrium.

It is permissible for the greater to be in one of the two parts and in the other part there remains only one. Therefore, this does not produce certitude. Perhaps it instigates probability. Perhaps it persuades in such a way that belief precedes it to its acceptance and continues with it.

### [p.154] The Sixth Type Analogy (*Tamthil*)

This is what jurists call ‘*qiyas*’ and scholastic theologians (*mutkallimun*) call ‘returning that which is absent to that which is witnessed.’ (*radd al-gha’ib ila al-shahid*).<sup>134</sup>

Its meaning: A judgement exists in two parts of a particular instance (*mu’ayyan wahid*). Its judgement is then transferred to another part which resembles it in a particular aspect (*wajh ma*).

An example of this is in the matters of reason (*‘aqliyyat*), is for us to say:

The sky is temporally created since it is a body analogous (*qiyas an ‘ala*) to the plant and the animal and these bodies whose temporal creation is witnessed.

This is not sound so long as it is not possible to show that the plant is temporally created. It is because it is a body and its corporeity (*jismiyya*) is the middle term for temporal creation (*al-hadd al-awsat lil-huduth*).

If that is confirmed, then you know that the animal is temporally created because the body is temporally created. It is a universal judgement (*hukm kulli*).

From it an analogy is ordered in the form (*hay’a*) of the first syllogistic figure (*al-shakl al-awwal*) which is as

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<sup>134</sup> Janssens, pp. 50-51.

follows:

- The sky is a body.
- Every body is temporally created.

Therefore, the result is:

- The sky is temporally created.

Therefore, the judgement passes from universal to particular, subsuming itself to it. It is sound.

The impact of the specific present thing is abolished. Mention of the animal is superfluous speech just as it is said to a person:

Why did you set out to sea?

[p.155] He said: So that I can become wealthy.

It is said to him: Why did you say that if you set out to sea you would become wealthy?

He said: Since that Jew set out to sea and became wealthy.

It is said: But you are not Jewish. Then it is not necessary to affirm the judgement concerning him and apply it to you.

Nothing will rectify [the matter] except for him to say: He did not strike it rich because he is Jewish, but because he set out to sea as a trader.

Then we say: Mention of the Jew is padding. But rather the way for you to say is as follows:

Whoever sets out to sea becomes wealthy.

I also set out to sea to become wealthy.

The impact of the Jew in the syllogism is dropped. Therefore, there is no good to be had in returning that

which is absent to that which is witnessed except on a condition, whenever it is fulfilled the impact of the specified witness is dropped.

Then in this condition is a place for error also. Perhaps the collective meaning is what displays its influence (*athar*) and sufficiency (*ghina*) in the judgement. Then it is thought to be sound (*salih*) when it is not, since the judgement is not necessary by itself but rather for being in a concealed state (*hal khafiyy*).

The individual essences (*a'yan*) of the testimonies (*shawahid*) contain hidden planes (*safhat khafiyya*). Therefore, it is necessary to reject (*ittirah*) the specific testimony (*al-shahid al-mu'ayyan*). Therefore, you say:

The sky is temporally created since it is associated with temporal creations (*hawadith*) like the animal.

Then you must reject mentioning the animal since it is said to you: The animal is a temporal creation by virtue of it merely being associated with temporal creations. Then reject the animal and say:

Everything associated (*muqaran*) with temporal creations is a temporal creation. The sky is associated. Therefore, it is a temporal creation. Perhaps with that the opponent will forbid the major premise. Therefore, it is unsound that:

Everything associated with temporal creations is a temporal creation except according to a certain aspect (*wajh makhsus*).

If you allowed that the necessitor of temporal creation its state is associated with a certain aspect, perhaps that aspect (you do not realise it), is present in the animal and not in the sky.

If you know that, then make it manifest, annex it to the

associated thing, make it a universal proposition and say:  
Everything associated with temporal creations with  
such and such an attribute is temporally created.  
[p.156] The sky is associated with such and such at-  
tribute.

Therefore, it is temporally created.

Concerning all states, there is no benefit in determining  
in the discursive sciences a particular testimony (*shahid*) to  
serve as a basis for a syllogism (*li-yuqas 'alayhi*).

Similar to this is your saying:

God is knowledgeable of a certain knowledge (*'alim  
bi-'ilm*) not in Himself. If He were a possessor of  
knowledge he would possess a certain knowledge  
analogous to that of a person (*qiyas 'ala al-insan*).

It is said: Why did you say that what is attributed to the  
person is attributed to God?

Then you say: That is because the cause (*'illa*) is [mu-  
tually] common (*jami'a*).

Then it is said: [Is the] cause his being a learned person  
(*insanan 'aliman*) or his being learned only?

If he is a learned person (*insanan 'aliman*), then the same  
is not necessary in the case of God.

If he is learned (*'aliman*) only, then leave out [the word]  
'person (*insan*)' and say:

Every knower is a knower possessing knowledge (*'ali-  
man bi-'ilm*).

The Creator is a Knower (*'alim*)

Therefore, He possesses knowledge.

With that there is disagreement in your saying [the following]: Every knower possesses knowledge (*'alim bi-'ilm*).

If that is not a primary statement (*awwaliyyan*) then it is inevitably necessary to demonstrate it with another syllogism.

If it is said: Is it possible to confirm the state of the connotational attribute (*ma'na*) which generalises (*jami'*) a cause (*'illa*) for judgement in such a way that we see the judgement is abolished with its abolishment?

We say: No, the judgement is abolished with the abolishment of some of the parts of the cause and its conditions. It (i.e., the judgement) is not present with the presence of some.

Whenever life is eliminated, man is eliminated.

Whenever life becomes existent (*wujidat*), it is not necessary for man to be existent. Perhaps a horse or something else would be existent.

However, the matter is contrary to that: Whenever a judgement is brought into existence, it indicates the existence of the general connotational attribute (*wujud al-ma'na al-jami'*).

The existence of the connotational attribute (*ma'na*) does not indicate the existence of the judgement merely with the existence of the eliminated judgement with the connotational attribute's abolishment.

Whenever the person becomes existent, life exists.

[p.157] Whenever the soundness of prayer exists, a condition exists which is ritual purity (*tahara*).

Whenever the soundness of ritual purity exists, it does not necessitate the existence of prayer.

If it is said: What you have mentioned concerning invali-

dating (*ibtal*) the benefit of that which is witnessed (*shahid*) in returning to it that which is absent (*gha'ib*) is definitive (*maqtu' bihi*).

So how is it presumed that given the numerous speculative theologians (*mutakallimin*) and the soundness of their intellects that there is inattention about that?

We said: Believing something to be true (*mu'taqad al-sihha*) in returning that which is absent to that which is witnessed is in one of two ways:

- 1) Either realised (*muhayyiq*) which returns to what we mentioned upon request (*mutalaba*). The specific thing that is witnessed is mentioned to alert the listener to the universal proposition concerning it (*al-qadiyya al-kulliyah bihi*).

[For instance,] one says: A person possesses knowledge but not about himself, alerting with it that one possessing knowledge does not understand anything of its connotational attribute (*ma'na*) except that he possesses knowledge. Therefore, 'the person' is mentioned in order to draw attention (*tanbihan*).

or

- 2) Someone falling short in reaching the pinnacle of realisation (*dharwat al-tahqiq*). Perhaps [this person] assumes (*zanna*) that there is proof (*dalil*) in mentioning the specific thing that is witnessed (*shahid mu'ayyan*).

The origin of his assumption consists of two issues: First, whoever sees the builder an actor (*fa'ilan*) and a body (*jisman*) perhaps generalises that one who undertakes an

action (*fa'il*) is a body (*jism*). [This word] “Al-fa'il” (with the definite article) (i.e., whoever undertakes an action) creates the illusion of exhaustiveness (*istighbraq*) especially in the language of the Arabs. It is among the indefinite propositions (*muhmalat*). It is possible to be forgiving with (*yutasamah*) the indefinite propositions. Whoever undertakes an action is taken as a proposition, the indefinite propositions are taken as universal, and whoever undertakes an action is ordered as a syllogism (*qiyasan*).

He says:

Whoever undertakes an action is a body.

The Maker of the world undertakes an action.

Therefore, He is a body.

Perhaps one looks at wheat and sees it edible (*mat'um*) and usurious (*rabawi*).<sup>135</sup> Then he says: That which is edible is usurious. He adds to it the saying:

The quince is edible.

Therefore, it is usurious.

This is because he confuses his saying: ‘edible [foodstuff] (*mat'um*)’ with ‘everything that is edible (*kull mat'um*).’

Therefore, should the keen verifier (*muhaqqiq*) hear him, he would distinguish between [them] and say:

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<sup>135</sup> Abu Sa'id Al-Khudriyy narrated a *hadith* in which the Prophet Muhammad singled out “staple foods” including wheat, barley, dates and salt as being usurious if traded with the same kind, such as wheat for wheat, where there is surplus. See for instance, Muslim, *Sahih, Kitab al-Musaqat*, Bab al-sarf wa bay' al-dhahab bi'l-waraq naqdan, no. 2969:

[http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=1&bo\\_ohad=2969](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=1&bo_ohad=2969)



By your saying ‘the edible [foodstuff],’ did you mean every [foodstuff] that is edible?

[p.158] Or some?

Should you say some of it, perhaps the quince is from the ‘other some.’ However, should you say all of it, then from where did you know that?

Should you say from the wheat, then wheat is not all edibles. Should you see it as usurious, then it is not necessary, except that all wheat is usurious and quince is not wheat. Or ‘some of the edible [foodstuff]’ is usurious. Another [part] is not required from it.

Likewise, his saying: Whoever undertakes an action is a body.

He is asked: All who undertake an action or some of them? as was affirmed. There is no need to repeat [this].

The second of the two [categories] is that perhaps he will induce (*yastaqri*) from those who undertake an action (*fa‘ilin*) until he has no other one who undertakes an action remains unaccounted for. Then he sees that has induced (*istaqra’a*) all those who undertake an action and generalises the saying: Everyone who undertakes an action is a body.

Truthfully, he should have said: Every thing that I witnessed and examined is a body.

Then it is said to him: You did not witness the Maker of the world over which judgement is not possible (*la yumkin al-hukm ‘alayhi*). His statement that ‘he witnessed’ is annulled.

Thus, he contemplates wheat, barley and the rest of the edible foodstuffs that are weighed and measured. He expresses these foodstuffs with the word ‘all’ (*al-kull*) and orders in his mind an analogy (*qiyas*) according to the first figure (*al-shakl al-awwal*) which is:

Every edible foodstuff is either wheat, barley or something else.

Every wheat and barley or something else is usurious.

Therefore, every edible foodstuff is usurious.

Then he says: Quince is an edible foodstuff.

Therefore, it is usurious.

This is the starting point of his error. Otherwise, the truth is what we have presented.

You ought not to lose the intelligible truth (*haqq ma'qul*) out of fear of opposing the well-known customs but rather the famous customs are mainly interpolated (*madkhula*). However, commonly accepted notions are their interpolations to the extent that only very few pay attention to them.

[p.159] Generally you ought not to define the truth by men but rather men by the truth. Therefore, you must be cognizant of the truth first. Whoever goes down the [path of] truth, know that he is right (*muhiqq*).

As for believing beforehand that a person is right; then you define the truth by him; this is the error (*dalal*) of the Jews and Christians and all the other imitators of [religious authority] (*muqallidin*). May God the Exalted vouchsafe you and us from it. Imitators

All the aforementioned [discussion] concerns annulling the analogy in the rational propositions (*'aqliyyat*).

As for the applied law (*fiqhiyyat*), it is permitted for a specified particular (*juz'i mu'ayyan*) to transmit its judgement to another particular by virtue of their both sharing a common description.

That common description (*wasf mushtarak*) necessitates equivocity (*ishtirak*) in the judgement if a proof indicates it (*idha dalla 'alayhi dalil*). Its general proofs (*adilla jumliyya*) before division are six:

**The First Proof:** It is the highest. It is when the possessor of the judgement, who is the lawgiver, to it (*wa huwa al-musharri'*) like his saying concerning the cat:

'It is among the animals that go round among you'<sup>136</sup>  
when mentioning permissibility [of using] the leftover  
it leaves behind.

[p.160] You draw an analogy for it with the mouse by generalising with the category of 'going round' even if both differ. This gets startled, and that is friendly, This is a mouse, and that is a cat.

However, equivocity in a description to which the judgement was added is more likely (*ahra*) in compulsoriness of the equivocity in the judgement rather than divergence a description that was not addressed as a justification for divergence. Thus he says concerning selling fresh dates (*rutab*) in exchange for dried dates (*tamr*). Does the [volume] of fresh dates decrease if they are dried?

It is said: Yes.

Then he says: Do not sell.

Therefore, he added the invalidity (*butlan*) of selling the

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<sup>136</sup> The first part of this tradition is that cats are not ritually impure. See for instance, Tirmidhi, *Sunan, Kitab al-Tahara 'an Rasul Allah Salla Allahu 'alayhi wa Sallam*, Bab ma ja'a fi su'r al-hirra, no. 92:

[http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=2&bo\\_ohhad=92](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=2&bo_ohhad=92); Abu Dawud, *Sunan, Kitab al-Tahara*, Bab su'r al-hirra, no. 75:

[http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=4&bo\\_ohhad=75](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=4&bo_ohhad=75).

fresh dates to the expected diminishment [in volume].

The same syllogism applies to grapes [that it cannot be exchanged for raisins] because it shares [the quality] of expected reduction in volume.

Asking the question about fresh dates about grapes is not prohibited even if one is grapes and the other is fresh dates. This is because this is a difference in name and outer form.

The Divine Law takes into account the connotational attributes (*ma'ani*) a lot, which is not the case with outer forms (*suwar*) and names (*asma'*). This norm of divine law gives preponderance in our presumption of equivocality (*tashrik*) in the judgement upon participating in that to which the judgement is annexed. Verifying the probability (*tahqiq al-zann*) in this matter is precise. The place of examining it is jurisprudence.

The **Second Proof** is for the conjunction (*ijtima'*) to be commensurate (*munasib*) with the judgement like our saying:

[Non-grape] wine (*nabidh*) is intoxicating. Therefore, it is forbidden like grape wine (*khamr*).

Should it be said: Why did you say that: The intoxicant is forbidden? (*al-muskir yuharram*)? impair

We say because it makes the intellect which guides to the truth stop functioning. It is what is necessary to be legally accountable (lit. completes legal accountability). Therefore, this is appropriate to investigate the common interests (*masalih*).

Then it is said: It is not logically impossible (*la yumtana'*) that the Divine Law took into account (*ra'a*) the intoxicant quality of that which is expressed from grapes in parti-

cular [p.161] especially as [an act of] devout worship or established prohibition (*tabrim*) not because of the cause of intoxication but as an act of devout worship concerning the wine of the grape without giving consideration (*iltifat*) to intoxication. How many of the judgements concerning devout worship are unintelligible?

Then he says: This is not impossible (*ghayr mumtani*).

Tet, the predominant in the Divine Law's custom is following the common interests (*ittiba' al-masalih*). This being [considered] predominant (*min qabil al-akthar*) is more probable (*aghlab 'ala al-zann*) than being by way of what is rare (*nadir*).

**The Third Proof** is for the general description (*al-wasf al-jami'*) to show causal efficacy (*ta'thir*) in a location without analogy (*min ghayr munasaba*). As the Hanafi [jurist] says concerning the state of being an orphan girl (*al-yatimiyya*): She is a minor child. Therefore, she ought to have a guardian (*yuwalla 'alayha*) like the non-orphaned [minor children].

Then it is said: Why have you explained custodianship [with the example] of youth?

Then he says: The [description] of youth has appeared as acknowledged by all (*bi'l-ittifaq*) concerning other than the orphan girl and concerning one's [biological] son.

It is judged (*quddira*) that the description is not relevant for the analogy to continue. Therefore, it is not necessary to say:

This is an orphan girl and this here is not an orphan girl.

Therefore, it is said: An invalidating difference (*iftiraq*) in this (i.e., orphanism) does not carry the equivocity (*ish-tirak*) in the description of youth. Its influence appears elsewhere. Orphanism did not appear elsewhere as acknowl-

edged by all.

Yes, if it is established that the orphan does not need a guardian over his property, both sides of the argument (i.e., orphanism and youth) will be even.

If it said: The impact of orphanhood has also appeared in supporting [the argument for] guardianship (*daf' al-wilaya*) in a location as the influence of youth appeared in a location. With that preponderance is required (*tarjih*).

Should you wish, you would compare (*maththalta*) this division with the analogy of the grapes and the fresh dates and their conjunction (*ijtima'*) in the expectation of decrease [in volume]. It is supposed (*yuqaddar*) that that is not a verbal relation (*idafa lafziyya*) from the Lawgiver. Rather it is known by agreement of the two groups so that it does not join with the analogy of the relation (*mithal al-idafa*).

**The Fourth Proof** is for what contains equivocity not to be enumerated (*ma'dud*) or detailed (*mufassal*) since it is the majority, and for what contains difference to be a single thing.

It is known that the genus of the connotational attribute (*jins al-ma'na*) which contains difference has no bearing on this judgement however much commentary is turned to. It is like the [Prophet's] saying:

The Prophet ﷺ said: 'Whoever manumits his share of a jointly possessed slave, it is essential for him to manumit the slave completely if he has sufficient money. [Otherwise his value should be estimated justly and then he is to be given the opportunity to work [for the amount that will secure his freedom]

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<sup>137</sup> The text of the *hadith* is incorrectly rendered by Ghazali. The translation has

without overburdening him with work.]<sup>137</sup>

Verily, [p.162] we apply the [same] analogy to the bondswoman (*ama*), not that we came to know the conjunction [of both the slave and the bondswoman] in an imagined connotational attribute, or one that is influenced (*mu'ath-thar*) or to which the judgement is added with its expression (*lafz*).

This is because he has not yet proved to us its imagined connotational attribute. This is not because we only saw them both as in close proximity to each other.

Should the matter of marriage guardianship (*wilayat al-nikah*) be examined and the state of being forbidden required marriage, it is not explicit that “slave” shares the same connotational meaning, and proximity to both sides all in the same way (*'ala watira wahida*).

However, should we turn to the custom of the law (*'adat al-shar'*), the judgement concerning slavery and manumission does not change due to masculinity and femininity, nor does it change due to blackness and whiteness, tallness and shortness, time and place, and other such examples.

**The Fifth Proof** is the same as the fourth but what contains invalidating difference (*iftiraq*) is not known with certitude whether or not there is an inroad for it in the judgement. But rather a manifest probability (*zannan zahiran*) is

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been corrected and the tradition reproduced in its entirety from Al-Bukhari, *Sahih, Kitab al-Sharika*, Bab taqwim al-ashya' bayna al-shuraka' bi-qimat 'adl, no. 2323: [http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display\\_hbook.php?hflag=1&bk\\_no=146&pid=100837](http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?hflag=1&bk_no=146&pid=100837)

See also a variation on this *hadith* in Muslim, *Sahih, Kitab al-'Itq*, Bab dhikr si'ayat al-'abd, no. 2768 where the passive verb *ustus'iya* which means that the slave is given the opportunity to work to secure the means to manumit himself:

[http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display\\_hbook.php?bk\\_no=158&chid=2768&pid=107155](http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?bk_no=158&chid=2768&pid=107155).

assumed like our analogy of annexing manumission to a specific part (*juz' mu'ayyan*) over annexing it to a non-differentiated half (*nisf sha'i'*) and the analogy of divorce annexed to a specific part over annexing it to a non-differentiated half.

Therefore, we say: The cause (*sabab*) is the cause; the judgement is the judgement and the conjunction (*ijtima'*) is complete except in one thing, namely this one is specific and is indicated and that one is non-differentiated.

If the modes of comportment (*tasarruf*) are not limited to what is annexed to it, then it would be remote for there to be for the possibility of indication and its opposite an entryway into this judgement.

This is manifest probability. However, its opposite is possible. The Sacred Law has made the common part a receptacle for some modes of comportment (*ba'd al-tasarrufat*). However, it did not make the specific a receptacle originally. So it is not remote that it would make that which is a receptacle for some modes of comportment a receptacle for annexing to it these modes of comportment. Therefore, investigating this possibility become probable (*zanniyyan*). The jurists who exercise independent reasoning (*ijtihad*) in the interpretation of Islamic law (*mujtahidun*) differed in accepting that, and in my view this genus (*jins*) contains what may be judged, but it refers to the levels of preponderance, which results in undefined and unlimited disparities, and differs in occurrences (*waqa'i'*) and principles (*ahkam*). The matter is entrusted to the jurist who exercises independent reasoning (*ijtihad*) in the interpretation of Islamic law (*mujtahid*); if one of his two opinions is prepon-

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<sup>138</sup> The editor's rendering of this paragraph is unsound. I have utilized the 1927 Kurdi edition to translate this passage, p. 111.



derant, then it is permitted for him to judge by it.<sup>138</sup>

**The Sixth Proof** is for the collective meaning (*ma'na jami'*) to be a specific matter (*amr mu'ayyan*) or matters. The collective does not have a relationship or influence [p.163] except if the collective makes believe that the concealed beneficial connotational attribute that is taken into consideration from the perspective of the Sacred Law is deposited within.

It being deposited in that connotational attribute which demands judgement (*muqtadi lil-hukm*) with God is more probable (*aghlab*) than containing the connotational attribute which contains opposition (*mufaraqa*).

The judgement of equivocity (*ishtirak*) concerning that is more likely (*awla*) than the judgement of invalidating difference (*iftiraq*).

An example of that is our saying: Ablution (*wudu'*) is a decreed act of ritual purification (*tahara hukmiyya*) because of acts that nullify purification [such as relieving oneself or having an intimate relation with one's spouse].

This lacks intention (*niyya*) as in the example of dry ablution (*tayammum*).

They are both equivocal in this.

However, they differ in that the former ritual purification is with water [not so with] dry ablution. It resembles it in eliminating impurities.

Our saying 'a decreed act of ritual purification (*tahara hukmiyya*)' [from impurity] encompasses dry ablution (*tayammum*). It caused the removal of impurities to go out.

We say that which necessitates intention (*muqtada al-niyya*) in the knowledge of God the Exalted is a meaning hidden from us. Comparing it to the decreed act of ritual

purification is considered significant (*yu'tadd bihi*), necessary in its place of necessity, more probable (*aghlab*) from its being associated with its being ritual purification with soil. Ablution is then annexed to it and more overwhelmingly probable than detaching it (i.e. dry ablution) from it.

There is a difference of opinion concerning this too.

We are of the view that that is conceptualised as benefitting the preponderance (*rajhan*) of conjecture over conjecture. That is entrusted to the jurist who exercises independent reasoning (*mawkul ila al-mujtahid*). In the biographies of the Companions that did not appear in appending that which does not enjoy textual reference with that which does except taking into account the majority of probabilities. Moreover, there are no further regulators (*dawabit*) after that in detailed qualification of the perceptual means of the suppositions (*madarik al-zunun*). Everything that is regulated with it is arbitrariness (*tahakkum*).

Perhaps he would make a mistake in supporting this genus. Then it is said: Ablution (*wudu'*) is [an act of] nearness [to God] (*qurba*).

Then the aspect of the relationship of nearness [to God] (*qurba*) to intention (*niyya*) is mentioned. This is abandoning this path by inclining towards the relation. Perhaps [the jurist] will err in making their side victorious. Then he says:

This is ritual purification with water.

Water is itself a purifier, as it is itself a thirst quencher.

It is called a relationship (*munasaba*). Then he abandons the similar difference (*farq shibhi*) as what we have men-

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<sup>139</sup> Sayf al-Din Al-Amidi, *Al-Ibkam fi Usul al-Abkam*. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1985, pp. 257-259.

tioned is abandonment of the collective similar (*jam‘ shibhi*).<sup>139</sup>

The noun ‘*al-shibh*’ in the language of most of the jurists is specified by comparison (*tashbih*) with the like of these [p.164] descriptions which it is not possible to affirm with the aforementioned perceptibles (*madarik*) even if not attaching to the imagination is similar (*tashbihan*). However, the expression was specified by it (i.e. *al-shibh*). It does not contain except for a semblance (*shibh*). Likewise, they specified [the word] (understanding (*mafhum*)) for a *fortiori* signification of the narrative despite the fact that the word ‘manzum (ordered) also has an understanding (*mafhum*). However, the a *fortiori* signification does not have order (*manzum*) but only ‘*mafhum* (understanding).’ It was named after it.

When we saw the reliance (*ta‘wil*) on the likes of this description whose attribute (*munasaba*) does not appear permitted by supposition alone (*mujarrad al-zann*), and suppositions differ according to the circumstances of the jurists who exercise independent reasoning (*ijtihad*) in the interpretation of Islamic law (*mujtahids*) to the extent that something might instigate the supposition of one jurist but itself does not instigate the supposition of another. [Moreover,] this thing does not possess a standard (*mi‘yar*) for both disputants (*mutanazi‘an*) to turn to in the arguments of discussion.

We have seen that what is necessary in the convention (*istilah*) of the debaters (*mutanazirin*) is what the forebearers from among the master jurists employed as a convention excluding that which those who followed them originated (*ahdathahu*). [The latter includes] whoever alleges that [he possesses] mastery in jurisprudence by seeking

to fix the cause with an appropriate attribute [for analogy] (*ithbat al-'illa bi-munasaba*), legal effect (*ta'thir*), or linguistic transformation (*ihala*). Rather our view is for the opposer to restrict himself to the question of the proponent (*mu'allil*): Of what kind is this analogy of yours?

If it is of the kind 'commensurate (*munasib*),' 'efficient cause (*mu'aththir*),' or the rest of the aspects, then do show which mode.

If it is a pure semblance in a description that does not contain a visible relationship (*munasiba zahira*) and you believe that it contains concealed meaning, I do not ask you but rather I confront you with the descriptions that make the fundamental principle (*asl*) and the corollary principle (*far'*) differ. Whatever is not analogous (*ma la yunasib*), if it should be valid for combination, the same is valid for separation (*farq*).

[p.165] With this question, the proponent is exposed in his analogy which he undertook. If its universal meaning (*ma'na jami'*) was a pure co-extensiveness (*tard mahd*),<sup>140</sup> it is not a valid analogy (*la yunasib*) and inclusion is not imagined upon an obscure analogy (*munasib mubham*).

If what the questioner is faced with is a pure co-extensiveness which does not [prompt] conceptualising a matter (*amr*), then the claimant (*mu'allil*) must give preponderance (*yurajjih*) in favour of [the questioner's] position (lit. side) (*janib*).

Likewise, if he should distinguish between dry ablution (*tayammum*) and wet ablution (*wudu'*), dry ablution includes two [body] parts and the latter includes four. This

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<sup>140</sup> *Tard*: In Islamic law 'whenever the cause is present, the legal qualification is present.'

[person] knows that it is not possible for the likes of him to have an entryway (*madkhal*) into the judgement not by himself nor by adhering to another meaning which has an entryway which encompasses it, along with his imagining the contrary to our saying: It is ritual purity (*tahara*).

This is the means of theoretical inquiry (*tariq al-nazar*) into jurisprudential principles (*fiqhiyyat*).

Among the People of Opinion (*ashab al-ra'y*)<sup>141</sup> is one who ventured into jurisprudence and took to the extremities of the discursive sciences, without limiting them.<sup>142</sup> He begins to void most of the types of analogies and to limit them to 'the efficient cause (*mu'aththir*),' and direct the rational posing of questions (*mutalaba 'aqliyya*) to everything to which he adheres in jurisprudence.

When he finishes by granting victory to his school of thought in a detailed exposition, he becomes impotent in taking a decision according to the condition which he established when laying down the foundational principles (*ta'sil*). Then he searches for strategies (*yahtal*) to grant victory to the base generalisations (*tardiyyat radiyya*) with varieties of corrupt imaginings which he calls the efficient cause (*mu'aththir*).

He pays no attention to the feebleness (*rakaka*) of those corrupt imaginings (*khayalat fasida*). Nor does he re-consider and pay heed to the corruption of the fundamental principle which he created. Then the corruption summoned him to be selective (*iqtisar*) in applying the judgement by way of the efficient cause or the commensurate (analogy) (*munasib*). He continues to fumble about.

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<sup>141</sup> Proponents of the use of opinion in legal decisions.

<sup>142</sup> The translation of this sentence is based on the 1927 edition, p. 113 where the text has: 'sada atrafan min al-'aqliyyat wa lam yukhmirha.'

A rebuttal to him concerning the detailed exposition of what he mentions of legal questions is contained in our works produced about the disagreements in matters of jurisprudence (*khilafiyat al-fiqh*) especially [the following]: *The Book of Fortifying the Reproach* (*Kitab Tahsin al-Ma'khadh*)<sup>143</sup> and the *Principles and Objectives* (*Al-Mabadi' wa'l-Ghayat*).

The object now from mentioning it is that the thorough examination (*istiqsa'*) which we mentioned concerning the discursive sciences (*'aqliyyat*) ought to be abandoned immediately in jurisprudential matters. Mixing the path that leads to seeking certitude with the path that leads to seeking probability (*zann*) is an action of one who treaded part of both paths, without mastering either of them (*lam yastaqilla bihima*). Rather you ought to learn that certitude in the theoretical sciences (*nazariyyat*) is among the rarest of things in existence.

As for supposition it is the easiest to attain and acquire.

The probabilities that are considered in juridical matters (*fiqhiyyat*) are the selectively determining factor (*murajjih*) with which matters are facilitated upon hesitation between [selecting] two things: approach or avoidance (*iqdam aw ihjam*).

People take initiative in experiential positions (*turuq al-tajarib*), holding onto the commodities (*sila'*) waiting for an opportunity or selling them out of fear they will depreciate in value, choosing one of two ways in their travels but in every action for which the person hesitates between two positions, they are all based on a probability (*'ala zann*).

[p.166] Should the intelligent person (*'aqil*) hesitate between two matters and they are both equal with him in his

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<sup>143</sup> Also referred to in the plural as 'Al-Ma'akhidh.'

objective, selecting is not facilitated unless one of them gains preponderance (*yatarajjah ahaduhuma*), seeing it more correct in the imagination (*mukhayyala*) or through a proof (*dalala*).

The measure (*qadr*) which gives preponderance to one of the two sides is a probability of it (*zannun lahu*). All of the juristic matters are theoretical inquiries from the *mujtahids* that aim at benefitting creation (*islah al-khalq*). These probabilities (*zunun*) and the like take advantage (*taqtanisu*) of the nearest imagination or least circumstances (*aqall qarina*). Upon this [probability] all the wise rely in their approach and avoidance of [in addressing] dangerous matters in this world.

That measure (*qadr*) is sufficient in legal matters. Constriction and thorough examination (*istiqlsa'*) in it distort its intent, but rather void it. Likewise, thorough examination in commercial dealings is a similitude which transgresses the intent of commercial dealing.

If it is said to a man: Travel so that you make a profit.

Then he said: How shall I know (lit. with what) that if I should travel, I will make a profit?

Then it is said: Take [example from] so-and-so and so-and-so.

Then he said: Opposite them are so-and-so and so-and-so who might have died along the way or were killed or [brigands] waylaid them.

Then it is said: However, those who have made a profit are more numerous than those who have made a loss or were killed.

Then he says: What is the hindrance to my being from among those who make a loss, or are killed or die? How do I benefit from the profit of others if I am from among

them (i.e., those who do not make it)?

This is a thorough examination (*istiqla*) seeking certainty. The one under consideration does not engage in commercial transactions nor does he make a profit. The likes of this man is considered overconcerned or a coward. The judgement is applied the cowardly trader does not make a profit.

This is the example of thorough examination (*istiqla*) in jurisprudential matters, and it is sheer obsession, and foolish.

Likewise abandoning thorough examination (*istiqla*) in certain rational matters (*al-'aqliyyat al-yaqiniyya*) is utter ignorance.

Let every thing be taken from its premise (*ma'akhadh*). Stupidity (*khurq*) in thorough examination is not in the place of its abandonment less than foolishness (*humq*) in abandoning it where it is required. God knows best.

### [p.167] The Seventh Type Concerning Compound<sup>144</sup> and Defective Syllogisms

Know that the syllogistic expressions that are employed in addresses and instructions and in books and collections are not summarised mainly according to what we have described but rather they might deviate from it:

1) Either through deficiency

or

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<sup>144</sup> For the compound syllogism, see for instance Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp.72-73.



2) Increase

or

3) Compounding and mixing a genus with another

This matter ought not to cause you confusion with your considering that which deviates from what we mentioned is not a syllogism. But rather the eye of your intellect should be restricted to the meaning (*ma'na*) and turned toward it and not to the verbal forms (*ashkal lafziyya*).

Every speech that has the potential to attain its desired goal and to return to the syllogism which we mentioned, its power is that of syllogism, it being a proof (*hujja*) even if its composition is other than that which we presented.

Every speech that is composed according to the aspect which we have presented except if it is pondered and examined, and no conclusion is attained from it, then this is not a proof (*hujja*).

As for the type which deviates [by being] deficient, we abandon one of the two premises (*muqaddimatayn*) or the result (*natija*):

[p.168] Abandoning the major premise like for example your saying:

These two are equal. [conclusion]

This is because both are equal to one thing. [minor premise]

Then I have mentioned the minor premise and the result and abandoned the major premise as your saying:

The things which are equal to a single thing are equal.

With it is a complete syllogism (*tamam al-qiyas*).

[The minor premise] might be abandoned due to its clarity. Thus are most of the syllogisms in the books and speeches. You might abandon the major premise if what is intended is concealment so that falsehood remains hidden within. If it should become manifest, then the one who is addressed would be alert to the location of the falsehood. An example of this is like your saying:

This person in this citadel is a traitor. He will surrender the citadel [conclusion] since I saw him speaking with the enemy. [minor premise]

Completion of the syllogism [requires that] you add to it:

Whoever speaks with the enemy is a traitor. [major premise]

This person speaks with him (i.e. the enemy). [minor premise]

Therefore, he is a traitor. [conclusion].

However, should you declare the major premise, the location of the falsehood appears and ‘Whoever speaks with the enemy is a traitor’ is not sound.

This is used frequently in the legal syllogisms.

As for abandoning the minor premise, an example of this is like your saying:

Be wary of this one’s duplicity. [conclusion]

Then it is said: Why?

Then we say: This is because the enviers engage in duplicity. [major premise]

Then abandoning the minor premise is like your saying:

[p.169] This is an envier.

This becomes [an envier] when envy appears from him.

It is like your saying:

This one's [hand] should be cut off. [conclusion]

[This is] since the thief's [hand] is cut off. [major premise]

You abandon the minor premise.

That is agreeable if the addressee knows [that one] is renowned for stealing.

Most of the jurists' addresses (*mukhatabat*) are thus, especially in the books of the schools of jurisprudence (*kutub al-madhab*). [We have summarised this] out of the need to be wary of prolongation. However, in the theoretical sciences (*al-nazariyyat*) it (i.e. the syllogism) has to be detailed so that the place of error becomes known.

As for that which deviates in composition (*tarkib*) and mixing (*khalt*) it is when different premises are concealed in the ordering of the words leading to a single conclusion. They are: Attributive (*hamliyya*), conjunctive and disjunctive conditional.

An example is like your saying: The world is either pre-eternal or temporally created.

If it is pre-eternal, then it is not contemporaneous (*muqarin*) with acts of temporal creation.

However, it is contemporaneous with acts of temporal creation since it is a body. If the body is not contempor-

aneous with acts of temporal creation, it is void of them.

[p.170] That which is void of acts of temporal creation is not compound and it is not possible for it to be in motion.

Therefore, the world is temporally created.

Therefore, this syllogism is composed of a disjunctive conditional, a conjunctive conditional, categorical contradictory (*jazmi ‘ala tariq al-khulf*),<sup>145</sup> and categorical probative (*jazmi mustaqim*).<sup>146</sup>

Ponder examples of that. This occurs frequently in public debates (*munazarat*) and formal instructional oratories (*mukhatabat ta‘limiyya*).

Among the compounds clear conclusions and some of the premises are not left in them. A single premise is mentioned for every analogy and some of the premises are arranged with others and are ordered into a single conclusion like our saying:

Every body is composite. [minor premise]

Every composition is connected (*muqarin*) to and inseparable from an accident (*‘arad*).

Every accident is temporally created (*hadith*).

Everything connected to a temporal creation (*hadith*) does not precede it (*fa-la yataqaddam ‘alayhi*).

Everything that does not precede a temporal creation coexists with it.

Everything that coexists with a temporal creation is a temporal creation. [major premise]

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<sup>145</sup> See Lameer, *Al-Farabi*, pp. 47-50.

<sup>146</sup> Lameer, *Al-Farabi*, p. 53.

Therefore, the world is temporally created. [conclusion]

Every one of these premises' completion is with a complete analogy whose conclusions are discarded and that which is apparent from its premises. They are put forth for one objective. Otherwise it ought to be said:

[p.171] Every body is composite. [minor premise]

Every composite is connected to an inseparable accident. [major premise]

Therefore, every body is connected with an inseparable accident. [conclusion]

Then it begins and another premise is added to it, namely: Everything connected to an inseparable accident is connected with a temporal creation.

Then it preoccupies itself with what immediately follows it in order.

However, the clarity of these conclusions make up for making them explicit (*al-tasrih biha*).

Perhaps the formal oratories (*mukhatabat*) encompass words which contain conclusions. However, those conclusions are abandoned due to: 1) their manifestation (*zuhur*) or 2) They are not sought for proof (*ihitijaj*).

But rather you mention the premises in order to define them in and of themselves by relying upon the acceptance of the addressee (*mukhatab*). The Prophet ﷺ said:

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<sup>147</sup> This *hadith* attributed to the Prophet can be found in slight variations in Dhahabi's *Kitab al-Kaba'ir*. Beirut: Dar al-Nadwa al-Jadida, n.d., p. 91; Muslim, *Sahib, Kitab al-Jannah wa Sifat Na'imih wa Ahliha*, Bab al-amr bi-husn al-zann bi'llah ta'ala 'inda al-mawt, no. 5130:

[http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display\\_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1&pid=108485&bk\\_no=158&startno=2](http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&hflag=1&pid=108485&bk_no=158&startno=2).

Man dies as he lived and is resurrected [in the same state] he died.<sup>147</sup>

Both are premises whose conclusion is that man is resurrected in [the same state] he died.

The condition of life is the minor premise.

The condition of death is the middle term [of the syllogism].

However much, the condition of resurrection<sup>148</sup> is equal to the condition of death and

However much the condition of death is equal to the condition of life,

The condition of resurrection is equal to the condition of life.

What is intended by the context of the words (*siyaq al-kalam*), is alerting the creation to the worldly life being the field of cultivation for the hereafter from which one gets provisions.

Whoever does not acquire happiness in the worldly life, there is no way for him to acquire it after his death. If one was [metaphorically] blind in this life, then he is so upon death. [By blind] I mean of impaired insight in the facility to realise the truth (*dark al-haqq*), God save us from that!

[p.172] Whoever was sight impaired upon death, is also upon resurrection sight impaired. Rather he is in worse position for straying from the path since in the worldly life the person has a hope of [attaining] his request and after death realises despair.

What is intended is the words that occur in the debates (*muhawarat*) are all corrupted syllogisms whose composition<sup>148</sup> The major premise.

tions were altered to make them easier. One ought not to be heedless of them by being preoccupied with the forms (*suwar*). Rather one ought to realise only the perceptible realities not the communicated utterances (*alfaz manqula*).

[p.173] The Second View (*al-nazar al-thani*)  
from the *Book of Syllogisms*

Concerning the Matter (*madda*) of the Syllogism

We previously mentioned that every compound (*murakkab*) is composed of two things:

First, its matter such as the relation of wood to bed.

Second, its outer form as the relation of the outer form of the bed to the bed.

We have convincingly addressed the outer form of the syllogism and the aspects of its composition. Let us now address its matter (*madda*).

Its matter is the sciences (*'ulum*), but not all of them, rather assentual knowledge (*'ilm tasdiqi*), not conceptual knowledge (*'ilm tasawwuri*).

Conceptual knowledge is the matter of the premise (*maddat al-hadd*).

Assentual knowledge is the knowledge of the relationship of the realities with each other in terms of affirmation or negation—not every act of assent (*tasdiq*) but the essentially true assentual knowledge and not even every truthful [act], but only the certain truth (*al-sadiq al-yaqini*).

Perhaps that [a matter] or something is in itself truthful with God but is not certain in the eye of the observer. Therefore, it is not allowable that the matter be, for him, the matter of the syllogism by which he seeks to deduct cer-

titude (*istintaj al-yaqin*)—not every certitude (*yaqini*), but only universal certitude (*yaqini kulli*). I mean that it is thus in every situation.

Whenever we say that the matters of the syllogism are the premises from one aspect, this is only so metaphorically (*majazan*). For the premise is an expression of speech through the tongue. It contains a subject (*mawdu‘*) and predicate (*mahmul*).

The matter of the syllogism is the expression (*lafz*) which the predicate and subject indicate, not the expressions themselves. On the contrary, the subject and predicate are the fixed sciences in the soul exclusive of the expressions (*alfaz*). However, it is not possible to make something comprehensible except through expression (*lafz*), matter (*madda*) and reality (*haqiqqa*). They are the endpoint led to in the fourth degree after three shells [of the physical elements].

[p.174] The first shell (*qishr*) is the outer form (*sura*) which is inscribed with writing.

The second [shell] is: speech (*nutq*) which consists of ordered sounds which are indicated by writing and indicative of the inner dialogue that takes place in the ‘soul’.<sup>149</sup>

The third [shell] is: the inner dialogue which is knowledge of the ordering of the letters and organisation of words orally or in writing.

The fourth is: the pulp (lit. mind) (*lubab*) which is knowledge (‘*ilm*’) present in the soul whose reality (*haqiqqa*) goes back to etching in the soul an identical resemblance to the object of cognition (*ma‘lum*).

Thus these branches of knowledge are the matters of the

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<sup>149</sup> See S.H. Nasr, *Islamic Spirituality: Foundations*. New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1997, chapter 15.



syllogism and the difficulty to intellectually abstract them (*tajrid*) in the soul without ordering the expressions with the inner dialogue in the 'soul', should not entice you to imagine a union between knowledge and inner dialogue. Verily, the union of knowledge and inner dialogue must not occur in the imagination since even the writer finds it difficult to conceive of a meaning except if written inscriptions are represented to him that indicate something so much so that if he thinks of a wall, the expression 'wall' appears [at the same time] to him in written form.

However, since the knowledge of the wall is not dependant on the knowledge of the origin of writing, it will not be questionable for him that [this expression] is a necessary concomitant (*muqarin lazim*) to knowledge and not the knowledge itself.

Similarly, he can conceive that a person knows many branches of knowledge but does not know the languages. Therefore, the soul's inner-dialogue will not occur in him by which I mean the occupation with the arrangement of the expressions.

Therefore, those cognitions that are verified and [that one has granted] assent to (*al-'ulum al-haqiqiyya al-tasdiqiyya*) are the premises of the syllogism (*mawadd al-qiyas*). If they are recalled in the mind according to a specific order, the soul prepares itself for knowledge to come about in it and that the conclusion is from God the Exalted.

[p.175] Thus, whenever we say: 'The matters of the syllogism are the certain premises (*muqaddimat yaqiniyya*),' you do not understand from this except what we have mentioned.

Likewise the [attributes of] roundness and engraving for the dinar are in addition to the matter of the dinar. The matter of the dinar is pure gold. Likewise in the syllogism.

Just as the gold which is the matter of the dinar has four states:

- 1) Pure unadulterated gold.
- 2) Mediocre gold. Not of the same high grades nor of pure gold.
- 3) Adulterated gold due to bits of melted silver and copper in it.
- 4) False gold. But it is a distinct genus resembling gold.

[Likewise the syllogism] contains belief which is close to certitude (*yaqin*) and acceptable to all in appearance. The mind does not immediately perceive the possibility of nullifying it, rather with precise thought.

The syllogism composed by it is called ‘dialectical (*jadali*)’ since it is suitable for [engaging] adversaries [in] disputations.

It may also contain belief in which categorical assent (*tasdiq jazm*) does not occur, but rather probability (*ghalib zann*), and self-contentment along with placing its nullifier in mind or the soul accepting the nullifier if it should be on one’s mind even if many times inattention about it occurs.

The syllogism from which it is composed is called ‘rhetorical (*khitabi*)’ since it is appropriate for manifesting information (*ta’limat*) and formal oratories (*mukhatabat*).

Sometimes it might resemble certitude or what is known as approximate to certitude (*al-muqarib lil-yaqin*) outwardly, but is not thus in reality. This is pure ignorance by which the syllogism composed from it is called fallacious, sophistic (*mughalati, sufista’iyy*) since what is intended by that is only mixing (*mukhalata*) and sophistry. That is annulling truths.

These are four stations which it is necessary to differentiate from each other.

[p.176] As for the fifth which is called ‘poetic syllogism (*qiyas shi‘ri*),’ it is not our objective. It is not mentioned to produce a benefit from knowledge or probability, but the addressee may know its reality. Rather it is mentioned for [the following reasons]:

- 1) Encouragement (*targhib*) or deterrence (*tarhib*)
- 2) Disinclining (*tanfir*) or withholding (*tabkhill*)
- 3) Incetivise one to become generous (*taskhiya*) or encouragement (*tashji‘*)

It produces an effect in the soul based on repetition of these states and its affirmation of contraction and expansion with knowledge of its invalidity.

That is like one’s nature disliking the snaller sweet (*al-hulw al-asghar*) if it is compared to feces such that he immediately finds it hard to consume it even if the sayer’s mendacity is known.

Based on this depends the art of poetry. The majority of the boastful preachers hold fast to it. They employ the art of poetry in prose.

An example of this is if one should wish provoke someone to behave recklessly, and distracts him from being prudent, he calls prudence ‘cowardice’ and rebukes and humiliates his companion and says:

The cowards regard cowardice as decisiveness.

Such is the trickery of the mean soul.

Then the soul of one who is refraining (*mutawaqqif*) expands to attacking with that, like his saying:

If I do not fall by the swords honourably  
I will die enduring humiliation., not being  
honoured.

[p.177] Likewise if he should desire to incentivise one to become generous, he exaggerates in praising the generous person. He likens him to that which he knows does not resemble him. However, it moves his soul, like his saying:

From whichever direction you approach him, he is  
the sea

His depths are gift and his shores munificence.  
So accustomed is he to be open-handed that if he  
invited [thehand] to clinch

To close them, his fingertips would rebel.  
You see him rejoicing, should you approach him  
As if you give him what you are asking.  
Should he only possess his soul in his hand  
He would be munificent with it. Then let his  
asker fear God.

All of these words are reports whose mendacity is known. However, they move the soul in an extraordinary and undeniable way.

Since this category does not accord with our objective, let us then avoid further elaboration on it and return to the four divisions.

Since we have made detestable the state of poetry one ought not to believe that all poetry is false. Verily, some poetry contains wisdom, and, verily, some narrative is enchanting.

Truth might be incorporated in poetic metre. This does not deviate from it being true like the poet degrading (*tabjin*) miserliness:

Whoever spends time amassing wealth  
out of fear of poverty; He is the one who made  
poverty (i.e., spiritually lacking).

These are truthful veracious words which influence the soul. The pleasant metre (*wazn latif*) and the quiescent poetic form promote it and increase its impact on the soul. Therefore, do not look at the outer form of the poetry and take note of the meaning in all of the matters so that you are on the straight path (*al-sirat al-mustaqim*).

Let us now return to the objective [at hand] and say: The premises can be divided into [the following two categories]: Truthful certainties (*yaqiniyyat sadiqa*) which are necessary to accept (*wajibat al-qubul*) and other categories.

### [p.178] First Sub-Division

#### [The Certain Premises that are Suitable for Proofs]

The first division taking into account the perceptible is of four types:

**First Type (*sinf*):** The purely primary-rational premises (*al-awwaliyyat al-‘aqliyya al-mahda*) which are propositions (*qadaya*) that occur in man from the perspective of his abstract rational faculty (*quwwa ‘aqliyya mujarrada*) without adding meaning to them which necessitates its believing them.<sup>150</sup>

However, should the essences of the simples (*basa’it*) occur for [one of three reasons]:

- 1) Aiding the senses
- 2) Aiding the imagination

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<sup>150</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 95.

3) Another aspect.

The intellective faculty (*al-quwwa al-mufakkira*) made it a proposition (*qadiyya*) when one of them is related to the other, negative or positive which the intellect believes out of necessity without feeling from where he got it. Rather it is able to as if it possesses knowledge of it perpetually as our saying:

Two is greater than one.

Three plus three equals six.

A single thing cannot be pre-eternal and temporally created at the same time.

The negative and positive together are not valid in a single thing only.

And other like examples. [As for] this genus (*jins*) of the sciences, the intellect does not stop believing in them except by conceiving of the simples (*basa'it*) by which I mean the premises (*hudud*) and the individual essences (*al-dhawat al-mufrada*).

However the essences are conceived and the compound realised, [the genus (*jins*)]'s veracity is not suspended.

Perhaps it requires pausing until it is realised in the meaning of temporally created and pre-eternal. However, after knowing both [of these terms], true judgement is not suspended.

**Second type:** the perceptibles (*mahsusat*) like our saying:

The moon is round. The sun is illuminated. The planets are many. Camphor is white. Coal is black. Fire is hot. Ice is cold.

[p.179] If the abstract intellect (*al-‘aql al-mujarrad*) does not attach itself to the senses, then it is unable to produce these propositions (*lam yaqdi bi-hadhihi al-qadaya*). It attains them by means of the senses. These are perceptible propositions (*awwaliyyat hissiyya*).

An example of this is our knowledge that we possess [the following]: Thought (*fikr*), fear (*khawf*), anger (*ghadab*), appetite (*shahwa*), apprehension (*idrak*), and sensory perception (*ihsas*).<sup>151</sup>

That is also revealed to the soul (*inkashafa lil-nafs*) with the help of inner-faculties (*qiwa batina*). It is as if it occurs later than the propositions which the intellect verified without need of another faculty (*quwwa ukhra*) except for the intellect.

Do not doubt the veracity of the perceptibles (*mahsusat*) if you should exempt accidental matters (*umur ‘arida*) like: the weakness of the sense, the remoteness of that perceived and the density (*kathafa*) of the medium.

**The Third Type:** The empirically tested premises (*mujarrabat*) which are matters whose veracity was tested by the sense with the aid of a hidden syllogism (*qiyas khafi*) like our judgement that: Hitting causes an animal pain. Cutting is painful. Cutting the neck causes death. Scamony<sup>152</sup> is a laxative.<sup>153</sup> Bread satiates. Water quenches. Fire burns.

The sense associates (lit. perceives) death with cutting

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<sup>151</sup> See Ghazali, *Alchemy of Happiness* and *Kitab Sharh ‘Aja’ib al-Qalb*. These ideas originate with Plato. Anger and appetite are the constituent elements of the irrational soul. See Plato, *Ethics* in his discussion of the division of the soul.

<sup>152</sup> Lat. *Convolvulus Arvensis*.

<sup>153</sup> For a discussion of this syllogism, see Griffel, *Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology*, p. 206.

the neck and pain is known upon [such] a cut with the dispositions of the object of hitting (*hay'at al-madrub*). That is continued to be mentioned. Then a strong constitution is ascertained from it. There is no doubt about it.

We need not mention the reason that causes certitude after knowing that it is certain. [apodeictic]

[p.180] Perhaps, the experimental matter (*tajriba*) necessitated a decisive judgement (*qada' jazmi*).

Perhaps, it necessitated a majority proposition.

The [experiment] is not devoid of a hidden syllogistic proposition which is present at visual perceptions the sense perceptions (*mushahadat*). They are:

If this matter were by chance (*ittifaqiyyan*) or non-necessary accidental (*'aradiyyan ghayr lazim*), it would not have continued in the main without divergence (*ikhhtilaf*), even if that concomitant (*lazim*) is not present, then the soul regarded as unlikely its being late in it and considered it rare and it would have attributed [its absence] impeding accidental factor.

If this sensation (*ihsas*) is conjoined repeatedly and the number of times is not fixed similar to the indefinite number in a hadith that has multiple independent chains of narrators (*tawatur*), every event occurs here like a witness informer.

The analogy which we previously mentioned is added to it.

The soul concedes to verification of veracity.

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<sup>154</sup> Reading 'hazz (deep cut)' for 'jazz (beheading).' For an explanation see Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*, p. 201 and n. 145. For a further example from Ghazali's *Iqtisad*, see Griffel, pp. 202 and n. 150; 203 and n. 154.



Should one say: ‘How is it that you believe this with certainty?’ The speculative theologians (*mutakallimun*) doubted it and said: ‘Cutting (*hazz*)<sup>154</sup> is not a cause of death. Food is not a cause for satiation, and fire is not a cause for burning.’

[p.181] However, God the Exalted creates ‘burning,’ ‘death,’ and ‘satiation’ upon these matters occurring not with them.

We say: We have alerted to the depth of this chapter and its reality in *Precipitance of the Philosophers*. What is required now is that the speculative theologian who if he were to be informed that his child’s neck was cut, would not doubt his death. Not a single rational person would doubt that. He acknowledges the occurrence of death and seeks to make a connection (*wajh al-iqtiran*).

When it comes to the question of whether this is an inseparable and necessary [connection] that cannot be changed or whether this is through the course of God’s Way (Sunna) through the carrying out God the Exalted’s pre-eternal will (*mashi’atihi al-azaliyya*) which is not affected by change (*taghyir*) or alteration (*tabdil*). This is a question about the kind of connection, not the connection itself. Then this should be understood and it should be known that doubting the death of a person whose neck was cut is pure delusion (*waswas*) and that the conviction (*i’tiqad*) that he is dead is a certitude (*yaqin*) which should not be doubted.

[p.182] Among the types of empirically tested premises (*mujarrabat*) are the intuitive premises (*hadsiyyat*) which are premises in which the principle of judgement in them is an intuition (*hads*) from the soul which occurs due to the clarity and strength of mind, and that it is entrusted with

witnessing over some matters. Then the soul yields to its acceptance and its assent (*tasdiq*) of it such that it is unable to doubt it.

However, should a disputer dispute it, believing in it or opposing it, it is not possible for him to know with it as long as his intuition is not strengthened and does not take control of the belief which one who possesses great intuition possesses. That is like our premise that: The moon's light is acquired from the sun.

The reflection of the moon's rays to the world mirrors the reflection of the mirror's rays to the rest of the bodies (*ajsam*) that face it. That is due to the difference in formation when its relationship to the sun (near, far, middle) differs.

Whoever contemplates the evidences of that, will not possess doubt concerning it.

Among the syllogisms that it contains is what is contained in the empirically tested premises (*mujarrabat*). If these differences came out of agreement or an external matter except for the sun, it would not have continued [following] one pattern over time.

Whoever is a practitioner of the sciences, will acquire from this genus (*jins*) by way of intuition (*hads*) and contemplation (*i'tibar*) many propositions against which he cannot produce demonstrative proofs (*la yumkinuhu iqamat al-burhan 'alayha*) or doubt it, or participate with it to teach another except by guiding the seeker [of knowledge] to the path he has travelled down and followed even if he should take charge of the spiritual journey himself and taking him from that spiritual journey to that belief if his mind were strong and clear to a perfect degree.

Concerning the likes of this, it is not possible to silence

every disputant (*mujadil*) with words meant to silence. You ought not to desire the ability to dispute every truth. Among the certain convictions (*al-i'tiqadat al-yaqiniyya*) is that which we are unable to make others know through demonstrative proof (*bi-tariq al-burhan*) except if he should participate with us in practicing it so that he may participate with us in the beneficial sciences (*'ulum mustafada mihu*).

It is appropriate to state here: Whoever has not tasted, will not know. Whoever does not reach, will not apprehend.

**The Fourth Type:** The propositions (*qadaya*) that are not known by themselves but through a middle term (*wasat*). However, its middle terms (*awsat*) do not escape one's mind. When either of the two parts of what is sought is recalled, its affirmation (*tasdiq*) is recalled by it because of the middle term is recalled with it like our saying: Two is one third of six.

[p.183] This is known through a middle term (*wasat*). It is:

Each one is divided into three equal parts. One of the parts is a third.

The six is divided by twos: three equal parts.

Therefore, two is one third of six.

However, this middle term (*wasat*) is not isolated from the intellect (*dhihn*) due to this small number. and due to man being accustomed to contemplate it. Even if it is said to you:

Twenty two. Is it one third of 66? Did you not hasten

to it like you did with the judgement that two is one third of six? Perhaps you were deficient in the division of 66 into three. If it is divided and it is concluded that every division is 22, then you know that is one third of it.

Likewise with the increase of the calculations.

Therefore, if this were known through a second opinion not with the first opinion, it does not require pondering (*ta'ammul*);<sup>155</sup> it follows the same course as the propositions (*awwaliyyat*). It is suitable for it to be among the substances of the syllogism.

Rather the propositions (*qadaya*) which are the conclusions (*nata'ij*) of the syllogisms are compounded from premises (*muqaddimat*) that are of the three aforementioned types and are suitable to be the substances of syllogism (*mawadd aqyisa*) and their premises.

### [p.184] Second Division

#### The Premises which are not certain and are not suitable for proofs (*barahin*)

[The premises] are of two types:

A type which is suitable for jurisprudential probable evidence (*zanniyyat fiqhiyya*).

A type which is unsuitable for that also.

The first type: It is suitable for legal matters but not epistemic certainties (*yaqiniyyat*) and is of three types: Commonly accepted statements (*mashhurat*), premises given by the accepted judgements (*maqbulat*), and conjectured state-

<sup>155</sup> It is printed *amal* in the Arabic text, which means hope! There are missing letters from couple of words on subsequent lines.

ments (*maznunat*).

**First sub-class:** commonly accepted statements like our judgement about the beauty of spreading greetings (*husn ifsha' al-salam*), feeding food (*it'am al-ta'am*), maintaining good family ties (*silat al-arham*), adhering to truthfulness in speech (*mulazamat al-sidq fi'l-kalam*), safeguarding justice in judgements and legal rulings (*mura'at al-'adl fi'l-qadaya wa'l-ahkam*).

Out judgement concerning the ugliness of harming the person, killing an animal, creating deception (*wad' al-buhtan*), husbands being content with wives' infidelity (*fujur al-niswan*), and requiting every grace with unbelief and transgression (*tughyan*).<sup>156</sup>

These are propositions which if man is left to his pure reason (*'aql mujarrad*), his estimative faculty (*wahm*) and his sense perception (*hiss*), the intellect would not be able to come up with them with only the pure intellect and sense perception. However, it was able to come up with them because of accidental causes (*asbab 'arida*) which confirm and fix these propositions in the soul which are five in number:

[p.185] First, a tender heart, as a result of natural disposition (*ghariza*).<sup>157</sup> That is with respect to most people (*fi haqq akthar al-nas*) so that it was antecedent to the estimative faculty (*wahm*) of a people that slaughtering an animal is rationally evil. [That is] if the divine law had not turned people away from that to considering slaughter and sacrifice to be good. If this were so, then this belief would have spread among the majority of people.

Concerning [slaughter], the Mu'tazilis and the majority of other groups have found problematic the aspect of justice

<sup>156</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 92-93.

<sup>157</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 92-93.

in causing pain to animals through slaughter and inflicting pain of [mental] illness on the insane. They alleged with the judgement of the mildness of their nature that that is evil.

Among them are those who were apologetic that they will have recompense after the Gathering (*hashr*) in the hereafter.

Those did not pay heed to the ugliness of a ruler's slapping a weak person on his to give him a loaf of bread despite his being able to do so without slapping him.

A group of them made the excuse that these are punishments for crimes they committed while they were legally responsible. They replied by way of transmigration of the souls (*tanasukh*) after death to these forms so that they would be tormented in them.

They did not know that the punishment of one who does not know that he would be punished (*mu'aqab*) so that he might refrain because of it, is evil.

Should they allege that they know [the soul] will be punished for previous crimes, it would have had a thinking faculty (*quwwa mufakkira*), which [in turn] would make it imperative to recognize the possibility of insects and worms knowing the realities of matters, and all the geometric and philosophical sciences. This is a rejection of that which is perceived by the senses.

[p.186] So long as the punisher does not have an objective in seeking revenge, rejoice [at the suffering of the punished], or averting harm in the future, or the punisher does not stand to benefit, then this is also evil (*qabih*). God is able to beneficently bestow [His] bounties on creation without [making them feel] pain, imposition (*taklif*) or force. Harming them by imposition first and by punishment last is more appropriate to be evil than what they have men-

tioned. They made it evil to inflict pain on a person who is innocent of committing crimes.

**The second reason** (*al-sabab al-thani*) is that the person was created with a natural disposition for fanaticism (*himya*) and pride (*anfa*). Because of it he judges as evil being pleased by (*rida*) the licentiousness of his wife. He thinks this is a necessary judgement for the intellect despite the fact that a group of people are accustomed to prostituting their wives so that they could be familiar with that and not find it repulsive. All adulterers deem committing adultery with another's wife as appropriate. They do not regard it as evil since it agrees with their lusts. But rather they deem as evil the one who alerts the husbands to it makes known to them what the adulterers do. They allege that that is slander (*ghamz, si'aya*) and defamation (*namima*). This is truly evil.

Righteous people say: This is unfaithfulness and betrayal of trust (*amana*). Their judgements are contradictory concerning what is good and evil. They allege that they are propositions of the intellect (*qadaya al-'aql*).

Rather the source [of the propositions] is the morals that were inculcated in them.

**The third reason** is love of making peace (*tasalum*), reconciling (*tasaluh*), cooperation over livelihood. Therefore, they find it good to show affection (*tawaddud*) for spreading peace and feeding [the poor]. They regard as evil cursing, repulsiveness (*tanfir*) and countenancing favour with ingratitude, etc.

If it were not for their inclining toward matters to which these reasons provoke ways or cause to depart from them, the intellects would not have passed the judgement of good or evil with their disposition (*fitra*) in these affairs. There-

fore, we see a group who does not like [p.187] making peace (*tasalum*) but who inclines toward conquest (*taghalub*). The most pleasurable and best matters with them are raiding, plundering, killing, and murder (*fatk*).

**The fourth reason** is the religious moral directives of upbringing (*al-ta'dibat al-shar'iyya*) for the reform of people. They have been repeated to their hearing since youth on the tongues of parents and teachers, and [the children's] upbringing was accordingly; it made firm those beliefs which led to the belief that they are rational (*'aqliyya*) like perfecting bowing and prostration and making devotional animal sacrifice and spilling [animal] blood.

Should the rational person, who was not raised with accepting these [directives] since his youth, be surprised with them, his bare intellect would not attain them in a good or evil manner. However, they are made good with the good of the divine law. The estimative faculty (*wahm*) conceded to accept it with the directive of upbringing from youth.

**The fifth reason:** Induction (*istiqra'*) of many particular propositions (*juz'iyyat*) [is many]. When something is connected with something else in most of its states, it is said that it is absolutely connected with it. Likewise, judgement is passed with spreading with good absolutely since it is good in the majority of instance and it is distracted from its evil at the time of relieving oneself (i.e. urinating or defacating).

Judgement is passed about truth with good since it is in accord with objectives, desired in most instances. Whoever asks about the place of a prophet or Friend of God (*wali*) is ignorant of its evil only for the asker to find and kill him. Perhaps he believed the evil of the lie then by hiding the place, for the coincidence (*musadafa*) of untruth combined



with evil most of the time.

These causes (*asbab*) and the like are the causes (*'ilal*) for the soul to pass judgement with these propositions (*qadaya*), not all of which are truthful or untruthful.

However, what is intended by what is truthful from among them is that its truth is not manifest as a primary formulation (*bayan auwali*) in the intellect. Rather it is in need of realising its truthfulness for reflection (*nazar*) even if it is praised by the primary intellect (*al-'aql al-auwal*).

The truthful [proposition] is not [necessarily] praiseworthy. The untruthful is different from the abhorrent (*shani'*). Perhaps there is that which is abhorrent which is also truthful. Perhaps there is that which is praiseworthy which is also untruthful.

There might be a praiseworthy [proposition] which is truthful. However, with a precise condition most people will not understand it and it is believed unreservedly despite the fact that it is not truthful except with that condition, like our saying: [p.188] Truth is good (*al-sidq hasan*).

This is not so in an absolute sense rather with conditions. If some of the conditions are removed then the truthfulness which is making known the place of the prophet whose killing is intended is rendered repugnant (*qabiha*). [This is in addition to] other such examples.

However you desire to know the difference between these famous proposition (*al-qadaya al-mashhurat*) and the primary-rational premises (*al-auwaliyyat al-'aqliyya*), then display our saying before your intellect: 'Killing a person is evil (*qabih*)' and 'Saving a person from being destroyed is beautiful.' [This is] after you estimate as if came to this world at once, a mature and rational person (*balighan 'aqilan*). [Moreover,] you did not hear admonition (*ta'diban*)

at all nor did you live with a people, nor had you experienced organization or politics. However, you witnessed the perceptibles (*mahsusat*) and took from them the imaginations (*khayalat*).

Therefore, it is possible for you to doubt these premises or examine them (*al-tawaqquf biha*). However, it is not possible for you to [contradict] (*al-tawaqquf fi*) our saying:

Negation and affirmation are not true in the same instance.

Two is more than one.

Therefore, when these premises are close to [being] true, are possibly untrue, then they are not suitable for demonstrations (*barahin*) which require certitude, they are suitable for applied law (*fiqhiyyat*).

**Second sub-class:** Accepted judgements (*maqbulat*). They are matters which we believe in them because we trusted those who informed us about them from a group whose number is less than the number [required] for multiple independent chains of narrators, or a single person who is distinguished from others by his manifest righteous conduct (*'adala zahira*), or abundant learning (*'ilm wafir*) which we accepted from our forefathers, teachers and imams and continued to believe it.<sup>158</sup>

Like the unique reports (*akhbar al-'ahad*) in the divine law which are sound for legal syllogisms (*maqayis fiqhiyya*) without the intellectual demonstrations (*barahin 'aqliyya*). In influencing informed opinion (*itharat al-zann*), the unique reports have levels which are hardly hidden. The

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<sup>158</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 89.

widely-circulated traditions in the sound compendia of hadith cannot be on [the same level] like a tradition transmitted by one person. Nor is what one of the rightly guided caliphs transmits like another transmits.

[p.189] The levels of probability concerning it are innumerable.

**Third sub-class:** Conjectured judgements (*maznunat*)<sup>159</sup> are matters which are believed (*yaqa'u al-tasdiq biha*) not fixed. Rather the possibility of its contradiction occurs in the mind. However, the soul inclines toward it (*amyal*), like our saying: Verily so-and-so goes out at night for suspicious behaviour.

The soul truly inclines toward [this sub-class] which forms the basis for the management of actions (*tadbir lil-af'al*). With that the soul perceives the possibility of contradicting [this sub-class].

When the well-known propositions (*mashhurat*) and the accepted statements (*maqbulat*)<sup>160</sup> are considered to the extent that their contradiction is felt sometimes, it is possible to call them 'a conjectured statement' (*maznuna*).

How many a well-known proposition in an unexamined opinion (*badi' al-ra'y*) engenders a belief. Should one ponder it and investigate it, that submission (*idh'an*) is returned to either conjecture (*zann*) or falsification (*takdhib*),

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<sup>159</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 93.

<sup>160</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 89.

<sup>161</sup> This is a *badith* of the Prophet: 'Support your brother whether he is oppressor or oppressed.' See for instance, Bukhari, *Sahib, Kitab al-Mazalim*, Bab a'in akhaka zaliman aw mazluman, no. 2311:

[http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=0&bookhad=2311](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=0&bookhad=2311). A similar *badith* may be found in Muslim, *Sahib, Kitab al-Birr wa-al-Sila wa'l-Adab*, Bab nasr al-akh zaliman aw mazluman, no. 4681:

[http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=1&bookhad=4681](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=1&bookhad=4681).

like one saying:

You ought to come to the aid of your brother [whether or not he is] the oppressor or the oppressed.<sup>161</sup>

This is praiseworthy and famous. The intellect quickly accepts it. Then it contemplates and its opposite is revealed, namely:

The oppressor ought not be helped to become victorious. Rather he ought to be prevented from [spreading] his evil and the oppressed made victorious over him. This is what is intended by the *hadith* addressing this. He (i.e. the Prophet) was asked about that: How does one help the oppressor? He replied: Helping him is preventing him from being unjust.<sup>162</sup>

**The second type (*al-naw' al-thani*):** What is unsound for utterances (*lafziyyat*) and probable knowledge (*zanniyyat*). Rather it is only sound for deception (*talbis*) and fallacious reasoning (*mughalata*). It is [as follows]: Ambiguous propositions resembling other propositions (*mushabbahat*). That is resembling (*mushabbah*) previously [mentioned] divisions outwardly but are not from among them. They can be divided into three parts:

First, the pure estimative premises (*al-wahmiyyat al-sirfa*)<sup>163</sup> which are the judgements (*qadayat*) with which human estimation (*al-wahm al-insani*) judges decisively and free from a doubtful and sceptical comparison (*muqaranat rayb wa shakk*) like its judgement at the outset of its primordial nature (*ibtida' fitratih*) that it is impossible to have

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<sup>162</sup> See for instance Bukhari, *Sabih, Kitab al-Ikrab*, no. 6552: [http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?bk\\_no=52&ID=3828&cidfrom=12708&cidto=12731&bookid=52&startno=11](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?bk_no=52&ID=3828&cidfrom=12708&cidto=12731&bookid=52&startno=11).

<sup>163</sup> Janssens, p. 52. Also translated as estimations.

an existent exists without being able to point to its direction (*la ishara ila jihatih*), and that for a self-subsisting existent to be neither connected with this world nor be separable from it, and is neither inside the world nor outside it. [All this is] impossible (*muh*).

[p.190] This resembles the primary-rational premises (*al-awwaliyyat al-‘aqliyya*) like the judgement that ‘A single person cannot be in two places at once’ and ‘One is less than two.’

[The primary-rational premises] are stronger than the well-known propositions (*mashhur*) which we have represented in the [following] examples: ‘Justice is good (*jamil*)’ and ‘Injustice is evil (*qabih*).’ They are with this strength false however it was in matters antecedent (*mutaqaddima ‘ala*) to the sensibilia (*mahsus*) or more general than them. This is because the imagination (*wahm*) is on intimate terms with the sensibilia and it produces a judgement to that which is not perceived with the like of that it is on intimate terms with the sensibilia.

Its reality as false is known from propositions that the imagination (*wahm*) believes in some isolated [cases] (*ahad*). However, [the imagination] does not yield to the conclusion (*natija*) since it is not within the power of imagination to perceive (*idrak*) the like of it. This is the strongest of the false propositions (*al-muqaddimat al-kadh*). The estimative natural disposition (*al-fitra al-wahmiyya*) passes judgement over the false propositions according to its judgement in the primary-rational premises (*al-awwaliyyat al-‘aqliyya*). Therefore, if the estimative premises are in the sensibilia, they are truthful and certain and reliance on them is sound like relying on the pure rational proofs (*al-‘aqliyyat al-mahda*) and the perceptibles (*hissiyat*).

**The second division:** That which resembles the conjectured judgements (*mazmunat*). If it is investigated, conjecture is expunged like one saying: You ought to aid your brother whether he is an oppressor or oppressed.

This also resembles the well-known propositions (*mash-hurat*). It could also resemble the well-known propositions or the conjectured judgements (*mazmunat*) from among the admitted propositions (*musallamat*) upon which the opponents in public disputations (*munazarat*) agree either by way of hypothesis (*wad'*) or belief (*i'tiqad*).

However if their acceptance among those present should be repeated (lit. among the hearing of those present), they will have an affinity for the [well-known propositions or the conjectured statements] and their souls will incline toward granting permission (*idh'an*) to it more than inclining toward categorical refutation (*takdhib*). Then he believes that that inclining is assumption (*zann*) since the meaning of assumption (*zann*) is inclining in conviction (*mayl fi'l-i'tiqad*). However, it is an inclining with a cause (*sabab*) like your believing:

Whoever sets out at night does so for suspicious behaviour.

The soul inclining to this accusation is for a reason.

[p.191] Should it be repeated to the hearing of a group that the blue-eyed blond-haired person for example, is only a traitor, evil. Should they see him, their souls would incline to belief [in his] treachery more than inclining toward belief [in his] inviolability (*siyana*).

This is realised without a confirmed cause, but rather [is] pure imagination by reason of hearing. For that reason it is said whoever listens makes a prejudiced [judgement]

(*yakhill*).

Therefore, there is a difference between this and the realised probable (*maznun muhaqqaq*).

Close to this are the objects of imagination (*mukhayyalat*) which is likening one thing with another repugnant or likeable thing since they share a common description which is not the reason for being repugnant or likeable. Then the soul inclines greatly because of it.<sup>164</sup>

That has nothing to do with conjecture (*zann*).

This despite the fact that it is the most lowly of ranks it stirs people to most deeds and from it most of the human behaviours emerge moving forward and refraining.

They are the poetic premises (*muqaddimat shi'riyya*) which we previously mentioned. You do not find an intelligent person who is removed from being affected by it. Even a woman to whom a man is asking her hand in engagement should it be mentioned that her name is of an Indian or Sudanese person who is deemed ugly, the innate [reaction] is to be eschewed from her because of the ugliness of the name. Then beauty resists this imagining and produces a kind of loving. [This is so] even the branck of knowledge of mathematics and logic which does not contain any opposition to the schools of [theology] either through refutation or confirmation, should one say:

It is among the branches of knowledge of the heretical philosophers (*al-falasifa al-mulhidin*).

The nature of the religious eschews it.

[p.192] This inclination and eschewing which emerge from this genus are neither conjecture (*zann*) nor knowledge. What influences them is not suited to be made a prop-

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<sup>164</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 94.

osition (*muqaddima*) not in the indisputable proofs (*qat'iyat*), nor in presumptive matters (*zanniyyat*) nor legal matters (*fiqhiyyat*).

**Third division:** The errors occurring either from the incorrect expression or from the meaning of the expression.

This happens from a truthful proposition in something that shares a common name. Then the intellect transfers it from that named thing to another with the very same name such that it is precise (*yaduqq wajh al-ishtirak*) in the commonality like 'light' when it is applied at times to the meaning for a seen light and at times to the intended meaning of God the Exalted's words:

*'God is the light of the heavens and the earth.'*  
(Qur'an 24:35)

Likewise it might be from confusion about a position of pausing (*mawdi' waqf*) in words, like God the Exalted saying:

*'...and none knows its interpretation, save God. And those firmly rooted in knowledge say, 'We believe in it...'* (Qur'an 3:7)

If pause on God is ignored, then 'those firmly rooted in knowledge' would be attached to God and a false proposition would occur.<sup>165</sup>

It might be through neglect of case endings like God the

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<sup>165</sup> The three types of pause in the Arabic language are: "pause in no vowel (*sukun*)," "pause with reduced vowel (*rum*)," and "pause with slight vowel (*ishmam*)." For a detailed explanation, see for instance M. Sharkawi, *History and Development of the Arabic Language* (Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2017), p. 123.

<sup>166</sup> Although a reading of *rasulahu* is attested to, the edition is in error as there is there is no reference to the second recitation.



Exalted's saying:

*'...God is free from obligation to the idolaters, and [so is] His Messenger...'* (Qur'an 9:3)

[p.193] The oversight is in the vocalisation of the 'lam' in His Messenger (i.e., *rasuluhu*).<sup>166</sup> Then the reader reads it with a 'kasra (i)' (i.e. *rasulih*) and a false proposition occurs.

Similar examples of these expressions are many.

As for the meaning, some occur from imagining the opposite. Should we say:

Every act of execution out of retaliation (*qawad*) its reason is an intentional [murder] (*'amd*).

Therefore, it is believed that every intentional [murder] is a cause for retaliation.

Therefore, the intentional [murder] was seen as concomitant to every act of execution out of retaliation. Then every act of execution out of retaliation also was seen as concomitant to the intentional [murder].

This genus precedes faster [before other possibilities] to understanding (*sabaq ila al-fahm*). Man remains deceived with his lack of awareness about its origin and precedes to imagine from where he does not know until he is alerted about it.

Among that is something whose cause is necessitating considering something in place of something to the extent that if judgement was passed over something it is believed that it is sound for that which requires it (*lazimhi*).

Then if it said:

Prayer is an act of obedience (*ta'a*).

Every prayer needs intention.

It is supposed that: Every act of obedience is in need of intention such that obedience is required for prayer. This is not so. The origin of belief and knowledge of God the Exalted is an act of obedience. It is impossible to say that it is in need of intention because the intention of getting near to the one who is worshipped does not precede knowledge of the one who is worshipped.

This also causes many errors in rational matters (*'aqliyyat*) and legal matters (*fiqhiyyat*).

The reasons for the errors are too numerous to enumerate. What we have mentioned contains an admonition for that which we did not mention.

Therefore, the sum of what we mention from the subtypes of propositions (*muqaddimat* that we have named above are ten:

Four in the first division.

Three in the second division which are the substances of the legal matters.

Three from the final division whose judgement we mentioned.

[p.194] Should one say: In what do the rational matters contradict the legal matters?

We say: there is no disagreement between them in the syllogistic form. Rather they differ in matter (*madda*), but not in every matter (*madda*).

Rather whatever is sound to be a proposition in rational matters is sound for legal matters.

However, what might not be sound for rational matters

might be sound for legal matters like the presumptive matters (*zanniyyat*).

What might not be sound for both of them together might be apprehended (*yu'khadhu*) as in the case of the ambiguous propositions resembling other propositions (*mus-habbahat*) and the logical fallacies (*mughallatat*).

Likewise they both disagree in the manner in which the proposition becomes universal. The particular propositions (*muqaddimat juz'iyya*) in jurisprudence are tolerated in making them universal (*yutasamah bi-ja'liha kulliyya*).

That is perceived (*yudrak*) from:

The statements of the possessor of the Divine Law and his actions.

The statements of the People of Consensus (*ahl al-ijma'*).

The statements of individual Companions.

[This is the case] if that should be regarded as proof, according to what is thoroughly examined in the principles of jurisprudence.

What is customary (*al-jari*) from [these statements] in a fashion analogous to (*majra*) the primary premises (*awwaliiyyat*) from rational matters is that which is patently clear in its expression, clear in its path like the patently clear expression that is heard from the legislator (i.e. God) or what is transmitted in uninterrupted multiple independent chains of transmission. That which is uninterrupted multiple independent chains of narrators are [in their certitude] like that which is heard [directly from the Prophet ﷺ].

His saying: '*... three days in the Pilgrimage. And of seven when you return ...*' (Qur'an 2:196) is patently clear

in its expression it being ten [days], clear in its way. I mean the Qur'an is transmitted by the most authentic narrations (*mutawatir*).

It might be clear in its way, apparent in its expression, like what is intended from His saying: '*when you return.*'

It might be patently clear in its expression, not clear in its way like the text which is transmitted by a number of individuals [not exceeding three] (from the expression (*lafz*) of the possessor of the Divine Law (i.e. God)).<sup>167</sup>

It might be devoid of the two faculties (*quwwatayn*) [being neither clear in its path nor its expression] like the outward manifestation which the individuals transmit.

The group of legal expressions in the universal and particular propositions [can be divided into] four divisions:

**The first,** A universal by which I intend with it a universal like his saying: Every intoxicant is forbidden.

[p.195] **The second:** A particular proposition which remains a particular proposition like [the Prophet's], May peace be upon him, saying concerning gold and silk: 'They are both forbidden unto the males of my *umma*.'<sup>168</sup>

This applied specifically to males, but not to females.

**The third:** A universal proposition which is intended for a particular proposition like [the Prophet's], May peace be upon him, saying: 'Paying *zakat* on grazing sheep is required. It is intended for that [herd] which reaches its legal

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<sup>167</sup> Less than *al-hadith al-mutawatir* which is characterised by a continuous and established series of transmitters all of whom are reliable.

<sup>168</sup> On the prohibition of men wearing silk, see for instance Al-Tirmidhi, *Jami'*, *Kitab al-Libas*, Bab ma ja'a fi'l-harir wa-al-dhahab, no. 1639:

[http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display\\_hbook.php?hflag=1&bk\\_no=195&pid=122763](http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?hflag=1&bk_no=195&pid=122763); Abu Dawud, *Sunan*, *Kitab al-Libas*, Bab ma ja'a fi lubs al-harir, no. 3525:

[http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display\\_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&chflag=1&pid=116535&bk\\_no=184&startno=1](http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.php?indexstartno=0&chflag=1&pid=116535&bk_no=184&startno=1).

minimum amount (*nisab*).

God's saying: '*And the thieving male and the thieving female cut off their hands...*' (Qur'an 5:38) What is intended are some thieves.

If we should wish to make this a universal proposition, then we would annex to it the descriptions upon which examination [of this verse] appears. We say for instance:

Whoever steals an object which reaches the minimum value in its entirety, from a secure location like it (*min hirz mithlihi*) and to which he has no suspected rights, [his hand] is amputated.

The grave robber (*nabbash*) or whoever steals wet (*ratba*) things for example, with this description, [his hand] is amputated. This is the custom.

What we deem sound in the decrees of the juristic disputations (*marasim jadal al-fiqh*) is that he should not do it as long as general wording is found. Rather, he should adhere to the general significance of wording. A request of the opponent for that which is specific is made.

That which is alleged is that which is specific could reach the general. There is no objection to cling to the general in the language of the jurists.

If they should employ this convention (*idha istalahu 'ala hadha*), adhering to it is more suitable than producing it in a form since they do not accept particularization of the occasioning factor (*takhsis al-'illa*).

Whatever you should say, whoever steals an object which reaches the minimum value in its entirety from a secure location like it, [his hand] is amputated.

He prevented the opponent, saying: You have disregarded a description (*wasf*), namely that the object that is stolen is not wet. What made you know that this is not

considered?

[p.196] There is no other option for you but to return to the general and say: It is the original. Whoever adds a description, he must produce the proof (*dalil*).

Therefore, adhering to the general is more suitable if it is present.

**The fourth:** It is the particular by which is intended the universal. As we express the particular with the general, we say: There is no good from friends. We intend some of them.

Likewise the particular might be employed. By it we intend the universal like God the Exalted's saying:

*And among them is he who, if you entrust him with a [single] dinar, he will not return it...* (Qur'an, 3:75)

It is intended to cover all kinds of money that are his.

*'So whoever does an atom's weight of good shall see it.'* (Qur'an 99:7)

He expresses the many with the few.

Like God the Exalted's saying:

*'...then do not say to them 'Fie'...'* (Qur'an 17:23)

He expresses everything that contains grumbling in it.

Like God the Exalted's saying:

*'Consume not your goods between you in deception'* (Qur'an 2:188)

*'Those who consume the property of orphans unjustly...'* (Qur'an 4:10)

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<sup>169</sup> Nusaybin is a city located in present-day south-east Turkey near Mardin.

What is intended is ‘destruction (*itlaf*)’ which is more general than ‘eating (*akl*).’ However, he used the word ‘eat (*akl*)’ instead.

Like al-Shafi‘i’s saying: If a snake or scorpion should bite [or sting] him [intentionally as part of a scheme] and if it is an Egyptian snake or a scorpion from Nusaybin,<sup>169</sup> [and he dies] then *qasas* retribution (i.e., execution, unless he is forgiven by the family of the victim) is necessary.<sup>170</sup>

His goal is not specifying, but everything that is lethal mainly. However, he mentioned what is famous to express everything.

If a special expression (*lafz khass*) appears from this genus, the specificity is annulled, and we derive the universal meaning intended by it and say:

Every [act] of contempt for both parents is forbidden.

Every [act] of consuming orphans’ property is forbidden.

Therefore, we attain a universal premise.

If it said: What is known about a specific occurrence: Is it a universal proposition (*qadiyya kulliyya*) whose specifi-

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<sup>170</sup> See Al-Shafi‘i, *Kitab al-Umm*, 8 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Ma‘rifa, 1990 (*Kitab Jirah al-‘Amad*), 6:145:

[http://islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?bk\\_no=31&ID=1282&idfrom=3037&idto=3385&bookid=31&startno=144](http://islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?bk_no=31&ID=1282&idfrom=3037&idto=3385&bookid=31&startno=144).

<sup>171</sup> See for instance, Al-Bukhari, *Sahib, Kitab al-Adab*, Bab ma ja’a fi qawl al-rajul waylaka, no. 5812:

[http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=0&ID=5912](http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=0&ID=5912); Muslim, *Sahib, Kitab al-Siyam*, Bab taghliz tahrir al-jima‘ fi nahar Ramadan ‘ala al-sa‘im wa wujub al-kaffara al-kubra fih, no. 1870:

[http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=1&bookhad=1870](http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=1&bookhad=1870).

<sup>172</sup> See for instance, Muslim, *Sahib, Kitab al-Hudud*, Bab man i’tarafa ‘ala nafsi

city requires [p.197] a proof? Or is it particular and by making it general a proof is required? That is like [the Prophet's], May peace be upon him, saying to the Bedouin: 'Manumit a slave'<sup>171</sup> when he said: 'I had sexual intercourse during the day in Ramadan.' [This is also] like his stoning of Ma'iz [ibn Malik al-Aslami] when he committed adultery.<sup>172</sup>

Does that descend to the level of his saying: Everyone who commits adultery, stone him? Whoever has an intimate relation with his spouse during the day in Ramadan, then must free a slave.

Then the description of the sexual intercourse is what the questioner described.

That established by reflection on the descriptions of the Bedouin and what the Messenger of God, May peace be upon him, knew, until the abandonment of seeking further details with the possibility of ambiguity (*ishkal*) occupied the place of the general words (*'umum al-maqal*), even if it were not known whether [Ma'iz] was a freeman or a slave. This was like the general applicability with respect to the freeman and the slave.

If he knew him to be a freeman, the slave ought to be charged with pursuing him to show that he does not affect the slave by paying what is stipulated by the religious practices (*mujibat al-'ibadat*).

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bi'l-zina, nos. 1694, 3206:

[http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?bk\\_no=1&ID=783&cid\\_from=3274&cidto=3282&bookid=1&startno=4](http://www.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?bk_no=1&ID=783&cid_from=3274&cidto=3282&bookid=1&startno=4).

<sup>173</sup> See for instance, Al-Suyuti, *Al-Durar al-Muntathara fi'l-Ahadith al-Mushtahira*, ed. Muhammad bin Lutfi al-Sabbagh, Riyadh: Malik Sa'ud University, n/d, p. 110, no. 199. The *hadith* is of unknown provenance. Al-Sakhawi, *Al-Maqasid al-Hasana fi Bayan Kathir min al-Ahadith al-Mushtahira 'ala al-Asina*, ed. Muhammad 'Uthman al-Khusht, Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1985, p. 312, no. 416.



Rather we have made this to take the place of the general since [the Prophet] said: ‘My judgement concerning the one is my judgement concerning the group.’<sup>173</sup>

If we had known that from among his custom is specifying every person with a judgement which is contrary to the other, we would not have put this in place of the general. It is as if one from among the Zahirites knows that what is intended by the aforementioned particular propositions (*juz’iyyat*) concerning the kinds of usury (*rabawiyyat*) is they are the same particular propositions.

There is much detail concerning this which this book cannot contain.

We have demonstrated upon closer examination concerning the form of the syllogism that the particular special judgement (*al-hukm al-khass al-juz’i*) is that it is made universal in six ways:<sup>174</sup>

[p.198] It is demonstrating that what diverges does not influence (*ma bihi al-iftiraq laysa bi-mu’aththir*).

That which is in conjunction (*ijtima’*) is commensurate (*munasib*) or the influencer (*mu’aththir*) in order to be a ruling (*manat*). It is more effective in revealing the objective.

That is because among the particular propositions are those from which it is known that what is intended from them is ‘universal (*kulli*).’ Also among them are those who do not know that like those from among the Zahirites who do not know that what is intended with the aforementioned six particular propositions concerning the kinds of usury (*rabawiyyat*) is a matter that is more general than [the particular propositions].

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<sup>174</sup> This refers to the earlier discussion on pages 105–109.

All of the theoreticians (*nuzzar*) knew that what is intended by ‘wheat (*burr*)’ is not ‘wheat (*burr*)’ but a meaning more general than it since usury on the wheat remained after grinding it and since it became flour and the name wheat stopped being applicable.

Then it is known that what is intended by it is general universal description which flour and wheat share.

However, the general universal (*al-kulli al-‘amm*) may be known through innate intelligence (*badiha*) without pondering like our knowing that what is forbidden (*muharram*) is the general complaining (*al-tabarurum al-‘amm*) without the specific grumbling (*ta’affuf*).

It may be in doubt like wheat. Flour and wheat are equivocal in universals (*yashtarikan fi kulliyyat*) like taste (*ta‘m*), sustenance (*uqtiyyat*), measure (*kayl*), and property (*maliyya*).

If doubt should set in concerning it, it is not possible to affirm it (*ithbatuhu*) except by one of the six ways which we have mentioned. God knows best.

[p.199] Third View  
Concerning the Logical Fallacies (*mughallatat*)  
in the Syllogism

It contains sections

Section One  
Concerning enumerating the  
inducers of error (*matharat al-ghalat*)

Know that the syllogistic premises (*al-muqaddimat al-qiya-siyya*) if they should be organized according to their form are of the kind that produce the three forms (*al-ashkal al-*

*thalatha*) and first the three terms (*hudud*) were produced from them. They are the first parts. If the two premises are distinguished (they are the second parts) and the premises are truthful and not a conclusion (*ghayr al-natija*) and are better known, then that from among them which is concomitant by necessity (*lazim bi'l-darura*) is true, no doubt about it.

That from which truth does not result, truth does not result due to imperfections (*khalal*) in these aspects which we mentioned.

1) Either it deviates from the forms or 2) from the moods produced from them (*al-durub al-muntaja minha*), or 3) the lack of distinction in the terms (*hudud*), or 4) in the premises (*muqaddimat*), or 5) inserting the conclusion in the premises and there is no other [conclusion], or 6) the conclusion precedes one of the premises in knowledge. 7) Therefore, the premise is not better known than the conclusion.

These are seven inducers.

We shall explain each one with an example so that being cautious with them is facilitated. We say:

**The first inducer:** It is not one of the three forms and not a common term from among the terms. It is either the subject of the two or the predicate or a subject of one of the two, a predicate of the other.

[p.200] If equivocity (*ishtirak*) is negated in reality and expression, the intellect does not make a mistake concerning it (i.e. the equivocity). Therefore, that appears. It makes a mistake in an equivocal expression (*ma huwa mushtarak*

*lafzan*) if it is present with a difference in meaning. Therefore, close scrutiny of the words in equivocal expressions (*al-alfaz al-mushtaraka*) is necessary, especially those whose synonymity (*mutawata'a*) is doubtful (*ma yushtabah min-ha*). It becomes difficult to perceive the difference. This is a great inducer to errors.

We have mentioned in summary the details of that in *The Book of Syllogistic Premises* except there we did not mention save for the expressions whose meanings are not combined (*la yattahid ma'naha*).

The reason for equivocity (*ishtirak*) might be the proper arrangement and order of the expressions, not the expressions themselves.

We mentioned four examples of them:

The first, what is composed from the positions of stopping and starting as we mentioned of God the Exalted's words: '*... save God. And those firmly rooted in knowledge...*' (Qur'an 3:7)

[It] has two different meanings. Then it casts its similitudes (*amthal*) in one of the two premises with a meaning and in the second of the premises with another meaning. Therefore, the common term (*hadd mushtarak*) is annulled and it is believed that there is a common term.

The second, the shuttling of the pronouns between multiple things to which attributing them is possible, like your saying:

All that the intelligent person learned is as he learned.

The intelligent person knows the rock.

Therefore, he (*fa-huwa*) is like the rock.

Your saying: 'Therefore, he (*fa-huwa*)' is between refer-

ring back to the intelligent person (*'aqil*) or that which is perceived with the intellect (*ma'qul*).

It is sound in the premise on the basis that it returns to that which the intellect perceives and is unsound (*yulbas*) in the conclusion. Its returning to the intelligent person is imagined (*yukhayyal*).

The third, the arranged letters between the two meanings in one of which they are truthful and in the other false, like his saying:

The five is double and single.

It is true.

Therefore, it is believed that our saying [the following] is believed: [p.201] It is double and (*waw*) single at the same time.

The reason for it is doubting the signification (*dalala*) of the conjunction (*waw*).

Therefore, it indicates all the parts when you say: The person is bone and flesh, i.e. he contains bone and flesh.

It indicates all of the attributes like our saying: The person is alive and a body.

Therefore, what we have mentioned is true in the five by way of combining the parts not by way of combining the attributes and the expression like the expression.

The fourth: The attribute going back and forth between being an attribute of the subject and being an attribute of the predicate mentioned before it. We say: Zayd is sighted (*basir*).<sup>175</sup> That is not blind. We say: Zayd is a physician.

When we order this we say: Zayd is a sighted physician. It is believed that he is possessing of insight (*basir*) in

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<sup>175</sup> A similar example can be found in Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p.144.

medicine.

These expressions are true individually. They are true as a group according to one of the two allegorical interpretations.

There are many examples of that and the syllogistic form is raised up to an unknown extent. In what we mentioned there is sufficiency (*ghaniyya*).

**The second inducer:** for it not to be a type of conclusive among the total of the types of the three forms [of reasoning]. For example your saying:

Few people are writers.

Every writer is intelligent.

Therefore, few people are intelligent.

This conclusion is true even if it did not produce with affirming the few negation of the many. If the many was intelligent, it contains the few.

If what is intended by it is that only the few are writers and intelligent, the order of the syllogism is mixed since he said: Few people are writers.

[p.202] It includes two premises in *potentia* (*bi'l-quwwa*). One of them is:

Some of the people are writers.

The other is: That 'some' is few.

Both are predicated on each other. In the second premise, judgement was passed over one of the predicates namely 'the writer (*katib*)' to the exclusion of the other. Thus the order became mixed.

Likewise if you should say:

It is impossible for a man to be a rock.

It is impossible for a rock to be an animal.

Therefore, it is impossible for a person to be an animal.

Since this type is composed of two negatives apart from they both contain the negative expression (*lafz salbi*) when you say: It is impossible (*mumtani‘ an...*) for a person to be a rock.

It means: Not a single person is a rock.

Rather this amount is sufficient to negate the conclusion (*nafy al-natija*).

The minor premise of the first form (*sughra al-shakl al-awwal*) as long as it is not positive, it does not produce any conclusion at all (*lam yuntij aslan*).

These errors increase if the mind becomes attached to the expressions without acquiring the meanings with their realities.

**The third inducer:** For the three terms [of the syllogism], which are the first parts, not to be distinct and complete (*mutakamila*) such as your saying:

Every person is human.

Every human is an animal.

Therefore, every person is an animal.

And your saying:

Every wine (*khamr*) is wine (*‘uqar*).

Every wine (*‘uqar*) intoxicates (*muskir*).

Therefore, every wine (*khamr*) intoxicates (*muskir*).

The middle term (*hadd awsat*) [of the syllogism] is identical with the minor term (*hadd asghar*). Indeed only the expression multiplied (*ta'addada al-lafz*).

[p.203] This is from the use of synonymous expressions whose spelling differ and whose terms are equal in their understood meanings.

We have already mentioned them. Let one be aware of them also.

**The fourth influencer:** For the second parts which are the premises not to be superior (*mutafadila*). That does not agree in the simple individual expressions (*al-alfaz al-mufrada al-basita*) since a place of error occurs in them. However, it is homonymous in the compound expressions (*al-alfaz al-murakkaba*).

How many a compound expression that conveys a meaning, the strength of which is as strong as the power of one or can be indicated with a single expression, as you say: The person walks.

Then it is possible for you to substitute the subject expression with 'the speaking animal (*al-hayawan al-natiq*).'<sup>176</sup>

The expression 'to walk (*yamshi*)' means that he 'moves by moving both feet from one location to another' so that the expression is extended.

It is possible for you to specify the deception (*talbis*) in it. Along these lines is our saying:

The more a Muslim teaches him, he is like the one he taught.

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<sup>176</sup> *Natiq* is also means rational in particular contexts.



The Muslim teaches the unbeliever.

Therefore, he is like the unbeliever.

These premises are different in their terms (*hudud*) in the positing (*wad'*). However, there is a defect in harmonization (*ittisaq*). It is abandoning making explicit its details (*al-tasrih bi-tafsilihi*, otherwise your saying:

'The one whom the Muslim taught' is subject.

Your saying: 'He is like the one whom he taught' is predicate.

However, the meaning of your saying: 'He (*huwa*)' is repeated.

It might be such that it is not distinguished in the positing (*wad'*), but rather it contains a part (*juz'*) which is possible that it is: 1) part of the subject, 2) part of the object.

You say: Zayd the tall is white.

Therefore, the predicate is 'white' only.

'The tall' is part of the subject.

It is possible for 'the tall' to be mentioned in the form of 'who is'. Then it goes back to Zayd, such that you say: Zayd, who is tall, is white.

[p.204] If you should say: 'Zayd is tall, white,' 'tall' becomes part of the predicate.

If 'who' is not mentioned it is possible that 'who' is wanted otherwise it is not wanted.

As you say: 'Humanity (*insaniyya*)' in so far as it is 'humanity' is specific or general.

It is possible for the subject 'abstract humanity' (*al-in-*

*saniyya al-mujarrada*) and the predicate is ‘the specific.’

It is possible for the subject to be ‘humanity’ alone and the predicate ‘specific’ in so far as it is humanity since if you should say: Humanity is specific or general, you would be informing about one thing.

Should you say: Humanity in so far as it is humanity is specific or general, you would be informing about two things.

Every *khavar* (predicate)<sup>177</sup> is a predicate (*mahmul*).

Thus, if you should say: ‘Humanity is not in so far as it is humanity, specific or general,’ it is true.

[However,] should you say: ‘Humanity is not specific or general,’ it is false.

The difference between both of them [becomes understood] when we mention the meaning of the universal (*ma‘na al-kulli*) in the principles pertaining to existence (*ahkam al-wujud*).

Errors whose solution is difficult for intelligent thinkers (*hudhdhaq al-nuzzar*) let alone the literalists (*zahiriyyin*) stem from these different syllogistic combinations (*tarkibat*). You will not be able to be rid of the places of concealment for error except through God the Exalted’s granting success. Then let the investigator into these impediments seek success from God the Exalted until he is delivered from its darkneses.

**The fifth inducer:** For the premise to be false. It is not free of either ambiguity in expression (*iltibas al-lafz*) or in meaning (*ma‘na*).

If there is not anything from these reasons, the intellect

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<sup>177</sup> The *khavar* is a predicate in a nominative sentence.

<sup>178</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 79-80.

will not submit to it and believe it. There are no words except for in that which rational persons err. Whoever believes everything he hears, is of morbid temperament (*fasid al-mizaj*), difficult to treat.<sup>178</sup>

As for ambiguity in expression (*iltibas al-lafz*), it is when there is a relationship between it and what is true, as if two expressions are equivocal in meaning and there is a difference (*iftiraq*) in precise meaning. Therefore, it is believed that the judgement that is truthfully applied to one of the two is true in the case of the other.

Confusion occurs about the difference in an addition to or deficiency in meaning along with the unity of that which is named.

[p.205] That has increased greatly. For example the expression ‘covering (*sitr*)’ and ‘covering (*khidr*)’. ‘Khidr’ is not said except if it is inclusive of a young woman otherwise it is ‘*sitr*.’

Like crying (*buka*) and ‘wailing (*awil*)’. [The word] ‘Awil’ is not said except if [crying] is accompanied by raising the voice. Otherwise it is crying (*buka*). Both are considered equal.

Likewise, soil (*al-thara*) and dirt (*al-turab*). ‘Thara’ is ‘turab’ that as a condition contains moisture.

Likewise ‘strait (*ma’ziq*)’ and ‘strait (*madiq*).’ ‘Ma’ziq’ is ‘madiq’ however it is not called that except in places of war.

Also ‘fugitive (*abiq*)’ and ‘fugitive (*harib*)’. ‘Abiq’ is ‘harib’ however with an additional meaning that [the fleeing] is from exhaustion and fear. If it not for a reason of strong dislike (*sabab munaffir*), [the fleeing] is called ‘harib’ not ‘abiq.’

[Another example] is the water in the mouth (*rudab*) is such as long as it remains in the mouth. Otherwise if it

leaves the mouth it is ‘*buzaq*.’

The brave person (*shuja*) is not called ‘brave (*kamiy*)’ except if he were heavily armed, otherwise he is a ‘batal.’

The sun is not called ‘*ghazala*’ (disc of the sun) except during sunrise.

These expressions are similar in origin and contain a kind of dissimilarity (*tafawut*).

It might be thought that the judgement for one of them applies to the other. Then it is believed for this reason.

As for the semantical cause (*sabab ma’nawi*) to erring, the premise is partially truthful not entirely. Then it is apprehended as if it is universal and is believed. Distraction (*dhuhul*) occurs from the condition of its veracity. Most of the premise occurs with the estimative faculty (*wahm*) preceding to the opposite. Should we say:

Every [dragged] person for [potential] execution is the result of intentional [first degree] murder.

Every act of stoning is for adultery.

Therefore, it is believed:

Every intentional murder is an act of execution out of retaliation and every act of adultery carries the punishment of stoning.

This contains many errors for whoever is not mindful of [this].

That which is true for some but not the whole, might be such that it is true for part of the subject like our saying: The animal is legally competent. This is true about the

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<sup>179</sup> *Duha* is the time between just after sunrise and before noon.

human to the exclusion of others.

[p.206] It might be true concerning the whole subject however in some circumstances like our saying: Man is legally competent. However, this is not true for the states of childhood and insanity.

It might be true sometimes like our saying: One who is legally competent is required to pray. It is not true about the time of *duha*<sup>179</sup> since no prayer is required then.

It might be true with a discrete condition like our saying: One who is legally competent is forbidden from consuming wine. It is with the condition that he is not compelled (*mukrah*) in which case the condition is abandoned.

Likewise, your saying: If he is wrongly killed, he is like one who is killed. It is sound with a condition, namely that the killer is not a father and the murdered is not a son.<sup>180</sup>

All of these matters which are believed to be truthful mainly and do not arise as generally true (*kulliyya sadiqa*) except if they are restricted by a condition, perhaps the intellect will give in and believe [them to be] true and accept that they are generally true (*kulliyya sadiqa*). Therefore, false conclusions are necessary.<sup>181</sup>

**The sixth influencer:** For the premises not to be other than the conclusion. Then they would sequester the objective of the premises without realising it.

[It is] like your saying: The woman has a guardian. She does not have power over the marriage contract.

If you are required to account for the meaning of her state (that she has a guardian), perhaps you would not

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<sup>180</sup> As an exception to the rule, a father, grandfather, or greatgrandfather do not face the same punishment for killing a son, grandson or greatgrandson.

<sup>181</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance*, pp.80–81.

be able to demonstrate a meaning except that which is disputed.

[p.207] Likewise if one says: the voluntary fast with declaring your intention during the day (*bi-niyya tansha'u naharan*) is sound since it is a fast obligation on oneself (*sawm 'ayn*). If it is requested that the definition of it being a fast obligation on oneself, he did not dispense with making the conclusion a part of [the definition], since it is said:

What is the meaning of it being a fast obligation on oneself (*sawm 'ayn*)?

He says: It is suitable on a voluntary basis (*tatawwu'*).

Then it is said: With that specificity is not determined (*la yuthbat al-ta'ayyun*) since it is suitable every day before the dawn for makeup (*qada'*). It is not said 'sawm 'ayn.'

Should he say: Its meaning is that it is not suitable save for on a volunteering basis, it is said: Specificity is not determined with this. Night is not suitable for other than the voluntary fast. It is not said of it 'ayn'. Then he is forced to combine between the two meanings and say: Its meaning is that it is beneficial on a voluntary basis, but not for anything else.

Then it is said: His saying that it is suitable on a voluntary basis is the judgement whose knowledge is required. How is it he made it a part of the justification ('*illa*)? The justification's ('*illa*) essence is not valued without judgement. Then judgement over it becomes necessary. Therefore, the judgement is other than the justification.

Similar examples of this in rational matters ('*aqliyyat*) are many. It is for that [reason] we did not mention them.

**The seventh influencer:** That the premises do not possess more knowledge than the conclusion. Rather the premises are either equal to it in knowledge like the complementary terms (*mutadayafat*).

That is like whoever disputed Zayd being a son to ‘Amr. He says: The proof of Zayd being a son to ‘Amr is that ‘Amr is a father to Zayd.

This is impossible since both of them are known simultaneously, and none of them is known through the other.

Likewise whoever confirms that an attribute is knowledge through his saying: Indication of that is the place in which it exists is knowledgeable (*‘alim*).

It is madness since he does not know the place as being knowledgeable except with the knowledge of the ‘state of emplacement (*al-hall*)’ in the place is knowledge.

The premise might be delayed in knowing about the conclusion. Then it becomes a circular analogy (*qiyas dawri*).

[p.208] Examples of it in the discursive sciences (*‘aqliyyat*) are many.

As for applied law (*fiqhiyyat*) as if the Hanafi says:

The prayer of one who does dry ablution (*tayammun*) is invalid if he should find water during it since he is able to use it.

Whoever is able to use water, he is required to [use] it.

Whoever is required to use water, it is not permitted for him to pray using dry ablution.

Therefore, the ability to use [it] is the middle term (*hadd awsat*) [of the syllogism].

The invalidation of the prayer is a conclusion.

It is said: If you should want the ability through sensory means, then it is invalid with what if he should find it is possessed by another.

If you should want with it the ability based on divine law: then it is said: As long as prayer [with dry ablution] being performed (*qa'ima*), the many actions are forbidden to him. Then the use [of water] is forbidden.

The ability [to use water for ablution] based on divine law is dependent on invalidating the prayer.

[p. 209] Invalidation produces ability (*qudra*).

Ability precedes [the invalidation] the way a cause ('*illa*) precedes effect (*ma'lul*); that is in essence not temporally.

How does he make that which is posterior (*muta'akhhir*) in rank a cause to that which is anterior in rank, which is invalid?

These are the inherent qualities which induce error. We have restricted them to seven divisions. Each division branches out to innumerable aspects.

If it is said: These are many errors; who will eliminate them?

We said: These errors do not all combine in every syllogism. Rather the inducer of the error in every syllogism is restricted and caution concerning it is possible.

Whoever takes into account the three terms (*hudud*) [of the syllogism], and acquired in his intellect meanings, not expressions, then predicated one of them on the other and made them two premises, and took into account the concomitants of predication (*tawabi' al-haml*) as we mentioned concerning the conditions of contradiction (*shurut al-tanaqud*) and took into account the form of the syllogism, unequivocally knows that the required conclusion is a concomitant truth (*haqq lazim*).



If he should not trust it, he turns again to the premises, the aspect of assent (*wajh al-tasdiq*), the form (*shakl*) and definitions (*hudud*) of the syllogism once or twice like the accountant does in his accounting which he organises, since he goes back to it once or twice.

Should he do that, and he does not attain confidence (*thiqa*) and profound peace of mind (*tuma'nina*), let him abandon investigation and be content with conformity with established custom (*taqlid*). Every job has men for which it is suited. 'Everyone is made to proceed with ease towards that for which he has been created.'<sup>182</sup>

[p.210] Section Two  
Concerning demonstrating the imagination  
of the Sophists<sup>183</sup>

Should one say: If the premises are necessary and truthful, and the intellects encompassing them, and this ordering which you mentioned concerning the syllogistic form (*surat al-qiyas*) also is clear, from where did the Sophists derive their denial of the sciences and their belief in the equipollence of proofs (*takafu' al-adilla*)?<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Bukhari, *Sahih, Kitab al-Tawhid*, Bab qawl Allah ta'ala wa laqad yassarna al-Qur'an li'l-dhikr fa-hal min muddakir, no.7112:

[http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=0&bookhad=7112](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=0&bookhad=7112);

Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Musnad, Musnad al-'Ashara al-Mubashsharin bi'l-Janna*, Musnad al-khulafa' al-rashidin, no.1352:

[http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=6&bookhad=1352](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=6&bookhad=1352).

<sup>183</sup> Like al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina rebuts the sophists but gives a fuller exposition of their fallacies, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 140-148.

<sup>184</sup> For an explanation of the equipollence of proofs, see P. Crone, 'Excursus II,' in S. Schmidtke, ed., *Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology*, p.110 and n.11.

Or from where did differences among people concerning the intelligibles (*ma'qulat*) get stirred up?

We said: As for the occurrence of difference, it is because of most intellects' falling short with respect to the conditions which we mentioned. Whoever contemplates these conditions will not be surprised from the opposing of the opposer concerning them, especially the proofs of the intellects are driven to conclusions which the estimative faculty (*wahm*) does not acquiesce to (*yudh'inu laha*). Rather it denies it (*yukadhdhibu biha*), unlike the arithmetical sciences, the estimative faculty and the intellect cooperate concerning them.

Whoever does not know arithmetical matters knows that he does not know them. If he should make an error in them, his error does not continue, rather it is possible to remove it in a short time.

As for the rational sciences, they are not this way.

Among the Sophists are those who deny the primary sciences (*'ulum auwaliyya*) and empirical knowledge (*his-siyya*) like our knowledge that two is greater than one and our belief in our existence, or that one thing is either eternal or temporally created.

Those people, imperfections entered them from a faulty temperament and corruption of the intellect as a result of great confoundment in the theoretical sciences (*nazariyyat*).

As for those who regarded as sound the indispensable assertions (*daruriyyat*), they allege that the equipollent proofs (*adilla mutakafi'a*) are in the theoretical sciences. What prompted them to address the problem (*hamalahum 'alayhi*) is what they saw from the contradiction of the proofs of the groups of speculative theologians and what overwhelmed them in one of the questions from the doubts

and problems whose solution is difficult. They believed that they do not have a solution originally. They did not address that due to their own short-sightedness, error (*dalal*), their lack of insight into the method of reasoning (*tariq al-nazar*), and they did not realise the conditions for reasoning as we presented.

We mention a group of their imaginings to which we provide a solution so that it is known that short-sightedness is from one who does not know how to resolve the doubts.

[p. 211] If not, then either every matter's existence is known and it is ascertained and its or its non-existence is known and it is ascertained or it is known that is of the type of [knowledge] that man could not know and he ascertains that also.

The inducers of [the Sophists'] imaginations are three parts:

First, What returns to the syllogistic form which includes the saying:

Your saying amongst the most obvious of what you mentioned: The negative universal (*al-saliba al-kul-liyya*) reflects a likeness of itself.

Should we say: Not a single person is a stone.

Then it necessarily follows from it our saying: Not a single stone is a person.

You consider this to be necessary (*daruri*). It is not conceived that it differs. This is an error. If the sense issues a judgment concerning it in a place, then it is considered true in every place.

We say: There is not a single wall in a peg (*watad*).

We do not say: There is not a single peg in a wall.

We say: There is not a single jug in the drink.

We do not say: There is not a single drink in the jug.

Therefore, we say: We alleged that the essence of the predicate however it opposes the essence of the subject itself, necessitates what we mentioned.

As we say: Not a single jug is drink.

Certainly it necessary follows that: 'Not a single drink is a jug' because if difference (*mubayana*) should occur, then certainly it necessarily follows: There is not a single drink which is a jug.

This is because if difference occurs between two things universally, it is from both sides since if the connection were imposed in some, the state of the difference would be false universally.

This example did not reflect itself and the two meanings in which difference exists between them did not produce a result (*lam yahsul*). If they both produced a result, then the opposite necessarily follows.

[p.212] Should we say: Not a single wall is in the peg.

Therefore, the predicate is our saying: 'in the peg', not 'the peg' absolutely.

Should difference occur between 'the wall' and the thing which we have estimated in the peg, then its opposite necessarily follows:

Everything in a peg is not a wall.

Therefore, certainly we say:

Not a single thing among that which is in the peg is a wall.

Not a single thing among that which is in the drink  
is a jug.

The solution to this is difficult for one who receives these matters from the expression (*lafz*) not from the meaning (*ma'na*).

Most intellects will experience difficulty perceiving the abstract meanings (*mujarradat al-ma'ani*) without turning to the expressions (*alfaz*).

Also among them is someone's saying: You have alleged that the universal affirmative proposition (*al-mujiba al-kulliyya*) reflects the affirmative particular proposition (*juz'iyya*).

Until when our saying is sound: 'Every person is an animal' our saying that 'Some of the animals are people.'

It is not thus. Thus we say: Every old man used to be a youth. We do not say: Some of the youth used to be old men.

Every loaf of bread used to be wheat. We do not say that: Some of the wheat was bread.

Therefore, we say: The impetus for error (*mathar al-ghalat*) is abandoning the condition in the opposite.

If it is inserted between the subject and predicate: our saying: It might have been (*qad kana*) is either taken into account in the opposite or it is annulled in both propositions.

If this is annulled, both premises are false together. It is our saying:

Every old man is a youth.

And every youth is an old man.

It is subject and predicate purely (*mujarrad*).

Should you say: Every old man used to be a youth.

Then its opposite is: One of those who were youth is an old man.

That does not necessarily follow certainly if the first is true.

[p.213] Whoever does not quickly understand the like of these matters is in error. Then he judges by making the error in himself necessary and believes that there is no way to knowledge of the truth.

Among them are their doubting the first [syllogistic] form and their saying:

You have alleged that it does yield a conclusion (*muntij*). One says:

Man alone laughs (*dahhak*).

Everyone who laughs is alive.

Therefore, man alone is alive.

The conclusion is erroneous. The form is the first form. They are both universal affirmative propositions (*mujibatan kulliyatan*). If you should make our saying: 'Man alone laughs' a particular proposition (*juz'iyya*), it is permitted for it to be the minor premise (*al-sughra*). It is not conditioned in the first form except for the major premise to be universal.

Then we say: The source of the error is his saying 'alone' is not taken into account in the second premise, and it is repeated in the conclusion, where it should not be repeated

in the conclusion, so that it becomes necessary that: Man is alive. Or, it is repeated in the second premise, so it become false. It is said: The one who laughs, alone is alive.

The meaning of our saying: 'Man alone laughs' is that man to the exclusion of others laughs.

Upon verification they are both premises (*muqaddimat*).

The first is that man laughs.

The other is: Anyone apart from man does not laugh.

Should you say: 'The one who laughs is alive' you have passed judgement over the predicate of one of the two premises, namely your saying: Man laughs.

You have abandoned the judgement over the predicate of the second premise which is: Anyone apart from man does not laugh.

Should you restrict yourself in one of the two premises to one thing, then limit yourself in the conclusion to [this thing] and say: Man is alive.

But do not say 'alone' since the judgement exceeds the middle term (*al-hadd al-awsat*) to the minor term (*al-asghar*) whatever judgement you pass on the middle term.

The middle term here is 'one who laughs (*al-dahhak*),' confirmed for man, and negated for other than him.

Therefore, the judgement over one who laughs ought to be predicated over both its parts together. It is not [p.214] opposed in the second premise in which the middle term is mentioned in the predicate to the second part from the middle term (*al-juz' al-thani min al-awsat*).

An example of this is: Weak intellects err. If something should be difficult for man, his soul does not permit him to refer to the incapacity of his soul, thinking that this is not possible to be in him, and he would conclude that theoretic-

cal reasoning is not a path that leads to certitude. This is an error.

Among this is their saying:

Two is one quarter of eight.

Eight is one quarter of thirty-two.

Therefore, two is one quarter of thirty-two.

This is due to ignoring the condition of predication (*shart al-haml*) in the correlatives (*idafiyyat*). Its reason is apparent since the conclusion to this is that two is one fourth of one fourth of thirty-two.

Then if the other premise is sound and it is: one fourth of one fourth is one fourth, then what they said is sound.

If we should say: Zayd is like ‘Amr.

‘Amr is like Khalid.

Then it does not follow (*lam yalzam*) that Zayd is like Khalid. Rather it follows that Zayd is an example like the example of Khalid’s example (*mithl mathal Khalid*).

If we should have another sound premise, namely:

The similitude of a similitude is a similitude.

Therefore, with that the conclusion is sound.

They have ignored a necessary premise which is false. Let him be wary of the like of it.

Also among them are their saying:

It is impossible for man to be a stone.

It is impossible for the stone to be alive.

Therefore, it is impossible for man to be alive.



We have mentioned the way of error it contains and that both premises are negatives (*salibatan*) which do not produce logical subjects that are positive.

Likewise the positive (*mujiba*) might be considered negative in our saying: Zayd does not possess sight (*ghayr basir*).

[p.215] Likewise, the negative proposition (*saliba*) is considered positive (*mujiba*) as in our saying: It is impossible for man to be a stone.

All of that is because of observing the expressions without verifying the meanings.

Further examples of this include their saying: Bones are not in the liver at all. The liver is in every man. Therefore, the bone is not at all in man.

The conclusion is erroneous.

Should you ponder this, you will know the impetus for error (*mathar al-ghalat*) in it by way of the means which we mentioned.

Likewise there are objections to the second and third forms with the likes of that.

After defining the way, there is no need for proliferating the examples.

Then these are the doubts about the form of the syllogism.

**Second division:** Concerning the doubts whose cause is an error in the premises.

For example they say: We see contradictory syllogisms. If the syllogism were sound then its affirmative proposition (*mujib*) would not be contradictory.

An example of this is: Whoever alleges that the governing power (*al-quwwa al-mudabbira*) in the person is the heart, infers (*istadalla*) that:

I found the king who governs takes up residence in the middle of his kingdom.

The heart is in the middle of the body.

Whoever alleges that it is in the brain infers that:

I found the highest [parts] of a thing clearer and better than its lower parts,

The brain is higher than the heart.

Other examples of this include:

The Merciful does not cause pain to one who is innocent of [committing a] crime.

[p.216] God is the Most Merciful of the merciful.

Therefore, he does not cause pain to whoever is innocent of [committing a] crime.

This conclusion is false. You can see that God does cause pain to animals, cattle, and the insane, pain without crime. Therefore, we doubt our saying that: He is the Most Merciful.

[Also] in our saying: The Merciful does not cause pain without benefit along with [possessing] the ability to abandon causing pain.

Likewise is one saying: Breathing is voluntary like walking, not like the heart beat, since we can abstain from it.

Another says: It is not voluntary. If it were so, then we would not breathe during sleep. However, we are able to abstain from it at any time we desire like walking. We are not able to arrest [our] breathing at all times. Both conclusions are contradictory.

An example of this is our saying: Every existent is either conjunctive (*muttasil*) or disjunctive (*munfasil*) with the world. Whatever is not conjunctive or disjunctive is non-existent. Therefore, this is more likely.

A group among which are you (pl.) have alleged with [employing] widespread syllogisms that the Creator of the world is not inside the world or outside. Then how can the syllogism be deemed reliable?

Likewise, some people alleged that the substance (*jaw-har*) is infinite in divisibility (*tajazzu'*).

We know that whatever has two limits (*tarafan*) and is confined between them, is finite (*mutanahin*).

Every body has two limits and is confined between them. Therefore, it is finite.

A group alleged that it is finite in a part which is indivisible.

We know that every substance between two substances that it encounters one of the two without encountering the other in the same way.

Therefore, it has two things that are distinct (*mutaghayiran*).

This syllogism is also definitive (*qat'i*) like the first one without difference (*farq*).

Another example of this is: We do necessarily know that a heavy object cannot stay put in air.

A group said: The earth is standing in air, the air surrounds it and people [p.217] stand straight on it (*mu'tamidun*) from all sides so that those standing on two opposite points of the earth with the soles of their feet are opposite each other.

We know that by necessity.

Therefore, this and its examples indicate that the syllo-

gisms do not cause trust (*thiqa*) and certitude (*yaqin*).

Therefore, we say: As the first is doubt which emerged out of ignorance in the form (*sura*) of the syllogism, then this emerged out of ignorance about the substance (*madda*) of the syllogism:

[The substance] is certain truthful premises (*muqaddimat sadiqa yaqiniyya*) and the difference between it and apart from it.

However certain what must not be certain is, it follows from it inevitably that its conclusions are contradictory.

**As for the first**, examples include: It is a syllogism composed of rhetorical exhortative premises (*muqaddimat wa'ziyya khitabiyya*) since one thing was taken from it and found in a [certain] way. Then with it, judgement was applied to everything.

We have already demonstrated that judgement (*hukm*) over everything with many particular propositions (*ju-z'iyyat*) is impossible (*mumtani'*). Then how is judgement with one particular proposition?

Rather if the particular propositions proliferated, they would not benefit except for probability (*zann*). Then probability continues to increase in strength with the proliferation of examples. However, it does not lead to knowledge.

**As for the second**, it is composed of well-known dialectical premises (*muqaddimat mashhura jadaliyya*) some of which are sound while its contradictory being found repugnant for [one of two reasons]: either for what it contains that goes against the people (*jamahir*) or what goes against the outward expression of the Qur'an.

How many a person renders something sound because he finds prohibiting it repugnant or his imagination ran away from accepting its contradictory.

We alerted to this in [the discussion of] the premises.

The location of the prohibition contains a description of God [being described by] mercy according to the general perspective which the common people understood. God the Exalted is glorified above this. Rather the expression of mercy and anger are interpreted allegorically in His own right (*fi haqqihi*) like the expressions ‘descending,’ ‘coming,’ and others like the expression revelation (*nuzul*) and coming (*maji*) and others.

Should one considered the outward and accepted it as sound without verification, then the false conclusion follows.

[p.218] God’s being merciful according to the notion by which the common people understand it is not a primary premise (*muqaddima awwaliyya*), nor does a syllogism with the aforementioned condition indicate it.

The location of the error is abandoning allegorical interpretation where it is necessary.

In accordance with this, you see the contradictory (*tanaqud*) of most of the syllogisms of the aforementioned [group]. They compose them from sound premises seeking fame or the zealots agreeing to aid the schools of jurisprudence with them without proof and without their being primary for which it is necessary to be sound.

**As for the third**, the certain and sound is that it (i.e. breathing) is a voluntary act. Whoever says:

If it were voluntary, then it would not happen in one’s sleep.

However, it does.

Therefore, it is not voluntary.

Therefore, it is conjunctive conditional in which is negated the hypothetical syllogism *in modus tollens* (*istuth-niya fihī naqid al-tali*) and the contradictory to the antecedent (*naqid al-muqaddim*) is concluded (*istuntija*).

The form of the syllogism is sound. However, making the consequent necessary for the antecedent (*luzum al-tali lil-muqaddam*) is not sound (*ghayr musallam*). The voluntary action occurred in sleep. How many a person who is asleep walks ordered steps and speaks comprehensible (lit. ordered) words!

His saying: 'If it were voluntary, then he would be able to abstain from it at any time' is unsound.

Rather man eats and passes urine voluntarily. He is not able to abstain all the time. However, he is generally able to abstain not restricted to every time.

If it is restricted with every time, it would be false and the consequent necessary for the antecedent would be unsound.

**As for the fourth**, it is that every existent is either conjunctive (*muttasil*) with the world or disjunctive (*munfasil*).

It is an imaginative premise whose way of error we mentioned and distinguished the estimative premises (*wahmiyyat*) and demonstrated that they are not sound to become premises in the demonstrative proofs (*barahin*).

It is the origin of error also concerning the question of the part that cannot be further divided. However, mention of the location in which the imagination errs is long and is thoroughly examined in another book.

**As for the fifth**, it is the earth being suspended in air which is not impossible.

[p.219] One saying: Everything heavy leans downward. The earth is heavy. Therefore, it leans downward. There-

fore, it follows from that that it is necessary for it to penetrate the air and not stop.

The error of its origin is disregarding the expression ‘downward (*al-asfal*)’ and ‘What is its meaning?’

Opposite downward is upward. Therefore, two opposite directions are necessary.

Opposite both directions is: either [the earth] is in addition to the person’s head and feet, even if he is not a person; he is neither downward nor upward. If man were inverted, the downward direction would be upward which is impossible;

or

The downward would be the most remote location from the surrounding celestial sphere which is the centre. The upward is the closest location to the surrounding [celestial sphere].

If this is sound, the earth if it is at the centre, then it is the lowest of the low (*asfal safilin*).<sup>185</sup> [This is] because the lowest of the low is extremely remote from the surrounding [celestial sphere] which is the centre. However much it should exceed the centre in any direction, it leaves the lowest direction for the upward.

If the meaning were in the lowest [area], then what they mentioned is not impossible.

If the meaning were upward (i.e. in the highest) and the lowest is parallel to the direction of our head and feet, then what they mentioned is impossible.

Then carefully ponder the definition of ‘low’ (*asfal*) until

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<sup>185</sup> Qur’an 95:5.

one of two matters appear to you. You will know that through investigating the reality of the direction and they are both in what you define its [i.e., direction's] opposite extremities. It is not possible to explain this in this book.

Therefore, these errors emerged from rendering sound premises which are not necessary to render sound and notice was given about their influencers (*matharat*). Then let him draw an analogy between what we mentioned and what we did not mention.

**The third division:** Doubts which are attached to the conclusion in one mode (*min wajh*) and to the premises in another.

Among them is their saying: If these conclusions occur from the premises, then from what do these premises occur?

If they should occur from other premises, then an endless chain to other than the conclusion is necessary. This is impossible (*muhāl*).

If they should occur from the premises that do not require premises, then are they sciences which occurred in our mind since we were born or were they acquired after they were not?

If they were acquired since we were born, then how is it that they were acquired and we do not sense them since the long years of his life go by and it does not occur to him that [p.220] things equal to one thing are equal?

How is it that knowledge of them being equal occurs in his mind while he is oblivious of it?

If these [premises] do not occur in us from the outset (*awwal al-amr*), then they occurred, then how is it that knowledge which did not exist occur without acquisition (*iktisab*) and the antecedence of a premise which is caused



by it (*yahsul biha*) and every acquired knowledge is not possible except with knowledge that precedes it and leads to succession (*tasalsul*)?

We say: Every knowledge is acquired (*muktasab*). Then with knowledge that preceded it is acquired since knowledge is either conceptualisation (*tasawwur*) or assent (*tasdiq*).

Conceptualisation is with a term and the parts of the term ought to be learned before the definition.

What is the benefit of our saying in the definition of wine that it is: ‘an intoxicating beverage expressed from grapes’ to whoever does not know ‘beverage’, ‘intoxicant,’ ‘grapes,’ and ‘expressed’?

Knowledge of these parts is antecedent (*sabiq*). Then [these parts] are also if you knew exactly, then knowledge of the parts of the term (*‘ilm bi-ajza’ al-hadd*) must precede them and regress infinitely. However, [this knowledge] comes to conceptualisations (*tasawwurat*) which are principles (*awa’il*) which are known through the witnessing (*mushahada*)<sup>186</sup> with an internal sense (*hiss batin*) or an undefined external sense (*zahir min ghayr tahdid*). Upon [these conceptualisations] [regress] stops.

Likewise the assent (*tasdiq*) to the conclusion which demands the antecedent of knowledge of the premises undoubtedly.

Likewise the premises (*muqaddimat*) until [knowledge] proceeds upwards to principles (*awa’il*) to which assent occurred not with the demonstration (*burhan*).

Their saying remained: How is it that those principles

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<sup>186</sup> For a discussion of Ghazali and Ibn Sina’s use of the term ‘mushahada,’ see for instance, Alexander Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazali’s Theory of Mystical Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation*. Abingdon, Oxon. and New York: Routledge, 2012, pp.62–63.

were present in us without us sensing? or

How did they occur when they do not come into being without acquisition? When did they occur?

Then we say: These sciences did not occur in actuality in us in every state. However, if the inherent disposition (*ghariza*) of the intellect is complete, then those sciences will be potential (*bi'l-quwwa*) not in actuality (*bi'l-fi'l*).

Its meaning is: We possess...: A faculty (*quwwa*) which perceives (*tudrik*) individual universals (*al-kulliyat al-mufradat*) with the aid of the outward and inner senses.

[p.221] An imaginative temporal faculty for the soul whose nature is composition (*tarkib*) and decomposition (*tablil*) and is able to relate the individual definitions (*mufradat*) to each other.

We possess a faculty (*quwwa*) which perceives what the intellectual faculty arranges the relationship between both of them from the individual definitions (*mufradat*) and the relationship between them both is negative and positive.

[The faculty] perceives the pre-eternal and the temporally created and relates them to each other.

Then it precedes the intellectual power (*al-quwwa al-'aqila*) to passing the judgement of negativity (*al-hukm bi'l-salb*), namely:

The pre-eternal (*qadim*) is not temporally created (*hadith*).

[The faculty] which relates the animal to the human then judges the relationship between both of them is positive, namely: Man is an animal.

This faculty perceives some of these relationships without an intermediary and does not perceive some of them. Therefore, it comes to be dependent upon (*tatawaqqaf ila*) the intermediary like it perceives 'the world,' 'the tem-

porally created,' and 'the relationship between both of them. Therefore, it does not issue the judgement of 'negative' as it did in the case of the pre-eternal and the temporally created and not of 'positive' as in the case of the animal and the person. Rather it is dependent upon seeking an intermediary which is for you to know that it is inseparable from the temporal originating events (*hawadith*) and does not precede them. Whatever does not precede the temporal is temporal.

If it is said: These assents (*tasdiqat*) you have divided into: 'What is known through an intermediary' and 'what is known as primary knowledge (*ma'rifa auwaliyya*)' without an intermediary.

However, these assents are inevitably preceded by conceptions (*tasawwurat*) since whoever does not know that the temporally created (*hadith*) and the world are [both] individual ideas (*mufrad*), does not know that the world is temporally created.

Only one who knows existence anticipated by nonexistence (*wujud masbuq bi-'adam*) knows what is temporally created (*hadith*).

Only one who knows 'nonexistence', 'existence,' 'priority (*taqaddum*)' and 'posterity (*ta'akhkhour*)' knows 'existence anticipated by nonexistence' and that 'priority' here refers to nonexistence and posterity for existence.<sup>187</sup>

It is necessary to know these concepts.

Concerning the one who perceives (*mudrik*) them, if it is this sense perception (*hiss*), then sense perception does not know except for one person. Therefore, assent ought

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<sup>187</sup> Concerning 'priority and posterity' see throughout this work. Also see for example, Ghazali, *Incoherence of the Philosophers* (trans. Marmura), pp. 27, 30.

to be only in one person.

[p.222] Should [the one who perceives] see a person and his whole is greater than his part, then why does he pass judgement that in every person the whole of him is greater than his part given the fact that he only witnessed with his sense perception only a specific person? Then let him pass judgement on that specific person and abstain from the rest of the persons until [when he] can observe [them].

If he should pass judgement over the generality that every whole (*kull kull*) is greater than the part, from where does he derive this judgement seeing that his sense perception did not perceive except a particular person (*shakhs juz'i*)?

We say: The universals are intelligible, not sensed and the particular propositions are sensed not intelligible.

The universal judgements of the intellect (*al-ahkam al-kulliyya lil-'aql*) are over the intelligible universals (*al-kulliyyat al-ma'qula*).

This is revealed in the difference between the intelligible and the physical.

Therefore, man is intelligible.

He is perceived by the senses (*mahsus*) and witnessed in the person of Zayd for instance.

We mean by his state of being perceived in two aspects:

The man who is perceived only does not conceive that he will sense except attached to a specific colour, a specific size, a specific condition, and a close proximity and remoteness [that are] specific.

These matters are accidental (*'aradiyya*) compared to human-ness (*insaniyya*), and not essential in it (i.e. the human-ness). If they were substituted, that person would [remain] that person.

As for the rational person, he is a human only with whom [the following attributes] participate in a single instance of homonymy (*ishtirak wahid*): tall, short, near, far, black, white, small, large.

Therefore, you have a faculty which man recalls connected with unusual matters. That faculty is called 'sense and imagery (*hiss wa khayal*).' You possess another faculty which man calls forth free from the unusual matters. Should you impose its opposites, you would not affect the person. That is called the 'rational faculty (*quwwa 'aqila*).'

[p.223] Therefore, what appeared to you is: Extreme separation lies between the sense perceiving the particular person whom the unusual accidents enclose and do not penetrate his quiddity (*mahiyya*) and between the intellect perceiving the pure essence of the thing not connected with that which is unusual to it.

[Likewise] the universal judgements (*al-ahkam al-kulliyya*) over the universal substance that is free from unusual substances and accidents.

If it is said: How did he attain with witnessing a particular person universal knowledge? How did he aid the senses in attaining that which is not sensed?

We said: The sense leads to the imaginative faculty (*al-quwwa al-khayaliyya*) examples of the sensibilia (*mahsusat*) and their images so that the person can see something with his eyes closed. Then he chances upon an image of the thing present with him identical with the seen (*'ala tibq al-mushahada*) [p.224] as if he sees it with the imaginative faculty (*al-quwwa al-khayaliyya*) not the perceptive faculty (*quwwat al-hiss*).

Not all animals possess this faculty. Rather among the animals are those in whom the perceived image disappears

with the disappearance of that which is perceived.

This image remains in memory because of the imprint in the imagination. It does not preserve the thing if it is not accepted with the potential which accepts it. [For example], water accepts the impression but does not preserve it. Wax accepts and preserves. Acceptance is with moisture and preservation is with dryness.

If these likenesses and images occurred in the imaginative faculty, the imaginative faculty reviews it but does not review the external sensibilia. If it should review it, you would find with it for example an image of a tree, an animal and a rock [as follows]:

Equivocal in corporeity (*muttafiqa fi'l-jismiyya*).

Different in animal-ness.

Then you distinguish what is equivocal, which is corporeality, and make it a single universal. Then you will comprehend the absolute body (*al-jism al-mutlaq*).

You take what contains difference which is animal-ness and make it other universals which are free from other connections (*qara'in*).

Then you understand what is essential (*dhati*) and what is foreign (*gharib*). Then you will know that corporeality is essential for animals. Should it cease, then its essence would cease. The 'whiteness' to an animal is not thus.

Therefore, with it what is essential is distinguished from what is unessential and the more general from the more specific. Those are the principles of categorical conceptualisations (*tasawwurat naw'iyya*).

These universal terms (*al-mufradat al-kulliyya*) occur because of sense perception and are not objects of sense. It is not a wonder for there to occur with sense perception that

which is not perceived. This is present with beasts of the field since the mouse distinguishes the cat, perceives it with sense, and knows its malice toward it. The baby goat kid perceived its mother's accordance (*muwafaqa*) with it and thus followed her.

[p. 225] Enmity (*'adawa*) or accordance (*muwafaqa*) are not objects of sense (*mahsus*). Rather they [constitute] the faculty of perception (*mudrak quwwa*) of animals which is called the 'estimative faculty (*wahm*)' or 'discerning (*mumayyiz*)' which in the animal are like the intellect (*'aql*) in man. Man also possesses that discrimination (*mumayyiz*) along with intellect (*'aql*).

Therefore, there occurs in the intellect from the imaginative particular propositions (*juz'iyat khayaliyya*) universal terms (*al-mufradat al-kulliyya*) which are commensurate with the imagination in one aspect and differ in another.

We shall demonstrate the aspects of it being commensurate and differing with it in the *Book of the Divisions and Principles of Existence* (*Kitab Aqsam al-Wujud wa Ahkamuhu*).<sup>188</sup>

The sum total of the words is that the primary cognitions (*al-'ulum al-uwal*) with the concepts conceptually (*bi'l-mufradat tasawwuran*) and with the relationships it contains in terms of assent (*wa bima laha min al-nasab tasdiqan*), occur in the soul from God the Exalted or from an angel of His when the faculty of intellect occurs in the soul and the occurrence of the perceptibles (*mahsusat*) in the imagination and it (i.e. the intellect) examining them.

The faculty of reason is as if it is the faculty of sight in the eye.

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<sup>188</sup> See below, p. 248.

Perceiving the imaginative particular propositions (*al-ju-z'iyyat al-khayaliyya*) is like sight looking at colourful bodies (*al-ajsam al-mutalawwina*).

The illumination of the King's (i.e. God's) light upon human souls resembles the illumination of the lantern's or sun's light being shed upon the colourful bodies (*al-ajsam al-mutalawwina*).

[p. 226] The acquisition of knowledge in a relationship with those terms resembles the vision of the harmony of the bodies' colours.

For this reason, God the Exalted made a similitude of this light through the medium of a perceivable symbol ('*ala tariq darb mithal mahsus*) with '*a niche wherein is a lamp*' (Qur'an 24:35).

If it should become evident to you that the soul is a substance that is independent within itself, not in a corporeal body and not impressed in a corporeal body, then God the Exalted's saying: '*an olive [tree] neither of the east nor of the west*' (Qur'an 24:35) is in accord with its reality of being free of all spatial locations (*jihat*).

If that does not appear to you by way of examination, then the allegorical interpretation of that parable is in another way ('*ala wajh akhar*).

What is intended by all of this is for the way of acquiring primary knowledge ('*ulum awwaliyya*) as an individual pre-cognition (*tasawwuran*) or an assertion (*tasdiqan*). Knowing that is among the most important matters.

It alone we have intended even if we have mentioned it when discussing the futility of the Sophists.

This is an entryway of the entryways of the equivocators (*mutashakkikin*) and indecidors (*ahl al-hayra*) which we have revealed.

Included is their saying: The way which you have men-



tioned in reaching a conclusion (*intaj*) is not beneficial since from knowledge of the premises according to your condition, the conclusion is known with those premises. Rather in the premises is the very conclusion. Therefore, whoever knows:

- 1) Man is an animal.
- 2) The animal is a body.
- 3) Therefore, he will know on the whole that man is a body.

Therefore, the knowledge of [man's] being a body is not additional knowledge acquired from these premises.

We say: Knowledge in the conclusion is a third knowledge additional to that in both premises.

As for the example of man and animal, we do not mention it except as a pure example. It is beneficial in what is possible for it to be the formed object of investigation. This is not of this genus. Rather it is possible that the conclusion would not appear to man even if each of the two premises are patently clear to him.

Therefore, man may know:

Every body is composed.

[p.227] Every composed thing (*mu'allaf*) is temporally created (*hadith*).

With that he is ignorant of the relationship of the temporal creation (*huduth*) to that which is composed (*mu'allaf*) and other than the relationship of the composed to the body.

Rather it is knowledge which occurs upon the occurrence of both premises and calling them forth together in the mind with the soul advancing toward seeking the

conclusion.

Should one say: Should you know that every two things are a pair, then is this in my hand a pair? Should you say: I do not know. Then your claim that every two things are a pair is invalid. It is two and you did not know that it is a pair.

Should you say: I know it. What is it? We say: This is answered [in the following manner]: Whoever says: Every two things are a pair. Therefore, he means with it that every two things that we know, are two. Therefore, it is a pair.

What is in your hand we do not know to be two.

[p.228] This reply is invalid (*fasid*). Rather every two things are in his soul a pair regardless of whether or not we know [the thing].

However, the reply is for us to say: If what is in your hand is two things, then it is a pair. Should you say: Is it two? Then I say: I do not know. This ignorance does not contract my saying that every two things are a pair. Rather opposite it I may say:

Every two things are not a pair.

or

Some of the two is not a pair.

Therefore, we should realise that: Is it two?

Therefore, should we know it is two, we know it is a pair and we recalled that in our mind.

It is conceivable that you would be heedless of the conclusion with the appearance of the two premises. How many a person looks at a [female] mule with a swollen

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<sup>189</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 82-83.

stomach and assumes that it is pregnant.

If it were said to him: Do you not know this is a [female] mule? Then he says: Yes.

If it were said to him: Do you not know that a [female] mule cannot be pregnant, he would say: Yes.

[p.229] If it were said: Why were you heedless of the conclusion and thought the opposite of it? Then he says: Because I was heedless of the composition of the two premises and bringing them together in the mind, directed toward seeking the conclusion.<sup>189</sup>

With that it was discovered that the conclusion even if it were subsumed *in potentia* (*bi'l-quwwa*) beneath the propositions as [is the case] with the particular propositions (*juz'iyyat*) beneath the universals, then it is knowledge added to the propositions *in actu* (*bi'l-fi'l*).

Among them is the saying of one of the equivocators (*mutashakkikin*): Should you seek to contemplate knowledge, do you know that knowledge or not?

If you should know it, then why should you seek it?

If you should not know it, then acquired it, from where do you know that it is your object of acquisition? Are you not like one who seeks a runaway slave and does not know him; Should he find him, he would not know that he is [the one] or not?

Therefore, we say: Knowledge which we seek, we know from one aspect but are ignorant of it from another aspect since we know it through actual conceptualisation (*al-tasawwur bi'l-fi'l*) and we know it through assent *in potential* (*al-tasdiq bi'l-quwwa*). We want to know it through assent *in actu* (*bi'l-fi'l*).

Should we seek the knowledge that the world is temporally created, we know of 'temporal creation (*huduth*)'

and 'the world' through conceptualisation. We are able to assent to it (*al-tasdiq bihi*). Should a middle term (*hadd awsat*) appear between the world and temporal creation like the conjunction (*muqarana*) of temporally created things (*hawadith*) or other thing, then we know that which is in conjunction with temporally created things is a temporally created thing (*hadith*).

Should we know that the world is in conjunction with temporally created things, we know *in actu* that it is a temporally created thing.

Should we know it, we would know that it is what we seek.

If we did not know it before conceptually, we would not have known it is what is sought.

If we had assented to it *in actu*, we would not have sought it.

Like the runaway slave whom we know through conceptualisation (*tasawwur*) and imagination (*takhayyul*) from one aspect and we are ignorant of his location. If he should be perceived by the sense in his place at once (*duf'a*), we would know that he is the one sought.

If we did not know him, we would not know him upon catching him.

Should we know him from every aspect, that is know his location, we would not have sought him.

Therefore, this is what we desire to demonstrate from the doubts [and ambiguities] that confuse the Sophists.

The objective in displaying it is not engaging in disputation (*munazara*) with them, but revealing these fine details. If he should seek (*talaba*) [p.230] certitude with the methods of demonstrative proofs (*masalik al-barahin*), he would greatly derive benefit otherwise how does the Sophist

engage in disputation while his disputation in himself is an admission of the means of reasoning (*tariq al-nazar*)!

One ought not to be amazed by the belief in Sophism and the indecision with the clarity of the intelligibles (*ma'qulat*). That does not agree except rarely with one who is afflicted with a disease in his mind. We witness a group of leaders of [theological] sects who are [practically] Sophists, and the people are ignorant of them.

Everyone who engages in disputation [arguing] for the logical necessity (*ijab*) of blindly following authority (*taqlid*) and annulling critical inquiry (*nazar*) is a Sophist in admonishing concerning critical inquiry. They do not have support except that intellects are not trustworthy (*la thiqa biha*), and the differences in them are many. Therefore, walking the way of safety that is blindly following authority (*taqlid*) is more suitable.

If it is said to them: Did you imitate the veracity of your prophet and distinguish between him and the liar? Or is your blind imitation like that of the Jews and Christians?

If it is like their blind imitation, you have permitted your being deniers (*mubtilin*). This is unbelief with you. If you should not permit it, do you know it with necessity or with intellectual examination?

Should you know it through intellectual examination, then you have confirmed intellectual examination.

People have disagreed concerning this intellectual examination, that is acknowledging the truth (*tasdiq*) of the prophets, as they have disagreed in all of the theoretical sciences (*nazariyyat*).

In confirming the truth of the prophets with miracles there are depths and obscurities which can hardly be hidden from the examiners. With this belief they at a rank lowlier

than that of the Sophist.

They are the most tenacious in denying critical inquiry and negators (should they confirm critical inquiry) of knowledge of the truth of the prophet.

As for the Sophist, he cast away his analogy in denying universal knowledge (*al-ma'rifa al-kulliyya*).

Of this genus are the Batinites of this age (i.e. the Isma'ilis). They were deceived by the many differences between the critical examiners [p.231] and called for belief in the invalidity of the intellect's investigation (*nazar al-'aql*). Then they called for blindly following their infallible imam.<sup>190</sup>

Should it be said to them: With what did you come to know the infallibility of your imam; It is not possible to argue for the necessity of him (*da'wa al-darura fih*)?

They alleged that in him is different kinds of critical inquiry whose use is equivocal in the presumptive matters (*zanniyyat*) and which are not introduced two except that they differ about them. They do not deduce by [a thing] being theoretical (*nazari*) occurring in a locus of difference (*mahall al-khilaf*) over its invalidity (*butlan*). They pass a judgement of invalidity over all the rest of the theoretical sciences (*nazariyyat*) so difference reaches them.

This and the likes of it are caused by diseases which afflict the mind. It spreads like madness but is not called madness. Madness takes [quasi] artistic forms.

Those who are deceived by examples of these illusions are lowlier than for us to engage in disputation with them.

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<sup>190</sup> For a refutation of the Isma'ilis, see in this volume *The Correct Balance* and Ghazali's *Fada'ih al-Batiniyya wa Fada'il al-Mustazhiriyya* (The Infamies (Enormities) of the Batinites and the Virtues (Merits) of the Mustazhirites), trans. McCarthy: <http://ghazali.org/works/bati.htm>.

<sup>191</sup> *Burhan* is apodeixis.

Let us confine ourselves to what we have already mentioned concerning demonstrating the reasons for indecision (*hayra*). God knows best.

#### Fourth view concerning

#### The concomitants (*lawahiq*) of the syllogism

It contains different sections with knowledge of which knowledge of demonstrative proofs (*barahin*)<sup>191</sup> will be complete

Section concerning the difference between causal analogy (*qiyas al-‘illa*)<sup>192</sup> and the analogy of indication (*qiyas al-dalala*).

Know that if the middle term (*al-hadd al-awsat*) is a cause (*‘illa*) for the major term (*hadd akbar*) the jurists called it ‘causal analogy (*qiyas al-‘illa*) and the logicians called it ‘the demonstration of why (*burhan al-lima*)’ [for in it is mentioned] the reply to ‘Why (*lima*)?’

If it is not a cause (*‘illa*) the jurists called it the ‘analogy of indication (*qiyas al-dalala*)’ and the logicians called it ‘demonstration through the ‘that’ (*burhan al-inna*)’ which is an indication of the major term present for the minor term without proof of its cause and an example of the analogy based on cause (*qiyas al-‘illa*) from the perceptibles (*mahsusat*) is your saying:

This piece of wood is burnt because fire burned it.

This person is satiated since he just ate.

The analogy of indication (*qiyas al-dalala*) is opposite it.

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<sup>192</sup> Also referred to as the ‘defective analogy.’

That is deducing the conclusion (*yustadall bi'l-natija*) from the conclusive (*muntij*). Then we say:

This is satiated. Therefore, he recently ate.

This woman is milk-bearing. Therefore, she gave birth recently.

Examples from jurisprudence include: This thing is inherently unclean (*'ayn najisa*). Therefore, praying with it is invalid (*la tasihh*).

The analogy of indication is opposite it. That is for you to say: Prayer is invalid with this thing (*'ayn*). Therefore, it is unclean.

[p.233] Generally, deducing the conclusion from the conclusive (*muntij*) merely indicates its existence not its cause (*'illa*). Therefore, we deduce [the following:]

From the creation of the world the existence of the Creator (*muhdith*).

From the existence of systematically arranged writing (*kitaba manzuma*) the knowledge of the writer.

We make 'writing' the 'middle term' and 'knowledge' 'the major term' and say:

Everyone who writes in a systematically arranged manner is learned in writing.

This [person] wrote in a systematically arranged manner. Therefore, he is learned in writing.

Writing is not a cause of learning. Rather learning is most deserving of our estimating its causality (*'illiyya*).

Likewise if two conclusions were concomitant (*talazamat*) with a single cause, it is permissible to deduce with one of the two conclusions the other. Therefore, it is an analogy of indication (*qiyas dalala*).



An example of it from jurisprudence is our saying:

Fornication (*zina*) does not necessitate (*la yujib*) the state of being forbidden (*muharramiyya*). Therefore, it does not necessitate forbidding marriage.

Forbidding marriage and making licit casual looking [such as seeing without lust, his stepmother or mother-in-law wearing house clothing that reveal the head or the arms as an example] are concomitant. They are both conclusions (*natijatan*) of consummated marriage which necessitates forbidding affinity by marriage (*musahara*) [such as the absolute prohibition to marry a step-daughter, mother-in-law...etc].

If both their concomitance with a single cause is determined, the existence of one of them indicates the existence of the other. If both their condition should differ, deduction is not possible (*lam yumkin al-istidlal*) because of the possibility of their differing in the condition.

Just as the analogy of indication is divided into two types, the analogy of cause is also divided into two divisions:

First, the middle term contains a cause (*'illa*) for the conclusion (*natija*) but it is not in itself a cause for the existence of the major term like our saying:

Every person is an animal.

Every animal is a body.

Therefore, every person is a body.

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<sup>193</sup> Al-Farabi, *Lexicon*, 2:579. (*burhan lima al-shay'*)

Therefore, the person was a body before he was an animal.

Corporeity (*jismiyya*) is first to the animal. Then [the animal] causes it for the human.

Therefore, the animal is a cause for predicating the body on the person, not for the presence of corporeality. Corporeality is essentially anterior (*tataqaddam bi'l-dhat*) in the ordering of the types and genii over the animal.<sup>193</sup>

[p. 234] Know that what is affirmed for the specie (*naw'*) from predicating the genus on it, likewise the highest genus (*jins al-jins*), the *differentia* (*fusul*), the terms (*hudud*), and the necessary accompaniments (*lawazim*) are because of the genus and the genus is a cause in its predicating it on the specie, not in the presence the predicate itself. I mean the predicate of the conclusion (*mahmul al-natija*).

**The second division:** What is a cause for the existence of the major term absolutely, not like this example.

It might not be absolutely as in something that has multiple causes. It is not possible for single causes (*ahad al-'ilal*) to be made a cause for the major term absolutely. Rather they are a cause at a specific time and place.

An example of this in jurisprudence is:

Assault is a cause for sin absolutely.

Adultery is a cause for stoning absolutely.

Apostasy is not a cause for killing absolutely.

It is necessary for killing to be by way of retaliation (*qasas*), etc. However, it is a cause for killing with respect to a specific person. That does not cause it to be excluded

from its being causal analogy (*qiyas al-'illa*).

[p.225] Chapter concerning  
demonstrating certitude (*burhan al-yaqin*)

The actual demonstrative proof (*al-burhan al-haqiqi*) does benefit something whose change is not conceived. That is according to the premises of the demonstrative proof. They are certain and eternal, are not altered and do not change at all. By that I mean that the thing does not change, even if a person should be heedless of it like our saying: 'The whole is greater than the part' and 'Things that are equal to a single thing are equal,' and the like.

Therefore, the conclusion that emerges from it are also certain (*yaqiniyya*).

Certain knowledge (*al-'ilm al-yaqini*) is for you to know [in the case of] a thing with such-and-such a description affirmed through assent (*muqtarinan bi'l-tasdiq*) that it is not possible for it not to be thus. Should you place in your mind the possibility of error in it and being oblivious to it, that would not occur in your soul originally. If that is affirmed, then you permit the error and its possibility. Therefore, it is not certain.

Thus, you ought to know the conclusions to the demonstrative proof. Should you truly know it according to our saying and the opposite was said to you, a report from the greatest of God's creation in rank and the loftiest in degree in theoretical inquiry (*nazar*) and discursive sciences ('*aqliyyat*), that caused with you a probability (*ihimal*). Therefore, certitude (*yaqin*) is not complete (*tamm*). Rather, if its opposite was transmitted from a truthful prophet, then the transmitter must be considered a liar, or one should resort

to allegorical interpretation of the expression heard from him. The possibility of truth does not occur to you.

Thus, if [the expression heard] is not open for allegorical interpretation, the prophethood of the one from whom was recounted the saying which opposes what you rationalised if what you rationalised must be doubted. If you should doubt its veracity, then your certitude is incomplete.

Should you say: Perhaps the demonstrative proof of his veracity appeared to me. Then I heard from him what contradicts a demonstrative proof I have.

[p.236] I say: The existence of this is impossible like one saying: If the widely-attested accounts are contradictory, what is the way forward concerning them, as if Mecca's existence and lack of was widely attested to? This is impossible.

Therefore, the contradiction in the demonstrative proofs which combine the conditions which we mentioned, is impossible. Should you see them as contradictory, know that in one of the two or both the aforementioned conditions were not realised. Therefore, review the location (*mazann*) of error and the seven influencers (*matharat*) which we previously enumerated.

Most of the errors are in the initiative to render as sound the premises of the demonstrative proof on the basis that they are primary premises (*awwaliyya*). They cannot be primary premises. Rather perhaps they are praiseworthy and well-known or imaginary.

You ought not to take the premises as sound so long as certitude is not part of them to the extent which we described.

Just as it is believed that what are not primary premises are primary premises, it might be believed that primary

premises are not primary premises. Therefore, they are [erroneously] doubted. There is no doubting the primary premises except if the sound innate human disposition (*fitra salima*) is removed from the intellect because of some of the fanatic speculative theologians who associated themselves with the corrupt schools of thought through rejecting the certain accounts (*jalliyyat*) to the extent the soul is accustomed to hearing them. Therefore, that which is certain is doubted.

Just as that which is not certain from among the praiseworthy beliefs (*mamduhat*) recurs to [your hearing], you hasten to believe it and regard it a certitude because of the repetition in hearing it. This is the greatest of the influencers of error (*matharat al-ghalat*). Rare are those from among the rational persons (*'uqala'*) who are vigilant against being deceived by it.

Should you say: The likes of this certitude is precious and rare. Therefore, few are the premises that have it (*taqillu bihi*).

We say: Those [areas] in which the imagination and the intellect cooperate are many, including: arithmetic, geometry, and sense perceptions (*hissiyyat*). Therefore, many certitudes of this kind proliferate in them. Likewise with the intelligibles (*ma'qulat*) which the estimative premises (*wahmiyyat*) do not adjoin (*la tuhadhaha*).<sup>194</sup>

As for the pure judgements of reason (*al-'aqliyyat al-sirfa*) that are attached to theoretical inquiry into metaphysics (*al-ilahiyyat*), they contain some of the like of these certitudes. Certitude in them does not reach the extent (*hadd*) which we mentioned except by practicing the judge-

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<sup>194</sup> Translating 'tuhadhi' rather than 'tuhazi.'

ments of reason and weaning the intellect off estimative premises and sense perceptions and making them intimate with the pure judgements of reason.

[p. 237] The more that theoretical inquiry increases in them and the perseverance in seeking them is more complete, insights into them are closer to the certain complete boundary.

Whoever's practice is prolonged and he attains mastery into those insights (*ma'arif*) is unable to silence his adversary or causing the one seeking guidance (*mustarshid*) to descend to his station by merely mentioning what he possesses, except if he were to guide him to travel his path in practicing the sciences and lengthy reflection until he reaches what he has reached. [That is] if he is of sound intuition (*sahib al-hads*), of sharp intellect and clear mind.

If he should depart from him [falling short] in intelligence or in intuition or guardianship over contemplation (*tawalli al-i'tibar*) which he undertook, he will not reach what he has reached. With that [the seeker of guidance] opposes what he says about himself with repudiation (*bi'l-inkar*).

He preoccupies himself with disapproving (*tahjin*) and exclusion (*istib'ad*).

The way of the insightful knower (*al-'arif al-basir*) is to abandon him out of disregard rather to not disseminate to him the secrets he possesses. That is more sound for his side and more conclusive for the noisy confusion of the ignorant.

Not all that is seen is said. Rather the chests of the free are the graves of secrets.

## Chapter concerning the primary

## questions of investigation (*ummahat al-matalib*)

Know that the objects of investigation (*matlubat*) of the sciences [about which] questions are asked, can be divided into four divisions because of the relationship of each one to the format with which it is asked about.

**The first**, the question whether something is the case (*matlab hal*). This question, I mean the form ‘hal’ is directed toward seeking the existence of something in itself like our saying: Does God exist? Does void exist? Or, regarding the presence of an adjective or adverb to something, like our saying: Does God will (*murid*)? Is the world temporally created (*hadith*)?

The former is called the question of the absolute *hal* (i.e. whether something is the case) and the latter the question of the qualified *hal* (i.e. whether something is the case).

[p. 238] **The second** is the question what (*matlab ma*). Conceptualisation (*tasawwur*) is known by it without assent (*tasdiq*).

That is either by name like your saying: What is the void (*khala'*)? What is the Griffin of the West (als. Fabulous Griffin) (*'anqa' mughrib*)?<sup>195</sup> That is: What is it that you want by its name?

This precedes every question. Whoever does not understand the meaning of ‘world’ (*'alam*) and ‘temporal creation

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<sup>195</sup> For a brief discussion of the griffon, See Thérèse-Ann Druart, ‘Avicennan Troubles: The Mysteries of the Heptagonal House and of the Phoenix,’ *Tópicos (México)* [online]. 2012, n.42 [accessed 2018-07-16], pp. 51-73. URL:

[http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=So188-66492012000100004&lng=es&nrm=iso](http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=So188-66492012000100004&lng=es&nrm=iso). ISSN 0188-6649.

(*huduth*)’ it is not possible for him to ask: ‘Does the world exist?’

Whoever does not conceive of the signifying meaning (*ma‘na al-dall*), it is not possible for him to ask about its existence, or the request (*al-talab*) is according to the essences’ reality (*haqiqat al-dhat*) like your saying: What is the person (*insan*)? What is wine (*‘uqar*)? With it you seek its definition (*hadd*), if you should know that what is intended by the name “uqar” is wine.

This is delayed from seeking whether something is the case (*hal*). The one who does not believe in the existence of wine (*khamr*) does not ask about its definition.

**The third**, the question ‘Why?’ which is seeking the cause (*‘illa*) to answer the question whether something is the case (*hal*) like your saying: Why was the world temporally created (*hadithan*)?

It is either seeking the cause (*‘illa*) of assent (*tasdiq*) is like your saying: Why (*lima*) did you say that God is existent (*mawjud*)?

The cause of His existence is not sought. Rather the cause is in the occurrence of the assent to His existence (*al-tasdiq bi-wujudihi*). It is the demonstration that something exists (*burhan al-inna*)<sup>196</sup> in the language of the logicians and the analogy of indication (*qiyas al-dalala*) in the language of the speculative theologians (*mutakallimin*).

As for seeking the cause of existence (*talab ‘illat al-wujud*) like your saying: ‘Why is the world created?’ we say: because of a temporally created will.

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<sup>196</sup> Marmura, ‘Ghazali and Demonstrative Science,’ pp. 188-193; Tariq Jaffer, *Al-Razi: Master of Qur’anic Reasoning and Theological Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp.201-202.



**The fourth is:** the question ‘Which? (*ayy*)’ through which something is sought apart from another.

These are the primary questions of investigation and certain problems (*as’ila*).

As for the question: ‘Where? (*ayna*),’ ‘When? (*mata*),’ and ‘How? (*kayfa*)’ they are not primary questions of investigation. They are potentially subsumed under the primary question: ‘the restricted *hal* (if something is the case).’ If the process of awareness and understanding (*tafattun*) occur to him with the question in the form of ‘*hal*’ and if they do not, they are primary questions of investigation not included in what we have enumerated.

[p.239] Chapter concerning  
Demonstrating the essential meaning (*dhati*)  
and the primary meaning (*awwali*)

As for the essential [meaning], it is applied to two aspects (*wajhayn*):

The first of which is: The predicate has to be taken into the definition of the subject, constituting it, internal to its reality, like our saying: Man is an animal.

Therefore, it is said: The animal is essential to man. That is it is constituting him as previously demonstrated.

The subject is either taken as part of the definition of the predicate like our saying: Some animals are men.

The predicate here is ‘man’. Rather ‘animal’ is part of the definition of man.

If one of two things is not taken as part of the definition of the other, then one is not essential to the other.

This can be exemplified [in the following example]: ‘The flattened [quality] is part of the nose.’ Therefore, it is essential to the nose with the aforementioned meaning since it is not possible to define the ‘flattened [quality]’ except as part of mentioning the nose in its definition.

As for the primary, it is also mentioned in two aspects:

**The first is** what is primary in the intellect. That is it does not need an intermediary to know it like our saying: Two is more than one.

**The second is** for it to be such that it is not possible to affirm or negate the predicate upon another meaning more general than the subject. Therefore, should we say: Man falls ill and does not recover.

It is not primary for him with this meaning since it is said about what is more general than him which is the animal.

Indeed, it is primary for the animal since it is not applied to what is more general than it which is the body.

Likewise accepting its transference to the animal is not primary since it is said of what is more general than it, namely the body. If the animal is annulled, the acceptance of the transference remains. If the body is annulled then it does not remain.

### Chapter concerning that in which the matter of the demonstrations (*barahin*) is combined

They are three [categories]:

Principles (*mabadi'*)

Subject matters (*mawdu'at*)

Questions (*masa'il*)

[p.240] By ‘subject matters (*mawdu‘at*) we mean that which is used in demonstrating (*ma yubarhan fiha*).

Questions (*masa‘il*): That upon which [the demonstration] is based (*ma yubarhan ‘alayha*).

Principles (*mabadi‘*): That with which [the demonstration] is produced (*ma yubarhanu biha*).

What is meant by principles (*mabadi‘*) is the propositions (*muqaddimat*) which we previously mentioned.

As for the ‘subject matters (*mawdu‘at*), they are the matters which are placed in the sciences and whose essential accidents are sought. By ‘essentiality (*dhatiyya*) I mean the second meaning of the two aforementioned meanings.

Every branch of knowledge has a subject.

The subject of geometry (*handasa*) is: measurable dimension (*miqdar*).

The subject of arithmetic (*hisab*) is: number (‘*adad*).

The subject of knowledge which is known as physics (*al-‘ilm al-mulaqqab bi‘l-tabi‘i*) is the body (*jism*) of the world. From a certain aspect the world’s body is in motion and is constant.

The subject of grammar (*nahw*) is the language of the Arabs from the perspective of its inflection differing.

The subject of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) is the actions of those who are legally responsible (*af‘al al-mukallafin*) from the perspective that [the actions] are not prohibited and they are commanded (*yu‘mar*), or are permitted (*mubah*), or are commendable (*yundab*), or are disliked (*yukrah*).

The subject of the principles of jurisprudence (*usul al-fiqh*) is the judgements of the divine law (*ahkam al-shar‘*), namely: obligation (*wujub*), prohibition (*hazr*), permissibility (*ibaha*) from the aspect of your perceiving it from its proofs (*adilla*).

The subject of logic (*mantiq*) is distinguishing the intelligibles (*ma'qulat*) and giving a precise exposition of the meanings (*ma'ani*).

[p.241] As for the questions (*masa'il*), they are propositions (*qadaya*) specific to every branch of knowledge through which knowledge in the sciences is sought by one of two terms: Negation (*nafy*) or confirmation (*ithbat*). [This is] like our saying concerning arithmetic: This number is either even or odd. In geometry: This measurable dimension (*miqdar*) is equal (*musawin*) or different (*mubayin*).

In jurisprudence (*fiqh*): This action is permitted (*halal*) or prohibited (*haram*) or obligatory (*wajib*).

In the divine science (*al-'ilm al-ilahi*): This existent is pre-eternal (*qadim*) or temporally created (*hadith*). This existent either has a cause (*sabab*) or not.

What is intended is if the predicate of questions (*mahmul al-masa'il*) is sought through theoretical inquiry (*matluban bi'l-nazar*). Therefore, it is not permitted for it to be essential to the subject with the first meaning since if it were thus, it would know the subject before the [branch of] knowledge. It is not permissible for the animal, which is essential to man, meaning that he is extant in his definition, to be the object of scientific investigation (*matlub*). Whoever knows man, will undoubtedly know his being an animal before him. Knowledge of specific parts of the definition precedes knowledge of the delimited (*mahdud*).

However, the essential with the second sense (*ma'na*) is the object of scientific investigation (*matlub*).

As for every predicate, which is not in the second sense (*ma'na*) or in the first sense is called 'strange (*gharib*)' like our saying in geometry upon examining the lines: This is a

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<sup>197</sup> See Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 102.

fine (*hasan*) line or crooked (*qabih*).

[This is] because the ‘fine (*hasan*)’ and the ‘wrong (*qabih*)’ are not apprehended (*la yu’khabdh fi*) the definition of line nor the line in its definition. Rather the essential is in itself straight or curved and the like.

Likewise, we say in medicine: This is a round or square wound.<sup>197</sup>

It is a strange predicate for the wound since one of the two cannot be apprehended in the definition of the other. Rather it is essential to the shapes.

The predicate may be essential to the subject with the second sense (*ma’na*). However, it is strange when annexed to the knowledge in which it is employed like our saying in jurisprudence This movement is fast or slow.

Therefore, speed and slowness are essential to movement. However, they are sought in natural science (physics).

What is sought in jurisprudence is another essential (*dhati akhar*), namely its state of being obligatory (*kaw-nuhu wajiban*), or prohibited (*mahzur*) or permitted (*mubah*).

If we should say in physics: This action is permitted or forbidden. It would be incompatible to this science (*gharib min al-‘ilm*).

[p.242] If it is said: Is it permissible for the predicate in both premises (*muqaddimatayn*) to be essential (*dhatiyyan*) in the first sense (*bi’l-ma’na al-awwal*)?

We say: No, if it were that way, the conclusion would be known. If we say:

Man is an animal.

The animal is a body

Therefore, man is a body.

Knowledge of the conclusion is not sought (*ghayr matlub*). Therefore, whoever knows man, know all the parts (*ajza'*) of his definition (*hadd*) which are 'the body' and 'the animal.'

Indeed, it is not unlikely that every definition is essential in the second sense (*bi'l-ma'na al-thani*). Rather if one of them is essential in the second sense, this is sufficient regardless of whether it is the minor or the major premise.

If it is said: Why have you said that the essential in the first sense (*al-ma'na al-awwal*) is not sought while we seek knowledge about [whether] or not the soul is a substance (*jawhar*)? Substantiality (*jawhariyya*) for the soul is essential (*dhatiyya*) since whoever knows the soul knows its state of being a substance (*jawhar*) if it is a substance (*in kana jawharan*).

We say: Whoever knows the soul does not conceive from him seeking its state of being a substance since knowledge of its substantiality is antecedent (*sabiqa*) to knowledge of [the substance]. However, should we seek whether or not the soul is a substance, we would not know from the soul except for a matter (*amr*) accidental to [the substance] ('*arid labu*) which is the mover (*muharrrik*) and the perceiver (*mu-drik*). That is like [the attribute] 'white' to snow.

What is sought is the genus of what is accidental to it (*al-ma'rud labu*) which is not constitutive (*muqawwim*) of the quiddity of the accidental quality ('*arid*). I mean the substantiality (*jawhariyya*) of the perceiver and mover is the constitution of the essentials (*taqwim al-dhatiyyat*).

Likewise every time its image or name occurred to us,

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<sup>198</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 77-78.

not its reality, it is possible for us to seek the genus (*jins*) of that whose name and image which occurred to us.

Other than in this aspect is not possible.

### Chapter in resolving doubt (*shubha*) in the circular analogy (*al-qiyas al-dawri*)

Should one say: Why did you conclude (*qadaytum*) with annulling the circular proof (*burhan dawri*)?<sup>198</sup>

It is known that if man is asked about the causes (*asbab*) and effects (*musabbabat*) of what God decreed His way (Sunna) that connects some of them with each other (i.e. the causes and effects). They contain what relates in a cycle to the first, since it is said:

Why was there a cloud?

Therefore, it is said: Since it was vapour which became concentrated and amassed.

[p.243] Then it is said: Why was there vapour?

Then it is said: Since the land was damp and the heat caused a reaction with it. Therefore, some moisture turned into vapour and ascended.

Then it is said: Why was the land damp?

Then it is said: Because there was rain.

Then it is said: Why was there rain?

Then it is said: Because there were clouds.

Therefore, it returned according to the cycle (*bi'l-dawr*) to the cloud. It is as if it said: Why were there clouds? I said: because there were clouds.

The occurrence in cycles (*dawri*) is invalid (*batil*) whether or not the repeated term (*al-hadd al-mutakarrir*) intervenes with an intermediary or intermediaries.

We say: This is not what occurs cyclically and is invalid. Rather the invalid is for something to be apprehended by revealing itself by saying:

Why was this cloud?

Therefore, the cause is what in the end returns to causation (*ta' lil*) with this cloud itself.

As for it returning to the explanation with another cloud, the cause is unlike the effect (*ghayr al-ma'lul*) in number (*'adad*). Except it is equal to it in type (*naw'*). It is not remote for the same cloud to be a cause for another through the dampness of the land, then the rising of vapor, then the formation of another cloud.

### Chapter concerning that in which the true demonstration occurs

Know that the true demonstration is what benefits the necessary, perpetual and eternal certitude (*yaqin*) which is impossible to change like your knowing that the world is temporally created and that it has a Creator and the like which is impossible to oppose it forever, since it is impossible for a time to come in which we judge the the world to be pre-eternity, and [we] negate [the existence of] [p.244] the Creator.

As for the changing things which do not possess perpetual certitude, they are all of the particular propositions (*juz' iyyat*) which are terrestrial, the closest of which to being unchanging are the mountains.



If you should say that this mountain's elevation is such-and-such.

Every mountain's elevation is such-and-such. Therefore, it is such-and-such.

Therefore, it is concluded: The elevation of this one is such-and-such.

The conclusion (*hasil*) is not eternal knowledge (*'ilman abadiyyan*) since in the minor premise certitude is not perpetual, since it is conceived that the mountain's elevation will change.

Likewise is the depth of the seas and the locations of islands. These matters do not remain [unchanging]. How is then your knowledge that Zayd is at home and the like of that which are related to accidental human circumstances? Not like our saying:

Man is an animal.

The animal is a body.

Man is not in two places at once.

and the likes of this.

These are eternal perpetual certainties which are not subjected to change. Even one of the speculative theologians said: Knowledge is a kind of ignorance (*al-'ilm min jins al-jahl*).<sup>199</sup>

He intended with it this kind of knowledge. Should you know as reliably reported on authority of multiple independent narrators (*bi'l-tawatur*) for example: Zayd is in the

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<sup>199</sup> Elsewhere Ghazali mentions that 'Reality is a kind of ignorance (*al-haqiqa jins min al-jahl*).'

house.

Should this conviction (*i'tiqad*) be perpetually assumed, and Zayd leaves [the house], then this conviction itself would become ignorance.

This genus (*jins*) is not perpetually conceived in the perpetual certitudes (*al-yaqiniyyat al-da'ima*).

If it should be said: Is it conceivable to produce a demonstration (*iqamat al-burhan*) on that whose occurrence is valid for the most part (*akthariyyan*) or by chance (*ittifaqiyyan*)?

We say: As for what is valid for the most part (*akthari*) from the major premises, they undoubtedly have causes for the most part (*'ilal akthariyya*).

If those causes (*'ilal*) are made middle terms (*hudud wusta*), they produce beneficial knowledge and overwhelming probability (*zannan ghaliban*).

As for knowledge, by virtue of it being 'majority (*akthari*)' and 'most likely (*ghalib*),' and if we should know the enactment of the Sunna of God the Exalted that the beard either grows because of the strength of the skin or the fortitude of the form (*matanat al-najjar*). If we should know by the old age [of the person as an indicator for] the strength [p.245] of the skin and the fortitude of the form, we pass the judgement of the beard emerging. That is we passed judgement that [its] emerging is most likely and that the direction of emerging is more dominating than the other direction. This is certain (*yaqini*). What occurs most likely (*ghaliban*), the set preponderant (*murajjah*) is inevitable (*la mahala*), however with a hidden condition (*shart khafi*) which is not known (*la yuttala'u 'alayhi*). The lack of that

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<sup>200</sup> 'Walad', the word for child, is masculine.

condition is rare. Therefore, we pass certain judgement that whoever marries a young woman copulated with her, will most likely (*ghaliban*) have a child. However, the presence of the child himself<sup>200</sup> is probable (*maznun*) and the state of the existence (*wujud*) which is generally overwhelming is definitive (*maqtu' bihi*).

Thus we pass judgement in the probable judgement of jurisprudence (*al-fiqhiyyat al-zanniyya*) that knowledge upon the appearance of probability is obligatory definitively and categorically (*qat'an*). Therefore, the production ('*amal*) is probable (*maznun*) and the presence of the judgement is [also] probable. However the presence of the production ('*amal*) is categorical (*qat'i*) since it is known with a categorical proof that the divine law established that with probability bordering on certainty (*ghalib al-zann*) in place of certitude (*yaqin*) with respect to [declaring] acts obligatory (*wujub al-'amal*). The judgement's being probable does not prevent us from regarding as definitive that we have regarded as such.

As for the matters which occur by chance (*ittifaqiyya*) like a person finding treasure while walking for which it is not possible for probability or knowledge to occur with it, even if attaining the probability of its existence, it would become mainly probable (*ghaliban akthariyyan*) and would no longer be only by chance.

Indeed, it is possible to produce a demonstration (*burhan*) by its being only by chance (*ittifaqiyyan*).

The logicians adopted the convention (*istalaha 'ala*) of designating 'demonstrating (*burhan*)' to that which produces necessary, perpetual, universal certitude (*al-yaqin al-kulli al-da'im al-daruri*).

If you do not support them in adopting this convention,

it is possible for you to call all of the true sciences (*al-‘ulum al-haqiqiyya*) ‘demonstrative (*buhaniyya*)’ if the premises assemble the conditions that were [mentioned].

Should you support them in this, then the demonstrative sciences (*al-burhani min al-‘ulum*) are: knowledge of God and His attributes and all the eternal unchanging matters, like our saying: Two is greater than one. This is true eternally and everlastingly (*fi’l-azal wa’l-abad*).

Knowledge of the configuration of the heavens (*hay’at al-samawat*), the planets, their distances, measurements and the manner in which they journey (*kayfiyyat masiriha*) are demonstrative (*burhaniyyan*) with those who saw that they are eternal and unchanging.

They are not demonstrative (*burhaniyya*) with the people of truth who view the heavens as they do the terrestrial realm (*ardiyyat*) in permitting change in them.

[p.246] As for that which differs in the territories (*biqa‘*) and regions (*aqtar*), like the linguistic sciences and the political sciences, it differs according to time period and religious community like the jurisprudential (*fiqhiyya*) and legal (*shar‘iyya*) statutes from the particulars of the permitted and forbidden.

It is not hidden that they are not from the demonstrative syllogisms (*burhaniyyat*) according to this convention (*‘ala hadha al-istilah*).

The philosophers allege that the highest felicity in the afterlife does not have any meaning except for the soul reaching its perfection which is possible for it to attain and that its perfection is in the sciences, not in the base desires of the self (*shahawat*).

When the soul remains eternally, its salvation (*najat*) and

happiness (*sa'ada*) in the truthful sciences for eternity like knowledge of God and His attributes, His angels, and the ordering of the existents (*mawjudat*) and the progression of the causes (*asbab*) and effects (*musabbabat*).

As for the sciences which are not perpetually certain, if they are sought, they get, rather to get through them to other than them.

This is a locus (*mahall*) which is not revealed except after lengthy theoretical inquiry. This book does not permit for a thorough investigation of it. Rather the locus where it is revealed is the specific sciences (*al-'ulum al-mufassala*).

[p.247] Chapter concerning the Divisions  
of the Cause ('*illa*)

[The word] 'cause ('*illa*)' is applied to four connotational attributes (*ma'anin*).

**The first:** Something that possesses movement in its essence (*ma minhu bi-dhatihi al-haraka*). It is the cause for a thing's existence, like the carpenter to the chair and the father to the boy.

**The second:** The substance (*madda*) and what is necessary to exist for something's existence like wood for a chair and menstrual blood and sperm for the boy.<sup>201</sup>

**The third:** The form (*sura*) which is the completion for everything. It may also be called a 'formal cause ('*illa surriyya*)' like the form of the bed to the bed and the form of the house to the house.

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<sup>201</sup> Compare Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 127.

<sup>202</sup> This has been corrected from the 'al-suluh lil-julus min al-sarir.'

<sup>203</sup> See for instance Al-Kindi, *Risala fi hudud al-ashya' wa rusumiha* in *Rasa'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyya*, ed. Mu'ammad 'Abd al-Hadi Abu Rida. 2 vols. Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, 1950–1953, 1:109–130. Also Andreas Lammer, *The Elements of Avicenna's Physics: Greek Sources and Arabic Innovations*, p. 247, 505.

**The fourth:** The teleological end (*ghaya ba'itha*) first, its existence is required to be at the end like dwelling (*sakan*), for the house and utility to sitting from [crafting] the bed (*al-suluh lil-julus min al-sarir*).<sup>202</sup>

Know that every one of these occurs as middle terms in the demonstrative proofs (*yaqa'u hududan wusta fi'l-barahin*) since it is possible for each one to be mentioned in reply to the question 'Why? (*jawab lima*).'

As for the principle of motion,<sup>203</sup> an example of it from the intelligibles (*ma'qulat*) for it to be said: Why (*lima*) did the prince fight so-and-so?

Then it is said: because he plundered his province. The act of plundering is the principle of motion.

[p.248] It is said: 'Why did so-and-so kill so-and-so?' Then it is said: 'because the sultan forced him to do it.'

An example of this from jurisprudence is to say: 'Why was this person killed?' Then it is said: 'because he committed adultery or apostatised.'

Therefore, 'adultery' is the originator of this matter (*mabda' hadha al-amr*) which is what the jurists call for the most part 'cause (*sabab*).'

As for 'substance (*madda*),' an example of it from the intelligibles is to say: Why (*lima*) does man die?

Then we say: since he is a composite of dissonant things (*umur mutanafira*) from hotness, moisture, coldness, dryness—contested and dissonant. hotness

Examples of it from jurisprudence is to say: Why were the commercial partnership (*qirad*) and agency (*wikala*) annulled with death and unconsciousness (*ighma*)?

We say: because it is a weak permitted contract which is not necessary (*la luzum lahu*).

This is a material cause (*madda*) since the voiding be-

fell's the contract the way death visits the human being, upon the concomitance of the cause (*jarayan al-sabab*) which is the principle of the matter (*mabda' al-amr*) in death and voiding together.

As for the form (*sura*), it contains the constitution (*qiwam*) of the thing, e.g. the bed is a bed with its form (*sura*), not its wood. Man is man because of his form (*sura*) not his body (*jism*).

The visual appearances (*hay'at*) of things differ in the outer forms (*suwar*) not in the substances (*mawadd*). Therefore, their being supported with them (i.e. the outer forms) is not hidden. If it said: 'Why did this sperm become a person and this wood a bed?'

Then it is said: Through the acquisition of the humanness form (*surat al-insaniyya*) and the bedness form (*surat al-saririyya*).

As for the purpose (*ghaya*) for whose sake is the thing, an example of it from the intelligibles (*ma'qul*) is to say: Why are the molars wide?

It is said: because what is intended with them is crushing (*tahn*).

Why did they fight the [particular] class? It is said: to enslave them.

In jurisprudence it is said: Why were the adulterer, the apostate and the murderer killed? It is said: to prevent [committing] grave sins (*fawahish*).

These four causes join together in everything that has a cause (*'illa*).<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Contrast Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 129, who argues that more than one, though not necessarily all four of the causes combine in a single instance.

<sup>205</sup> Synonymous with *sabab*.

<sup>206</sup> *Bud'* can also refer to sexual intercourse (*jima'*).

Thus it is in the legal judgements.

[p.249] Perhaps the jurists called the matter ‘locus (*mahall*)’ ‘the agent (*fa‘il*),’ which is like the carpenter (*naj-jar*), and the father, ‘cause (*ahl*),’<sup>205</sup> the objective (*ghaya*), and ‘judgement (*hukm*).’

In the example of marriage (*furida al-nikah*), the husband is the cause (*ahl*), the vagina (*bud‘*)<sup>206</sup> is locus (*mahall*), making it lawful (*hill*) is an ‘objective (*ghaya*),’ and the form of the contract is as if it is the outer form (*sura*).

So long as these matters (*umur*) are not in conjunction, marriage does not exist. Thus it is said: Marriage which does not benefit lawfulness (*la yufid al-hill*) does not exist. Likewise selling which does not benefit ownership.

The existence of the objective (*wujud al-ghaya*) is inevitable (*la budda minhu*). Its (i.e. the objective) nature as intelligible (*ma‘qulan*), inducive (*ba‘ith*) is a condition prior to existence. Its nature as present *in actu* is necessary after existence.

As long as the agent (*fa‘il*) and the substance (*madda*) are able to be present, the existence of the thing like the carpenter, the wood, the father, the sperm drop (*nutfa*), the seller (*ba‘i‘*) and the sale object (*mabi‘*) are not necessary under all circumstances (*fi kull hal*).

So long as the form exists, it is necessary for the thing to exist, like the form of the bed, and humanity (*insaniyya*).

So long as the objective exists *in actu*, it is necessary for the thing to exist, like the ‘state of being lawful (*hill*)’ in marriage and ‘usefulness (*suluh*)’ for sheltering oneself and sitting in the house.

The thing in these four aspects differs in this meaning.

Then every one of these causes [is as follows]:



Distant (*ba'ida*) like the wife surrendering [herself] to the husband upon the husband possessing half of the dowry (*sadaq*). It is the cause ('*illa*) of the dowry.

The dowry is the near cause of surrendering.

or *in potential*: like drunkenness to wine before drinking.

or *in actu*: as in the state of drinking.

or specific: like adultery is to stoning.

or generally: like the to stoning or the punishment.

or essentially: It is called 'cause' by the jurists like adultery is to stoning.

[p.250] or accidentally: like someone being liable for having been married [which should shield against adultery] (*al-ihsan lahu*) which is called a condition (*shart*). Stoning is not imperative except by finding one liable [for the act of adultery] while being married. It is [from] the characteristics (*khisal*) which however, function in place of the cause with it. Just as if you should release the support from beneath the roof, then it falls. Therefore, it is said: its falling is by the cause of weight ('*illat al-thuql*). However, with the removal of the support, 'the quality of [collapsing] downward (*huwiyy*)' has a condition which is the space underneath being devoid of a solid body, not to penetrate it.

Examples of this in the perceptibles are many. Thus we have restricted ourselves to the legal examples (*al-amthila al-fiqhiyya*).

# [p.251] [BOOK THREE] DEFINITIONS<sup>207</sup>

Theoretical inquiry in this book is restricted  
to two aspects (*fannan*)

*First:* What occurs of the terms that constitute  
the universal laws

*Second:* The specific terms

[p. 252] The First Discipline  
Concerning the laws of the definitions

It contains chapters

The first [chapter] concerning  
demonstrating the need for the definition

We previously presented that knowledge is of two parts:

The first: Knowledge of the essences of things (*'ilm bi-dhawāt al-ashya'*) which is called 'conceptualisation (*tasawwur*).'

The second: Knowledge of the relationship of the essences to each other whether through negation (*negation*) or confirmation (*ijab*). It is called 'assent (*tasdiq*).'

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<sup>207</sup> Also Syllogistic Terms.

Attaining ‘assent’ is through proof (*hujja*) and attaining complete conceptualisation (*tasawwur*) through the term (*hadd*).

The existent things are divided into:

Individual concrete things (*a‘yan shakhsiyya*) like Zayd, Mecca, and ‘this tree.’

Universal things (*umur kulliyya*) like the person, the country, the tree, wheat, and wine.

You already know the difference between the universal (*kulli*) and the particular (*juz‘i*).

Our objective is the universals (*kulliyyat*) since they are used in demonstrative proofs (*barahin*).

The universal is sometimes understood in a universal sense (*fahman jumliyyan*) like an understanding from just the common name and the rest of the names and nicknames of the species (*anwa‘*) and genera (*ajnas*).

[The universal] may also be understood in a detailed summary which encompasses all of the essentials which contain the supports (*qiwwam*) of the thing and greatly and completely distinguish it from another in the mind reflecting the name and the name reflecting upon it as is understood from our saying:

An intoxicating beverage expressed from the grape  
(*sharab muskir mu‘tasar min al-‘inab*).

and

A speaking mortal animal (*hayawan natiq ma‘it*).

and

A body possessing a soul, sensitive, moves at will, and gets nourished (*jism dhu nafsin hassasin mutaharrikin bi‘l-irada mutaghaddhin*).

[p. 254] With these above mentioned terms, it is possible to understand:

Wine    Man    Animal

an understanding that is greatly summarised, detailed, verified and discerned fashion than is understood from their mere names.

That which makes the thing understood this kind of understanding is called 'a term (*hadd*) just as that what makes the first 'kind (*darb*)' of understanding understood is called a 'name' and a 'nickname.'

The understanding which occurs from defining is called a summarised (*mulakhkhas*), detailed (*mufassal*) knowledge. Knowledge which occurs with only the name is called knowledge in general ('*ilm jumli*).

A thing might be understood by that which distinguished it from apart such that it is reflected in its name and the name reflects on it. It is distinguished by essential constitutive / (*al-sifat al-dhatiyya al-muqawwima*) which are the genera (*ajnas*), species (*anwa'*), and *differentia* (*fusul*). Rather by the accidents ('*awarid*) and the specific attributes (*khawass*). That is called a description (*rasm*). It is like our saying in distinguishing man from others: He is the animal who walks on two legs, who has wide nails, and laughs.

This distinguishes him from others like the term (*hadd*).

Like your saying concerning wine: It is the liquid that ferments in the earthen jar upon whose surface froth forms...and other such accidents which if combined do not occur except with wine.

And this if it is more general than the thing defined with abandoning some of the precautions (*ba'd al-ihdirazat*), is called a 'deficient description (*rasm naqis*).'

There is something which is difficult to comprehend all of its essences or for which an expression cannot be found and then modulates to accidental precautions (*ihirazat ‘aradiyya*) instead of the essential *differentia* (*fusul dhatiyya*). Therefore, it becomes a distinguished description (*rasm mumayyaz*) existing in place of the term (*hadd*) only in discernment (*tamyiz*) not in understanding all of the essentials (*tafahhum jami‘ al-dhatiyyat*).

Those who are sincere request from the term (*hadd*) conceptualising the true nature (*kunh*) of the thing and representing its reality (*tamaththul haqiqatihi*) in [p.255] themselves not for the sake of discernment (*tamyiz*). Rather it attains the conceptualisation completely and discernment follows it. Whoever seeks absolute discernment (*al-tamyiz al-mujarrad*) will be convinced by the description (*rasm*).

Then you would know to what the [following] reach out of causal efficacy (*ta’thiran*):

The noun (*ism*)

The term (*hadd*)

The description (*rasm*)

You know the division of the conceptualisation of the thing (*inqisam tasawwr al-shay’*) into a conceptualisation which has detailed understanding of its essentialities (*dhatiyyat*) and a conceptualisation which has an understanding of its accidents (*a‘rad*).

Each one of them might be complete and equivalent to the name in the extremities of predication (*tarafay al-haml*) or it might be incomplete (*naqis*). Therefore, it is more general than the name.

Know that the most beneficial of the descriptions (*anfa‘u al-rusum*) in defining the things is for the proximate genus

(*al-jins al-qarib*)<sup>208</sup> to be placed in it originally. Then you mention the well-known particular accidents (*al-a'rad al-khassa al-mashhura*) in terms of *differentia* (*fusulan*). The hidden *proprium* (*al-khassa al-khafiyya*) if mentioned, do not generally benefit the definition. When you say concerning the description of the triangle:

It is a form whose angles are equal to two right angles.

You have defined it (*rasamtahu*) to an architect (*mu-handis*) alone.

Therefore, the definition is a saying which indicates the quiddity (*mahiyya*) of the thing.

The description (*rasm*) is the saying composed of the accidents of the thing and its particular characteristics whose sum specifies them (i.e. the accidents) by being in conjunction and are equivalent to it.

### Second Discipline concerning the substance of the definition and its form

We have presented that every composed thing (*mu'allaf*) has substance and form as in the syllogism (*qiyas*).

The substance of the definition (*maddat al-hadd*) are the genera, the species and the *differentia*. We have mentioned them in the *Book of the Syllogistic Premises* [above].

[p.256] As for [the definition's] form and configuration (*hay'a*), they are for taking into account in it the production (*irad*) of the proximate genus (*al-jins al-aqrab*). It complements (*yurdif*) all the essential *differentia* (*al-fusul al-dhatiyya*) with none left behind. We mean by producing the proximate genus to not say concerning the definition of

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<sup>208</sup> Janssens, p. 58.

man (*hadd al-insan*): ‘A mortal speaking body (*jism natiq ma’it*)’ even if that is equivalent to what is being sought (*al-matlub*). Rather we say (animal). The animal is an intermediary (*mutawassit*) between the body and man. It is closer to what is sought from ‘the body.’

We do not say in the definition of wine: that it is an intoxicating liquid (*ma’i’ muskir*), rather we say: an intoxicating beverage. Therefore, it is more specific than ‘liquid’ and closer to ‘wine.’

Likewise, all of the essential *differentia* (*fusul dhatiyya*) ought to be produced in order even if discernment should occur in some of the *differentia*.

Should he be asked about the definition of the animal, he says: A body possessing a soul (*jism dhu nafs*), sensitive (*hassas*), possessing dimension (*bu’d*), moving at will (*mutaharrik bi’l-irada*).

He brought all of the *differentia*. Should he have abandoned what comes after the sensitive (*hassas*), discernment would occur with [the definition]. However, he would not have conceived of the animal with its complete essential parts.

The definition is the exterior expression (*‘unwan*) of what is defined. Therefore, it ought to be equivalent in meaning. If some of these *differentia* are deficient, then it is called an ‘incomplete definition (*hadd naqis*)’ even if it is discerned and was a constant (*mutarrid*) reflected on the way to a solution (*fi tariq al-hall*).

However much he mentions the proximate genus (*al-jins al-qarib*) and brings all of the essential *differentia*, he ought not to increase it.

However much you mention these conditions in the form and substance of the definition, you would know that

the single thing does not have except for one definition and that it does not have the capacity for conciseness and proximity [p.257] since its conciseness is from omitting some of the *differentia*. This is deficiency (*nuqsan*).

Prolonging it by mentioning the definition of the proximate genus instead of the genus is like your saying in the definition of man: He is a body possessing a soul, sensitive, in motion by will, speaking, and mortal.

[p. 258] Then he mentioned the definition of the ‘animal’ in place of the ‘animal’ which is superfluousness which is not needed. What is intended is that the definition includes all of the essentialities of the thing either *in potentia* or *in actu*.

However much the animal is mentioned, it includes [the following attributes]: sensitive, in motion, and body *in potential* that is by way of inclusion (*tadammun*).

Likewise a definition is present for the thing which is composed of a form (*sura*) and a substance (*madda*) by mentioning one of the two. As it is said in the definition of anger: It is the blood of the heart boiling. This is mentioned of the substance.

It is said: It is seeking revenge. This is mention of the form.

Rather the complete definition is to say: It is the boiling of the heart’s blood for seeking revenge.

If it said: If the heedless person should be heedless or if somebody had acted deliberately, and prolonged the definition by mention of the proximate genus, instead of the proximate genus [itself] -whether he added to some of the essential *differentia* something of the accidents (*a‘rad*) an effective concomitants (*lawazim*) or reduced some of the *differentia*, would the aim of the definition be missed like that of the syllogism by formulating it wrong?



We say: Those who look to the outward forms of things (*zawahir al-umur*), perhaps regard as great the matter concerning this error and the matter is easier than they believe, however much man takes note of the definition's intention (*maqsud al-hadd*). What is intended is the conceptualisation of something with all its constituents (*muqawwimat*) while taking into account the order in knowledge of the most general and important through displaying the general first and backing it with the particular (*akhass*) which functions the same as the *differentia* (*al-majri majra al-fusul*). If that is preserved, required detailed conceptual knowledge occurs.

As for the deficiency (*nuqsan*) in abandoning some of the *differentia* (*fusul*), it is a deficiency in conceptualisation (*tasawwur*).

As for an increase in some of the accidents, what has occurred of complete conceptualisation is not refuted. [On the contrary,] benefit might be derived from it in some of the situations in increasing disclosure and illumination.

As for the substitution of the essentials with the concomitants (*lawazim*) and accidents (*'ardiyyat*), that is objectionable (*qadih*) in perfect conceptualisation.

Then let him know the level of the influence of each of these in what is intended. Man ought not to remain fixated on the habitual description that is familiar in every matter and forget his objective.

[p.259] Therefore, as long as all the essentials are known in order, the objective is fulfilled even if something of the accidents (*a'rad*) is added or if the definition of the proximate genus was posited (*ukhidha*) instead of the genus [itself].

### Third discipline concerning ordering of seeking the definition with a question

The inquirer about something by his saying: ‘What is it?’ does not reply except after finishing from the ‘question of what (*matlab hal*).’ Likewise, the questioner with ‘Why?’ does not ask except after finishing from the ‘question of what (*matlab hal*).’

If he should ask about the thing before conviction in its existence, and say: What is it? (*ma huwa*) he returns to seeking an exposition of the name like one saying: ‘What is the void (*khala*)?’ ‘What is alchemy (*kimiya*)?’—and he does not believe either to be in existence.

If he should believe in the existence, the request is directed at conceptualising the thing in its essence (*fi dhatih*).

Its proper order is for him to say: What is it? pointing, for example, to a date palm.

Then if the one who is asked answers with the proximate genus and says: ‘a tree,’ he does not convince the questioner with it, rather it is related to what the form (Which? (*ayy*)) mentions. He said: Which tree is it?

Should he say: ‘It is a tree which bears dates’ he attained the objective and the question ends except if the meaning of dates (*rutab*) or tree is not understood [in which case] he returns to the form ‘What (*ma*)’ and says: What are dates? What are trees? Then he mentions the genus and species and says: The tree is a plant which has a trunk.

If it is asked: What is a trunk? Then he mentions its genus and species and says: It is a body which receives nourishment and is growing.

If it is asked: What is a body? Then he says: It extends in the three dimensions (*al-aqtar al-thalatha*)—It has length, width and height.

It is thus until the questioning ceases.

If it is said: When does it cease? The progression to an undefined end is impossible. If you should specify its stopping, then it is arbitrariness (*tahakkum*).

[p.260] Then we say: [The question] does not progress indefinitely, but rather terminates at genera and species which are known to the questioner undoubtedly.

If [the questioner] should maintain [total] ignorance (lit. eternally), he does not have an expose of the definition (*hadd*), since every definition (*ta'rif*) and knowing requires previous knowledge. Therefore, one does not know the form of the thing with the definition except one who knows the parts of the definition from the genus and differentia before it, either by himself in order to clarify it or by another abstraction (*tajrid*) until he proceeds upward to beginnings (*awa'il*) which are known by themselves.

Likewise every assensual knowledge (*ta'allum tasdiqi*) is with the proof (*bi'l-hujja*) and with knowledge that precedes the premises which are primary and are not known through analogy or are known through analogy but return in the end to the primary intelligibles (*awwaliyyat*).

The end of the definition is in a fashion analogous to the syllogistic premises without difference.

What is intended by this is that the definition (*hadd*) is undoubtedly composed of the thing's genus (*jins*) and essential differentia (*fasl dhati*) and does not have any other meaning (*la ma'na lahu siwahu*).

Whatever does not have differentia (*fasl*) or a genus (*jins*), does not have a definition (*hadd*). Thus if we are asked about the definition of 'existent (*mawjud*)' we would not be able to [define] it except if commentary on the name is desired. Then it gets translated with another foreign

[language] expression or is substituted with something in Arabic. That is not a definition but rather mention of a name in place of another which is synonymous.

If you should ask about the definition of wine (*khamr*), we say: wine (*'uqar*). About the definition of knowledge (*'ilm*) we say: knowledge (*ma'rifa*) and about the definition of movement (*haraka*), we say: movement (*naqla*).

It is not a definition but rather repetition of things that are synonymous.

[p.261] Whoever should wish to call it a definition, then there is no objection in [such] designations (*itlaqat*). We mean by definition (*hadd*) what obtains in the soul a parallel image to that which is defined (*mahdud*), coinciding with all of its essential species (*fusulihī al-dhatiyya*).

We have taken into account the essential species (*fusul dhatiyya*) since the thing:

It may be differentiated from other than it in the objective which does not support its essence like the differentiation of the red garment from the black.

It may be differentiated by an inseparable concomitant (*lazim la yufariq*) like the differentiation of tar with blackness from snow [white], and the differentiation of the crow from the parrot.

It may also be differentiated in essence the differentiation of the garment from the sword and the robe of silk from the dirham of cotton.

Whoever asks about the quiddity of the garment seeking its definition, he seeks those matters with which there is support for its state of being a garment (*thawbiyya*). We do not support the state of being a garment from colour,

length, and width. Then his reply is: What is not essential to the garment's essence is locus in the question (*mahall bi'l-su'al*).

You know that the definition is composed of genus and *differentia* and that which is not subsumed to the genus until it is differentiated from it with an undefined *differentia*, like what is mentioned in displaying a description (*ma'rad rasm*) or elucidating a name. Then its naming of 'definition' is opposed to the naming which we adopted by convention (*istalahna 'alayha*). Therefore, the definition is equivocal with it (*mushtarakan lahu*) and to what we mentioned.

#### Fourth discipline concerning Classifications to which the name definition is applied

'Definition' is applied equivocally (*bi'l-tashkik*) to five things:

**First:** the definition which explains the meaning of a name (*al-sharih li-ma'na al-ism*) and does not turn with it to the existence of the thing or non-existence. Rather, [p. 262] it may be doubtful (*mashkuk*) and we mention the meaning. Then if its existence appeared, it is known that the definition was not through the pure name (*al-ism al-mujarrad*) and its explanation (*sharh*) but rather is an [exterior] expression (*'unwan*) of the essence and its explanation.<sup>209</sup>

**Second:** According to the essence which is the conclusion of demonstration (*natijat burhan*).

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<sup>209</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 126.

**Third:** What is, according to the essence. It is the principle of demonstration (*mabda' burhan*).

**Fourth:** What is, according to the essence and the complete definition which combines the principle of demonstration and the conclusion of demonstration.

Likewise, if you are asked about the definition of eclipse (*kusuf*) and you said: obscuring the light of the moon because of the middle [positioning] of the earth between it and the sun,<sup>210</sup> 'obscuring the light of the moon' is the conclusion of the demonstration.

'The middle [positioning] of the earth' is the principle (*mabda'*).

Therefore, in the emplacement (*ma'rad*) of the demonstration you say:

When the earth [took a middle position] the light was obscured.

Therefore, 'taking a middle position' is the middle term (*hadd awsat*). It is the principle of demonstration (*mabda' burhan*).<sup>211</sup>

'The obscuring' is the greater term (*hadd akbar*). It is the conclusion of demonstration (*natijat burhan*).

Thus the demonstration and the definition are intertwined (*yatadakhlu*). The essential causes of this genus (*al-'ilal al-dhatiyya min hadha al-jins*) enter into the definitions of things (*hudud al-ashya'*) as they enter into their demonstrations (*barahin*).

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<sup>210</sup> See Ghazali, *Incoherence of the Philosophers* (Marmura trans.), p. 6.

<sup>211</sup> Concerning the 'principle of demonstration,' see Lammer, *The Elements of Avicenna's Physics*, p. 85.

Everything that has a cause (*'illa*) its essential cause (*'illa dhatiyya*) in its definition must be mentioned so that the form (*sura*) of its essence is complete.

The four causes (*'ilal*) enter into the definition of the thing which has the four causes (*al-'ilal al-arba'a*) like his saying concerning the definition of: Adze (*qadum*)

It is an artisan tool (*ala sina'iyya*) made of iron, its form thus, with which wood is carved.

Therefore, your saying: 'tool (*ala*)' is a genus (*jins*).

'Artisan (*sina'iyya*)' indicates the efficient principle (*al-mabda' al-fa'il*). 'The form (*shakl*)' indicates the formal cause (*sura*) (lit. form). 'Iron indicates the substance (*madda*).'

[p. 263] 'Carving (*naht*)' indicates the final cause (*ghaya*). It is with [carving] that [the definition] avoids the awl and the saw as one cannot carve with them.

One might restrict oneself in the definition to the conclusion of the demonstration (*natijat al-burhan*) if discernment (*tamyiz*) occurs with them. Concerning the definition of eclipse, it is said:

The occlusion of the moon's light.

Therefore, this is called a definition (*hadd*). It is the conclusion of demonstration (*natijat burhan*).

If he should limit himself to the cause (*'illa*) and say:

'The eclipse is the middle positioning of the earth between the moon and sun', discernment occurs with it.

It is said: Premise of the principle of demonstration (*hadd mabda' burhan*).

The complete definition (*al-hadd al-tamm*) is composed of them both.

**The fifth section:** What is a definition for matters which do not contain internal causes (*'ilal*) and external (*sabab*) causes. If it had internal causes, they would not be internal to their substance, like defining: 'the point (*nuqta*),' 'unity (*wahda*),' and 'definition (*hadd*).'

For 'unity' a definition (*ta'rif*) is mentioned but it does not have an [external] cause (*sabab*).

The 'definition (*hadd*)' is defined. It is a saying which indicates the thing's quiddity (*mahiyyat al-shay'*).

The saying has a cause. Therefore, it is undoubtedly temporally created (*hadith*) sssssfor an internal cause (*li-'illa*), However, its [external] cause (*sabab*) is not essential to it like the obscuring of the moon's light in an eclipse.

This fifth one is not purely a commentary on the name nor is it a principle of demonstration (*mabda' burhan*) or the conclusion of the demonstration (*natijat burhan*) nor is it a composite from them both.

The noun 'definition (*hadd*)' is applied to these divisions. The description (*rasm*) might be called a definition (*hadd*) because it is distinguished.

Therefore, that is a sixth aspect.

### **Fifth discipline concerning the definition not being restricted with the demonstration**

**It is not possible to confirm it using it upon dispute.**

This is because if it is confirmed with the demonstration, [the form of the syllogism] lacks a middle term, like one



saying: The definition of knowledge (*'ilm*) is experiential knowing (*ma'rifa*). Then it is said to him: Why?

[p.284] Then we say: because every science (*'ilm*) is conviction (*i'tiqad*) and every conviction (*i'tiqad*) is experiential knowing (*ma'rifa*). Experiential knowing (*ma'rifa*) is greatest.

The middle term ought to be equal to [the lesser and greater terms (*tarafayn*)] since this is how the definition is. This is impossible since the middle term in that has two states (*halatan*) as follows:

1) For it to be a definition of the lesser.

or

2) A description (*rasm*) or a *proprium* (*khassa*).

**The first state:** for it to be a definition. This is invalid in two respects:

First, the thing does not have two complete definitions (*haddan tamman*) since the definition does not combine from the genus and the species. That does not accept substitution (*tabdil*).

The subject is a middle term which is precisely the greater [term], not apart from it. If it should be different in expression (*lafz*) or in reality (*haqiqa*) it is not a term for the lesser.

Second, [as for] the middle term by what is its being a definition for the minor (*haddan lil-asghar*) known? If it is known by another term, then the question exists in that other. That either progresses without end, which is impossible, or it is defined without a middle term. Therefore, the first is without a middle if it is possible to identify (*mu'arrif*) the term without a middle term (*wasat*).

**The second state:** That the middle term is not a definition for the minor. Rather it is a description (*rasm*) or *proprium* (*khassa*).

This is invalid in two respects:

First, how is it possible for that which is not a definition nor essentially constitutive (*dhati muqawwim*) to become more knowledgeable than the essentially constitutive? How does it conceive that you know from man that he is a laugher or a walker and he does not know that he is a body and an animal?

Second, that it is the greater in this middle term, if it should be an absolute predicate, and not a definition; only necessary is its state of being a predicate for the minor term and not it being a definition (*hadd*).

[p. 265] If it was a definition, it would be impossible since the definition of true characteristics (*khassiyya*) and the accident ('*arad*) is not the definition of the subject of the *proprium* (*khassa*) and the accident ('*arad*). The definition of a laugher (*al-dahik*) is not the very definition of a person.

If it is said: It is predicated on the middle term (*awsat*) according to the meaning it is the definition of its subject. This is a postulate (*musadara*) of what is sought.

Therefore, it has been proven (*tabayyana*) that the definition is not acquired (*la yuktasabu*) with the demonstration (*burhan*).<sup>212</sup>

Then if it is said: With what is it acquired (i.e. cogitated)(*bi-madha yuktasabu*)? What is its method (*tariq*)?

We say: Its method is composition (*tarkib*) which is to take a particular element (*shakhs*) from the elements whose

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<sup>212</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 114-115.

definition is sought such that it is not divisible and examine from which genus from among the ten categories (*al-maḥallat al-‘ashar*).<sup>213</sup> Then we take all of the predicates that constitute them which are in that genus [or in the thing which constitutes them like the genus]<sup>214</sup> and [p. 266] it does not turn to the accident (*‘arad*) and the concomitant (*lazim*). But rather it is limited to the constituent elements (*muḥawwimat*). Then what is repeated is excised and from its totality restricts to the latest and near (*al-akhir al-qarib*) [concomitant] to which you add the species (*faṣl*).

If we should find it coextensive (*musawwiyān*) to that which is defined (*al-mahdud*) from two aspects, it is the definition (*hadd*), by which we mean one of the two aspects:

[First,] coextensiveness (*tard*) and coexclusiveness (*‘aks*)<sup>215</sup> and equality (*tasawwī*) with the name in the predicate. Whenever the definition is affirmed (*thubita*), the name (*ism*) is unrestrained (*intalaqa*). Whenever the name is unrestrained, the definition occurs.

By the second aspect we mean: coextensiveness (*musawwāt*) in meaning which is for it to indicate the completeness of the reality (*kamal haqiqat al-dhat*), nothing is excepted from it. How many a distinguished essential (*dhati muta-mayyiz*) abandoned one of its species. Consequently, its memory (*dhikruhu*) does not in the soul produce a form that is intelligible (*ma‘qula*) to that which is defined (*mahdud*), coextensive with the perfection of its essence (*kamal*

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<sup>213</sup> Here Ghazali refers to Aristotle’s ten categories. See also Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp. 120-123; Studtmann, Paul, ‘Aristotle’s Categories’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/aristotle-categories>.

<sup>214</sup> Text added by editor from Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 116.

<sup>215</sup> Janssens, p. 59 and n. 64.

*dhatihi*). This is sought by the definitions (*matlub al-hudud*). We have already mentioned an aspect of that.

An example of seeking the definition (*talab al-hadd*) is if we were asked about the definition of wine (*khamr*). Then we indicate a specific wine (*khamr mu'ayyana*) and collect its attributes upon which it is predicated. Then we see it as red and with froth on top. This is accidental. Then we cast it off (*natrahuhu*). We see it as having a strong smell, wet and for drinking. This is a necessary. Then we cast it off.

We see it as a body or a liquid and flowing, an intoxicating drink, and expressed from grapes. These are the essentials (*dhatiyyat*).

Therefore, we do not say: a body, liquid, flowing, drink, since the liquid (*ma'i'*) suffices for the body since it is a specific body. The liquid is more particular than it.

We do not say: 'liquid' since the drink suffices for it and includes it. It is more particular and nearer. Then you take the nearer genus which includes all of the general essentials. It is: Drink (*sharab*). We deem it coextensive with other drinks. Then you differentiate it with an essential *differentia* (*fasl dhati*) not accidental (*la 'aradi*) like our saying: 'An intoxicant kept in an earthen vessel or the like.'

Then the following conjoin for us: [p.267] An intoxicating drink (*sharab muskir*).

Then you perceive: Is the name coextensive in both terms of the predicate? If it is coextensive with it, did we abandon another essential *differentia* whose essence is not completed except with it? If it is found with us, then we annex it to it just as if we found in the definition of the animal that it is: a body, has a soul, sensitive.

It is coextensive with the name in predication. However, there is another essential *differentia* which is moving at

will (*al-mutaharrik bi'l-irada*). Therefore, you should add it to it.

Thus, this is the way to determine the validity of the definitions, the only way.

### Sixth discipline concerning the inducers of error in the definitions

They are three [in number]:

The first is in the genus (*jins*).

The second is in the *differentia* (*fasl*).

The third is equivocal (*mushtarak*).

**The first inducer:** The genus which has a number of aspects (*wujuh*):

Among them is: For the *differentia* to be denoted instead of the genus. It is said about rapturous love (*'ishq*) that it is exaggerated love (*ifrat fi'l-mahabba, al-mahabba al-mufrata*). Love is a genus and exaggeration (*ifrat*) is a *differentia* (*fasl*).

Among them is: For the substance (*madda*) to be denoted in place of the genus, like your saying about the sword that it is iron that cuts and about the chair that it is wood upon which [one] sits.

Among them is: For the primordial matter (*hayula*) to be adopted in place of the genus like our saying that about ashes that they are burnt wood.

Therefore, its state is not wood but rather it was wood in opposition to wood from the bed which exists in it as a substance (*madda*). However, not in the ashes. However, it was [before] becoming something else through conver-

sion of its essential form. This is what we intended by ‘primordial state.’ You may express it with another expression if you should find its use disagreeable (lit. find it ugly) [because its Greek in origin].<sup>216</sup>

Among them is: For the particulars (*ajza*) to be adopted in place of the genus. Therefore, it is said in the definition of [the number] ten that it is five plus five, or six plus four or three plus seven, and the like.

[p. 268] Our saying that the animal is a body and soul is not thus because the body being a type of soul (*nafsan ma*) derives from (*yarji‘u*) an essential *differentia* of it. The soul is a form (*sura*) and perfection (*kamal*) for the body. [It is] not like the five for the remaining five.

Among them is: For the habitus (*malaka*) to be denoted in place of potentiality (*quwwa*). and [potentiality in place of the habitus. That is among the genera (*ajnas*) that are put forth (*al-muqaddama*) in the genera of the definitions (*ajnas al-hudud*)],<sup>217</sup> like our saying: The righteous person is one who is able in avoiding the appetitive pleasures (*ladhdhat shahwaniyya*).

This is not so since the sinner (*fajir*) is also able, but also acts.<sup>218</sup> However, the righteous person abandons the pleasures with a firm disposition and the sinner *in potentia* (*bi’l-quwwa*).

Habitus (*malaka*) might resemble potentiality (*quwwa*) as in our saying:

One capable of oppression is one in whose prerogative (*min sha’n*) and nature (*tiba’*) is the predilection (*nuzu’*)

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<sup>216</sup> Satiated” is a correct translation of *istashba’t* in the Arabic text. It is a typo. It should be *istabsha’t*.

<sup>217</sup> From Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 137.

<sup>218</sup> That is, he acts on his appetitive pleasures.

to forcibly seize from the hand of another that which is not his.

Habitus (*malaka*) is denoted in place of potentiality (*quwwa*) since one who is able to oppress might be just and his nature does not incline toward oppression.

Among that is for you to take a metaphor (*ism musta'ar*) or a dubious name (*mushtabah*) like one saying: Understanding is harmony (*muwafaqa*) and the soul is a number (*'adad*).

Among that is for you to place something from the necessary concomitants (*lawazim*) in place of the genera (*ajnas*) [like the one and the existent].<sup>219</sup>

Among [these aspects] is to place the species in place of the genus. Then it is said: Evil is oppressing the people.

Oppression is one of the species of evil. Evil is a general genus which encompasses other than evil.

**The Second Inducer:** With respect to the *differentia* (*fasl*), placing that which is genus in place of the *differentia* or that which is a *proprium* (*khassa*) or a concomitant (*lazim*) or an accidental (*'aradi*) in place of the *differentia*.<sup>220</sup>

That occurs most of the time. Being circumspect with regard to it is very difficult.

[p. 269] **The Third Inducer:** What is equivocal (*mushtarak*). It contains different aspects:

Among them is to define something with that which is more hidden than it (*akhfa minhu*) like one who defines fire as: 'a body which resembles the soul. The soul is more

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<sup>219</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 138.

<sup>220</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 138.

hidden than fire.’ Or he defines it with that which is like it in knowledge like a contrary (*didd*) with a contrary like our saying:

A pair is anything that is not single. Then you say: Anything single is not a pair.

or

You say: The pair is anything that exceeds anything single by one.

Then you say: The single is that which is less than the pair by one.

Likewise, if the other component of the relation (*mudaf*) is posited in the definition of the modifying expression (*mudaf ilayhi*),<sup>221</sup> then you say: Knowledge is from what the essence constitutes the scholar. Then you say: The scholar is one in whom knowledge subsists.

Both *relatum* (*mutadayifayn*) know together (*ya‘laman ma‘an*). One is not known through the other. Rather, [they are known] together.

Whoever is ignorant of knowledge is ignorant of the scholar. Whoever is ignorant of the father is ignorant of the son.

It is wrong to say to the questioner who says: ‘What is a father?’ whoever has a son. He is [effectively] saying: Should you know the son, truly you would know the father.

Rather it ought to be said: The father is an animal, there is another [person] of his species who [came into existence] from his drop of semen such that he is thus.

There is no definition of the thing itself nor its assignment to one who is like him in ignorance.

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<sup>221</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 139.



Among them is for the thing to be defined by itself or by that which is posterior to it in knowledge like your saying about the sun: a star which comes out in the day.

It is not possible to define the daytime (*nahar*) except with the sun. [The daytime's] meaning is: the time of the sun's rising. It is concomitant (*tabi'*) to the sun. Therefore, how is it defined?

Like your saying concerning the primary quality (*kayfiyya*) is that with which similarity (*mushabaha*) and its antithesis occur.

It is not possible to define the similarity except that it is an affinity (*ittifaq*) in the primary quality. Perhaps it opposes sameness (*musawa*). Therefore, it is an affinity in the quantity (*kammiyya*) and opposes similarity (*mushakala*). Thus it is an affinity in the species.

Therefore, it is necessary to be mindful of its definitions (*muraqabatuhu fi'l-hudud*) of this and the like so that error through being heedless of them does not address them. Examples of this are many. In what we have mentioned is an admonition concerning the genus.

**[p.270] Seventh discipline concerning  
the difficulty for the human capacity (*quwwa bashariyya*)  
to define except at the end of rolling up sleeves  
and [exerting] effort**

Whoever knows what we have mentioned among the inducers to doubt (*matharat al-ishtibah*) in the definition, will know that the human capacity does not overcome wariness about all of that except that it overcomes those things that are rare (*nudur*) which are a lot. The most difficult of them for the intellect are four matters (*umur*):

The first of them is: We have made conditional to take the nearest genus (*al-jins al-aqrab*). How is it that the seeker of knowledge is not heedless of it and takes a genus which he considers to be in closer proximity? Perhaps there exists what is closer in proximity than it. Therefore, he defines wine as: an intoxicating liquid, while being oblivious to ‘beverage (*sharab*)’ beneath which it is. ‘Beverage (*sharab*)’ is closer than it.

Man is defined as follows: A mortal speaking body. Therefore, the animal and its like are overlooked.

**Second:** If we should make conditional for all the *differentia* to be essential and for the concomitant (*lazim*), which does not separate from existence and imagination, to be highly suspect in the essential, and perceiving that is among the most obscure matters. Then from where does he get [the idea] that he is not heedless, takes a concomitant (*lazim*) instead of a *differentia* and considers it essential?

**Third:** Should we make conditional putting forward all of the essential *differentia* so that we are not defaulting (*nukhill*) one [of them], from where do we vouchsafe a deviance (*shudhudh*) from it especially if it existed as a *differentia* in which differentiation and coextensiveness in the name in predication occurred (as in the body, possessing a soul, sensitive) in its rendering as coextensive the expression ‘animal’ with being heedless of ‘movement by will’? This is among the most obscure (*aghmad*) of what is perceived.

**Fourth:** The *differentia* constitute (*muqawwim*) the species and divide (*muqassim*) the genus.<sup>222</sup> If the condition

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<sup>222</sup> See for instance Silvia di Vincenzo, ‘Avicenna against Porphyry’s Definition of *Differentia Specifica*,’ *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 26 (2015), p. 171 and n. 102.

for division is not taken into account, it adopts in the division *differentia* which are not primary to the genus (*laysa awwaliyya lil-jins*). [The *differentia*] is difficult and unsatisfactory in the definition (*hadd*). Just as the body is divided into: ‘growing (*al-nami*)’ and ‘non-growing (*ghayr al-nami*)’ a division in an essential *differentia* (*inqisaman fi fasl dhati*),’ likewise it is divided into the sensible (*al-hassas*), non-sensible (*ghayr al-hassas*) and into speaking (*natiq*) and non-speaking (*ghayr al-natiq*).

Whatever is said, the body is divided into:

[p.271] Speaking and not speaking.

It was divided into that in which the primary *differentia* are not primary (*awwaliyyan*). But rather it ought to be divided first into:

Growing and non-growing.

Then the growing is divided into:

Animal and non-animal.

Then ‘animal’ is divided into:

Speaking and non-speaking.

Likewise, ‘animal’ is divided into:

Possessing two legs and possessing [more than two] legs.

However, this division is not in primary *differentia* (*fusul awwaliyya*), but rather ‘animal’ ought to be divided into:

Walking and not walking.

Then ‘walking’ is divided into:

Possessing two legs and possessing [more than two] legs.

The animal was not prepared for two or more legs because of his being an animal, rather taking into account his state walking. He was prepared due to his walking by taking into account his being an animal.

Paying attention to the order in these matters (*umur*) is a condition for realisation of the discipline of definitions (*sina'at al-hudud*). It is extremely difficult. Therefore, when that became difficult the speculative theologians regarded as sufficient that which is discerned (*mumayyaz*), saying: The definition (*hadd*) is: It is the speech which combines and restricts.

[p.272] [The speculative theologians] did not make conditional concerning [the definition] except for discernment (*tamyiz*). Therefore, it is necessary for it to suffice with mention of the *propria* (*khawass*). About the definition of the horse, it is said: It is the neighing. About man it is said: He is the laughter. About the dog it is said: It is the barker.

That is extremely remote from the definition of defining the essence of that which is defined.

Due to the difficulty of the defining, we saw it appropriate to relate a group of the known definitions that are formulated precisely in the Second Category (*fann*) of the *Book of Definitions*.

Here concludes the First Category with the praise of God, the Glorified and Exalted.

[p. 273] The Second Category

Concerning the differentiated definitions  
(*al-hudud al-mufassala*)

Know that the things which it is possible to define are endless since the truthful sciences (i.e. assensual knowledge) (*'ulum tasdiqiyya*) are endless since they follow conceptual knowledge (*tasawwuriyya*). The least that affirmation (*tasdiq*) encompasses is two concepts (*tasawwuran*).

In general, everything that has a name it is possible:

To precisely formulate (*tahrir*) its definition (*hadd*) or in its description (*rasm*), or give an exposition of its name (*ism*).

If there is no desired object (*matma'*) in the thorough investigation (*istiqla'*), then it is more appropriate to be restricted to the laws that define its path.

This occurred with the First Category. However, we produced detailed definitions for two benefits:

The first is: You acquire experience (*durba*) by means of being exact in the definition and its composition (*ta'lif*). Examination and practice in the thing undoubtedly indicates (*tufid*) gaining power over it.

The second is: Being cognizant of the meanings of the names which the philosophers employed. We have presented them in *Precipitance of the Philosophers* since engaging in disputation (*munazara*) with them is not possible except in their language and according to the judgement of their convention (*istilah*).

If [one] does not understand what they want, then it is not possible to engage in disputation with them. They have presented the definitions of expressions which they applied in metaphysics (*ilahiyyat*) and physics (*tabi'iyyat*) and a

little something of maths. Then let these definitions be taken as an explanation of the name.

[p.274] If the proof (*burhan*) has been established—that what they have expounded is as they expounded it, it is considered a definition (*u'tuqida haddan*). Otherwise it is considered an explanation of the name as we say:

Definition of the *jinn*: An airborne animal that speaks, [has a] transparent body, and possesses the ability to transform itself into different forms.

Therefore, this is an explanation of the name in people's understanding.

As for the existence of this thing according to this aspect, it is known through the proof (*burhan*). If the proof indicates its presence, then it is a definition (*hadd*) according to the essence (*bi-hasb al-dhat*). If it does not indicate it, but rather that the *jinn* intended in the divine law which is described by its description is another matter (*amr akhar*), this is taken as an explanation of the name in people's understanding.

As we say in the definition of the void (*khala'*): It is a dimension (*bu'd*) for which it is possible to impose on it three dimensions (*ab'ad thalatha*), existent not in a substance (*madda*), to be such as a body fills it and evacuates it.

Perhaps the indication indicates that its existence is impossible. Therefore, it is taken as an explanation of the name in the absolute sense of the theoreticians (*muzzar*).

We have presented this overview so that you know that what we present from the definitions is an explanation to what the philosophers intended in an absolute sense. There is no judgement that what they mentioned is as they mentioned it. Perhaps that depends on examination of the proof's necessitating it (*mujib al-burhan 'alayhi*).

[The First Section which is employed  
in Metaphysics (*ilahiyyat*)]

Employed in metaphysics are fifteen expressions: The Creator the Exalted who is called in their language (The First Principle).

The Intellect (*'aql*), the soul (*nafs*), the universal intellect (*al-'aql al-kulli*), intellect of the whole (*'aql al-kull*), the universal soul (*al-nafs al-kulliyya*), the soul of the whole (*nafs al-kull*), possession (*mulk*), cause (*'illa*), effect (*ma'lul*), creation (*ibda'*), creation (*khalq*), temporal creation (*ihdath*), and pre-eternal (*qadim*).

[p.275] As for 'the Creator (*al-bari*) the Mighty and Sublime' they alleged that He has no definition (*hadd*) or description (*rasm*) since He does not have a genus or *differentia* or accidents concomitant with Him (*talhaquhu*).<sup>223</sup>

The definition (*hadd*) is in harmony with (*yalta'imu*) with the genus and the *differentia*.

The description (*rasm*) is [in harmony] with the genus and the differential accidents (*al-'awarid al-fasila*).

All of that is composite (*tarkib*). However, there is speech which explains His Name, namely:

The Existent (*mawjud*), necessarily existing in Himself, whose existence is not possible to be from another. Any other cannot exist except emanating from His existence (*fa'idan 'an wujudihi*) and occurring through Him (*hasilan bihi*) either through an intermediary or without.

It follows from this explanation that He is the Existent Who does not multiply in number or measure nor in the parts of subsistence (*ajza' al-qiwwam*) like the multiplicity of the body in form (*sura*) and prime matter (*hayula*), nor in

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<sup>223</sup> Al-Ghazali, *Incoherence* (Marmura trans.), pp. 88-89.

the parts of the definition like the multiplicity of the person with animalness (*hayawaniyya*) and speech (*nutq*), nor in additional parts.

[The Creator] does not change neither in essence (*dhat*) nor in the concomitants of the essence (*lawahiq al-dhat*).

What they mentioned contains a negation of the attributes (*nafy al-sifat*) and negation of the multiplicity in them. That is in what they are opposed.<sup>224</sup>

Therefore, this is an explanation of the name ‘Creator’ whom they regard as the ‘First Principle.’

As for the intellect (*‘aql*), it is an equivocal term (*ism mushtarak*) which the public (*jamahir*), the philosophers, and the speculative theologians apply to different aspects and to different meanings. The equivocal does not have a universal definition (*hadd jami‘*).

[p. 276] As for the public, they apply it to three aspects:

**First**, what is wanted with it is the soundness of the initial original disposition (*al-fitra al-ula*) in people. Then it is said of one whose initial original disposition is sound that he is rational (*‘aqil*). Therefore, his definition is: A power (*quwwa*) with which he excels at distinguishing between evil (*qabiha*) and good (*hasana*) matters.

**Second**: What is intended by it is what man acquires through empirical matters (*tajarib*) of the universal judgments (*al-abkam al-kulliyya*). Thus its definition is: Meanings (*ma‘anin*) that join together in the mind which are premises (*muqaddimat*) in which the matters (*masalih*) and aims (*aghrad*) are deduced (*tustanbatu*).

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<sup>224</sup> According to al-Ghazali, God has seven attributes (*sifat*): Ability (*qudra*), knowledge (*‘ilm*), life (*hayat*), will (*irada*), hearing (*sam‘*), sight (*basar*), and speech (*kalam*). For a discussion of these terms, see for instance *Al-Ghazali’s Moderation in Belief*, trans. Aladdin Yaqub (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).



**Third:** Another meaning (*ma'na*) which returns to the man's self-compusure (*waqar*) and appearance (*hay'a*). Its definition is: A praiseworthy disposition in man (*hay'a mahmuda lil-insan*) in his movements (*hakat*), states of rest (*sakanat*), looks (*hay'at*), words (*kalam*) and choice (*ikhthiyar*).

In this equivocity people dispute calling a single person 'rational ('*aql*).' Then one says: This one is rational by which he means the soundness of the inborn capacity (*ghariza*).

Another says: He is not rational. What he means by it is the lack of practical experiences (*tajarib*) which is the second meaning.

As for the philosophers, the name 'intellect ('*aql*)' in their estimation is equivocal, indicating eight different connotational attributes (*ma'anin*):

The intellect ('*aql*) which the scholastic theologians want.<sup>225</sup>

Theoretical intellect ('*aql nazari*)

Practical intellect ('*aql 'amali*)

Hylic (alt. material) intellect ('*aql hayulani*)

Habitual intellect ('*aql bi'l-malaka*)

Actual intellect ('*aql bi'l-fi'l*)

Acquired intellect ('*aql mustafad*)

Active intellect ('*aql fa'al*)

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<sup>225</sup> Al-Ghazali's source for the definition of intellect is Ibn Sina's *Book of Definitions*. See for instance Dimitri Gutas, 'Ibn Sina [Avicenna]', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.):

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/ibn-sina/>.

As for the first: It is what Aristotle mentioned in the *Book of Demonstrations*<sup>226</sup> and he distinguished between ‘intellect (‘*aql*)’ and ‘knowledge (‘*ilm*).’

The meaning of this ‘intellect’ is the conceptualisations (*tasawwurat*) and assents (*tasdiqat*) which occur to the soul in the original disposition (*fitra*). Knowledge (‘*ilm*) is what occurs to the soul by way of acquisition (*iktisab*). Then they differentiated the acquired (*muktasab*) and the innate (*fitri*). Then one of them is called ‘intellect (‘*aql*)’ and the other ‘knowledge (‘*ilm*).’

It is pure convention (*istilah mahd*).

[p. 277] This meaning is the one with which the speculative theologians defined the intellect. Abu Bakr al-Baqilani<sup>227</sup> says concerning the definition of intellect: ‘It is a necessary knowledge (‘*ilm daruri*) which makes possible possible things (*ja’izat*) and makes impossible impossible things (*mustahilat*) like the knowledge which makes impossible a single thing being pre-eternal and temporally created and making impossible a single person being in two places [at once].

As for the rest of the [categories of] the intellect, the philosophers mentioned them in *The Treatise on the Soul*.<sup>228</sup>

As for the theoretical intellect (‘*aql nazari*), it is a faculty (*quwwa*) of the soul which accepts quiddities of the universalia (*mahiyyat al-umur al-kulliyya*) with respect to their being universal.

[This faculty] is a reservation against (*ihdiraz ‘an*) the

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<sup>226</sup> i.e. *Posterior Analytics*

<sup>227</sup> Baghdadi theologian, judge and logician, d. 403/1013.

<sup>228</sup> This appears to be a reference to Ibn Sina’s *Treatise on the Soul* (*Kitab al-Nafs*) as found in the *Book of Deliverance* (*Kitab al-Najat*) and *The Book of Healing* (*Al-Shifa*’).

sense (*hiss*) that only accepts the particularities (*al-umur al-juz'iyya*).

Thus is the imagination (*khayal*).

This is what is intended by the soundness of original human disposition (*al-fitra al-asliyya*) with the public as previously mentioned.

As for the practical intellect (*al-'aql al-'amali*): It is a faculty of the soul (*quwwa lil-nafs*) which is the principle of stirring (*mabda' al-tabrik*) the faculty of desire (*al-quwwa al-shawqiyya*) to what it chooses of the particulars for the purpose of a supposed or known objective.

This is a motive (als. agent) faculty (*quwwa muharrika*) and is not a genus of the sciences. Rather it was called 'rational ('*aqliyya*)' because it is commanded by the intellect (*mu'tamar li'l-'aql*), by nature obedient to its directives (*isharat*). How many an intelligent person knows that he is afflicted in following his desires but is [p. 278] unable to oppose the desire, not because of the impotency of his theoretical intellect but rather because of the lassitude of this faculty which was called the 'practical intellect (*al-'aql al-'amali*).'

This faculty (i.e. the practical intellect) is strengthened through spiritual self-discipline (*riyada*), struggle (*mujahada*) and perseverance in opposing the desires.

The theoretical faculty (*al-quwwa al-nazariyya*) has four states:

**The first:** That it has not acquired any referring objects (*ma'lumat*). That is with the young boy. However he only possess a readiness. This is called the 'hylic intellect (*al-'aql al-hayulani*).'

**The second:** The boy reaches the age of discernment (*tamyiz*). What used to be with the remote faculty (*al-*

*quwwa al-ba'ida*) becomes with the near faculty (*al-qariba*). However much the necessary assertions are displayed for him he finds himself believing them, not like the infant. This is called the 'habitual intellect (*al-'aql bi'l-malaka*).'

**The third:** For the theoretical intelligibles (*al-ma'qulat al-nazariyya*) to occur in his mind. However, he is heedless of them. Whoever wishes can invoke them in actuality. It is called the 'actual intellect (*'aql bi'l-fi'l*).'

**The fourth:** The acquired intellect (*al-'aql al-mustafad*) is when those referring objects (*ma'lumat*) are present in his mind. He reviews (*yutali'u*) them and becomes intimately aware in contemplating them (*yulabis al-ta'ammul fiha*). It is the knowledge that is in existence in actuality, present.

The definition of the 'hylic intellect (*al-'aql al-hayulani*):' It is a faculty of the soul that is ready to accept the quiddity of things (*mahiyyat al-ashya'*) separated [p.279] from matters (*mawadd*). And with them the boy is differentiated from the horse and the rest of the animals, not with limited knowledge or a faculty near to the knowledge (*quwwa qariba min al-'ilm*).

The definition of the 'habitual intellect (*al-hadd bi'l-malaka*):' It is the perfection (*istikmal*) of the hylic intellect (*'aql hayulani*) until it becomes with proximate potentiality to actuality (*bi'l-quwwa al-qariba min al-fi'l*).

The definition of the 'actual intellect (*'aql bi'l-fi'l*):' It is perfecting the soul with a certain form. That is an intelligible form (*sura ma'qula*) until when its intellect desires or it recalls it in actuality.

The definition of the acquired intellect (*al-'aql al-mustafad*): It is quiddity separated from matter (*mujarrada 'an al-madda*), impressed upon the soul by way of acquisition externally.

As for the Agent Intellects (*al-‘uqul al-fa‘‘ala*),<sup>229</sup> they are another type (*namat akhar*).

What is intended by Agent Intellect (*al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al*): Every quiddity separated from substance originally.

Therefore, the definition of Agent Intellect (*al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al*) is in so far as it is an intellect:

A formal substance (*jawhar suwari*). Its essence is a quiddity separated in its essence (*dhatuhu mahiyya mujarrada fi dhatiha*) (not by separating something other than it for it) from matter (*madda*) and its attachments (*‘ala‘iq*). Rather it is an existent universal quiddity (*mahiyya kulliyya mawjuda*).

In so far as it is an Agent, it is: A substance (*jawhar*) with the aforementioned description to be such as that the hylic intellect (*al-‘aql al-hayulani*) emerges from potentiality to actuality with its supervising it.

What is intended by substance is not ‘a space occupying object (*mutahayyiz*)’ as the speculative theologians intend, but rather what exists by itself (*qa‘im bi-nafsihi*), not in a subject.

The formal (*suri*) is an exclusion from the body (*jism*) and what is in the matters (*mawadd*).

Their saying ‘not with the abstraction of something else (*la bi-tajrid ghayrihi*)’ is excluding the intelligibles (*ma‘qulat*) that are inscribed on the soul from the individual matters (*ashkhas al-maddiyyat*). [The intelligibles] are abstracted with the intellect’s abstracting them not their abstracting themselves in their essences (*la bi-tajridiha fi dhatiha*).

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<sup>229</sup> Also known as the Active Intellect.

The Agent Intellect (*al-‘aql al-fa‘al*): That which causes human souls in the cognitions (*‘ulum*) to emerge from potentiality to actuality. It is related to the intelligibles and the intellectual power like the relationship of the sun to the visible objects (*mubsarat*) and the faculty of sight (*al-quwwa al-basira*) with which the vision emerges from potentiality to actuality.

[p.280] These intellects may be called ‘angelic intellects (*al-‘uql al-mala’ika*).’

Concerning the existence of a substance (*jawhar*) (i.e. angelic substances (*al-jawahir al-mala’ika*)) in this manner, the speculative theologians oppose them since in their view there is no existence to something that exists in itself that does not occupy space except God alone.

Angels are subtle space-occupying bodies according to the majority [of the speculative theologians].

Affirming the soundness of that is through demonstration (*al-burhan*). What we mentioned is an explanation of the name.

As for the soul, it is in their view an equivocal term (*ism mushtarak*) which occurs in a meaning: Man, animal, and plant are equivocal in it.

In another meaning: Man and heavenly angels (*al-mala’ika al-samawiyya*) are equivocal in it in the view.

The definition of the soul in the first meaning in their view is:

First Perfection (*kamal auwal*) of the natural organic body (*jism tabi‘i ali*) which possesses life *in potentia*.

The definition of the soul according to the second meaning is:

A non-corporeal substance (*jawhar ghayr jism*) which is

First Perfection of the body, moving it by choice according to the principle of rationality (*'an mabda' nutqi*), that is intellectually (*'aqli*) *in actu* or *in potentia*.

That which *in potentia* is the *differentia (fasl)* of the human soul. The one *in actu* is a *differentia (fasl)* or a *proprium (khassa)* of the angelic soul (*al-nafs al-malakiyya*).

An explanation of the first definition is: If the seed is cast to the ground, it has the capacity for growth (*numuwu*) and nourishment (*ightidha'*). Therefore, it changed from what it was before it was cast to the ground. That is with occurrence of a description in it (*huduth sifa fih*) [p.281]. If it did not exist it would not have the capacity to receive from the Bestower of Forms, who is God the Exalted, and from His angels. That description is perfection for it. Thus, it is said concerning the definition that it is First Perfection (*kamal awwal*) of a body.

That was posited (*wudi'a*) in place of the genus. The seed and the semen of animals and man are equivocal in it.

The soul is a form (*sura*) through a syllogism to that mixed matter (*madda mumtazija*) since it is imprinted in the matter (*muntabi'a fi'l-madda*) and is a potentiality by analogy (*quwwa bi'l-qiyas*) to its actuality (*fi'l*). It is a perfection through a syllogism (*kamal bi'l-qiyas*) to the plant and animal species.

The signification (*dalala*) of perfection is more complete than the signification of potentiality and form. Thus [the definition of the soul] is signified in the locus of the genus (*mahall al-jins*).

The natural (*tabi'i*) is a caution against (*ihdiraz 'an*) the artificial (*sina'i*). The images of the technical arts also contain perfection.

The instrumental (*ali*) is a caution against (*ihdiraz 'an*)

the faculties which are in the four elements. They act with their essences (*dhawat*) not with instruments (*alat*). The faculties of the soul (*al-qiwa al-nafsaniyya*) act with instruments in them.

[The speculative theologians'] saying: Possessing potential life (*dhu hayat bi'l-quwwa*) is another *differentia*. That is in his nature to live by growth and to subsist through nourishment. Perhaps he lives through sensory awareness (*ihzas*) and movement (*haraka*) which are both in his power.

Their saying 'First Perfection' is as a caution against the faculty of motion (*quwwat al-tahrik*) and perception. It is also perfection of the body. However, it is not 'First Perception.' It occurs second due to the existence of the perfection which is a soul.

As for the soul of man and celestial bodies, they are not imprinted in the body but rather are the perfection of the body meaning that the body moves with it through rational choice (*ikhayar 'aqli*).

As for the celestial spheres (*aflak*), they are perpetually active (*'ala al-dawam bi'l-fi'l*).

As for man, his movement is through potentiality (*bi'l-quwwa*).

As for the universal intellect (*al-'aql al-kulli*) and the intellect of the whole (*'aql al-kull*), the universal soul (*al-nafs al-kulli*) and the soul of the whole (*nafs al-kull*), its proof is that the existents are three parts in their view: Bodies which are the most base (*akhass*) of the [categories].

Agent Intellects (*al-'uqul al-fa'ala*) are the most noble of them since they are free of matter and its attachment (*'alaqa*) such that it does not move the matters also except with desire (*bi'l-shawq*).

[p. 282] At their centre are the souls which are activated



by the intellect and are active in the bodies. They are an intermediary. [The speculative theologians] mean by ‘celestial angels (*al-mala’ika al-samawiyya*) the souls of the celestial spheres (*nufus al-aflak*). They believe they are alive.

They mean by ‘the nearest angels (*al-mala’ika al-muqarrabin*), the Active Intellects (*al-‘uqul al-fa‘‘ala*).

By the ‘universal intellect (*al-‘aql al-kulli*)’ they mean the intelligible meaning (*al-ma‘na al-ma‘qul*) which is said about the numerous minds of individual human persons. It does not exist in a normal state (*qiwam*) but in conceptualisation (*tasawwur*). Should you say ‘the universal man (*al-insan al-kulli*),’ you have indicated with it a rationalised meaning of the person existent among the rest of the individuals (*ashkhas*), which in the intellect is a single form (*sura wahida*) which is in congruence with (*tutabiq*) the rest of the individuals from among humankind. There is not just a single humanity (*insaniyya wahida*). It is Zayd’s humanity which is the very same as ‘Amr’s humanity. However, in the intellect there occurs an image of a person from the person of Zayd for instance. [Zayd’s person] is in congruence with the rest of the individual persons, all of them. Therefore, that is called ‘the universal humanity (*al-insaniyya al-kulliyya*).’

This is what [the speculative theologians] mean by the ‘universal intellect (*al-‘aql al-kulli*).’<sup>230</sup>

As for [the expression] ‘the intellect of the whole (*‘aql al-kull*),’ it is used in two senses:

The first, which is more suitable to the expression is: What is intended by ‘the whole (*al-kull*)’ is ‘all of the world

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<sup>230</sup> Other names for the ‘universal intellect’ include: God (Allah), the First Existent, the Prime Mover, the Director, the Necessary Being.

(*jumlat al-‘alam*).’ Therefore, ‘the intellect of the whole’ has this meaning with the meaning of explaining its name: It is all of existence that is free from matter from all aspects and that does not move by itself (*dhat*) and not by accident (‘*arad*).<sup>231</sup> It is not moved except through urging (*bi’l-shawq*).

The last rank of this ‘all (*jumla*)’ is the ‘Active Intellect (*al-‘aql al-fa‘‘al*)’ that causes the human soul in the rational sciences (*al-‘ulum al-‘aqliyya*) to emerge from potentiality to actuality. This ‘all’ is ‘The Principles of the Universe (*mabadi’ al-kull*)’ after the First Principle (*al-mabda’ al-awwal*).

The First Principle is the Originator of everything (*mubdi‘ al-kull*).

As to ‘the universal (*al-kull*)’ according to the second sense, it is: ‘the farthest body (*al-jirm al-aqsa*).’ I mean the ninth celestial sphere (*al-falak al-tasi‘*) that revolves in the day and night. All of that is inside it from all of the heavens is in motion. Therefore, its celestial sphere is called the ‘Universal Celestial Sphere (*jirm al-kull*)<sup>232</sup> and to its movement the ‘Movement of the Universe (*harakat al-kull*).’ It is the greatest of created things. In their view what is intended is the ‘Throne (‘*arsh*).’

The Universal Intellect: In this sense it is the substance free of matter in all aspects. It is the mover of the ‘Movement of the Universe’ at the urging of itself (‘*ala sabil al-*

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<sup>231</sup> For an explanation of Ibn Sina’s take on this concept, see Andreas Lammer, ‘Defining nature: from Aristotle to Philoponus to Avicenna,’ in *Aristotle and the Arabic Tradition*, ed. Ahmed Alwishah and Josh Hayes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 137.

<sup>232</sup> For an explanation of ‘celestial sphere (*jirm*),’ see Al-Kindi, *Al-Kindi’s Metaphysics: A Translation of Ya‘qub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi’s Treatise ‘On First Philosophy (fi al-Falsafah al-Ula)*,’ trans. Alfred L. Ivry (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974), p. 157.

*tashwiq li-nafsibi*). [p.283] Its existence is the first existent acquired (*mustafad*) from the First.

[The speculative theologians] allege that what is intended by [the Prophet's], May peace be upon him, saying: 'The first thing that God created was the intellect. He said to it: 'Come forth,' and it did....'<sup>233</sup>

As for the universal soul (*al-nafs al-kulli*), what is intended by it is the intelligible meaning (*al-ma'na al-ma'qul*) which is said about many things that are different in number in reply to the question 'What is it?' from which every one of [the souls] is a soul particular to an individual (*shakhs*) as we mentioned in respect to the Universal Intellect.

The soul of the whole (*nafs al-kull*) by analogy with the intellect of the whole (*'aql al-kull*) is the totality of incorporeal substances (*jumlat al-jawahir al-ghayr al-jismaniyya*) which are perfections (*kamalat*) that order the heavenly bodies and move them by way of rational choice (*al-ikhhtiyar al-'aqli*).

The relationship of the soul of the whole to the intellect of the whole is like the relationship of ourselves to the Active Intellect.

The soul of the whole is a principle that is near to the existence of the natural bodies (*al-ajsam al-tabiiyya*). Its rank is in attaining existence after the rank of the intellect of the whole. Its existence emanates from [the latter's] existence.

The definition of angel (*malak*) is: A simple substance (*jawhar basit*) possessing life and speech (*nutq*), rational

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<sup>233</sup> This *hadith* is weak. It appears for instance in Tabarani's *Mu'jam al-Kabir*: [http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display\\_book.php?flag=1&bk\\_no=84&bookhad=7986](http://library.islamweb.net/newlibrary/display_book.php?flag=1&bk_no=84&bookhad=7986).

and immortal and is an intermediary (*wasita*) between the Creator, the Mighty and Sublime and the earthly bodies (*al-ajsam al-ardiyya*). From it is rational and [also] essential (*nafsi*). This is [the angel's] definition in their view.

The definition of 'cause ('*illa*)' in [the speculative theologians'] view: It is every essence (*dhat*) which is the existent of another essential (*dhat akhar*). It is in actuality from the existence of this action. The existence of this is actually not from the existence of that actually.

As for the effect (*ma'lul*), [it is] every essential whose existence is actually from the existence of another. The existence of that other is not from its existence.

The meaning of our saying: 'from its existence (*min wu-judih*)' is apart from our saying 'with its existence (*ma'a wu-judih*).' The meaning of our saying 'from its existence' is for the essence to be through its own consideration possibly existent (*mumkinat al-wujud*). Its existence is necessary *in actu* not from its essence, but rather another essence is existent *in actu* from which necessitating this essence is necessary (*yalzamu 'anha wujub hadhihi al-dhat*).

And it possesses this pure possibility (*imkan mahd*) within itself.

And it [also] possesses necessity (*wujub*) within itself on condition of the cause (*bi-shart al-'illa*).

And it [also] possesses impossibility (*imtinah*) within itself on condition of the non-existence of the cause (*bi-shart 'adam al-'illa*).

[p.284] As to our saying 'with our existence (*ma'a wu-judih*),' it is for each of the two essences if imposed into existence (*furida mawjudan*), it is necessary for it to know that the other is existent. If it is imposed that it is eliminated (*marfu'*), then it is necessary that the other be eliminated.

The cause ('*illa*) and effect (*ma'lul*) are together with the meaning of both these consequences (*luzumayn*) even if there should be difference between the two manners of the two consequences (*wajhay al-luzumayn*) since one of them which is the effect (*ma'lul*) if imposed into existence, it is necessary for the other to have been in existence until this one is brought into existence.

As for the other which is the cause ('*illa*), if it is imposed into existence, it is necessary for the effect (*ma'lul*) to existence to follow.

If the effect (*ma'lul*) is eliminated it is necessary to pass judgement that the cause was eliminated first so that this could be eliminated. It is the case that the elimination of the effect necessitated elimination of the cause.

As to the cause, if we should eliminate it, it is necessary to eliminate the effect with the affirmation (*ijab*) of eliminating the cause.

Definition of origination (*ibda'*): It is an equivocal term (*ism mushtarak*) for two concepts (*mafhumayn*):

**First [concept]**, establishing (*ta'sis*) something not from matter and not with an intermediary.

**Second concept**, that something has an absolute existence (*wujud mutlaq*) from a cause (*sabab*) without an intermediary (*mutawassit*). In its essence it is for it not to be existent. That which is in its essence is completely lost.

With this concept, the first intellect (*al-'aql al-awwal*) originates (*mubdi'*) in every state since its existence is not from its essence. It possesses knowledge from its essence. That had been completely lost.

Definition of creation (*khalq*): It is an equivocal term (*ism mushtarak*). It is called 'creation (*khalq*)' in order to acquire (*ifada*) the existence of 'whatever its form (*kayfa*

*kana*.)’ It is said ‘creation (*khalq*)’ in order to acquire existence (*wujud*) occurring from matter (*madda*) and form (*sura*) of ‘whatever its form (*kayfa kana*).’

It might be called ‘creation (*khalq*)’ for this second meaning but by way of origination (*ikhtira*‘) without prior matter (*sabq madda*) and containing the potentiality of its existence (*wujud*) and possibility (*imkan*).

Definition of temporal creation (*ihdath*): It is an equivocal term that is applied to two aspects:

The first: temporal (*zamani*). The meaning of creation in time is bringing into existence something after it did not have existence in a previous time.

The meaning of atemporal creation (*al-ihdath al-ghayr zamani*): It is something acquiring existence. That thing does not contain that existence in its essence not at a specific time, excluding other times, but at every time.

Definition of pre-eternity (*qidam*): Pre-eternity has different aspects: It is called pre-eternity (*qidam*) by analogy (*bi’l-qiyas*) and absolute pre-eternity (*qidam mutlaq*).

[p. 285] Pre-eternity by analogy: It is something whose time is in the past more than the time of any other thing. It is pre-eternal by analogy to it.

As for absolute pre-eternity, it also has two aspects: It is said according to time (*bi-hasb al-zaman*) and according to essence (*bi-hasb al-dhat*).

As for that which is according to time, it is the thing which is existent in a past time that is infinite (*ghayr mutanahin*).

As for the pre-eternal according to essence, it is that the existence of whose essence does not have a beginning with which it is necessitated.

Therefore, the pre-eternal according to time is that

which does not have a temporal existence and is existent [with respect to] the angels, the heavens, and all of the fundamental principles (*usul*) of the world in the view [of the speculative theologians].

The pre-eternal according to essence, does not have a higher beginning; that is it does not have a cause (*'illa*). This is only exclusive to the Creator the Mighty and Sublime.

## [p. 286] The [Second] Division

### That employed in Physics (*al-tabi'iyat*)

We mention from among them 55 expressions which are [as follows]:

Form ( <i>sura</i> )	Hyle ( <i>hayula</i> )	Subject ( <i>mawdu'</i> )
Predicate ( <i>mahmul</i> )	Matter ( <i>madda</i> )	Element (alt. matter of all matter) ( <i>'unsur</i> )
[Definition of the] element ( <i>ustuqas</i> ) <sup>234</sup>	Base element ( <i>ruk'n</i> )	Nature ( <i>madda</i> )
Natural disposition ( <i>tab'</i> )	Body ( <i>jism</i> )	Substance ( <i>jawbar</i> )
Accident ( <i>'arad</i> )	Fire ( <i>nar</i> )	Air ( <i>hawa'</i> )
Water ( <i>ma'</i> )	Earth ( <i>ard</i> )	World ( <i>'alam</i> )
Celestial sphere ( <i>falak</i> )	Planet ( <i>kawkab</i> )	Sun ( <i>shams</i> )
Moon ( <i>qamar</i> )	Movement ( <i>haraka</i> )	Eternity ( <i>dahr</i> )
Time ( <i>zaman</i> )	Time: Now ( <i>an</i> )	Place ( <i>makan</i> )
Void ( <i>khala'</i> )	Plenum ( <i>mala'</i> )	Non-existence ( <i>'adam</i> )
Rest ( <i>sukun</i> )	Speed ( <i>sur'a</i> )	Slowness ( <i>but'</i> )
Inclination ( <i>i'timad</i> )	Impetus/Driving ( <i>mayl</i> )	Lightness ( <i>khiffa</i> )
Weight ( <i>thuql</i> )	Temperature ( <i>harara</i> )	Moisture ( <i>rutuba</i> )
Coldness ( <i>buruda</i> )	Dryness ( <i>yubusa</i> )	Coarse ( <i>khashin</i> )
Smooth ( <i>malis</i> )	Hard ( <i>sulb</i> )	Soft ( <i>lin</i> )
Loose ( <i>rakbu</i> )	Transparent ( <i>mushaff</i> )	Rarefication ( <i>takhalkbul</i> )
Conjunction ( <i>ijtima'</i> )	Homogeneity ( <i>tajanus</i> )	Interpenetrating ( <i>mudakhbil</i> )
Conjunctive ( <i>muttasil</i> )	Union ( <i>ittihad</i> )	Succession ( <i>tatalin</i> )
Continuous succession ( <i>tawalin</i> )		

<sup>234</sup> Often translated as 'element.' *Ustuqas* can also be pronounced *astaqis* or *ustuqus*.

[1] Definition of form (*sura*): ... An equivocal term encompassing six meanings:

[p.287] First, it is the species (*naw‘*) which is applied and intended by it that which is beneath the genus. Its definition with this meaning is the definition of the species (*hadd al-naw‘*). This was previously [discussed] in the premises of the *Book of Analogy*.

Second, the perfection (*kamal*) with which the species completes its second completion (*istikmalahu al-thani*). Therefore, it is called form (*sura*). Its definition with this meaning is every existent in the thing, not like a part of it. Its constitution (*qiwam*) is not sound without it. Because of it the thing came into existence like the sciences and the virtues (*fada’il*) in man.

Third, a thing’s quiddity (*mahiyya*) is how it came to be called a form (*sura*).

Its definition with this meaning is that every existent in the thing is not like a part of it. Its constitution is not sound without it whatever its form (*kayfa kana*).

Fourth, the reality (*haqiqa*) which constitutes the locus (*mahall*) in [the form].

Its definition with this meaning is: It is what exists in another thing not like a part of it. Its existence is not sound if it is separated from it. However, its existence occurs to it *in actu* like the form of water in the *hyle* of the water. It occurs *in actu* in the form of water or in another form whose judgement is that of the form of water.

Fifth, the form (*sura*) which constitutes the species is called a form (*sura*).

Its definition with this meaning is: It is what exists in something not as a part of it. Its constitution would not be sound if it is separated from it. Nor would the constitution



of less than it be sound either except if the natural species (*al-naw‘ al-tabi‘i*) occurs in it like the form of humanness or animalness in the natural body created for it.

Sixth, the separate perfection (*al-kamal al-mufariq*). It may be called a form (*sura*) like the soul for the person.

Its definition with this meaning is: It is a non-corporeal part (*juz‘ ghayr jismani*), separate, which along with a corporeal part (*juz‘ jismani*) complete the natural species (*naw‘ tabi‘i*).

[2] Definition of *hyle*: As for the absolute matter (*hyle*) (*al-hayula al-mutlaqa*) it is a substance (*jawhar*) whose existence *in actu* occurs by his saying ‘the corporeal form (*al-sura al-jismaniyya*)’ (as a faculty which accepts forms) and that in its essence there is no form except for in the sense of potentiality. It is now with them [a non-quantitative] part (of the body) which is divided in an abstract way; rather I do not say with a measured division, into ‘form’ and ‘*hyle*.’ The words affirming that are long and precise.

It may be said ‘*hyle*’ for everything in whose prerogative it is to accept perfection and something that it does not contain. Therefore, it is in analogy with what does not contain *hyle* and in analogy with what contains a subject (*mawdu‘*).

[p. 288] The bed’s matter (*madda*) is a subject (*mawdu‘*) of the bed’s form (*surat al-sarir*) and *hyle* for the form of ashness (*ramadiyya*) which occurs with burning [the wood of the bed].

[3] The subject (*mawdu‘*): It is said about everything that it is its prerogative to have a kind of perfection (*kamal ma*). That perfection was present and is its subject.

It is said ‘subject’ for every locus (*mahall*) which is recognised by its essence (*mutaqawwim bi-dhatih*) and composing that which is placed in it (*ma yahilluhu*).

As it is said: ‘hyle’ for the locus which is not recognised by its essence but rather with what occurs in it.

It is said subject (*mawdu‘*) for every meaning over which the judgement of negation or affirmation is passed. [4] It opposes the predicate (*mahmul*).

[5] **Matter (*madda*):** It might be said that it is a synonym (*ism muradif*) for *hyle*.’

Matter (*madda*) is said for every subject which accepts perfections through its combining with another and its appearance to it is little like semen (*mani*) and blood (*dam*) to the animal form (*surat al-hayawan*). Perhaps that which was mating with it is from its species, perhaps not.

[6] **Element (alt. matter of all matter) (‘*unsur*):** a term for the fundamental principle (*asl*) in subject matters. Therefore, it is said ‘element (‘*unsur*)’ for the primary locus (*al-mahall al-awwal*) with whose alteration (*istihala*) it accepts forms (*suwar*) in which the creations (*al-ka‘inat*) which occur from it are diversified (*tatanawwa‘u*)—if absolutely it is the first intellect (*al-‘aql al-awwal*). If with a corporeal condition, it is the first locus of bodies which the rest of the existent bodies form to accept their forms.

[7] **[Definition of the] element (*ustuqas*):** It is the primary body (*al-jism al-awwal*) in whose conjunction (*ijtima‘*) with primary bodies (*ajsam uwal*) opposing it in [p. 289] species (*naw‘*). It is called the ‘[definition of the] element (*ustuqas*).’ Therefore, it is said: It is the last [stage] to which the dis-

integration of the bodies reaches. Upon division to it there is not a division except whose parts are homoeomerous (*ajza' mutashabiha*).<sup>235</sup>

[8] **Base element (*rukn*)**: It is a simple substance (*jawhar basit*) and an essential part (*juz' dhati*) of the world like the celestial bodies and elements. Therefore, the thing by analogy with the world is a base element (*rukn*).

In analogy with what is assembled from it (*ma yatarakkabu minhu*), it is a definition of the element (*ustuqas*).

In analogy with the element ('*unsur*) which is from it whether it came into being from it at the time of composition (*tarkib*) and conversion (*istihala*) together or with pure conversion (*istihala mujarrada*) from it. The air (*hawa'*) is an element ('*unsur*) of a cloud with its density but is not a definition of the element (*ustuqas*). It is a definition of the element (*ustuqas*) and an element ('*unsur*) for plants.

The celestial sphere (*falak*) is a base element (*rukn*) but not a definition of the element (*ustuqas*) or an element ('*unsur*) of the form. Its form has a subject. It does not have an element ('*unsur*) whatever is meant by the subject. It is a locus (*mahall*) for a matter in which it is *in actu*. A prior locus (*mahall mutaqaddim*) is not meant by it.

These names which are the *hyle*, subject, element, matter, [definition of the] element, and base element may be used by way of synonymy (*taraduf*). Therefore, some of

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<sup>235</sup> Kindi's definition as quoted in Kennedy-Day, *Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy*, p. 78, is: 'the element (or matter) of the body; it is the smallest of things of the assemblage of the body.' Ibn Sina, *Kitab al-Hudud* (trans. by Kennedy-Day), p. 106: 'About the element<sub>1</sub> (*ustuqas*). The element<sub>1</sub> is the primary body by whose coming together with other bodies different kinds of primary bodies are formed. Element<sub>1</sub> is said of the final result after the bodies break down, where there is no further division except into similar parts.'

them may be substituted in place of others by way of concession (*musamaha*) so that what is intended by the connection (*qarina*) is known.

If a rock should tumble down, it does not tumble down due to it being a body, but rather for another meaning in which it differs from the rest of the bodies in it. Then it is a meaning in which it differs from fire which inclines upward. That meaning is a principle (*mabda'*) for this species of movement. It is called [9] 'nature (*tabi'a*).'

The same movement may be called 'nature.' Therefore, it is said: the rock's nature (*tabi'a*) is: tumbling down (*al-huwiyy*). The element ('*unsur*) and the essential form (*sura dhatiyya*) might be called 'nature.'

Physicians apply the expression 'nature' to the hot temperament (*mizaj*), the 'instinctive heat (*al-harara al-ghariziyya*),' the forms of the organs (*hay'at al-a'da'*), the movements (*harakat*), and the vegetative soul (*al-nafs al-nabatiyya*).

Every one has another definition with which our goal has no relation. Therefore, we have restricted ourselves to the first [definition].

[p. 290] [10] Natural disposition (*tab'*): It is every form with which one of the different species (*naw' min al-anwa'*), whether active (*fi'liyya*) or passive (*infi'aliyya*), are completed. It is as if it is more general than 'nature (*tabi'a*).'

A thing might be from nature ('*an al-tabi'a*) and not in natural disposition (*laysa bi'l-tab'*) like an additional finger.

It might resemble it being in the natural disposition according to the individual nature (*tabi'a shakhsiyya*) and not in the natural disposition according to the universal nature (*al-tabi'a al-kulliyya*).

The generality of the disposition is more inclusive of ‘action (*fi’l*)’ and ‘passivity (*infi’al*)’ than nature (*tabi’a*) which is an actual principle (*mabda’ fi’li*).

[11] The body (*jism*) is an equivocal term (*ism mushtarak*) that may be applied to that which is called by it such that it is conjunctive (*muttassil*), defined (*mahdud*), potentially measured by three dimensions. I mean it is measured *in potentia* (*bi’l-quwwa*) if not *in actu* (*bi’l-fi’l*).

‘Body’ may be applied to ‘outer form (*sura*)’ in which it is possible to display dimensions of how they are related in height, width and depth and possessing particular boundaries.

This differs from the first in that if it did not make conditional defining the being of the totality (*jumla*) and measuring it in *potentia* or in *actu* or believing the bodies of the world are infinite, every part (*juz’*) of it would be called a ‘body (*jism*)’ with this reflection (*i’tibar*).

‘Body (*jism*)’ is applied to a substance (*jawhar*) composed of hyle and outer form which is in the attribute which we mentioned. Therefore, it is called a body with this reflection (*i’tibar*).

The difference between quantity (*kamm*) and this outer form is that a portion of water and wax however much they exchange their forms, the measurable defined dimensions are exchanged and not one of them remains exactly the same (*bi-’aynihi*), one in number, and the outer form which receives these states (*qabil li-hadhihi al-ahwal*) remained one in number without exchange.

The outer form (*sura*) receives these states, which are corporeal (*jismiyya*).

Likewise if the body condenses (*takathaf*) for example,

like air turning into a cloud through condensation (*takathuf*), or water [p. 291] or rarefaction (*takhalkhul*) for example freezing (*jamd*) which results in the transformation (*yastabilu*) its physical form (*sura jismiyya*) and its dimensions and measurements are altered. Thus the difference appears between the physical form (*al-sura al-jismiyya*) which belongs to quantity (*kamm*) and the form which belongs to substance (*jawhar*).

[12] Substance (*jawhar*) is an equivocal name. It is said substance (*jawhar*) for the essence of the whole (*dhat kull*) like ‘person’ or ‘whiteness.’ Therefore, it is said: ‘the substance of whiteness and its essence (*dhat*).’

It is said substance (*jawhar*) for every existent (*mawjud*). Its essence does not need another essence to join to it so that it can be actualised. That is the meaning of their saying: Substance is self-existent (*qa'im bi-nafsihi*).

‘Substance’ is also said to what is with this description. It is in its prerogative to accept the contraries (*addad*) with their succession to it.

It is said ‘substance’ to every essence whose existence is not in a subject (*mawdu'*). This is the convention of the ancient philosophers.

The difference between the subject and the locus (*mahall*) was previously discussed. Therefore, the meaning of their saying: ‘The existent is not in a subject,’ is that the existent is not in conjunction in existence with a locus existent in itself and constituting it.

There is no objection that [the substance] is in a locus which is not constituted without it in *actu*. If it was in a locus, it is not in a subject.

Therefore, every existent if it is like whiteness, tempera-

ture, movement, work, it is a substance in the first meaning.

The first principle (*al-mabda' al-awwal*) is a substance in all its meanings except in the third aspect (*wajh*) which is the succession of the contraries (*ta'aqub al-addad*). Indeed, [one] may abstain from applying the expression 'substance' to it out of propriety for the divine law.

The hyle (*hayula*) is a substance in the third meaning, not in the second meaning.

The outer form (*sura*) is a substance in the fourth meaning, not in in the second or third.

The speculative theologians apply the name 'substance (*jawhar*)' to 'the indivisible space-occupying individual substance (*al-jawhar al-fard al-mutahayyiz alladhi la yanqasimu*)' and call the divisible (*munqasim*) 'a body (*jism*),' not 'a substance (*jawhar*).' With that judgement they refrain from applying the name 'substance (*jawhar*)' to the First Principle (*al-mabda' al-awwal*), the Mighty and Sublime. Contesting the names after clarifying their meanings is a habit of those possessing imperfections.

[p. 292] [13] **Accident** ('*arad*) is an equivocal name which is said of every existent in a locus (*mahall*).

It is said accident ('*arad*) [of the following]:

- 1) Every existent in a subject (*mawdu'*).
- 2) The individual universal meaning (*al-ma'na al-kulli al-mufrad*) which is predicated upon many (*kathirin*) in a non-constitutive predication (*hamlan ghayr muqawwim*). It is the accident which we placed in opposition to the essential (*alladhi qabalnahu bi'l-dhati*) in the *Book of Syllogistic Premises*.

- 3) Every meaning existent in the thing outside of its nature (*kharij ‘an tab‘ihi*).
- 4) Every meaning predicated on the thing for its existence in another [thing] which is separate from it (*yufariquhu*).
- 5) Every meaning whose existence was not primarily and principally (*fi awal al-amr*).

The outer form (*sura*) is an accident (*‘arad*) in the first meaning only. It is what the speculative theologian means if he does not compare it (*qabalahu*) with the substance (*jawhar*).

‘White’ is anything possessing whiteness which is predicated on snow, gypsum and camphor. It is not an accident in the first and second aspects, [but rather] in the third aspect. That is because this ‘white’ which is a non-constitutive predicated species (*naw‘ mahmul ghayr muqawwim*) is a substance not in a subject or a locus.

Therefore, ‘whiteness’ is subsisting (*hall*) in a locus and a subject. Whiteness is not predicated on snow. Therefore, there is no snow which is whiteness, but rather it is said ‘white (*abyad*)’ which means something possessing whiteness. Therefore, this is not a constitutive predicate (*haml muqawwim*).

A rock tumbling down is an accident in the first, second, and third aspects, but not in the fourth, fifth or sixth. Rather its movement upward is an accident in all of these aspects.

The movement of the person sitting in a ship is an accident in the sixth and fourth aspects.

[p. 293] [14] The celestial sphere (*falak*) in their view is a



simple spherical body which is not susceptible to accident of location (*kawn*) and corruption, moves by nature on its axis ('*ala al-wasat*), including it (*mushtamil 'alayhi*).

[15] The planet (*kawkab*) is a simple spherical body whose natural place is the same as of the celestial sphere in whose nature it is to not be susceptible to accident of location (*kawn*) and corruption, moves by nature on its axis, not including it (*ghayr mushtamil 'alayhi*).

[16] The sun (*shams*) is a planet (*kawkab*) and the largest of all the planets (*kawakib*) in body (*jirm*) and the most intense in light. Its natural place is in the fourth orb (*kura*).<sup>236</sup>

[17] The moon (*qamar*) is a planet (*kawkab*) whose natural place is downward, in whose nature it is to receive the light from the sun in different forms. Its essential colour is toward black.

[18] Fire (*nar*) is a simple body whose nature is hot and dry, moving by nature from the centre. It settles beneath the orb of the moon.

[19] Air (*hawa'*) is a simple body (*jirm basit*) whose nature is hot and moist, clear and subtle, moving to the place beneath the orb of fire (*kurat al-nar*) and above the orb of the land.

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<sup>236</sup> For a discussion of the orb (*kura*), see for instance Damien Janos, 'Moving the Orbs: Astronomy, Physics, and Metaphysics, and the Problem of Celestial Motion according to Ibn Sina,' *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 21 (2011), pp. 165–214.

[20] **Water** (*ma'*) is a simple body whose nature is cold, moist and transparent which moves to the place beneath the wind orb (*kura*) and above the land.

[21] **The land** (*ard*) is a simple body whose nature is cold, dry, moving to the middle and descending to it.

[22] **The dominion** (*'alam*) is the totality of all simple natural bodies. 'Dominion' is said about every group of homogenous existents (*mawjudat mutajanisa*) like their saying: The dominion of nature (*'alam al-tabi'a*), the dominion of the soul (*'alam al-nafs*) and the dominion of the intellect (*'alam al-'aql*).

[23] **Movement** (*haraka*) is the first perfection *in potentia* (*kamal auwal bi'l-quwwa*) because of what is *in potentia*. If you wish, you could say: It is the emergence from potentiality to actuality, not at a single moment.

[p. 294] Every change in their view is called 'movement (*haraka*).'

As to the movement of the whole (*harakat al-kull*), it is the movement of the farthest body (*al-jirm al-aqsa*) toward the center, encompassing all of the movements which are in the middle, and faster than them.

[24] **Eternity** (*dahr*) is the reality of the intelligible (*al-ma'na al-ma'qul*) from adding permanence (*idafat al-thabat*) to the soul in all of time (*fi'l-zaman kullihi*).

[25] **Time** (*zaman*) is a measurement (*miqdar*) of movement marked by the aspect of priority (*taqaddum*) and posterity (*ta'akhkhar*).

[26] **The now** (*al-ana*) is a moment (*zarf*) in which past and future time participate.

It may be said that time is small measure in estimation, conjoined with the true now (*al-ana al-haqiqi*) from its genus.

[27] **Place** (*makan*) is the internal surface (*al-sath al-batin*) from the containing substance (*al-jawhar al-hawi*), contiguous (*mumass*) to the surface visible from the containing body (*al-jism al-mahwi*).

‘Place’ might be said of the lower surface upon which a thing rests and carries it.

It is said ‘place’ with a third sense except that it is not existent. It is [of] finite dimensions like the dimensions of the situated (*mutamakkin*) in which the dimensions of the situated enter into it.

If it is permitted for it to be applied without the situated, it is a void (*khala’*).

[p. 295] If it is not permissible except for an existent body in it to occupy them (i.e. the dimensions), it is not void.

[28] **Void** (*khala’*) is a dimension in which it is possible to impose in it the dimensions of three constituent elements (*qawa’im*), not in matter (*madda*), such as a body occupies it and abandons it.

As long as this is not existent, this definition is an explanation of the name [void].

[29] **The plenum** (*mala’*) is a body from some aspect. Its dimensions oppose another body entering into it.

[30] **Non-existence** (*'adam*) is one of the principles (*ma-badi'*) of temporally created events (*hawadith*). It is for there not to be in something the essence of something in whose nature it is to accept it and exist in it.

[31] **Rest** (*sukun*) is the absence of movement in what by nature moves with it being in one state of the quantity, quality, place and position in time. It exists in it in two times (*anayn*).

[32] **Speed** (*sur'a*) is movement traversing a long distance in a short time.

[33] (*but'*) is movement traversing a short distance in a long time.

[34, 35] **Inclination** (*i'timad*) and **impetus** (*mayl*) is a quality (*kayfiyya*) with which the body resists what prevents it from movement toward its direction.

[36] **Lightness** (*khiffa*) is a natural power with which the body moves away from the centre naturally.

[37] **Weight** (*thuql*) is a natural power with which the body moves toward the centre naturally.

[p. 296] **Temperature** (*harara*) is an efficient quality (*kayfiyya fi'liyya*) which moves that which is in it upward in order for it to produce lightness. Therefore, there is opposition to it to combine the homogeneous things (*mutajanisat*) and to separate the disparate things (*mukhtalitat*) and to produce rarefaction (*takhalkhul*) similar to the quality in

the quality (*al-kayf fi'l-kayf*), and condensation (*takathuf*) in the position (*wad'*) with its decomposition and its subtle ascending (*tas'idihi al-latif*).

[39] **Coldness** (*buruda*) is an efficient quality (*kayfiyya fi'liyya*) which combines the homogeneous things (*mutajjanisat*) and the non-homogeneous things (*ghayr al-mutajjanisat*) by its restricting (*hasr*) the bodies through reducing and tightening them which are both from the [category] of the quality (*kayfa*).

[40] **Moisture** (*rutuba*) is a passive quality (*kayfiyya infi'aliyya*) with which the body accepts restriction and strange formation (*tashkil gharib*) easily, but does not preserve that. Rather [the body] returns to the form of itself and its position which is according to the movement of its body (*jirm*) in nature (*fi'l-tab'*).

[41] **Dryness** (*yubusa*) is a passive quality (*kayfiyya infi'aliyya*) for the body whose restriction and strange formation are difficult. Abandoning it and returning to its natural form are difficult.

[42] **Coarse** (*khashin*) is a body whose surface is divided into parts which are in a different position (*mukhtalifat al-wad'*).

[43] **Smooth** (*amlas*) is a body whose surface is divided into homogeneous parts (*mutasawiyat al-wad'*).

[44] **Hard** (*sulb*) is a body which does not accept pushing its surface inward except with difficulty.

[45] Softness (*lin*) is a body which accepts [pushing its surface inward].

[46] Loose (*rakhw*) is a body which is not quickly separated.

[47] Clear (*mushaff*) is a body in whose essence there is no colour and to be such as what is behind it is seen with an intermediary (*bi-tawassut*).

[48] Rarefication (*takhalkhul*) is an equivocal term (*ism mushtarak*).

‘Rarefication’ is said about the body’s movement from a measure (*miqdar*) to a greater measure which necessitates for its constitution to be thinner. ‘Rarefication’ is applied to the quality of this constitution (*kayfiyyat hadha al-qiwwam*). [p. 297] ‘Rarefication’ is applied to the movement of the parts of the body from close proximity to apart from each other. Therefore, a body which is more delicate than them penetrates them.

This is a movement in position (*wadʿ*). The first is in the quantity (*kamm*). ‘Rarefication’ is said about the same position of the parts of this.

The definition of condensation is understood from the definition of rarefication. It is known that it is equivocal and occurs in four senses opposite to those meanings.

One of them is movement in the quantity.

The other is quality.

The third is a movement in position (*haraka fiʿl-wadʿ*).

The fourth is position (*wadʿ*).<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> See Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), pp.131-132.

Conjunction (*ijtima'*) is the existence of many things which are encompassed by a single meaning. Opposite it is difference (*iftiraq*).

[50] **Two homogenous things** (*mutajanisan*) both resemble each other in position (*wad'*). It is not permissible for anything possessing a position (*dhu wad'*) to occur between them.

[51] **Interpenetrating** (*mudakhil*) is a thing which meets another in its totality until a single place adapts to them.

[52] **Conjunctive** (*muttasil*) is an equivocal term (*ism mush-tarak*) said about three meanings:

First, is about which it is said 'conjunctive in itself (*muttasil fi nafsihi*)' which is a species of quantity (*kamm*).

Its definition (*hadd*) is something in whose nature it is for an equivocal name (*hadd mushtarak*) to exist between its parts.

Its description (*rasm*) is that it is subject to division indefinitely.

The second and third have the meaning of conjunctive (*muttasil*).

The former is from the accidents ('*awarid*) of conjunctive quantity (*kamm al-muttasil*) with the first meaning with respect to what is a conjunctive quantity. [That is] both the conjunctive things' two extremities are one.

[p. 298] The third is equivocality (*shirka*) in position but with a position.

That is everything whose extremity and that of another

thing are one in *actu*, it is said that they are conjunctive like the two lines of an angle.

The third meaning is that it is among the accidents (*'awarid*) of the conjunctive quantity from the aspect of it being in a matter (*madda*), namely the conjunctives in this meaning, the extremity of each one of them is concomitant (*mulazim*) with the extremity of the other in movement even if it should change it (*ghayyarahu*) in *actu*. [An example of this is] the conjunction of the body parts with each other and the ligatures (*ribatat*) with the bones.

In general every contiguous concomitant thing (*mumass mulazim*) is difficult for it to accept disjunction (*infisal*) which is opposite contiguity (*mumassa*).

[53] **Union** (*ittihad*) is an equivocal term.

'Union' is said of the equivocation of things in a single essential or accidental predicate (*mahmul wahid dhati aw 'aradi*) like the union of camphor and snow in whiteness, and the person and the ox in 'animalness.'

'Union' is [also] said of the equivocation of the predicates (*mahmulat*) in a single subject (*mawdu'*) like the union of taste and smell in the apple.

'Union' is [also] applied to the conjunction of the subject and predicate in a single essence like both parts of a person: the body and soul.

'Union' is applied to many bodies either through succession (*tatali*) like the table or through genus like the chair and the bed, or the conjunction of an animal's [body] parts.

Most worthy of [being mentioned in] this chapter by the name 'union' is a single body occurring in number (*bi'l-'adad*) from the conjunction of many bodies (*ajsam*) due to their specific attributes being annulled, the removal of their



individual definitions (*irtifa‘ hududiha al-munfarida*), and the annulment of their independence (*istiqlalat*) in the conjunction.

[54] **Succession** (*tatali*) is the being of things that have a position (*wad‘*) with not another of their genus between them.

[55] **Continuous Succession** (*tawali*) is the existence of a thing in an analogous relationship to a definite principle (*mabda’ mahdud*). There is nothing between them similar to them both.

### [p. 299] Third Section

#### What is employed in Mathematics

When we did not talk about mathematics in *Precipitance of the Philosophers*, we restricted ourselves to these expressions in small measure (*‘ala qadr yasir*).

Some of them are subsumed under metaphysics (*ilahiyyat*) and physics (*tabi‘iyyat*) in the examples and illustrations which are six expressions:

Extremity ( <i>nihaya</i> )	Infinite ( <i>ma la nihaya</i> )	Point ( <i>nuqta</i> )
Line ( <i>khatt</i> )	Surface ( <i>sath</i> )	Distance ( <i>bu‘d</i> )

**The extremity** (*nihaya*) is the end to which the thing possessing quantity goes so that there is nothing of it behind it.

**The infinite** (*ma la nihaya*) is the quantity (*kamm*) possessing of many parts to the extent that nothing remains

external to it, it being of its same species, and in so far as it is not terminated.

**The point** (*nuqta*) is an indivisible essential (*dhat ghayr munqasima*) which has a position (*wad'*) which is the extremity of the line.

**The line** (*khatt*) is a measurement which does not accept division except from one side which is the extremity of the surface (*nihayat al-sath*).

**The surface** (*sath*) is a measurement (*miqdar*) in which it is possible for there to occur two divisions which intersect at the angles (*mutaqati'atayn 'ala qawa'im*) and is the extremity of the body.

[p. 300] **The distance** (*bu'd*) is everything between two extremities which do not intersect. It is possible to indicate its direction (*jiba*) and it is in its nature for extremities to be imagined in it from the type of potential of the two extremities.

The difference between the distance and the three measurements (i.e. point, line and surface) is that the [distance] may be a linear distance without a line, and a flat distance (*bu'd sathi*) without a surface.

An example of it is: If it was imposed in a body, which is not internally disjunctive, two points, between them both was a flat distance (*bu'd sathi*) but no line.

Likewise if two opposite lines are imagined in it, a distance exists between them, but not a surface because either a surface is between them if it is separated in *actu* with one of the aspects of disjunction or a line exists in it if it is in a surface.

Therefore, we differentiate between height and line and between width and surface since the distance between the two aforementioned points is length and not a line. The distance between the two aforementioned lines is width, not surface even if each line has a length and each surface has a width.

Our objective was reached of the *Book of Definitions* in general rule and exposition.

# [p.303] [BOOK FOUR] DIVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF EXISTENCE

The objective of this book is to research (*bahth*) the divisions of existence (*aqsam al-wujud*). I mean the universal divisions and researching the essential accidents (*'awarid dhatiyya*) which are attached to it as in existence (*min haythu al-wujud*). This is what is intended by the principles (*ahkam*) [of existence].

The difference between the essential accidents and non-essential accidents have been discussed.

The concomitants of a thing, meaning its predicates, are divided into that for which something more specific than it is present and that for which there is nothing more specific than it.

That for which something more specific than it is present is divided into: *Differentia* (*fusul*) and essential accidents (*a'rad dhatiyya*). The difference between them was previously discussed.

In the *differentia*, the thing is divided into its species.

In the accidentals, it is divided into differing states (*ikhtilaf ahwalih*).

The difference between the *differentia* and the universal accidents (*a'rad 'amma*) have been discussed.

The division of existence into ten divisions one of which is substance (*jawhar*) and nine accidents whose totality was previously [discussed] resembles the division of the *differentia* even if it is not so in reality.

Likewise if we should mention in the verification of the differentia (*tahqiq al-fasl*) and its penetration into quiddity, these matters (*umur*) are not external to the differentia as existence (*wujud*) is and the thing (*shay'*) is external to the genera. That is with the judgement of what previously occurred from the convention (*istilah*).

The division [of existence] into potential and actual, one and many, anterior and posterior, general and specific, universal and particular, pre-eternal and temporally created, complete and defective, cause and effect, necessary and possible and the like, resembles the division of the essential accidents. These matters are not concomitant to the existent for a matter more general than it nor a matter more specific than it like movement (*haraka*). It is concomitant to the existent insofar as its being a body not insofar as its being an existent.

Our objective from proper reflection (*nazar*) on this is divided into two aspects (*fannayn*):

### [p. 304] First Aspect (*fann*)

#### Concerning the Divisions of Existence

They are ten species in themselves.

Then its affair (*amr*) in the soul—I mean knowledge of it (*al-'ilm biha*)—is also ten heterogeneous [things] (*mutabayina*). The meaning of knowledge is an example which is in full concordance (*mutabiq*) with that which is known (*ma'lum*) like the form (*sura*) and picture (*naqsh*), which is a similitude (*mithal*) of the thing.

[Existence] has ten outward expressions (*'ibarat*) since the expressions (*alfaz*) are in the consequence (*tabi'a*) of the traces that are permanent in the soul and are in full con-

gruence (*mutabaqa*) with the external things (*al-ashya' al-kharija*):

Substance ( <i>jawhar</i> )	Hyle ( <i>hayula</i> )	Subject ( <i>mawdu'</i> )
Correlative ( <i>mudaf</i> )	Place ( <i>ayna</i> )	When ( <i>mata</i> )
Position ( <i>wad'</i> )	Possession ( <i>lahu</i> )	To do ( <i>an yaf'ala</i> )

The logicians produced these ten outward expressions each of which whose meaning we reveal. After comprehending the meaning, the expressions are incontestable (*la mushaha*).

### Saying concerning Substance (*jawhar*)

Know that the existent is divided with a type of division into:

Substance (*jawhar*) and Accident (*'arad*)

The primitive name of the substance and accident are equivocal as previously mentioned. However, we now mean with all of them a single thing. Thus, we want with 'substance' that which is existent and not in a subject (*la fi mawdu'*).

[p.305] What we want by 'subject (*mawdu'*)' is the proximate locus (*mahall qarib*) which is self-sufficient (*yaqum bi-nafsih*), not with the subsistence (*taqwim*) of the thing which inheres (*hall*) in it like colour in a person, rather in the body. The quiddity of the body is not subsistent with the colour, rather colour is an accident (*'arid*) which adheres after the quiddity of the body constitutes its essence (*qiwam mahiyyat al-jism bi-dhatihi*). [This is] not like the form of the 'wateriness (*ma'iyya*)' in the water. If [its form] should separate upon the water being converted into air, the quiddity is not replaced because of that which is separ-

ated, not like heat and cold upon separating from the water. Therefore, the quiddity is not altered.

If we are asked about hot and cold, ‘What is it?’ we would say: It is water. If we are asked about the air, we do not say it is water.

Should we present there and say: Hot water or cold and did not present here, then we should say: Water which has become rarefied (*takhalkhala*) and spread. Therefore, the form of ‘wateriness’ has dissipated.

The speculative theologians also call this an accident (*‘arad*). They mean by accident that which is a locus (*mahall*). This form is in a locus. There ought to be no conflict over the terminology (*istilah*). Each group has a right to specify the accident (*takhsis al-‘arad*) as it wants. However, it is not possible to deny the difference between heat in relationship to the water [the heat] dissipates after it cools and between the water form which disappears when it is converted to air. What is lost (*za’il*) here takes the place of the aforementioned in the question ‘What is it?’ What is lost there does not take its place.

Substance in the terminology of the speculative theologians is an expression concerning what [cannot inhere] in a locus (*mahall*). The ‘water form’ is not a substance (*jawhar*).

According to the terminology of the Philosophers, the expression ‘of what (*‘amma*) [cannot inhere] in a locus (*laysa fi mahall*). They take form (*sura*) as substance (*jawhar*).

The equivocal meaning (*ma‘na mushtarak*) between water and air if water is converted to air, they also call it substance (*jawhar*) which is hyle.

If the meaning of the subject (*mawdu‘*) is understood,

then the difference between it and the predicate (*mahmul*) is that substance (*jawhar*) is divided into: That which is not in the subject (*mawdu‘*) (which cannot be a predicate) and into that which is not in the subject but is possible to predicate it on a subject.

**First:** It is the individual substance (*jawhar shakhs*) like Zayd or ‘Amr.

**Second:** It is the collective substances (*jawahir kulliyya*) like the person, the body, and the animal.

Therefore, we indicate the subject like Zayd and predicate these substances on it (*wa nahmilu hadhihi al-jawahir ‘alayhi*). We say: Zayd is a person, an animal, and a body.

Therefore, the predicate is a non-accidental substance (*jawhar la ‘aradan*) except that it is predicated and knows the essence of the subject (*‘arifa dhat al-mawdu‘*) and not [p.306] external to its essence (*kharijan ‘an dhatihi*) not like the accident (*‘arad*) since it is predicated on the substance. A thing that is external to the subject’s essence (*kharij ‘an dhat al-mawdu‘*) is known by it. [For instance,] whiteness is predicated on the substance and is external to the substance’s essence. Therefore, this subject is not defined with the definition of the predicate since we say in defining ‘whiteness’:

It is a colour which sight distinguished (*yufarriq al-basar*) but by which the subject is not defined (*la yuhadd bihi al-mawdu‘*). As to the person, the animal, the body and the like, we predicate them on the person of Zayd. These substances (*jawahir*) are defined by a definition which is exactly the definition of the subject (*hadd al-mawdu‘*), since we say about Zayd: He is a mortal, speaking animal, or, He is an animate sensitive body possessing freewill (*jism dhu nafs hassas mutaharrik bi’l-irada*).



Thus the difference between the universal and particular substances has a disposition (*yatahayya'u*).

As for the accidents they are generally in a subject. However, they are divided into that which is said about a subject by way of predicating it (*bi-tariq al-haml 'alayhi*) and that which is not predicated on a subject.

That predicated on a subject is the universal accidents like colour for example. It is predicated on white, black, and other colours. Therefore, it is said: White is a colour and black is a colour.

As for the individual accidents (*a'rad shakhsiyya*), it is not possible to predicate them like Zayd's writing, a person's whiteness since it is not possible to predicate it on something until it is said: 'It is Zayd's writing,' or 'It is a person's whiteness.'

Should you say that Zayd is a writer or white, that is not posited for whiteness. Rather it means that he possesses writing (*dhu kitaba*).

Whenever we say: 'He is a person (*dhu insan*),' the person is not predicated. Likewise if we should say: 'possessing of whiteness (*dhu bayad*).' Therefore, it is possible the thing is either predicated (*mahmul*) in consideration of it being universal, whether accident or substance. As long as it is an individual it is not predicated, whether in terms of accident or substance.

The reality of the definition of universal (*kulli*) is [mentioned] in the principles pertaining to existence (*ahkam al-wujud*).

Therefore, if it is said: 'Is the universal substance (*jawhar kulli*) more appropriate to knowing substantiality (*jawhariyya*) or the individual (*shakhsi*)?'

We say: The universal substance (*jawhar kulli*), accord-

ing to what follows, its constitution (*qiwam*) is from the singular propositions (*shakhsiyyat*) since without them the universals (*kulliyyat*) would not be extant. The individual in rank is more advanced than it (i.e. the universal). However, the individual in its being rationalised (*fi sayruratihi ma'qulan*) is in need of the universal (*yaftaqiru ila al-kulli*) but is not in need of [the universal] for its existence.

This is verified upon demonstration (*bayan*) of the meaning of the universal (*ma'na al-kulli*).

If it is said: What are the divisions of substance?

We say: If it is intended by this substance: what exists not only [inhering] in a locus (*la fi mahall*) or existing not in a subject, it is divided into:

[p.307] A body (*jism*), I mean 'occupying space (*mutahayyiz*)' and 'not subject to space (*ghayr mutahayyiz*).'

The body is divided into 'nutritive (*mutaghaddhin*)' and 'non-nutritive (*ghayr mutaghaddhin*).'

The nutritive is divided into 'animal' and 'other.'

The animal is divided into speaking (*natiq*) and not speaking (*ghayr natiq*).

All of the animals are included in their different classes (*asnaf*) and each species (*naw'*) is divided into a class which is specific to it even if we cannot sense it.

As to the non-nutritive, included herein is [the following]: the sky, the planets, the four elements (*al-'anasir al-arba'a*) and all of the metals (*ma'adin*).

Then these are the divisions of the substances.

The majority of the speculative theologians are of the view that all the determined substances (*al-jawahir al-mutamayyiza*) are a single genus. However, they differ in their accidents (*a'rad*) since the body has a single quiddity (*mahiyya wahida*) which is by nature space-occupying (*muta-*

*hayyiz*) and composite (*mu'talif*). [The body's] being alive means: The subsistence of knowledge (*qiyam al-'ilm*) and life in it.

The philosophers say: These substances (*jawahir*) are different in themselves with the differing of their definitions. The attributes (*sifat*) that constitute the [substances] are configurations (*hay'at*) of the things (*ashya'*) which with the change of its quiddity the answer to 'What is it?' is changed. This necessitates divergence (*ikhtilaf*) in the verification (*tahqiq*) of the essence.

Verifying the truth in both schools of thought (i.e. of the scholastic theologians and philosophers) is not our objective. Rather our objective is demonstrating the meaning of the substance and its divisions.

It is time now to speak about 'quantity (*kammiyya*)' and 'measurable dimension (*miqdar*).'

### Quantity (*al-kam*)

Know that quantity (*kamm*) is an accident ('*arad*) and is an outward expression ('*ibara*) of the meaning which accepts divisibility (*tajazzu'*), coextensiveness (*musawat*) and dissimilarity (*tafawut*) to its essence (*dhat*).

Coextensiveness (*musawat*), dissimilarity (*tafawut*), and divisibility (*tajazzu'*) are of the concomitants of quantity. If something else is concomitant then it is through its mediation not insofar the essence of that other thing.

[p.308] [Quantity] is divided into: Conjunctive quantity (*al-kamm al-muttasil*) and disjunctive quantity (*al-kamm al-munfasil*).

As for the conjunctive (*muttasil*), it is every measurable dimension (*miqdar*) for which exists for its parts (*ajza'*) a common definition (*hadd mushtarak*) whose two terms

(*tarafahu*) meet at it (*yatalaqa 'indahu*) like the dot for the line and the line for the surface (*sath*). The now (*alana*) is a demarcator (*fasil*) of past and future time.

The conjunctive is divided into [two parts] 'that which possesses denotation (*wad'*)' and 'that which does not (*malaysa bi-dhi wad'*).'

That possessing denotation is whose parts are in conjunction, [possess] stability (*thabat*) and concomitance (*tasawuq*) in existence together such that each of the two can be indicated by: 'Where is it from the other? (*ayna huwa min al-akhar*)'

From that is what accepts division in only a single aspect like the line.

From it is what receives constitutions (*qawa'im*) in two distinct aspects (*jihatayn mutaqqati'atayn*). It is the surface (*sath*).

From it is what receives constitutions (*qawa'im*) in all of them. It is the body.

The place (*makan*) is also possessing of denotation (*wad'*) because it is the interior surface of a containing [surface] (*al-sath al-batin min al-hawi*). It surrounds the contained (*mahwi*). Therefore, it is its place (*makan*).

A group say: the place of water from the vessels (*aniya*) is the space (*fada'*) which is measured as an absolutely void space (*khala' sirf*) should the water depart from it and another does not take its place.

This also, according to the speaker, is the totality of the conjunctive quantity (*al-kamm al-muttassil*). It is a measurable dimension (*miqdar*) which accepts division (*inqisam*), coextensiveness (*musawat*), and dissimilarity (*tafawut*).

As for time (*zaman*), it is the measurable dimension of movement (*haraka*) except that it does not possess denota-

tion (*laysa lahu wad*‘) since there is no existence to its constituent elements together even if it should have conjunctivity (*ittisal*) since its past and its future are defined by the term ‘the now (*alana*).’

[p.309] As for the disjunctive (*munfasil*), it is that whose parts do not have an equivocal thing (*shay’ mushtarak*) at which its both terms meet like ‘number (‘*adad*)’ and ‘speech (*qawl*).’ For example, the parts of the [number] ‘ten’ are not in conjunction with each other. Should you place five on one side and five on the other, there is no equivocal term (*hadd mushtarak*) which functions like the dot of a line and ‘the now (*alana*)’ of time.

The statements (*aqawil*) also are among the totality of what is related to quantity (*kammiyya*). Everything that is possible to measure with one of its parts possesses measurements (*aqdar*) since ten is measured: with one ten times, and two five times. There is not a number which is not estimated with one of its parts. Likewise with time, the hour measures night and day. With night and day the month is measured and with the month, the year.

These matters function like the cubits (*adhru*‘) of lengths (*atwal*). Likewise, the statements (*aqawil*) are measured by one of their parts. Likewise, the accident (‘*arad*) is measured since with it correspondence (*muwazana*), coextensiveness (*musawat*), unity (*wahda*), and dissimilarity (*tafawut*) are measured.

These are the divisions of quantity.

### Saying concerning Quality (*kayfiyya*)

What is meant by it is the dispositions (*hay’at*) with which questioner’s question about singular individuals (*ahad al-ashkhas*): ‘How is he?’ is answered.

We have been cautious with the individuals against the differentia (*fusul*). That reminds [one] of the question concerning the discrimination (*mumayyiz*) of the thing: ‘With what thing is it? (*bi-ayyi shay’ huwa*)’

On the whole, it is an expression of every disposition fixed (*hay’a qarra*) in the body in which the consideration of their existence in [the body] does not necessitate a relationship (*nisba*) with [what is] external to the body nor a relationship which occurs in its parts (*ajza*)’.

These two differentia (*faslan*) are for a precaution against the relation (*idafa*) and the denotation (*wad’*) as will be forthcoming.

Then this ‘quality (*kayfiyya*)’ can be divided into what is specific to the ‘quality’ from the aspect of what is ‘quality’ (*min jihat ma huwa kam*)<sup>238</sup> like quadrature (*tarbi’*) for the surface (*sath*).

And straightness for a line, singularity for a number, and so for even [numbers].

As for that which is not specific to ‘quality,’ it is divided into sensible (*mahsus*) and non-sensible (*ghayr mahsus*).

As for the sensible it is that by which the sensible is affected (*yanfa’ilu ‘anhu*). That is it produces (*yuhdith*) in it traces of the [particular circumstances] [p.310] like colour, taste, hotness, coldness, etc. which affect the five senses.

That which is firmly rooted from the whole of that is called ‘passive qualities (*kayfiyyat infi’aliyya*) like the yellowness of gold and the sweetness of honey. That which is quick to dissipate like the blushing from [experiencing] em-

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<sup>238</sup> Concerning the conceptual qualifier (*min jihat...*), see Sari Nusseibeh, *Avicenna’s Shifa’*. Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2018, p. 258.

barrassment and yellowness<sup>239</sup> due to fear is called passivity (*infi'al*).

As for the non-sensible, it is divided into predisposition (*isti'dad*) for another matter and into perfection which is not predisposed to other than it.

As to predisposition, it is for constitution (*muqawama*).

Passivity is called a natural faculty (*quwwa tabi'iyya*) like salubriousness,<sup>240</sup> firmness, the faculty of memory (*quwwat al-dhakira*), and wrestling (*musara'a*).

If there was a predisposition (*isti'dad*) to difficulty of action ('*usr al-fi'l*) and ease of passivity (*subulat al-infi'al*), it is called 'weakness (*da'f*'); that is the negation of power like chronic illness (*mimradiyya*) and softness (*lin*).

A difference exists between health and salubriousness.

A salubrious person may not be healthy and a chronically ill person may be healthy.

As for the perfections (*kamalat*) which is not possible for them to be pre-disposed (*isti'dad*) to another perfection (*kamal*) and are imperceptible in themselves like knowledge and health, what is quickly dissipating from among them is called: 'states' like the anger of one possessing forbearance and the illness of the salubrious person. That which is enduring (*thabit*) is called 'habitus (*malaka*)' like knowledge and health. I mean enduring knowledge with long practice save for the sciences of the self-acquired sciences (*al-'ulum al-shada*)<sup>241</sup> which are threatened with disappearing. Knowledge is a non-sensible quality of the soul.

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<sup>239</sup> The text has *safwa* instead of *safra* which is clearly an error.

<sup>240</sup> Concerning the natural faculty see for instance Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (trans. Ahmed), p. 122.

<sup>241</sup> Corrected to 'al-shada' from 'al-shadi' which has the meaning of polite literature and guiding oneself through the acquisition of knowledge. Lane, *Lexicon*, 4:1521.

## Saying concerning the possessive construction (*idafa*)

It is the meaning whose existence in the syllogism is to another thing which does not exist at all like ‘fatherhood (*al-ubuwwa*) in syllogistic relationship (*bi'l-qiyas*) to sonship (*bunuwwa*) not like the father who has an existence (*wujud*) which is specific to him (*yakhussuhu*) like ‘humanity (*insaniyya*)’ for instance.

[p.311] This meaning is distinguished from the quality (*kayf*) and quantity (*kam*); there is no concealing it.

Therefore, this is its origin (*asl*).

As for its divisions, they are divided according to the rest of the intelligibles (*maqulat*) in which the relationship (*idafa*) is displayed.

It is displayed to the substances and the accidents.

If it is displayed to the substances (*jawahir*), [the following] occur from it: father and son, master and slave, and the like.

If it is displayed in the quantity (*kam*), [the following] occur from it: small, large, few, many, half, double and the likes of it.

If it is displayed in the quality (*kayfiyya*), [the following] come from it: habitus (*malaka*), the state (*hal*), the sense (*hiss*), the sensible (*mahsus*), knowledge (*‘ilm*) and that which is known (*ma‘lum*).

If it is displayed in the ‘where (*ayna*),’ [the following] appear from it: above (*fawqa*), below (*asfal*), front (*quddam*), beneath (*that*), right (*yamin*), and left (*shimal*).

If it is displayed in the ‘when (*mata*)’ [the following] occur from it: quick (*sari‘*), slow (*bati‘*), prior (*mutaqaddim*) and posterior (*muta’akhhir*).

Likewise the rest of the intelligibles (*maqulat*). They are



divided in another aspect into:

That in which the name of the relatum (*mutadayi-fayn*) differs like: father (*ab*), son (*ibn*), master (*mawla*), and slave (*'abd*).

That in which the name is concordance in both of them like: the brother (*akh*) with the brother (*akh*) and the friend (*sadiq*) with the neighbour (*jar*).

[p.312] That in which the structure of the name differs along with unifying with that from which is derived from it like: the owner (*malik*) and the owned (*mamluk*), the scholar (*'alim*) and that which is learned (*ma'lum*) and the sensing (*hassas*) and the sensed object (*mahsus*).

As long as the annexed (*mudaf*) is not present by virtue of it being annexed, the possessive construction (*idafa*) is invalid. Therefore, the father is a human. It is an expression of his being a person, not annexed but rather indicates its adding the expression 'father.'

The signifier of the expression indicating annexation is the equipollence of both sides, for the 'father' is a father of a 'son', and the 'son' is a son of 'father'.

If it is said: The 'father' is a father to a human being, it is not possible to say: The human being is a human being for the father.

If it is said: 'The place is a place for the possessor of the place (*dhi al-makan*),' it is possible for you to say: 'The possessor of *the* place possesses *a* place in *the* place' so long as the possessor of the place (which is one of the two relatum) is a proper name (*ism khass*) just as you say by 'the hand' to the hand and 'possesses the hand' to one who possesses

the hand and ‘with the hand (*bi’l-yad*).’ If we should say: The place is a place for the sailing vessel (*zawraq*), [the order of both expressions] is not reversible (*lam yanqalib*) since not every sailing vessel has a place. Therefore, the origin of the relation (*mudaf ilayhi* (lit. the thing added), is not mentioned and contains the expression which indicates the possessive construction.

Should you say: ‘The hand is the person’s hand,’ it is not possible for you to say: ‘The person is a person for the hand.’ Rather it should be said: The hand is for the possessor of the hand until it is transformed by way of equipollence (*takafu*’).

Among the conditions for equipollence (*takafu*’) is for the union of the direction of the possessive construct (*wijhat al-idafa*) until they are all apprehended (*yu’khadh*) *in actu* or all *in potentia*, otherwise it would be thought that one of them would possess priority over the other.

Among the specific qualities of the possessive construct is if one of the annexed [elements] is known actualised with it (*muhassalan bihi*), the other is also known thus. The existence of one of them is with the existence of the other, neither before nor after.

Perhaps it is probable (*yuzann*) that knowledge (*‘ilm*) and ‘that which is known (*ma‘lum*)’ are not equal. Rather that which is known is prior to knowledge, not so. Rather knowledge is a similitude of that which is known by its being known with the existence of knowledge in itself and the essence being knowledge without order, except for what is known and what is perceived to exist in *potentia* not in *actu*. Therefore, [that which is known] precedes knowledge *in actu* but not *in potentia*.

## Saying concerning 'where (*al-ayna*)'

What is intended by it is the relationship of the substance to its place in which it is like your saying concerning the question: 'Where is Zayd?' that he is in the *suq* or at home.

[p.313] We do not mean by it that 'where (*ayna*)' is the house. Rather what is understood from our saying: 'in the house' is the accident (*'arad*) to it.

Every body (*jism*) has a 'where (*ayna*).' However, some of them are manifest (*bayyin*) like the person, [who] is one for the world. Some of them are known through allegorical interpretation (*ta'wil*) like for all the world. Therefore, it has 'where' based on allegorical interpretation (*ta'wil*).

Every body has a specific obscure 'where' (*ayn khass gharib*) and equivocal 'wheres' (*aynat mushtaraka*) which include it. Some are smaller than each other and closer to the first like 'Zayd, he is in the house.' His near 'where' is the air [pocket] which surrounds him and meets the surface of his body, then the city, then the populated areas (*ma'mur*) of the earth (*ard*). This is why it is said: He is in the house, in the city, in the populated areas, on earth, and in the world (*'alam*).

As for the types of 'where (*ayna*),' among them is 'where' in its essence and 'where' that is annexed (*mudaf*). As for 'where' in its essence, like our saying: 'in the house' and 'in the *suq*.'

As for 'where' that is annexed, it is like: 'above,' 'below,' 'right,' 'left,' 'around,' 'intermediate,' 'what is between,' 'what follows,' 'next to,' 'with,' 'over,' and the like of that.

However, the body does not have 'where' that is annexed if it does not have 'where' in its essence. What is 'above' is inevitable and for it to have 'where' in its essence.

If the meaning of its being is ‘above’, it is a ‘temporal above-ness (*fawqiyya zamaniyya*).’

### Saying concerning ‘when (*mata*)’

It is the relationship of the thing to the restricted time which accompanies its existence and whose extremities (*nihayat*) correspond with the extremity of its existence (*nihayat wu-judih*) or a definite time of which this time is a part. Generally: It is what is said in the answer to [the question] ‘when.’

The definite time is defined according to: (1) its distance from the now (*alana*) either in the past or future. That is through a common name (*ism mashhur*) like your saying: yesterday, the day before yesterday, tomorrow, next year, and a century, or to (2) a well-known historical event after ‘the now (*alana*),’ like your saying: during the period (‘*ahd*’) of the Companions [of the Prophet] and the time (*waqt*) of the [Prophet’s] Emigration [to Yathrib].

The definite time is either primary to it or secondary to it. Its primary time is what envelopes its existence. The [designation of] non-disjunctive (*ghayr munfasil ‘anhu*) is consistent with it.

Its secondary time is the supreme definite time (*al-zaman al-mahdud al-a‘zam*) of which the extremity of the first is a part of it, like [p.314] for the war to be in six hours on the day of...the month of ... in the year. Those six hours are the primary time that is consistent.<sup>242</sup>

The day, the month, and the year are secondary times (*azmina thawanin*) which are relative (*tudafu ilayha*) by vir-

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<sup>242</sup> This is real time (*al-mata al-haqiqi*).

tue of the its time being a part of it. Therefore, it is said: A war broke out in such-and-such year.<sup>243</sup>

The concurrence (*musawaqa*) of time to a thing's existence is not time being antecedent to it. By '*musawiq*' we mean coextensive. That could be with the extremities of a divisible time.

The measure (*miqdar*) is an answer to the questioner about 'How many? (*bi-kam*)' as is said: How many [years] (i.e. how long) did so-and-so live? Then it is said: one hundred years. Therefore, time is the measure (*miqdar*).

If it is said: For how long (*kam*) did the war last? Then it is said: For one year. Therefore, this is in full concordance (*mutabiq*), not an antecedent (*muqaddim*). That in full concordance (*mutabiq*) may be extended (*mumtadd*). However, it is not a condition of it to be extended. A condition of antecedent time (*al-zaman al-muqaddam*) is extension (*imtidad*) and division (*inqisam*).

### Saying concerning position (*wad'*)

It is an expression of the being of the body such that a relationship [with the following qualities exists] for its parts, some of them with some: inclination (*inhiraf*), correspondence (*muwazana*), and modes (*jihat*). The parts (*ajza'*) of the place if in a place which carries it, like standing (*qiyam*), sitting (*qu'ud*), lying down (*idttija'*), and lie flat (*inbitah*), this difference is due to a change in the relationship of the [body] parts. The leg is distanced from the thigh in standing, and in sitting they both come together. If [the body] should extend both its legs to lie down, the position of its

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<sup>243</sup> This is figurative time (*al-mata al-majazi*).

parts is like the [body's] position if it should stand up. However, relative to the mode and place, [the position] differs if the head is upright above the leg which is not the case with lying down.

However, whenever a person should walk, the position does not change for him, but the place does. 'Position' is not [equal to] changing the place (*tabaddul al-makan*).

The position might be for the body relative to its essence (*dhat*) like the parts of a person. If [the body] is not the body of another, the position (*wad'*) of its parts would be intelligible (*ma'qul*). [The position] might be relative to another body. That is in its 'where' which affirms it in relationship to 'above,' 'beneath,' 'right,' 'intermediate,' etc.

When the places are of two types: [p.315] A type in the essence and a type in the relationship, the position also becomes two types.

However, the thing does not have a relative position (*wad' bi'l-idafa*) if it does not have a position in its essence.

When the place in his essence which is not relative is of two types: A type which is primary and proper (*awwal khass*) to the body, then its position is sometimes analogous (*bi'l-qiyas*) to its primary and proper place and sometimes to its secondary place which is common to it and another and [that place's] horizons. Every person has a position vis-à-vis the two poles for instance and the horizons. Every part of the sky has a [corresponding] position to the parts of the earth in every situation. With [the earth's] movement the position only changes, not the place.

## Saying concerning the accident which is expressed through ‘for it (*lahu*)’

It might be called ‘possession (*jida*).’<sup>244</sup> When there is like this with ‘moving,’ ‘bearing a weapon,’ and ‘wearing a Persian mantle,’ ‘for it (*lahu*)’ does not acquire a meaning except that it is the relationship of the body to the body which corresponds to all of its simple [forms] or some of what coincides (*muntabaq*) is transferred with what is surrounded by it to that which coincides with it.

Then from [for it (*lahu*)] is what is natural like skin to an animal or foot to a turtle. There is also what is voluntary like a shirt to a person. As for water in the vessel, it is not like this since the vessel is not transferred with the water being transferred, but rather it is vice versa. That relationship is not included among these categories (*maqulat*) but rather under the category of ‘the now (*al-ayna*).’ God knows best.

### [p.316] Saying concerning ‘to do (*an yaf’ala*)’

It means the relationship of the substance (*jawhar*) to a matter existing of it in something else, not subsisting in the essences. But rather it continues to be renewed like: heating, defining, and cutting.

Coldness, hotness and cutting which occur with ice and fire and the hot things in other than it, have a relationship to its causes (*asbab*) with whoever is convinced of the causes in existence (*asaban fi al-wujud*).

That relationship on the part of the cause (*min janib al-sabab*) is expressed by ‘to do (*an yaf’ala*)’ if it is said: to

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<sup>244</sup> Text has been corrected from ‘jidda’ to ‘jida.’

heat up, to cool down. The meaning of 'heat up' is to make heat and the meaning of 'cool down' is to make cold. Therefore, it is this relationship that is expressed with these expressions.

One may believe that calling that a verb is a metaphor, if he sees the action a metaphor for all that has no will to choose. However, with that he does not deny that relationship for which his [following] saying is believed: The fire heated it. Therefore, that relationship is a genus of the accidents (*jins min al-a'rad*) which is expressed with a verb or something else. Thus, there is no impediment in the expressions.

### Saying concerning passivity (*infi'al*)

It is the relationship of the changed substance to the changing cause (*al-sabab al-mughayyir*). Every passive thing (*munfa'il*) is from an agent (*fa'il*). Every thing heated or cooled is from something that heats or cools with the judgement of the general custom (*'ada muttarida*) with the adherents of the truth (*ahl al-haqq*), and with the judgement of the necessity of the natural disposition (*jibilla*) in the understanding of the Mu'tazilites and philosophers.

In general passivity is change (*taghayyur*) which may be from particular circumstances (*kayfiyya*) to particular circumstances like the hair changing from black to white, for it has been changed gradually by getting older, and changed it from black to white, little by little, gradually.

Also [it is] like water turning hot from cold. When water heats up the coldness is removed little by little and heat is created in it little by little, in conjunction (*'ala al-ittisal*) except if its paths are cut off; [p.317] then it stops. At every pause it is in one state which departs from what is before it



and what is after it. Its condition is not stable at the time of procession (*suluk*).

Generally, there is no difference between your saying: to be affected (*yanfa'ilu*) and your saying: to be changed (*yataghayyaru*).

The types of change are many. They are exactly the types of being affected (*infi'al*).

Therefore, these are the high genera (*al-ajnas al-'aliya*) of all the existents.

The custom is to limit them to these ten [categories].

If it said: Was this limiting acquired through imitation of the early scholars (*mutaqaddimin*) or is there a demonstrative proof (*burhan*) for it?

We say: Imitation (*taqlid*)<sup>245</sup> is the affair of the blind. The purpose of this book is for the ways of demonstrative proof to be cultivated with it. Therefore, how is it possible to convince of it with [blind] acceptance? Rather it is fixed through demonstrative proof.

Its manner (*wajh*) is that this limiting contains claims (*da'awa*):

The first of which is that this ten is present [categories]. This is known through experience (*mushahada*) of the intellect and the senses as we detailed.

The other is that there is none apart from it in existence. That is known through everything which the intellect perceives that is not void of the following: substance (*jawhar*) or accident (*'arad*).

Every substance (*jawhar*) has an expression (*'ibara*) applied to it or encompasses a thought. Therefore, it is possible to insert it under this totality (*jumla*).

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<sup>245</sup> *Taqlid* is blind acceptance of authority.

As to it not being possible to restrict it to nine [categories], the way of knowing it is for you to know the dissonance (*tabayun*) of these divisions with what we mentioned concerning their differing. Then knowledge of these claims is complete with this totality (*jumla*).

Yes, it is not remote for the theoretician (*nazir*) to doubt the aspect of the difference (*mubayana*) of a division to a division until the aspect of difference between the pure relative (*idafa mahda*) and the relationship to the place (*nisba ila al-makan*) or passivity (*infi'al*) is unclear in his mind. [This is because] these matters also contain a relationship (*nisba*). However, there is something behind the relationship. If he should look closely, then dissonance (*tabayun*) would appear to him.

Likewise, it is not remote to puzzle over an accident (*'arad*) that it is from this division or that as a theoretician puzzles over the difference between the relationship of the substance (*jawhar*) to its place (*makan*) and between the relationship of the substance by way of juxtaposition (*mu-hadhat*).

That is presented in such a way as to be an attribute and its being in the place (*makan*) such that [p.318] it is relative and it does not have a name which indicates it in so far as that attribute is concerned without a relationship until it is assigned (*yutakallafa*) the name 'the where (*al-ayna*)' and the name 'when (*mata*)' is created for an occurrence in time.

However much its name indicates it in so far as it is relative (*mudaf*), and is the one which made its name indicate it in so far as it is a description, it opposed this doubt. This is negligence (*taqsir*) from the one who created the names.

Likewise it might be displayed in this that the name of a

genus (*ism jins*) indicates it in the sense it is relative and the names of its species (*anwa'*) indicate in so far as they are attributes (*sifat*), not in so far as they are relative. Therefore, it is thought that the genus is a relation (*idafa*). It is wondrous that the genus might be from the category (*maqula*) of the correlative (*mudaf*), and the species (*naw'*) from another category (*maqula*). Its cause is what we mentioned.

If there is equivocation in the condensation (*takathuf*) and the rarefaction (*takhalkhul*), that it is from the category of particular circumstances (*kayfiyya*) or from the category of denotation (*wad'*), and doubt spread widely from the equivocity of the name here. 'Rarefaction (*takhalkhul*)' means to separate the parts of the body from each other so that foreign bodies from this or another can intervene in them.

'Condensation (*takathuf*)' means the close proximity of the parts by becoming compact until the air they contain is pressed out. Then it flows from its openings and its parts come together and touch.

### [p. 319] Second Aspect (*fann*)

#### Concerning the division of existence with its essential accidents into its types and states

Like [existence] being a principle (*mabda'*), a cause (*'illa*), and an effect (*ma'lul*).

[Also] it is [divided] into what is *in potentia* (*bi'l-quwwa*) and what is in *actu* (*bi'l-fi'l*).

Pre-eternal (*qadim*) and temporally created (*hadith*).

Before (*qabl*) and after (*ba'd*).

Prior (*mutaqaddim*) and posterior (*muta'akhkhir*).

Universal (*kulli*) and particular (*juz'i*).

The complete (*tamm*) and the deficient (*naqis*).

The singular (*wahid*) and the many (*kathir*).

The necessary (*wajib*) and the possible (*mumkin*).

These accidents (*'awarid*) are confirmed for the existence (*wujud*) in so far it is existent (*mawjud*) not in so far as it is another thing more specific than it like it being a body, an accident or other than them both.

**Saying concerning division into cause and effect  
and describing the existent with it being a principle  
(*mabda'*) and a cause (*'illa*)**

The principle is a name for that whose existence in itself is complete (*istatamma wujuduhu fi nafsibi*) either from its essence or from something else.

Then the existence of another thing occurs from it which constitutes it. This is called a cause (*'illa*) in relationship to what is a principle (*mabda'*) of it. Then it must be either like the part from the effect, e.g. wood and the image of a bed to a bed or it is not like the part.

[Concerning] that which is like the part, the effect in *actu* may not be necessary from its existence. It is called an 'element (*'unsur*)' like wood for the bed. It might be necessary from its existence undoubtedly the existence of the effect (*ma'lul*) [p. 320] in *actu*. It is the image of the bed. The element (*'unsur*) is called a material cause (*'illa qabiliyya*) and the image is called a formal cause (*'illa suwariyya*).

That which is not like the part (*juz'*) is divided into that which is distinct to the effect (*mubayin lil-ma'lul*) and intrinsic (*mulaq*).

The intrinsic (*mulaq*) is divided into: 'that which acquires a description (*sifa*) from the effect and is described by it,'

which is like the subject to the accident since it is said: subject, hot, cold, black, and white, and into ‘that which is opposite of it;’ that is the effect acquires the description from the cause. Therefore, the effect is described by the cause. It is like the form of ‘waterness’ to the equivocal matter (*madda mushtaraka*) between water and air upon conversion. That which is equivocal is called ‘hyle (*hayula*).’ It is incontestable to apply this name and replace it.

As for that which is distinct (*mubayin*), it is divided into [the following]:

That from which existence comes about. Existence is not for the sake of it (*laysa li-ajlihi*). It is the efficient cause (‘*illa fa‘iliyya*’) like the carpenter to the bed.<sup>246</sup>

That to which the effect owes its existence is the end cause (*al-‘illa al-gha‘iyya*),<sup>247</sup> like the utility (*suluh*) for sitting to chair and bed.

The first cause (*al-‘illa al-ula*) is the end (*ghaya*) without which the carpenter would not have become a carpenter.

It being a cause is antecedent (*sabiqa*) to the rest of the causes since with it the causes became causes. Its existence is posterior to the existence of the whole (*wujud al-kull*). The prior (*mutaqaddim*) is its causality (‘*illiyya*’).

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<sup>246</sup> For an explanation of the different types of cause, see Andreas Lammer, *The Elements of Avicenna’s Physics: Greek Sources and Arabic Innovations*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2018, pp. 162-164. Also see Jon McGinnis, ‘Ibn Sina’s Natural Philosophy’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL:

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/ibn-sina-natural/>;

Kara Richardson, ‘Causation in Arabic and Islamic Thought’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.):

<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/arabic-islamic-causation/>. (Section 2.3)

<sup>247</sup> Ibn Sina, *Deliverance* (Ahmed trans.), p. 127.

[p.321] The cause is eternally (*abadan*) more nobler than the recipient (*qabil*) since the agent (*fa'il*) is beneficial and the recipient is the benefitting (*mustafid*).

Then the cause might be in the essence (*dhat*), in the accident (*'arad*), in *potentia* (*bi'l-quwwa*), in *actu* (*bi'l-fi'l*), in close proximity (*qariba*), [or] far (*ba'ida*). Examples of it were previously [mentioned].

### Saying concerning division into that which is in *potentia* and in *actu*

The name 'potentiality (*quwwa*)' may be applied to another meaning. Therefore, there is ambiguity about 'potentiality' which is opposite 'actuality (*fi'l*).' Then let its proof be presented:

It is said: Potentiality (*quwwa*) is the principle of change (*mabda' al-taghyir*) either in the passive thing (*munfa'il*), which is the passive power (*al-quwwa al-infi'aliyya*), or in the active thing (alt. agent) (*fa'il*), which is the efficient power (*al-quwwa al-fi'liyya*).

It is said of what it contains that action or passivity is permitted from the thing.

And with what it contains the thing constitutes the other.

With what it contains the thing either becomes changing or fixed. Changing is not without weakness (*da'f*).

[p.322] The power of the passive thing may be limited and oriented toward a single specific thing like the potential of water to accept the form (*shakl*) without preserving it which is opposite the wax which contains the power of acceptance and preservation together.

The thing might contain the passive power in relation-

ship to the two contraries like the wax's acceptance of heating and cooling.

Likewise, the power of the agent is oriented toward a single specific thing like the power of fire to burning only.

It might be oriented toward many things like the power of those who choose different matters.

A thing may contain a disposition (*isti'dad*) for things, however some through the intermediary of others like the potentiality of cotton to accept the form of spinning and the state of being a garment (*thawbiyya*).

The theoretician (*nazir*) may make an error in the expression 'potentiality' and become confused by this meaning with the potentiality which is mentioned opposite the actuality.

The difference between them both is apparent from [a number] of aspects:

First, the potentiality which is opposite the actuality reaches its limit when the thing becomes actual. The other power remains present if it is in an active state.

Second, [concerning] the active power (*quwwa fa'ila*), only the mover principle (*al-mabda' al-muharrrik*) is described with it. With the second power, the passive thing (*amr munfa'il*) is mainly described.

Third, the action which is opposite the active power means: Relationship of change, or being (*kawn*) or [certain] movement to a principle which is passive in [this relationship].

The action which is opposite the other power is used to describe everything from the likes of the acquired existents (*al-mawjudat al-hasila*) if it is:

Passivity (*infi'alan*) or a state (*halan*).

Non-action (*la fi'lan*) and non-passivity (*la infi'alan*)

If it is said your saying: ‘The thing in *potentia*, not in *actu* is summed up a disposition for the thing and acceptance of its locus (*mahall*),’ this is understood.

As for the other power, which is the active (*fa’ila*), like the power of fire to burn, how does one who has not seen fire burn acknowledge it? Truly God the Exalted created burning when cotton and fire come together, for example, with the judgement of God the Exalted’s habitual course?

[p.323] We said: Our objective concerning what we have mentioned is to explain the meaning of the name, not to verify the existence of the named. We have warned about the aspect of realising the truth of it in *Precipitance of the Philosophers*.

The objective is for one of them not to be confused by the other if one who believes that employs both of them.

### **Saying about the divisions of the existent into pre-eternal, temporally created, before and after**

As for the pre-eternal it is an equivocal name between the pre-eternal according to essence and between pre-eternal according to time.

That which is according to time has no beginning to the time of its existence. As for the one according to essence, it is the one whose essence does not have a principle, and cause with which it is existent.

The true well-known [one] is the first one. The second is as if it is borrowed from the first and is as if it is figurative (*majaz*). This is from the traits designated by the philosophers.

In this equivocality a temporal event is equivocal also. There the temporal event is according to time. It is that



whose time of existence has a beginning (*ibtida'*). According to essence, its essence has a principle (*mabda'*) through which it exists.

The world according to the philosophers is a temporal creation according to the second sense and pre-eternal according to the first.

The creator (*sani'*) of the world is pre-eternal according to both interpretations together.

[p.324] The [philosophers'] calling the world temporally created (*hadith*) with its casuistry (*ta'awwal*) is purely figurative (*majaz mahd*) since it is the understanding existing after it did not exist. The world in their view was not brought into being after it was not.

Among their interpretations (*ta'wilat*) is their saying: The world has a relationship to the nature of existence and a relationship to non-existence (*'adam*). Existence occurs to it (i.e. the world) not from its essence but rather from something apart from it. Should we estimate the absence of that other, from its essence there would be non-existence (*'adam*).

A thing does not possess from its essence beforeness in essence (*qabliyya bi'l-dhat*) before it does not possess [anything] from something else. Therefore, non-existence for it is before existence. Therefore, this is allegorical interpretation (*ta'wil*).

It is a constraint (*takalluf*) from the words in applying the expression [temporally created]. One cannot deny to them abandoning the expression 'temporally created (*hadith*)' until they charge for themselves a manner (*wajh*) to apply the expression. Rather they are to be rebuked for abandoning belief in the locus of temporal creation (*ma-hall al-huduth*) and that the existence of the world is not

preceded by nothingness. If that is not believed, then the names are insufficient and incontestable (*la mushaha fiha*).

It is astonishing that they say: With the belief in the temporal creation of the world we are more appropriate (*awla*), we say: The effect (*ma'lul*) is a temporal creation in every time. The description of its temporal creation in it is fixed (*thabit*) in their view for all eternity and with you in one state.

If what is understood from temporal creation is what [the philosophers] mentioned, then it is more deserving of it except that the understanding of temporal creation is what we mentioned and what they had denied and applied the expression to something else which continues in all times.

The way of annulling it is what we mentioned in *Precipitance of the Philosophers*.

As for 'before,' it is an equivocal name for the disputations (*muhawarat*) of the speculative theologians and the masses since what is applied and desired is 'beforeness by nature (*al-qabliyya bi'l-tab'*),' as it is said: One is before two. That is in everything. It is not possible for the other to exist except if it is existent and it to be existent and the other non-existent.

Therefore, its existence is not possible without the other since it is before the other. That 'other' may be called 'after (*ba'd*)' as if it is metaphorical (*musta'ar*) and figurative (*majaz*). Rather the famous apparent 'beforeness' is the temporal 'beforeness' (*al-qabliyya al-zamaniyya*) and its affair is visible.

It is said 'before' for priority in rank (*al-taqddum bi'l-martaba*) like the priority of genus over species in relationship to the highest genus (*al-jins al-a'la*).

[p.325] It might be in relationship to something particular, as it is said: The first row is before the second row, if the *mihrab* became that which is related (*mansub*). If it is related to the *masjid*'s door, perhaps the last row would be described by 'beforeness.'

'Before' might be said of precedence (*sharaf*) as it is said: Muhammad, May peace be upon him, is before Moses and before Abu Bakr and 'Umar.

'Before' might be said of the cause ('*illa*) in relationship to the effect (*ma'lul*) bearing that they are both together in time and that in their being in *potentia* or in *actu* they are equal (*yatasawiyan*). However, in as much as that one of them is in existence and not acquired from the other and the other's existence is acquired from it, it is prior to it (*mutaqaddim 'alayhi*).

Should you ponder the state of the prior in all of its meanings, [the prior] depends on the priority (*taqaddum*) having the description (*wasf*) which is for the posterior (*muta'akhhir*) in every state. The posterior does not have that except if it is an existent to the prior.

### Saying concerning division of the existents into universal and particular

Know that the universal is an equivocal name which is applied in two senses:

First, existent in the outer world (*al-a'yan*).

Second, existent in the inner-mental realities (*adhhan*), not in the outer world (*al-a'yan*).

As for the first, it is for the thing that is taken absolutely ('*ala al-itlaq*) without reflection it joined another to itself and [without] reflection of its abstraction from another, rather without taking into consideration that it is one. Man,

for example, is comprehended (*ma'qul*) that he is a certain reality (*haqiqat ma*) and that something is made compulsory (*ulzima*) for humanity (*insaniyya*) and the most clinging (*ashadduhu iltisaqan bihi*) to [existence]; his state, being one or many; since he is not conceptualised except thus. However, the intellect is able to consider absolute humanity without taking into consideration that it is one or more. Man in so far as he is man is something and in so far as he is one or more is something. That being for him is in *potentia* or in *actu* is another thing. Man is man only without another condition at all.

The general or the particular is an additional condition for whoever is a person. Unity and multiplicity are thus. Whoever knows the person, knows a single matter. Whoever knows that the person, who is known, possesses unity, knows two things:

First of the two: man.

The other: unity

Likewise if he knows multiplicity.

Similarly, if he knows the particular and the general.

[p. 326] All that is additional to the object of knowledge (*ma'lum*).

That is not only so if you imposed these states in *actu*, but is thus if you imposed them in *potentia*.

You impose 'the absolute man (*insan mutlaq*)' in *potentia* without consideration of unity and multiplicity and impose unity and multiplicity after him. Therefore, in your understanding 'humanity (*insaniyya*)' and the relationship of 'humanity' to unity or multiplicity occurs.

Imposing unity and multiplicity is additional to the origin of humanity.

Indeed multiplicity and unity necessitate humanity in existence inevitably. Not everything that makes something necessary is in its essence. We know that humanity *qua* humanity is one or many. There is a difference between our saying that ‘Humanity does not exist except if it possesses two states’ and our saying: ‘One of its two states is ‘humanity *qua* humanity (*bi-ma huwa insaniyya*).’ It does not contradict our saying that: ‘Humanity *qua* humanity is one.’ Humanity *qua* humanity is many. Its contradiction is: Humanity *qua* humanity is not one.

If it is thus, it is permitted for one or many to exist, but not in so far as it is humanity.

By universal, it is intended with it absolute humanity (*al-insaniyya al-mutlaqa*) which is devoid upon the condition of unity or multiplicity (*ishtirat al-wahda aw al-kathra*) or other than that from the concomitants (*lawahiq*) that stand aloof from every consideration except humanity with negation and confirmation together.

The difference between our saying: ‘Humanity without another condition’ and our saying: ‘Humanity on the condition that there is not another with it,’ since the latter contains the added condition of negation (*ishtirat nafy*) and by the former we mean absoluteness (*itlaq*) which is definitely demarcated from what is behind humanity, whether negative or affirmative.

Therefore, the universal with this meaning is existent in the outer world (*mawjud fi'l-a'yan*). The existence of unity or multiplicity or other than that from among the concomitants with the person, even if it is not with humanity *qua* humanity, since humanity is not external to it in existence,

every existent along with something else not in its essence has a particular existence (*wujud yakhussuhu*). Another adhering to it does not necessitate negating existence from the perspective of its essence (*min haythu dhatihi*).

Humanity upon consideration is existent in *actu* in particular individuals (*'ahad al-nas*), is predicated on every one not that it is one in the essence or many. Therefore, that is not humanity *qua* humanity.

The second meaning of the universal is humanity for example on the condition that it is a category (*maqula*) in every respect (*bi-wajh min al-wujuh*) which is *dictum de omni*.<sup>248</sup> This is not present in the concrete things since it is impossible for there to exist a single thing which in itself [p.327] is predicated on every one of the individuals (*ahad*) at a single specific moment in time. That is because the accidents particular to the person of Zayd surround him but not the accidents of 'Amr until that very humanity is brought into existence in 'Amr and [the person] becomes that in number exactly.

Perhaps antipathetic accidents (*a'rad muta'anida*) surround him. However, this denotation of him exists in the intellects in the meaning that if the person of Zayd is prior in the senses, a trace (*athar*) occurs in the soul. [The trace] is an imprint of the form of humanity in it, but it does not know.

This form which is taken from absolute humanity without consideration of the particular accidents (*'awarid mukhassasa*) if brought into a relationship with 'Amr's

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<sup>248</sup> The principle that whatever is affirmed or denied of an entire class or kind may be affirmed or denied in another. See for instance, Richard Patterson, 'Aristotle's Perfect Syllogism, Predication, and the 'Dictum de Omni,' *Synthese* 96 (1993), pp. 359-378.

humanity, it would truly correspond to it (*tabaqathu*) in the sense that if a horse appeared to the senses after him, another trace would temporally occur in the senses. If ‘Amr had appeared a trace (*athar*) would not be renewed in the soul. Rather all the rest of the individual persons whether in existence or potentiality or whose relationship is equal to the whole, are equal in that. Therefore, it is called universal in this sense since its relationship to every one is one.

Therefore, this form has a relationship to one of the individuals and another to the rest of the forms that are inscribed in the soul. When its relationship with one of the individuals and apart from was one, the example of its coinciding (*mutabiq*) was likewise. Thus it is said: It is universal and its relationship to the soul and the rest of the forms in the soul is an individual relationship (*nisba shakhsiyya*). Therefore, it is one of the individual forms of knowledge (*ahad al-‘ulum*) that are inscribed in the soul.

This is what posed a problem for the speculative theologians and about which they expressed themselves in the present condition (*bi’l-hal*). They differed in affirming it and denying it.

A group said: It is neither existent nor non-existent.

A group denied it and found problematic the difference (*iftiraq*) and the equivocity between the names since black and white are equivocal in being a colour (*lawniyya*) and are different in a thing. Then how is it that what contains difference and what contains equivocity are one?

The origin (*mansha’*) of that is some of them misunderstanding a belief of his which has an existence in the soul, non-existent outside, if it established a universal form in the soul.

Its being universal in this aspect is not in existence. But

rather it is established in the outer world (*fi'l-a'yan*) in the first aspect (*al-i'tibar al-awwal*).

The meaning of its universality is: homogeneity (*tamathul*) without unity in the existent humanity of Zayd and the existent humanity of 'Amr in its being humanity in number (*al-insaniyya bi'l-'adad*).

[p.328] As to examples of it in the soul is the intelligent [one] to humanity. Therefore, it corresponds a single correspondence with it and to the humanity of Zayd and 'Amr.

The form in its soul is one and with its unity corresponds to multiplicity as if in relationship to it is also one; I mean that multiplicity.

Therefore, this is verification of the meaning of the universal which is the most obscure of what is perceived (*aghmad ma yudrak*) and the most important of what is sought since all the perceptibles are a branch for verifying these meanings. Therefore, it is inevitable that they would be made clear.

As for the complete and the deficient, what is intended by them is not the particular and universal.

Rather what is intended by the complete (*tamm*) is that for which exists everything that is in its nature to exist for it and [that which is not a thing] from which it is possible to exist for it except it is existent for it. [That] is either in the perfection of existence (*kamal al-wujud*) or in the active capacity (*quwwa fi'liyya*) or in the passive power (*quwwa infi'aliyya*) or in the quantity (*kammiyya*).

The deficient is the opposite of (*ma yuqabil*) the perfect complete (*al-tamm al-kamil*).



## Saying concerning the division into One and Many and their concomitants

Know that 'one' is a name for something that does not accept division from the aspect that it is said that it is one.

However, the aspects for which division is prohibited because of them, affirming unity in relationship to them (i.e. the aspects), are many.

Among them is what is not divided in the genus. Therefore, it is one in genus, like our saying: The horse and man are one in 'animalness' since there is no difference between them except in number, species and accidents. As to 'animalness,' there is no difference or division between the both of them in it.

Among them is what is not divided in species; [therefore it is one in species], like your saying: The ignorant and the learned are one in species; that is in humanity.

Among them is what is not divided in 'common accident (*'arad 'amm*).' [Therefore, it is unified in accident, like our saying: The crow and the mouse are one in blackness.

[p.329] Among them is what is not divided by relation (*bi'l-munasaba*). [Therefore, it is one by analogy], like our saying: The relationship of the king to the city, and the relationship of the intellect to the soul, is one. Among them is what is not divided in the subject. [Therefore, it is one in the subject even if it is many in the definition], like our saying: The growing and the withered are one in subject. Likewise the smell, taste and colour of the apple converge in a single subject. Therefore, it is said: These things are one; that is in subject, not in every aspect.

Among them is that whose meaning is not divided in number or is divided into common numbers in a thing like

the head—it is one from a person. That is it is divided into parts which mean the head.

Among them is what is not divided by definition (*hadd*). That is its reality does not exist for another nor does it have anything comparable in the perfection of its essence (*kamal dhatihi*) like it is said: The sun is one.

The most true of things with the name one is one in number. Then it is divided into:

- 1) What contains multiplicity in *actu* and is one in composition (*tarkib*) and conjunction (*ijtima'*) like one house for example.
- 2) What does not contain multiplicity in *actu* but in *potentia*...like the body *qua* body. That is it possesses a continuous corporeal form (*sura jismiyya ittisaliyya*).
- 3) What does not contain multiplicity neither in *actu* nor in *potentia*. It is, every substance in the view of the philosophers is one and incorporeal (*kull jawhar wahid laysa bi-jism*).

The essence of the first and real one (*al-auwal al-haqq*) is thus through affinity (*bi'l-ittifaq*). That is confirmed by the scholastic theologians for the one singular distinguished substance. It is not divided nether in *potentia* nor in *actu*. It is one in number.

That which does not accept division neither in *potentia* nor in *actu* is more deserving of the name the unique (*wahid*).

Therefore, the meaning understood from multiplicity is in opposition to singular at every rank.

The absolute multiplicity (*al-kathir 'ala al-itlaq*) is placing the one in opposition to the absolute. It is not one re-

garding that in which it is contained. That is it contains one [thing] which is not alone in it. This is answered through arithmetic.

The many might be many in relation to [something else] (*bi'l-idafa*).

Unity (*ittihad*) in quality (*kayfiyya*) is called 'similarity (*mushabaha*).

[p. 330] In quantity (*kammiyya*) it is called 'coextensiveness (*musawat*).'

In genus (*jins*) it is called 'homogeneity (*mujanasa*).'

In species (*naw'*) it is called 'similarity (*mushakala*).'

Unity in the terms [of a syllogism] (*atraf*) is called 'congruence (*mutabaqa*).'

Therefore, from this appears evidence (*bayan*) of the meaning of the one in genus (*al-wahid bi'l-jins*),<sup>249</sup> one in species, one in number, one in accident, and one in coextensiveness.

The totality of the relationships to the one are: similitude (*tashabuh*), coextensiveness (*musawat*), congruence (*mutabaqa*), homogeneity (*mujanasa*), and similarity (*mushakala*).

The types of multiplicity are opposite that.

### Saying concerning division of existence into contingent (*mumkin*) and necessary (*wajib*)

Know that the contingent (*mumkin*) is an equivocal name that is applied to [different] meanings:

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<sup>249</sup> For a discussion of oneness, see for instance Damien Janos, 'Al-Farabi's (d. 950) On the One and Oneness: Some Preliminary Remarks on Its Structure, Contents, and Theological Implications,' in *Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy*, pp.101-128.

First, it is the general term, expressing what is not prohibited from existing. In accordance with this the necessary existent (*al-wajib al-wujud*) is subsumed under it.

The First Truth (*al-haqq al-awwal*) is contingent (*mumkin al-wujud*); that is existence is not impossible. Things in this aspect are divided into two parts: impossible (*mumtani'*), that which is impossible, and contingent (*mumkin*), [i.e.] that which is not impossible.

Subsumed under it is: contingent (*ja'iz*) and necessary (*wajib*).

[p.331] Second, the specific position (*wad' khassi*) by which is intended negation of necessity (*salb al-darura*) in existence and non-existence together. It is that whose existence and non-existence are not impossible. The necessary does not belong to it (*kharaja 'anhu*). That mentioned with this aspect is [of] three [types]:

That whose existence is impossible (*mumtani' wujudihi*). That is its non-existence is necessary.

That whose existence is necessary (*wajib*). That is its existence is necessary (*daruri*).

A thing whose existence and non-existence are not necessary (*la daruri fi wujudihi*). But rather its relationship to them both is one. That is what is intended by contingent (*mumkin*).

Third, to express a contingent (*mumkin*) which its existence is unnecessary in a state of its states. It is more specific than what preceded. That is like writing to the person, not like change to the moving. It is necessary (*daruri*) in the state of it moving, not like the lunar eclipse which is necessary (*daruri*) when the earth is between it and the sun. The numbers in this position are four: necessary (*wajib*), contingent (*mumkin*), existent possessing necessity (*mawjud*)

*lahu darura*), and existent not possessing necessity at all (*mawjud la darura lahu al-batta*).

Fourth, the non-existent thing is specified (*yukhassas*) in a state where its existence in the future is not impossible. Therefore, ‘contingent (*mumkin*)’ is said of it. That is it has existence in *potentia* and in *actu*. In accordance with this it is not said: The world in its state of existence is contingent (*mumkin*). But rather it is said: Before its existence it was contingent.

As to the necessary existent (*wajib al-wujud*), it is when that which is imposed out of non-existence is non-extant. It being impossible follows (*lazima*).

The necessary existent (*wajib al-wujud*) is divided into [two]:

- 1) What is necessary for its essence.
- 2) What is necessary for another, not for its essence.

As to what is necessary for its essence, it is that whose non-existence (‘*adam*’) is impossible for its essence, not by the imposition of another thing [does] imposing its non-existence (‘*adam*’) becomes impossible with it.

The world is a necessary existent (*wajib al-wujud*) however much we imposed eternal volition (*al-mashi’a al-azaliyya*) which is attached to its existence. However, it became necessary (*sara al-wujub lahu*) from volition, not from its essence (*la min dhatihi*).

[p.332] Necessity for God is from His essence (*min dhatihi*) not from another.<sup>250</sup>

Generally, all that its necessity took place through its existence, it is necessary due to the existence of its cause

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<sup>250</sup> This notion is known as ‘Aseity.’

(*sabab*) undoubtedly. It remained contingent. Its existence does not become more probable than its non-existence.

When existence and non-existence are coextensive, it remained non-existent in non-existence. Its existence is sound due to making necessary its existence and due to its cause encountering by chance the perfection of what became a cause for its existence.

From this, many matters are clarified [as follows]:

**First**, it is impossible to posit something which is a necessary existent through itself and something else together. If the other thing is removed or its existence is not taken into consideration, it has to be the case that: 1) Either the necessity of its existence does not remain. Therefore, it is not necessary for itself (*fa-la yakun wajiban li-dhatihi*), or 2) Or it is a necessary existent through itself and its necessity remains. Therefore, the necessity of its existence is not for another. That other is superfluous (*fadla*).

**Second**, everything that is necessary in existence by virtue of something else is possible of existence (*mumkin al-wujud*) in itself (*bi-dhatihi*), since by considering its essence, it is possible of existence, or a necessary existent or non-existent (*mumtani' al-wujud*).

The last two divisions are invalid (*batilan*), since if it were non-existent (*mumtani' al-wujud*) in its essence, an existence for it would not have been conceptualised in another.

If it were a necessary existent through itself, it would not be a necessary existent for another as previously mentioned. Therefore, it is affirmed that it is possible of existence in itself.

The outcome is that every thing that is possible in essence is necessary through another (*wajib bi-ghayrihi*).

Therefore, the possible, if its cause (*'illa*) is considered, and [the cause's] existence is decreed (*quddira*), it is necessary of existence.

If the absence of its cause (*'adam 'illatihi*) is decreed, then it is non-existent.

If its cause is not taken into consideration, not through considering the void (i.e. the absence) (*'adam*) nor the existence (*wujud*), it [acquires] in itself the third meaning (*al-ma'na al-thalith*) which is possibility (*imkan*).

[p.333] Therefore, every contingent (*mumkin*) is impossible (*mumtani'*) and necessary (*wajib*); that is impossible upon decreeing the absence of the cause (*'adam al-'illa*). Therefore, it is impossible with another not in its essence, or possible inasmuch as its essence, if its cause is not considered with it out of negation (*nafyan*) and affirmation (*ithbatan*).

Combining these matters [together] is not contradictory (*mutanaqidan*). Rather we add: The impossible is also divided into: Impossible in itself (*mumtani' li-dhatihi*), and impossible for something else (*ghayr*). Combining of blackness and whiteness is impossible for itself.

The being of negation and affirmation is one thing, true, and impossible in itself. Imposition of the Resurrection today and God the Exalted knows that He will not bring it about today is impossible. However, not because of itself like the impossibility of combining between whiteness and blackness. However, because of the previous knowledge of God that it does not exist and the impossibility of knowledge being ignorance. Its impossibility is due to something else not to itself.

**Third:** It is not permissible for two things, each of which is necessary of existence to the other because it is not necessary for the other. It has a cause prior to it in essence not in time. It is impossible for that which is prior in essence (*mutaqaddim bi'l-dhat*) to be posterior in essence (*muta'akhhiran bi'l-dhat*).

Inasmuch as it is a cause, it is necessary for it to be prior in essence.

Inasmuch as it is an effect, it is necessary for it to be anterior.

That is absurd (*muhāl*) since it is necessary for the thing to be before that which is before it in essence.

**Fourth:** The necessary existent in its essence (*wajib al-wujud bi-dhatihi*)<sup>251</sup> is necessary existent in all its aspects so that it is not a locus (*mahall*) of temporal creations (*ahdath*), nor change, nor have a delaying will, nor a delaying knowledge, nor an attribute delayed from its existence. Rather everything that it can possibly have has to be present in itself,<sup>252</sup> [the attributes have to be] posterior to itself. It is possible for a concomitant (*laziman*) to be for it and not be for it. It is due to the fact that it is (*yakunu haythu yakunu*) for a cause ('*illa*) and is negated due to the fact that is negated because of the absence of that cause ('*illa*). Therefore, its existence in the two states of the absence of that

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<sup>251</sup> Concerning the 'Necessary Existent through Himself,' see Maria De Cillis, *Free Will and Predestination in Islamic Thought: Theoretical compromises in the Works of Avicenna, al-Ghazali and Ibn 'Arabi*. Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, 2014, pp. 26-27. Also useful for a discussion of necessity of existence is Robert Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003, esp. chaps. 12-14.

<sup>252</sup> The first part may be applied to the Aseity of God. Griffel is of the view that this passage is not Ghazali's view. He states: 'In fact, the passage reads much like



attribute and its presence is connected to a matter external to it, either negation or affirmation until its abandoning it is impossible. Therefore, it is not existent through itself. Rather its essence is impossible except with that attribute or its existence.

In the state of existence, the presence of the cause is conditioned and in the state of non-existence, either the absence of that cause or the presence of a non-existent cause (*'illa ma'duma*).

[p.334] Its essence is not devoid of making conditional a thing except its essence so that you can conceptualise that with the rest of what we explained with it the necessity of existence (*wajib al-wujud*).

This is what we wanted to mention from the judgements of existence and its divisions and to take hold of the reins of the demonstrative proof in this case since [it would mean further] elaboration. The position of this book is not to show the details of these matters, but rather to show the way to knowledge of the realities of things, introducing the law of proper reflection, and cultivating the standard of knowledge (*tathqif mi'yar al-'ilm*) in order to distinguish between [knowledge] and fancy (*khayal*) and supposition (*zann*) which are near to it.

If happiness in this world and the hereafter cannot be achieved except by knowledge and good deeds, and real knowledge is confused with that which is not real; thus because of it a standard is required. Similarly, the righteous

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an analytical and slightly polemical restatement of Avicenna's position, notwithstanding that the latter believed that God indeed has a will and would not have chosen these specific words on knowledge and will. We might assume this passage is a report rather than al-Ghazali's own opinion.' *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*, p. 272.

deed,<sup>253</sup> which is beneficial for the hereafter is confused with the uncharitable deed, so it requires a balance with which its reality is perceived. Therefore, we shall compile a book on *The Balance of Action* as we have compiled *The Standard of Knowledge*. Therefore, we dissociated that book as a separate book so that people who are not interested in this book could dedicate themselves to that book (i.e., *The Balance of Action*). May God give guidance to those who examine both books with the eye of intellect, not with the eye of imitation. He is the Giver of support and direction. Amen.

End of  
*The Standard of Knowledge*



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<sup>253</sup> The editor has ‘knowledge (*‘ilm*)’ which is clearly an error.





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